People v. Diaz CA1/1

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 30, 2022
DocketA164059
StatusUnpublished

This text of People v. Diaz CA1/1 (People v. Diaz CA1/1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Diaz CA1/1, (Cal. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

Filed 12/30/22 P. v. Diaz CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publi- cation or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or- dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A164059 v. DANIEL JAMES DIAZ, (Marin County Super. Ct. No. Defendant and Appellant. SC213213A)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 During an attempted drug deal, defendant (the purchaser) shot and killed the dealer at point blank range. Defendant attempted to pay for the drugs, in part, with counterfeit bills, and claimed he became scared when the dealer threatened to take him to the dealer’s supplier, and he shot the dealer without thinking. The prosecution’s view was that defendant was a seasoned dealer and purchaser, who took a gun to the buy and was prepared to use it, and after he did so, thought the killing gave him bragging rights. The parties reached a negotiated disposition, and defendant pleaded guilty to second

This appeal may appropriately be resolved by Memorandum Opinion 1

pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

1 degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 15 years- to-life. On appeal, defendant does not challenge his plea or sentence. Rather, he maintains the trial court erred in failing to correct six assertedly inaccurate or misleading statements in the probation report that he claims could negatively impact him in connection with future prison or parole decisions. The Attorney General does not seriously dispute that the trial court erred in refusing to rule on the merits of defendant’s claims of inaccurate or misleading statements in the probation report. Rather, he argues “[r]emand is not appropriate because appellant does not demonstrate prejudice” from the claimed inaccuracies. The Attorney General first points out defendant’s factual showing consisted only of “hearsay statements and the presentation of parts of transcripts,” but concedes the prosecutor made no evidentiary objections and simply “contested” the “inferences” defendant claimed had to be drawn from the excerpts from witness statements and transcripts defendant presented to the court. He next observes defendant’s sentencing memorandum and request for corrections was “filed the day before the sentencing hearing, allowing the prosecutor little time to challenge [defendant’s] assertions,” but concedes the prosecutor did not ask for a continuance. He further asserts any claimed errors in the probation report did not affect the trial court’s sentencing decision, since the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement and parties’ understanding defendant would be sentenced to a 15-years-to-life term. Lastly, the Attorney General maintains any “claims of future possible harm” from any inaccuracies in the probation report “are entirely speculative in nature” and any incorrect or misleading statements in the probation report can be

2 remedied through the prison administrative process2 or by requesting a Franklin3 hearing. “[T]he basic evil which should be avoided in probation reports tendered to the court for sentencing purposes is that the reports should not in any way be misleading or inaccurate, should not make reference to arrest records or police contacts without supporting factual information concerning them; and above all should contain accurate and reliable information.” (People v. Lutz (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 489, 497; see Pen. Code, § 1203.) A sentencing court therefore has the discretion to correct or to strike a probation report, in whole or in part. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437(d); id., rule 4.437(e) [sentencing court can order corrections to probation report if parties dispute facts on which conviction rested]; see generally People v. Municipal Court (Lopez) (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 456, 458–459.) The purpose of this discretion is to assure probation reports are founded on accurate and reliable information, thus affording fundamental fairness to a defendant on matters related to the report. Accordingly, when a defendant believes the probation report is insufficient, inaccurate, or based upon unreliable information, he may present evidence “to counteract or correct any portion of the report.” (People v. Gelfuso (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 966, 973; accord, People v. Bloom (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 310, 320; People v. Valdivia (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 145, 148.)

2 The Attorney General points out defendant “has recourse to an administrative review process should he contest placement scores. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3375, subd. (f)(5); 3376.1; 3084.1-3084.9 [describing appeal process for inmates and parolees with grievances].) He can pursue an administrative appeal. (See Pen. Code, § 3000, subds. (b)(5), (b)(7) [inmates have the right to reconsideration of parole conditions].)” 3 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.

3 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court refused to consider the merits of defendant’s request that the probation report be corrected, with one exception. The prosecutor agreed defendant had graduated from high school and the report was incorrect in stating otherwise. The court corrected the probation report to so state. However, the court declined to consider the other items defendant maintained were incorrect and/or misleading, variously stating: “I don’t particularly need to go through the defendant’s sentencing statement and write the corrections or the objections to the information in the probation report on the report, itself.” “[I]f the two of you [defense counsel and the prosecutor] disagree with some sentence in the probation report, it’s not for me to hear today, or to decide what is truth and what is not truth, and make that change.” “I hear you [referring to defense counsel]. But this is not a hearing for me. What you’re asking me to do is make a factual finding, to look at your evidence and decide if there’s a factual mistake in the probation report. . . . [¶] . . . I can’t do it that way. [¶] So I think the best way for me to do this is to accept you’ve made those claims in your sentencing statement, that you disagree with certain facts portrayed in the probation report.” As the Attorney General has implicitly conceded, the trial court erred in refusing to consider and rule on the merits of defendant’s claims of error in the probation report. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437(c)(2); id., rule 4.437(e) [“In the event the parties dispute the facts on which the conviction rested, the court must conduct a presentence hearing and make appropriate corrections, additions, or deletions in the presentence probation report or order a revised report.”]; see generally Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2022) § 38.28, at p. 1205 [“[t]he defendant has the

4 right to present testimony or other evidence on the defendant’s behalf to . . . counteract or correct any portion of the probation report”].4) As we have recited, although the Attorney General is critical of defendant’s evidentiary presentation in the trial court, the prosecutor never made any specific objections to his evidentiary showing and therefore waived any such objections on appeal.5 (See People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243,

4 It appears one of the reasons the court declined to address the merits of defendant’s correction requests was that it believed his factual claims and the material he wanted to present to the court could and would be presented at the anticipated Franklin hearing.

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People v. Diaz CA1/1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-diaz-ca11-calctapp-2022.