People v. Davis

15 Wend. 602
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1836
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 15 Wend. 602 (People v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Davis, 15 Wend. 602 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1836).

Opinion

By the Court,

Cowen, J.

It was the duty of the witness to obey the subpoena; and he is guilty of a contempt in disregarding it, and must be punished unless he has furnished us with a legal excuse. Both insolvency and poverty in the witness are sworn to by himself and Mr. Lamb who was one of his assignees. But it is scarcely necessary to observe that these form no excuse in the abstract. If received at all it must be in connection with the situation of the family, or as showing the utter inability of the defendant to defray his expenses. In rendering these excuses of sickness and extreme poverty,while we are not disposed to deny the validity of either if clearly made out in a proper degree, we cannot allow the [604]*604witness to judge for himself. Were we to stop and be content wjtj1 jjjg telling us in this general way, “ some of my Family were so sick that, with want of assistance and consider'nS our poverty, I deemed it improper to leave home,” we should surrender our own judgment. Men often take great latitude in swearing to matters of opinion, even where they are disinterested; and to receive sworn answers framed in that manner, for the purposes of exculpation, would be to render the process of subpoena entirely inefficient. The answer in question is remarkable for being barren of any facts except that of an insolvent assignment, by which we can govern ourselves in coming to a conclusion. Take the allegation of sickness: we have no information as to kind or degree. For aught we know the two children may have had slight colds, or the hooping cough. Either might pass for sickness, and so might any other slight deviation from good health, in the deposition of a man deeply interested. Seeing himself in danger of a fine, he would of course go on and say “ the sickness was such that I deemed it improper to leave home,” as he does here. Telling us that Mrs. Davis was not able to take care of the children in the night, is equally unsatisfactory, until we learn that they required such care. So of the inability to procure assistance, until we see that the assistance was necessary. Mr. Lamb comes in and says, “ it was publicly rumored in the neighborhood that two of the family were sick, as stated in said answer;” and he has no reason to doubt it, and verily believes it. If the children were seriously indisposed, it is highly probable they were attended by a physician, whose opinion would have been lawful evidence. He could have sworn generally, as a witness of skill. Mere opinion from any other is not receivable. It is incompetent, according to the settled law of evidence, even from a disinterested witness. Here the main witness, the man best qualified to speak, is deeply interested, and we yet have but his mere loose opinion, upon all the circumstances, that it was improper for him to leave home. The kind or degree of sickness, or that the children had ever been attended in the night, or that he had ever tried to procure assistance, or whether a physician had attended, is all left out, and the corroborative [605]*605evidence is, neighborhood rumor and belief; that too comes from a man .who has in other respects made a somewhat intemperate affidavit in respect to the motives and character of Mr. Kelly. I mean Mr. Lamb, who swears roundly that Mr. Kelly’s affidavit in respect to Davis’ dwelling-house is “ grossly deceptive.” Full thirteen days elapsed, I perceive, between the service of the subpoena and the sitting of the circuit court. Looking at the answer we are to infer that instead of making the least effort to get on his way to the circuit, Mr. Davis folds his arms, and sitting down with his friend Mr. Williams, anticipates the excuses which he now sets up, and directs Mr. Williams to render them to Mr. Hay, the attorney. But if he means that the letter was confined to the mere excuse of poverty, and want of money, and his family being in danger of suffering for want of common necessaries, it seems to me he was quite premature. He had got ten dollars, the full fees allowed by law. It would have looked much more like a desire to obey the subpoena in good faith, had he made an effort to raise what little balance might have been necessary. We should at least have listened with more favor to the excuse. He had yet nearly a fortnight within which to make the necessary arrangements ; arrangements for a quick journey to what was usually a short circuit, and certainly not an expensive journey, if conducted with due economy. So poor a man as he and Mr. Lamb make him out to be, of course would not think of travelling except in a very close way; and poor men, if they will- take pains, can travel very cheaply.

As to the excuse of inability from, poverty, we should have been much better satisfied with more particularity. Poverty and dependence on daily labor for daily bread, as expressed in the answer and in Mr. Lamb’s affidavit, are relative terms; and it would have been much more instructive, if instead of such generalities the defendant had sworn that he had no money, and could not get any, after trying, in the course of the twelve or thirteen days opportunity. In the mean time, too, I should suppose that in a civilized, not to say a humane neighborhood, some expedient, even short of a resort to public charity, might have been effectual to save the defendant’s family from suffering for want of food. We have no ac[606]*606count of any attempt to dispose of the family with a view to journey • nor are we here furnished with the degree in which they wanted what the defendant calls the common necessaries of life. He had, about that time, though how long before we are not precisely informed, assigned his property under the insolvent act; and we are not disposed to doubt but that the case was equally honest with the general run of insolvencies. Mr. Kelly, however, says, that when he went for an explanation why the defendant had not attended under the subpoena, he was told nothing of sickness, or downright poverty; but only that the ten dollars being unequal to the expenses, and the defendant earning 10 shillings per day, which would no more than support his family, he had concluded not to go. The suit was by Kelly, to recover from De Forrest property which he (Kelly) had sold to the defendant, while in good credit; and which it was alleged he had shortly after assigned to De Forrest, with intent to defraud the plaintiff. He says, also, that he found the defendant and his family in a three or four story house in Pearl street, expensively furnished. This is the account which Mr. Lamb, in his deposition, pronounces to be grossly deceptive ; and he adds, that he has heard the reputation of Kelly spoken of by various persons; that his reputation for truth and integrity is bad in the neighborhood where hé resides, and that from the deponent’s knowledge of his reputation, and his affidavit as to the residence and furniture of the defendant, he would not believe him under oath. It is probable from the depositions of the defendant and Mr. Lamb, his assignee, that Mr. Kelly had mistaken the furniture of another, in his progress through the lower stories in the Pearl street house for that of the defendant. It is not a very surprising mistake, on the part of a stranger, resident so far in the country as Queensbury, Warren county. The defendant and Mr. Lamb both being residents in New-York, have greatly the advantage as to accuracy in this respect. The only surprise is that the parties being thus located, and without any apparent means of adequate knowledge, Mr. Lamb should have undertaken to pronounce on Mr. Kelly’s general credibility upon oath.

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Bluebook (online)
15 Wend. 602, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-davis-nysupct-1836.