People v. Davenport
This text of 254 N.W.2d 647 (People v. Davenport) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
D. C. Riley, J.
As a result of plea negotiations, defendant pled guilty to one count of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, MCLA 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3), in return for the elimination of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCLA 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2). The sentencing court later imposed a 5 to 15 year sentence upon defendant.
On appeal, defendant contends that the lower court failed to elicit an adequate factual basis for the pleaded charge. With respect to this issue, the following colloquy ensued at plea-taking:
"THE COURT: What is it that you did to make you think that you are guilty?
"DEFENDANT DAVENPORT: Well, I was upstairs in the front room and I had been drinking and was sitting up there looking at television, and this little girl come up and I taken my finger and rubbed it between her legs.
"THE COURT: All right. And how old was this little girl?
"DEFENDANT DAVENPORT: Seven.
"THE COURT: And this happened at that address of 2966 Springle?
"DEFENDANT DAVENPORT: That is right.
"THE COURT: Is that in the City of Detroit?
"DEFENDANT DAVENPORT: That is right.
"THE COURT: All right. The Court accepts the Plea of Guilty to the charge of Criminal Sexual Conduct In The Second Degree.”
Under the criminal sexual conduct act, a second-degree violation occurs when one "engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances exist: (a) That other per[49]*49son is under 13 years of age”. MCLA 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a). The act defines "sexual contact” as:
"the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.” MCLA 750.520a(g); MSA 28.788(l)(g).
It defines "intimate parts” as:
"the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being.”
In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 130; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), our Supreme Court observed:
"A factual basis for acceptance of a plea exists if an inculpatory inference can reasonably be drawn by a jury from the facts admitted by the defendant even if an exculpatory inference could also be drawn and defendant asserts the latter is the correct inference.”
On the terse record before us, we conclude that the lower court erred reversibly in accepting defendant’s plea without first requiring a more elaborate factual basis. No jury could reasonably draw an inculpatory inference from defendant’s admissions at plea-taking. Defendant merely acknowledged that he had rubbed his finger between the legs of a seven-year-old female. Under the act, intimate parts do not include the legs of a human being; hence sexual contact, as statutorily defined, did not occur.
Where, as here, a statute comes equipped with its own set of definitions, courts are admonished [50]*50not to import any other interpretation, but must apply the meaning as expressly defined. In re Jones Estate, 52 Mich App 628, 636; 218 NW2d 89 (1974), Bennett v Pitts, 31 Mich App 530, 534; 188 NW2d 81 (1971), W S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc v Department of Revenue, 353 Mich 345; 91 NW2d 269 (1958). This admonition applies as well to the reasonable inculpatory inferences that a jury may properly draw.
Accordingly, defendant’s plea-based conviction is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
"On remand the prosecutor shall be given an opportunity to establish the missing element. If he is able to do so and there is no contrary evidence, the judgment of conviction shall be affirmed. If the prosecutor is unable to establish the missing element, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside. If contrary evidence is produced, the matter shall be treated as a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and the court shall decide the matter in the exercise of its discretion. GCR 1963, 785.7(4).” Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 129; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
See also, People v Stewart, 69 Mich App 528, 532; 245 NW2d 121 (1976), People v Clifton, 70 Mich App 65, 69; 245 NW2d 175 (1976).
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
254 N.W.2d 647, 75 Mich. App. 46, 1977 Mich. App. LEXIS 1074, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-davenport-michctapp-1977.