KOURLIS, Justice.
In People v. Harold Cunefare, 85 P.3d 594 (Colo.App.2003), the court of appeals reversed Harold Cunefare's convictions for tampering with a witness or victim under section 18-8-707, C.R.S. (2004), and for forgery under section 18-5-102, C.R.S. (2004).
We granted certiorari to determine two issues: first, what the prosecution is required to prove to sustain a conviction under section 18-8-707(1)(a); and second, whether a letter to the prosecutor urging him to drop the charges against the defendant, signed by the defendant in the victim's name without her knowledge or consent, constitutes forgery under section 18-5-102.1
We now hold that section 18-8-707(1)(a) neither requires evidence that the witness or victim has been legally summoned to an official proceeding nor does it require evidence that the defendant's actions are interfering with actual testimony. With respect to the forgery charge, we hold that a letter to the prosecutor in which the defendant forged the victim's signature is an instrument that may affect a legal right or interest of the defendant within the purview of the forgery statute. Hence, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and reinstate both convictions.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In March of 1998, the defendant's ex-wife Karen Cunefare (the "victim") filed a complaint against the defendant for domestic assault. Out of that incident, the People charged the defendant with second degree assault, menacing, false imprisonment, wiretapping, and crime of violence with a deadly weapon. One month later, the victim called the victim-witness advocate and requested that the charges be dropped. She then sent a signed, notarized letter to the District Attorney stating that she did not tell the truth in her complaint and that she had made the statements out of anger.
[304]*304In August of that year, the defendant contacted the victim, who had moved to Tennessee, and asked that she recant again. He sent the victim a prepared letter recanting her statements and asked that she sign and send it to the prosecutor. The victim refused. The defendant then signed the vice-tim's name without her consent or knowledge and sent the letter to the prosecutor. Subsequently, the People dropped the assault and related charges.
The People then charged the defendant with witness tampering and forgery based upon the defendant's efforts to have the charges dismissed, including the falsified letter. At trial, the victim testified that she did not author the April letter and that she had signed it out of fear. With respect to the August letter, the victim asserted that the defendant had contacted her and requested her to sign and forward the letter to the District Attorney but that she had torn it up without signing it. The victim opined that the defendant had signed her name on the letter and sent it to the District Attorney's office. The jury returned verdiets of guilty on both charges.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed tampering with a witness and forgery. The court of appeals agreed. As to the tampering charge, the court held that "the People must prove an attempt to interfere with actual testimony, which is anticipated to be offered at a hearing, trial, or other proceeding," and that although the vie-tim had given a "statement" to the prosecutor prior to her contact with the defendant, there was no evidence that the statement was sworn or otherwise constituted testimony. As to the forgery charge, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the letter to the prosecutor was a document that affected some right or status sufficient to fall within the forgery statute. The court of appeals therefore vacated both convictions.
We granted certiorari on the issues identified above and now conclude that the subsection of the tampering statute under which Cunefare was charged merely requires evidence that Cunefare induced or attempted to induce the victim to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold her testimony. It does not require evidence of 'actual testimony." We further conclude that the forgery statute prohibits a defendant from falsely executing a letter to the District Attorney's office intending to defraud that office into dismissing a legal action against him-and that such a letter does suffice as an instrument affecting his legal status. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' vacation of Cunefare's convictions and remand for issuance of mandate and sentencing.
II. Analysis
A. Conviction Under the Tampering Statute
1. Background of Section 18-8-707
In the companion case of People v. Yascavage, No. 03SC559, 101 P.3d 1090, 2004 WL 2711049 (Colo.2004), we concluded that the general assembly intended section 18-8-707 as a whole to criminalize a wide range of activities related to interference with a witness or victim of a crime. We also held that each subsection of 18-8-707 presents an independent objective prohibited under the Tampering statute. Therefore, to sustain a conviction under section 18-8-707, the subject of the defendant's influence must be a person encompassed by the introductory provision and the defendant's objective must be prohibited in subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c) of section 18-8-707.
A "witness" covered by the statute is not just someone who is subject to legal process. Rather, "witness" means any natural person:
(a) Having knowledge of the existence or mon-existence of facts relating to any crime;
(b) Whose declaration under oath is received or has been received as evidence for any purpose;
(c) Who has reported any crime to any peace officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer;
(d) Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any court in [305]*305this state, of any other state, or of the United States; or
(e) Who would be believed by any reasonable person to be an individual described in paragraph (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection (2).
§ 18-8-702(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, the introductory portion of the statute contains no limitation that would require proof that the witness or victim be under legal process.
Section 18-8-707 then creates three distinct forms of witness tampering, each with different elements required for a conviction. Section 18-8-707(1)(a) prohibits the defendant from inducing or attempting to induce a witness or victim to "testify falsely or unlawfully withhold any testimony." Section 18-8-707(1)(b) prohibits the defendant from inducing or attempting to induce a witness or victim to "absent himself from any proceeding to which he has been legally summoned;" and section 18-8-707(I)(c) prohibits the defendant from inducing or attempting to induce a witness or victim to "avoid legal process summoning him to testify."
2. Requirement of 'Actual Testimony"
Our question on certiorari requires us to determine what the prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction under subsection (1)(a) of the statute. The court of appeals concluded that there must be evidence of "an attempt to interfere with actual testimony," which it defined as testimony "anticipated to be offered at a hearing, trial, or other proceeding where witnesses would be sworn." Cunefare, 85 P.3d at 596. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied upon People v. Moyer, 670 P.2d 785 (Colo.1983), and People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207 (Colo.App.2002).
In Moyer, the defendant was charged with charitable fraud and witness tampering by grand jury indictment. 670 P.2d at 786-87. The witness tampering charge arose out of the defendant's statement to a potential witness notifying her that if she appeared before the grand jury he would sue her, and any others who appeared, for perjury. Id. at 788. The witness did testify before the grand jury, and also related the defendant's attempt to influence her not to do so. Id. at 790-91. The trial court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, and this court reversed, concluding that the statements attributed to the defendant were "designed to obstruct justice and were within the ambit of the statute." Id. at 792.
In Scialabba, the defendant was charged with assault against the victim and was prohibited from communicating with her. 55 P.3d at 208. The evidence established he wrote a letter and mailed it to the victim's address. Although the defendant used a different name for the victim (which he had used in the past), she believed the letter was intended for her. Id. The letter stated that if she were not to appear in court on the assault charges, the charges would be dropped, thereby "making things good" with him. Id. A month later, the defendant asked his mother to contact the victim and tell her not to appear in court. Id. at 211. The People added a count of witness tampering to the charges and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on that count. The defendant appealed, arguing in pertinent part that he should have been entitled to an abandonment instruction on the tampering charge. Id. at 210. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the crime of tampering is an intentional attempt to interfere with a witness, without regard to the success or failure of the attempt. Therefore, the crime was complete when the attempt was made.
In both Moyer and Scialabba, the witnesses actually testified. However, there is nothing in either case that requires such testimony as an element of tampering. To the contrary, both cases reaffirm the precept that the crime of tampering arises out of the intentional attempt to interfere with a witness's testimony.
3. Interpretation of Section 18-8-707(1)(a)
To give effect to the intent of the legislature, we first look to the language of the statute itself. The plain language of subsection (1)(a) does not require that the witness or victim actually testify at a pro[306]*306ceeding for the crime to occur. Indeed, unlike subsection (1)(b), the language does not even require that the witness or victim have been legally summoned to appear at the proceeding. See generally People v. Yascavage. To sustain a conviction under section 18-8-707(1)(a) the prosecutor is required to prove the defendant attempted to influence a witness or victim "to testify falsely or unlawfulty withhold testimony." (emphasis added).
We first address the meaning of "testify" or "testimony." We interpret words and phrases according to their common usage unless they have a technical definition in the statutes. The general assembly defines testifying or testimony to "include[] oral or written statements, documents, or any other evidence that may be offered by or through a witness in an official proceeding." § 18-8-601, C.R.S. (2004) (emphasis added). This definition does not require that a statement be sworn to qualify as testimony. Similarly, it does not require that the witness be in the midst of actual testimony, but rather only that the witness be in a position such that he or she may offer testimony in an official proceeding.
We next turn to what "unlawfully withhold" means in the statute. We have guidance here, in that we have addressed this language in the context of a similar statute dealing with intimidating a witness. That statute provides that:
A person commits intimidating a witness or victim if, by use of a threat ... he intentionally attempts to [ ][iIInfluence the witness or victim to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold any testimony.
§ 18-8-704, CRS. (2004). In People v. Proctor, 194 Colo. 172, 570 P.2d 540 (1977), the defendant was charged with violating the intimidation statute. An individual, Mr. Box, had witnessed a "ruckus" and was listed as a potential witness on the defendant's summons. Id. at 173, 570 P.2d at 541. The defendant told him that if he appeared in court he would be "taken care of." Id. At the time of the comment, Box had not received a subpoena, but he was subsequently subpoenaed and did testify at the defendant's trial. The defendant was convicted of intimidating a witness under section 18-8-604, 8B C.R.S. (1978) (1978 Repl.Vol. 8).2 On appeal, the defendant argued that subsection (1)(a) of the statute was designed to deal solely with the circumstance in which a witness is induced to and actually does testify falsely or withhold material testimony. Proctor, 194 Colo. at 174, 570 P.2d at 541. Because Box did testify and presumably testified accurately, the defendant argued that the statute was inapplicable. The court was not persuaded. Rather, we concluded that "all that is necessary to complete this crime is to presently attempt, by threat of harm or injury, to influence someone to withhold testimony at a future time." Id. Henee, the victim or witness did not have to be under subpoena or summons at the time of the intimidation-nor was there any requirement of "actual testimony" implicit in the statute. We have not even required that the testimony to be withheld be material, relevant, or competent. People v. Francois, 198 Colo. 249, 598 P.2d 144 (1979).3
Because the language of the intimidation statute is substantially similar to the language we interpret in this case, we hold that the same prineiples apply here. Reading the introductory portion of the statute together with subsection (1)(a), we interpret "testimony" and "unlawfully withhold" to protect statements that may be offered in the future, not just those already sworn or received as evidence. Accordingly, under subsection [307]*307(1)(a), the witness or victim need not be under subpoena or legal summons at the time of the contact, and the defendant need not succeed in interfering with actual testimony of the victim or witness.
4. Application of Section 18-8-707(1)(a)
On the tampering charge, the jury was instructed that the elements of the crime were:
1. [Tlhat the defendant, 2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 8. intentionally, 4. attempts, without bribery or threats, 5. to induce a witness or a victim, or a person he believes is to be called to testify as a witness or vietim in any official proceeding to, 6. testify falsely or to unlawfully withhold any testimony.
The People offered evidence at trial that assault charges were pending against the defendant as to which Ms. Cunefare was the named victim. Ms. Cunefare had given a statement to the police concerning the charges. While those charges were pending, Cunefare contacted Ms. Cunefare and convinced her to sign a letter to the District Attorney on April 6 recanting the charges and stating that "the events of that evening on March 21, 1998[sicl never happened." Ms. Cunefare testified that she felt under duress from Cunefare to sign that letter, that the events actually had occurred, and that the recantation was therefore false. She further testified that in August, Cunefare again contacted her and attempted to persuade her to sign a second letter to the District Attorney restating the false recantation. At that time, she declined to sign the letter.
Such evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for tampering. Ms. Cunefare was the named victim/witness in the assault proceeding. It is reasonable to conclude from her earlier statements that defendant attempted to induce her to recant her previous truthful statements. Further it is reasonable to infer that the defendant intended for her to continue to claim falsely that the events of March 21st did not happen if the matter went to trial. Thus, reasonable inferences from Ms. Cunefare's testimony support the statutory requirement that at the time of defendant's actions, he believed that the victim/witness may be called to testify in the case and he intentionally attempted to cause that victim/witness to testify falsely.
We conclude that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to sustain the tampering conviction.
B. Forgery Conviction
1. Background
Additionally, the People charged the defendant with forgery under section 18-5-102(1)(c), C.R.S. (2004), for sending the August letter to the prosecutor's office recanting the initial statement of events and purporting to contain the victim's signature.
The defendant was convicted under the section of the forgery statute that provides:
A person commits forgery, if, with intent to defraud, such person falsely makes, completes, alters, or utters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or is calculated to become or to represent if completed: ... (c) ... [an] instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status.
§ 18-5-102(1)(c) (emphasis added).
The question before us is whether, assuming that the defendant forged the victim's name on the August letter and sent it to the District Attorney in an effort to secure dismissal of the charges, such conduct constitutes forgery under the statute.4
[308]*3082. Interpretation of Section 18-5-102
There are two questions of law implicit in the analysis: the first is whether the letter is an instrument under the statute, and the second is whether it "does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status." § 18-5-102, C.R.S. (2004).
The definitions section of the statute answers the first question for us. Specifically, section 18-5-101(9), C.R.S. (2004), defines written instrument in part as "any paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for purposes of reciting, employing, conveying, or recording information." See also People v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330 (Colo.App.1988) (holding that computerized driver's records constitute a "written instrument").
The second issue is the more difficult one. The plain language of the statute refers not only to instruments that create a legal right but also encompasses those that may otherwise affect a legal interest or status. The general assembly has not defined legal right, interest, obligation, or status under section 18-5-102. Because the statute is not clear on its face, we must turn to other tools of construction, including legislative history.
An early version of Colorado's forgery statute provides insight into what traditionally constituted the crime of forgery. § 40-6-1, 8 CRS. (1963). That statute presented an exclusive list of forgery crimes, including forging the seal or handwriting of another. Id. The statute also suggests that false documents affecting legal proceedings may constitute forgery.5 In 1971 the legislature re-codified second degree forgery preserving several examples that had explicitly appeared in section 40-6-1 and dividing the offense into differing degrees. Colo. Sess. Law 1971, ch. 121, § 40-5-108 at 484. The 1971 amendment also included phrases arguably intended to allow more flexibility in applying the statute to forgery crimes.6 In 1998, the general assembly again amended the forgery statute merging first and second degree forgery into the broad statute that we interpret today. Colo. Sess. Law 1998, ch. 822, § 18-5-102, 1975, 1988.
Until this case, Colorado courts have dealt primarily with forgery convictions involving negotiable instruments.7 This lack of guiding precedent led the court of appeals to conclude that a forgery conviction could stand only where the interest or status contemplated relates to a financial, testamentary or property interest.. However, in People v. Medina, 926 P.2d 149, 151 (Colo.App.1996), the defendant was convicted of forgery after presenting a false prescription to a pharmacist. See also People v. Merchant, 5 Ill.App.3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724, 725 (1972) (suggesting that although pharmacist would suffer no pecuniary loss, forged prescription "intended to cause the pharmacist to assume he had the right to dispense a prescription drug to the defendant" was sufficient evidence to uphold conviction under the Illinois forgery statute).
Although no other jurisdictions have interpreted the precise language of 'legal right, interest, obligation, or status," some jurisdictions with statutes similar to Colorado's have concluded that forgery should not necessarily be limited to instruments affecting pecuniary interests. In Evans v. State, 794 So.2d 415 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), the defendant was convicted of second-degree forgery for falsely completing several absentee ballot applications. On appeal, the defendant argued that because his actions were not committed for pecuniary gain, the forgery statute did not [309]*309apply. Id. at 435. The court of appeals disagreed, interpreting the introductory provision of the Alabama forgery statute to encompass situations where the forger forges an instrument "which has pecuniary significance or other value." Id. Because the right to vote is a valuable legal right, the court of appeals held the forgery statute was applicable.8 Id. See also, People v. Gaul-Alexander, 32 Cal.App Ath 735, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 180 (1995) (forged removal orders were intended to deprive a public agency of the lawful custody of the prisoner, which constituted a tangible legal right within the meaning of the forgery statute).
New York prohibits a person from "falsely mak{[ing] ... a written instrument {with intent to defraud] which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed[ ] (1) a deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, credit card ... or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status." N.Y. Penal Law § 170.10 (McKinney 2004). In determining whether "cloned" cellular telephones fit within the broad description of forged instruments, which is identical to Colorado's forgery statute, the court concluded that both the carrier and lawful user of the phones have a "legal interest" in the unique numbers used to identify the phones. People v. Pena, 169 Misc.2d 366, 642 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996). Therefore, the "cloned" cell phones were forged instruments within the meaning of the statute. Id.
Illinois has specifically addressed whether forged letters have any legal effect. Although Illinois' statute is written somewhat differently than Colorado's, both include broad, catchall language regarding the creation of rights or obligations. In the first case, the defendant altered a letter from his personal banker to give false information on the balances of several bank accounts. People v. Hagan, 145 Ill.2d 287, 164 Ill.Dec. 578, 583 N.E.2d 494 (1991). The letter was held to be capable of defrauding another within the definition of the Illinois forgery statute because a reasonable person could have relied on the information contained in the letter in business negotiations. Id.
In People v. Muzzarelli, 331 Ill.App.3d 118, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 770 N.E.2d 1232 (2002), the defendant had been convicted of retail theft. Prior to sentencing, the defendant sent a letter to the judge purportedly written and signed by the defendant's co-worker requesting leniency. Id. 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 770 N.E.2d at 1234. Under the Illinois forgery statute, a document "apparently capable of defrauding another includes one by which any right, obligation, or power with reference to any person or property may be created, transferred, altered, or terminated." 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/17-8(c) (West 2004). The court upheld a forgery conviction based upon the letter, rejecting the contention that only potential economic gain is a proper focus of forgery. Muzzarelli, 264 Ill.Dec. 536, 770 N.E.2d at 1236. Rather, the court held that while the sentencing judge was free to exercise discretion in sentencing the defendant, he was bound to consider all evidence and information from the parties concerning aggravation or mitigation during sentencing. Id. The letter "could have altered his right and obligation to impose a proper sentence." Id. Therefore, it was an instrument capable of having a legal effect as contemplated by the forgery statute.
Because the reach of the statute is broad and includes instruments that affect or may affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status, we construe the statute liberally. Even though transfer of property or monetary gain may be the most common objectives of forgery, we do not conclude that our statute is delimited by those objectives, The language of the statute does not apply only to instruments affecting financial, property, [310]*310or legal matters but rather applies to any legal right, interest, obligation or status. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that we must give effect to every word of the statute. Legal "status" is one of those words.
C. Application of Forgery Statute
The jury was instructed that the elements of forgery were:
1. [TJhat the defendant, 2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. with intent to defraud, 4. falsely makes, completes or utters a written instrument, 5. which is or purports to be, of which is calculated to become or represent if completed an instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, or status.
The People presented evidence that the August letter was authored by the defendant and signed by him with the victim's name-and further that the defendant sent it to the District Attorney with the intent of securing dismissal of the assault charges against him.
That evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for forgery. Cunefare's letter to the prosecutor was intended to defraud the prosecutor and could have affected his legal status as a defendant in a pending eriminal prosecution, the obligation of the prosecutor to pursue the assault charges, and the interest of the victim. Although a letter to the prosecutor has no legal effect standing alone, this letter was clearly an effort to influence the prosecutor and thereby impact or affect the pending case. Just as the judge in Muz-zarelli could have been influenced by false information in making a sentencing decision, so too could the prosecutor have relied on the false letter when considering whether to dismiss the charges against the defendant. The prosecutor has an obligation to determine whether probable cause exists before moving forward with a case. If the sole witness recants her version of events or is reluctant to testify, the prosecutor may be inclined to dismiss the charges. The prosecutor would likely rely on the letter in making this determination. Forged letters to the prosecutor purporting to be authored by the victim of a crime hinder the administration of justice.
IH. Conclusion
The Tampering statute includes an expansive definition of victims and witnesses and delineates prohibited conduct in three subsections. Unlike section 18-8-707(1)(b) discussed in People v. Yascavage, No. 03SC559, 101 P.3d 1090, 2004 WL 2711049 (Colo.2004), the subsection under which Cunefare was charged neither requires evidence that the witness or victim has been legally summoned to an official proceeding nor does it require evidence that the defendant's actions are interfering with actual testimony. In this case, there was sufficient evidence that Cunefare attempted to influence a pivotal witness to testify falsely or withhold testimony.
With respect to Cunefare's forgery charge, section 18-5-102 is not limited to the objectives of property transfer or monetary gain through the use of false instruments. The language of the statute applies to any legal right, interest, obligation or status-inelud-ing a letter forged with the intent to secure dismissal of pending criminal charges. Cunefare's letter to the prosecutor, although it had no independent legal effect, was intended to impact Cunefare's legal status as a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Because the evidence presented against Cunefare was sufficient to sustain a conviction under seetion 18-5-102, we reverse the court of appeals decision with regard to the forgery conviction as well. We reinstate both the tampering and forgery convictions and remand to the courts of appeals for consideration of any remaining issues.
Justice BENDER, concurs in Part ILA., but dissents to Part ILB., and dissents in part to the judgment, and Justice MARTINEZ joins in the concurrence and dissent.