OPINION OF THE COURT
Gische, J.
Central to each of these appeals is the issue of whether a showup identification of the defendants made by the complainant in a nearby garage, approximately one hour after a 911 call reporting a crime, is unreliable because it was the product of an unduly suggestive procedure. Police officers Myskowsky and Mitchell were the only witnesses who testified at a Wade hearing challenging the identification. They were credible witnesses and the facts regarding the circumstances of the showup identifications are not disputed.
In reviewing the propriety of the showup identification we are, of course, limited to consideration of only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing (People v Riley, 70 NY2d 523, 531-532 [1987]; see People v Gagner, 59 AD3d 963, 963 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 816 [2009]). The dissent’s consideration of facts later adduced at trial cannot be relied upon to substantiate an otherwise improper pretrial identification.
The following facts were adduced at the suppression hearing: The complainant was attacked at night by a group of men as she walked home from work along West 90th Street on the uptown side between Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues. She [122]*122was thrown to the ground, punched, and kicked, and her bag was taken from her. Her assailants then fled through a housing complex, heading uptown towards 91st Street. Officers Myskowsky and King, who were first to respond by patrol car to the 911 call, picked up the complainant at her apartment building and proceeded to drive her around the neighborhood for 15 to 20 minutes looking for suspects. According to Officer Myskowsky, the complainant described her attackers as “three or four male blacks, teens.” No other description was given.
Several other officers responded to the call as well. Officer Mitchell, who was in a separate patrol car, initially canvassed the area with no success, but the search for suspects then focused on a garage with a roll down gate located about one quarter of a block away from where the complainant had been attacked. Officer Myskowsky was directed to bring his car to the garage. Once he observed that the other officers had gained access to the garage on foot, he left and drove the complainant to the precinct on 100th Street, where she was treated by EMS.
Officer Mitchell was one of seven officers who searched the garage, which was located down a flight of stairs. The officers found a purse outside a locked boiler room. The Emergency Services Unit (ESU) of the New York City Police Department was contacted to come break open the locked door. Once inside the boiler room, the officers found defendant Dimitri Marshall lying on the floor. A plastic bank or credit card belonging to the complainant was located near him and to his left was a gun. Defendants Thomas Cruz and Kareem Santiago were found inside an opening or well in the floor of the boiler room. The well, which was covered by a grate, was described as being dirty and sooty when opened. A plastic bag containing one eighth of an ounce of crack cocaine was recovered from that area. Following a physical struggle between the officers and defendants, defendants were arrested and placed in handcuffs.
Approximately 15 minutes after he returned to the precinct, Officer Myskowsky was instructed to drive the complainant back to the garage for a showup identification. They arrived at the garage shortly after defendants had been arrested and approximately one hour after the 911 telephone call had been placed. During their ride from the precinct to the garage, Officer Myskowsky explained to the complainant “that [there are] people stopped in the garage” and told her that “she was to look at them and let me know if [she’s] seen them before.”
Officer Myskowsky drove into the garage where he encountered a “large group of people” inside. The group included de[123]*123fendants who were standing side by side, just outside the boiler room. Although no handcuffs were readily visible, each defendant had his hands behind his back and Officer Myskowsky stated he assumed they were handcuffed “because they had their hands behind their backs in that position.” Officer Mitchell was physically holding onto Santiago, who had sustained a laceration to his face during his struggle with police. Other than the complainant, defendants were the only civilians present. Two uniformed officers stood to the right of defendants and two other uniformed officers stood on their left side. Another three or four uniformed officers stood behind them. Including ESU, there may have been eight or more officers in the garage surrounding defendants. All three defendants, particularly Cruz and Santiago, were visibly dirty and, as Officer Mitchell described it, covered with soot from head to toe, including their faces. No effort was made to clean up defendants before they were shown to the complainant.
When Officer Myskowsky drove his patrol car into the garage, he already had his headlights on. He then turned on the takedown lights mounted on the hood of his car, pointing them directly ahead in the direction of the defendants. The garage was well lit, even without the patrol car lights. As Officer Myskowsky described it, the overhead lighting was “pretty good” and “it wasn’t dark before the car came in.” He stopped his vehicle approximately 20 to 30 feet away from the group and got out of the patrol car, leaving the complainant seated in the rear. Officer Myskowsky then positioned himself to speak with the complainant and asked her to look at the individuals. Although there was a mesh divider between the back and front seats of the car, and the complainant looked at the individuals through the front windshield, Officer Myskowsky testified, without contradiction, that the complainant had a clear view of the individuals she was asked to identify. After looking at the three men, she identified them as the men who had robbed her, but according to Officer Myskowsky, the complainant also stated that they looked different than when they had attacked her because they were “dirty.”
Officer Mitchell, who testified that he pulled Santiago out of the well and was holding onto him, stated that when Santiago was shown to the complainant, he was covered with soot and had a laceration on his nose. The officer could not tell if the cut was bleeding, because “he was still covered in it,” an apparent reference to the soot. Despite his appearance, Officer Mitchell [124]*124stated that no effort was made to clean up Santiago’s face. When asked at the Wade hearing whether it was reasonable to say that Santiago’s face was much darker in the garage than it appeared “right now” (in court), Officer Mitchell responded “it was a little darker, yes.” Santiago is not black, but a light-skinned Hispanic. None of the defendants were teenagers at the time of the crime.
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that showup identifications are strongly disfavored because they are suggestive by their very nature (People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533 [1997]; People v Johnson, 81 NY2d 828 [1993]; People v Riley, 70 NY2d 523 [1987]). However, they are not presumptively infirm and are permissible where exigent circumstances exist requiring immediate identification (see People v Rivera, 22 NY2d 453, 455 [1968], cert denied 395 US 964 [1969]) or if the suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and can be viewed immediately (see Riley at 529).
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Gische, J.
Central to each of these appeals is the issue of whether a showup identification of the defendants made by the complainant in a nearby garage, approximately one hour after a 911 call reporting a crime, is unreliable because it was the product of an unduly suggestive procedure. Police officers Myskowsky and Mitchell were the only witnesses who testified at a Wade hearing challenging the identification. They were credible witnesses and the facts regarding the circumstances of the showup identifications are not disputed.
In reviewing the propriety of the showup identification we are, of course, limited to consideration of only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing (People v Riley, 70 NY2d 523, 531-532 [1987]; see People v Gagner, 59 AD3d 963, 963 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 816 [2009]). The dissent’s consideration of facts later adduced at trial cannot be relied upon to substantiate an otherwise improper pretrial identification.
The following facts were adduced at the suppression hearing: The complainant was attacked at night by a group of men as she walked home from work along West 90th Street on the uptown side between Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues. She [122]*122was thrown to the ground, punched, and kicked, and her bag was taken from her. Her assailants then fled through a housing complex, heading uptown towards 91st Street. Officers Myskowsky and King, who were first to respond by patrol car to the 911 call, picked up the complainant at her apartment building and proceeded to drive her around the neighborhood for 15 to 20 minutes looking for suspects. According to Officer Myskowsky, the complainant described her attackers as “three or four male blacks, teens.” No other description was given.
Several other officers responded to the call as well. Officer Mitchell, who was in a separate patrol car, initially canvassed the area with no success, but the search for suspects then focused on a garage with a roll down gate located about one quarter of a block away from where the complainant had been attacked. Officer Myskowsky was directed to bring his car to the garage. Once he observed that the other officers had gained access to the garage on foot, he left and drove the complainant to the precinct on 100th Street, where she was treated by EMS.
Officer Mitchell was one of seven officers who searched the garage, which was located down a flight of stairs. The officers found a purse outside a locked boiler room. The Emergency Services Unit (ESU) of the New York City Police Department was contacted to come break open the locked door. Once inside the boiler room, the officers found defendant Dimitri Marshall lying on the floor. A plastic bank or credit card belonging to the complainant was located near him and to his left was a gun. Defendants Thomas Cruz and Kareem Santiago were found inside an opening or well in the floor of the boiler room. The well, which was covered by a grate, was described as being dirty and sooty when opened. A plastic bag containing one eighth of an ounce of crack cocaine was recovered from that area. Following a physical struggle between the officers and defendants, defendants were arrested and placed in handcuffs.
Approximately 15 minutes after he returned to the precinct, Officer Myskowsky was instructed to drive the complainant back to the garage for a showup identification. They arrived at the garage shortly after defendants had been arrested and approximately one hour after the 911 telephone call had been placed. During their ride from the precinct to the garage, Officer Myskowsky explained to the complainant “that [there are] people stopped in the garage” and told her that “she was to look at them and let me know if [she’s] seen them before.”
Officer Myskowsky drove into the garage where he encountered a “large group of people” inside. The group included de[123]*123fendants who were standing side by side, just outside the boiler room. Although no handcuffs were readily visible, each defendant had his hands behind his back and Officer Myskowsky stated he assumed they were handcuffed “because they had their hands behind their backs in that position.” Officer Mitchell was physically holding onto Santiago, who had sustained a laceration to his face during his struggle with police. Other than the complainant, defendants were the only civilians present. Two uniformed officers stood to the right of defendants and two other uniformed officers stood on their left side. Another three or four uniformed officers stood behind them. Including ESU, there may have been eight or more officers in the garage surrounding defendants. All three defendants, particularly Cruz and Santiago, were visibly dirty and, as Officer Mitchell described it, covered with soot from head to toe, including their faces. No effort was made to clean up defendants before they were shown to the complainant.
When Officer Myskowsky drove his patrol car into the garage, he already had his headlights on. He then turned on the takedown lights mounted on the hood of his car, pointing them directly ahead in the direction of the defendants. The garage was well lit, even without the patrol car lights. As Officer Myskowsky described it, the overhead lighting was “pretty good” and “it wasn’t dark before the car came in.” He stopped his vehicle approximately 20 to 30 feet away from the group and got out of the patrol car, leaving the complainant seated in the rear. Officer Myskowsky then positioned himself to speak with the complainant and asked her to look at the individuals. Although there was a mesh divider between the back and front seats of the car, and the complainant looked at the individuals through the front windshield, Officer Myskowsky testified, without contradiction, that the complainant had a clear view of the individuals she was asked to identify. After looking at the three men, she identified them as the men who had robbed her, but according to Officer Myskowsky, the complainant also stated that they looked different than when they had attacked her because they were “dirty.”
Officer Mitchell, who testified that he pulled Santiago out of the well and was holding onto him, stated that when Santiago was shown to the complainant, he was covered with soot and had a laceration on his nose. The officer could not tell if the cut was bleeding, because “he was still covered in it,” an apparent reference to the soot. Despite his appearance, Officer Mitchell [124]*124stated that no effort was made to clean up Santiago’s face. When asked at the Wade hearing whether it was reasonable to say that Santiago’s face was much darker in the garage than it appeared “right now” (in court), Officer Mitchell responded “it was a little darker, yes.” Santiago is not black, but a light-skinned Hispanic. None of the defendants were teenagers at the time of the crime.
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that showup identifications are strongly disfavored because they are suggestive by their very nature (People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533 [1997]; People v Johnson, 81 NY2d 828 [1993]; People v Riley, 70 NY2d 523 [1987]). However, they are not presumptively infirm and are permissible where exigent circumstances exist requiring immediate identification (see People v Rivera, 22 NY2d 453, 455 [1968], cert denied 395 US 964 [1969]) or if the suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and can be viewed immediately (see Riley at 529).
Examples of exigency include the police needing to know whether they have apprehended the right person or whether they should keep looking for other suspects, or when the victim has been mortally wounded and is not expected to survive his or her injuries to later identify his or her attacker (see People v Howard, 22 NY3d 388, 402 [2013]). Even in the absence of exigent circumstances, a showup identification may still be permissible if it took place at or near the scene of the crime, shortly after it was committed and in the context of a continuous, ongoing investigation (People v Brisco, 99 NY2d 596, 597 [2003]).
Although prompt showup identifications which are conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity are not presumptively infirm, they are not routinely admissible either (see Ortiz at 537), but must be examined further to see whether they are part of an unbroken chain of events, or ongoing investigation (People v Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541, 543-545 [1991]). “Promptness” varies from case to case (see Howard at 402; Duuvon at 544). Even when a showup identification satisfies the temporal and geographic proximity requirements, it cannot be unduly suggestive (id at 543).
The burden is initially on the People to produce evidence validating the admission of such evidence (Ortiz at 537). A defendant challenging a showup identification, however, bears the ultimate burden of proving that the procedure employed by law enforcement was unduly suggestive and the identification [125]*125should be suppressed (id.). Whether a showup is unduly suggestive under the circumstances usually presents a mixed question of law and fact, and the trial court is entitled to deference (Howard at 403). There are circumstances, however, when a showup identification is unduly suggestive as a matter of law, requiring its suppression (Johnson at 831).
The People argue they have met, and in fact exceeded, their initial burden of showing that all the components of a permissible showup were satisfied, including the requirements of temporal and geographical proximity, exigency and reasonableness. We disagree. Although the complainant’s identification of defendants was made in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime, this was not a situation where the showup was unavoidable because of a fast-paced situation (see Rivera at 455). The complainant had already been driven away from the scene to the precinct, where she was being tended to by EMS for her injuries. Her treatment was interrupted so that she could return to the garage, one hour after the crime, to identify the suspects who were already under arrest (see Brisco at 597; Johnson at 831).
Nor were there exigent circumstances warranting a showup identification. The 55-year-old complainant, though bruised and visibly shaken, was not suffering from any life threatening wounds that would have made her otherwise unable or unavailable to make an identification at a later time or at the precinct where she was already located (see Rivera at 455). Furthermore, after Officer Myskowsky ascertained that other officers had suspects confined to the garage, he left the scene because, as he testified, “there was no point guarding the gate of somebody [sic] trying to get away.” Thus, having determined that there were suspects detained in a confined area where they could not escape, the police stopped canvassing the area (see Duuvon; Riley) and public safety was no longer an issue (see Howard at 403).
We disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that exigent circumstances existed because without a showup identification, the police could not have detained the defendants. By the time the defendants were shown to the complainant they were already cuffed and arrested. Moreover, there was sufficient probable cause to arrest them for the assault and other crimes without conducting a showup identification.
Although the dissent takes into consideration the People’s argument that the burden of arranging a lineup at the precinct, [126]*126particularly given the late hour, is an additional factor lending exigency to the situation, the additional time and resources required to conduct a separate lineup for each defendant are nothing more than the administrative burdens generally attendant to conducting lineup identifications. Inconvenience does not excuse the utilization of the preferable method of lineup identification (see Riley at 530 [undue burden not established by renovation of station house or effort to minimize time defendant was detained]).
In any event, the showup identifications in this case were unduly suggestive. While suggestiveness is inherent and tolerated in all showup identifications, that does not mean that such law enforcement procedures are without limitations. The cumulative techniques the police employed in the showup identification before us renders it unduly suggestive.
Here, the three suspects were standing side by side after the complainant had described her attack by multiple attackers. Defendants were flanked by as many as eight officers and, apart from the complainant, they were the only civilians present. Defendants were visibly restrained. This was obvious, not only from the fact that their hands were behind their backs, but also from the fact that defendant Santiago, who had visible physical injuries to his face indicative of a recent scuffle, was being physically restrained by one of the officers as the complainant made her identification. Defendants were covered in soot, such that it affected their appearance, particularly as to skin color. Previously, the complainant had described her assailants’ “black” skin color as a prominent identifying feature, along with their ages. As the complainant was driven from the precinct to the location of the showup identification, she was told that she would be looking at people, and that she should tell the officers if she had seen them before. When defendants were shown to the complainant, they were illuminated by the patrol car’s headlights and takedown floodlights, even though the garage lighting itself was good.
We recognize that some of these factors, either alone or even in combination do not necessarily make a showup identification unduly suggestive. A showup identification may be acceptable, even where a defendant is handcuffed and guarded by police officers when shown to the complainant (Duuvon at 545). Nor is the fact that remarks are made to a complainant before being taken to a lineup itself a basis for a prohibited showup identification (People v Gatling, 38 AD3d 239, 240 [1st Dept [127]*1272007], lv denied 9 NY3d 865 [2007]). This is because a person of ordinary intelligence would realize that the police are showing them someone suspected of having committed a crime (see People v Santiago, 83 AD3d 1471 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 800 [2011]). Even shining lights on a suspect is not by itself unduly suggestive (People v Gilford, 16 NY3d 864 [2011]). It is the cumulative effect of what otherwise might be individually permissible that makes this particular showup identification unduly suggestive. The showup was clearly beyond the high-water mark set forth by the Court of Appeals in Duuvon.
In Duuvon, the Court of Appeals held that although a showup identification in which the defendant was shown while handcuffed in the backseat of a patrol car was suggestive, it was not unduly so, given the fast-paced events which transpired in rapid succession within three to four minutes after the commission of the crime making misidentification unlikely. The Court cautioned, however, that the manner in which the defendant was shown “is suggestive and not preferred. It presses judicial tolerance to its limits” (id. at 545). At bar, the circumstances of the showup identification were much more suggestive, surpassing the limits of judicial tolerance set in Duuvon.
Contrary to the dissent, there is no binding precedent mandating a different conclusion from the one we reach in this case. There is no case in which so many suggestive practices and procedures simultaneously converged, but were found acceptable by this, or any other, appellate court. In fact, the binding precedent is quite the contrary. As the Court of Appeals has held: “Generally, a showup identification will be inadmissible when there was no effort to make the least provision for a reliable identification and the combined result of the procedures employed establish that the showup was unduly suggestive” (Riley at 529, citing People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 249 [1981] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Having failed to show that the showup identification was reasonable, the People nonetheless maintain that the complainant sufficiently described her attackers to the police before the showup. Since the reliability of the complainant’s identification is at issue, and the Supreme Court, by finding the showup was not unduly suggestive did not conduct an independent source hearing, we reverse and vacate the robbery and stolen property convictions of all three defendants, remand for a pretrial independent source hearing, and a new trial on the robbery and criminal possession of stolen property counts (People v Wilson, [128]*1285 NY3d 778 [2005]; People v Foster, 200 AD2d 196, 200-201 [1st Dept 1994]).
The issue of the undue suggestiveness of the showup identification was raised by all three defendants below. While Santiago only indirectly raised that issue on appeal, it was directly raised by both his codefendants. Since we find the showup identification was unduly suggestive and it was necessarily defective as to all three defendants, we reach that issue as to Santiago in the interest of justice.
We find, however, that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under CPL 200.70 when it amended a count of the indictment by changing the description of the stolen property from “credit card” to “debit card” (see People v Grist, 98 AD3d 1061, 1062 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1061 [2013]). Penal Law § 165.45 (2) states that a person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree “when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof” and “[t]he property consists of a credit card, debit card or public benefit card.” While there are some differences between a credit card and a debit card, the language of the statute encompasses both, the elements of the crime are the same, and the amendment of the indictment was within the category of amendments relating to “matters of form . . . and the like” contemplated by CPL 200.70 (1). It did not improperly change the prosecution’s theory of the case, nor have any of the defendants explained how their defense was impacted.
Marshall’s arguments concerning the sufficiency and weight of the evidence on the weapons possession charge are likewise unavailing (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Michael J. Obús, J., at hearing; Marcy L. Kahn, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered December 3, 2010, as amended January 7, 2011, convicting defendant Thomas Cruz of robbery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and resisting arrest, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of six years should be modified, on the law and the facts, to vacate the judgments of conviction on the two counts of robbery in the second degree and the count of criminal possession of stolen [129]*129property in the fourth degree, remand for an independent source hearing and retrial, and otherwise affirmed. Judgment, same court and Justices, rendered February 1, 2011, as amended February 15, 2011, convicting defendant Kareem Santiago of robbery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and resisting arrest, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 4x/2 years, should be modified, on the law and the facts, to vacate the judgments of conviction on the two counts of robbery in the second degree and on the criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree count, remand for an independent source hearing and retrial, and otherwise affirmed. Judgment, same court and Justices, rendered December 3, 2010, as amended December 15, 2010, convicting defendant Dimitri Marshall of robbery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and resisting arrest, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 8V2 years, should be modified, on the law and the facts, to vacate the judgments of conviction on the two counts of robbery in the second degree and on the criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree count, remand for an independent source hearing and retrial, and otherwise affirmed.