PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY
delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of Cook County revoking the probation of Leonard Cox (defendant) and sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment and two years’ mandatory supervised release. Defendant’s sentence was imposed following a stipulated probation revocation hearing. The sole issue presented for our review is whether defendant has been denied due process of law, where the trial court did not admonish defendant of his right to a hearing or establish that defendant voluntarily stipulated to certain facts or understood the consequences of his stipulation. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In August 1985, defendant was charged by indictment for the burglary of Kahlil Mohmoud’s store located at 5959 South State Street in Chicago, Illinois, on or about July 21, 1985. On December 12, 1986, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge and was subsequently sentenced to 48 months’ probation, with the following conditions: (1) participation in the Safer Basic Skills Program; (2) one-year home confinement seven days a week from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m.; and (3) one year’s periodic imprisonment, stayed pending the outcome of defendant’s home confinement and participation in the Safer Program.
On March 31, 1987, the State filed a petition to vacate defendant’s probation, based upon defendant’s failure to enter the Safer Program. After finding that defendant violated his probation, the trial court resentenced defendant to 48 months’ probation, one-year periodic imprisonment, one-year home confinement, beginning May 27, 1987, and immediate enrollment in a GED program.
On June 25, 1987, the State filed a second petition to vacate defendant’s probation, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his home confinement. Defendant failed to appear for the hearing, and the court issued an arrest warrant.
On August 31, 1987, defendant, represented by counsel, proceeded to a stipulated hearing on the violation of probation charge. The stipulation indicated that if called to testify, defendant’s probation officer would state that defendant did not receive the telephone calls the officer made to defendant’s home on June 6, 1987, at 8:15 p.m. and 8:10 p.m. on June 23, 1987. Defendant presented no evidence as to the allegations contained in the violation of probation petition.
The trial court entered a finding of guilty on the violation of probation charge and proceeded to a hearing in aggravation and mitigation. Defendant waived his right to a presentence investigation report and presented no evidence in mitigation of the violation. The State relied solely upon aggravating factors presented during an in-chambers conference1 and in the pretrial report. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to six years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the consequences of a determination that a probation order has been violated are so serious that a defendant is entitled to many of the same due process safeguards accorded to a defendant at a trial to determine his guilt. Defendant contends that the trial court’s order revoking his probation must be reversed because the stipulation presented during the probation revocation hearing was tantamount to a guilty plea pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (107 Ill. 2d R. 402) and the court failed to provide defendant with the basic constitutional due process safeguards outlined in Rule 402. Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to minimally determine whether: (1) defendant knew the specific allegations in the petition; (2) defendant was aware of his right to a hearing with counsel present; (3) defendant’s admission was not based on any promises or coercion; and (4) defendant understood the consequences of his admission. See People v. Followell (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 28, 518 N.E.2d 706.
The State initially responds that defendant has waived review of this issue by failing to object at. trial or in a written post-trial motion. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) The State argues that defendant was represented by counsel during the hearing, and thus, should not now be allowed to circumvent the waiver rule by raising the argument for the first time on appeal. As to the State's waiver argument, we believe it is necessary to determine whether any due process deprivations have occurred here which affect the substantial rights of defendant. We therefore invoke the plain error doctrine. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.
The State alternatively argues that Rule 402, which prescribes the actions to be taken prior to the trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea, is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings under our supreme court’s decisions in People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 225-27, 319 N.E.2d 745, 748. It is well established in Illinois that Supreme Court Rule 402 (107 Ill. 2d R. 402) requires that the trial court give admonitions to a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense. Defendant relies on People v. Pier (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289, as establishing these admonitions must also be given in revocation of probations proceedings.
In Pier, the defendant, in his post-conviction petition, alleged that his admission of the violation of probation was induced by an unfulfilled promise of the State’s Attorney to recommend a different sentence than that imposed. Our supreme court stated that due process of law requires that a defendant charged with violating probation should be entitled to many of the same safeguards accorded to a defendant at a trial to determine his guilt. (Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 281 N.E.2d at 291.) It held that where a defendant confesses or admits a charge that he violated his probation in reliance upon an unfulfilled promise by the State’s Attorney, such confession or admission of the charge is not voluntary. (Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 100, 281 N.E.2d at 291.) The court further stated that “[¡Justice demands that [a defendant] be entitled to the protection of the same due-process requirements which pertain to pleas of guilty when he waives his right to a judicial determination of the charge that he violated his probation and confesses or admits the charges of the revocation petition.” Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 281 N.E.2d at 291.
Two years later, however, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745, clarified Pier. The court acknowledged that a probation revocation proceeding was comparable to the entry of a guilty plea, but only “insofar as consideration of the voluntariness of a defendant’s admissions made in both instances.” (Emphasis added.) (Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 224, 319 N.E.2d at 747.) It explained that Pier “merely expressed the view that due process required that a defendant’s admission must be voluntarily made.” (Beard, 59 Ill.
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PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY
delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of Cook County revoking the probation of Leonard Cox (defendant) and sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment and two years’ mandatory supervised release. Defendant’s sentence was imposed following a stipulated probation revocation hearing. The sole issue presented for our review is whether defendant has been denied due process of law, where the trial court did not admonish defendant of his right to a hearing or establish that defendant voluntarily stipulated to certain facts or understood the consequences of his stipulation. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In August 1985, defendant was charged by indictment for the burglary of Kahlil Mohmoud’s store located at 5959 South State Street in Chicago, Illinois, on or about July 21, 1985. On December 12, 1986, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge and was subsequently sentenced to 48 months’ probation, with the following conditions: (1) participation in the Safer Basic Skills Program; (2) one-year home confinement seven days a week from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m.; and (3) one year’s periodic imprisonment, stayed pending the outcome of defendant’s home confinement and participation in the Safer Program.
On March 31, 1987, the State filed a petition to vacate defendant’s probation, based upon defendant’s failure to enter the Safer Program. After finding that defendant violated his probation, the trial court resentenced defendant to 48 months’ probation, one-year periodic imprisonment, one-year home confinement, beginning May 27, 1987, and immediate enrollment in a GED program.
On June 25, 1987, the State filed a second petition to vacate defendant’s probation, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his home confinement. Defendant failed to appear for the hearing, and the court issued an arrest warrant.
On August 31, 1987, defendant, represented by counsel, proceeded to a stipulated hearing on the violation of probation charge. The stipulation indicated that if called to testify, defendant’s probation officer would state that defendant did not receive the telephone calls the officer made to defendant’s home on June 6, 1987, at 8:15 p.m. and 8:10 p.m. on June 23, 1987. Defendant presented no evidence as to the allegations contained in the violation of probation petition.
The trial court entered a finding of guilty on the violation of probation charge and proceeded to a hearing in aggravation and mitigation. Defendant waived his right to a presentence investigation report and presented no evidence in mitigation of the violation. The State relied solely upon aggravating factors presented during an in-chambers conference1 and in the pretrial report. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to six years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the consequences of a determination that a probation order has been violated are so serious that a defendant is entitled to many of the same due process safeguards accorded to a defendant at a trial to determine his guilt. Defendant contends that the trial court’s order revoking his probation must be reversed because the stipulation presented during the probation revocation hearing was tantamount to a guilty plea pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (107 Ill. 2d R. 402) and the court failed to provide defendant with the basic constitutional due process safeguards outlined in Rule 402. Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to minimally determine whether: (1) defendant knew the specific allegations in the petition; (2) defendant was aware of his right to a hearing with counsel present; (3) defendant’s admission was not based on any promises or coercion; and (4) defendant understood the consequences of his admission. See People v. Followell (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 28, 518 N.E.2d 706.
The State initially responds that defendant has waived review of this issue by failing to object at. trial or in a written post-trial motion. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) The State argues that defendant was represented by counsel during the hearing, and thus, should not now be allowed to circumvent the waiver rule by raising the argument for the first time on appeal. As to the State's waiver argument, we believe it is necessary to determine whether any due process deprivations have occurred here which affect the substantial rights of defendant. We therefore invoke the plain error doctrine. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.
The State alternatively argues that Rule 402, which prescribes the actions to be taken prior to the trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea, is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings under our supreme court’s decisions in People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 225-27, 319 N.E.2d 745, 748. It is well established in Illinois that Supreme Court Rule 402 (107 Ill. 2d R. 402) requires that the trial court give admonitions to a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense. Defendant relies on People v. Pier (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289, as establishing these admonitions must also be given in revocation of probations proceedings.
In Pier, the defendant, in his post-conviction petition, alleged that his admission of the violation of probation was induced by an unfulfilled promise of the State’s Attorney to recommend a different sentence than that imposed. Our supreme court stated that due process of law requires that a defendant charged with violating probation should be entitled to many of the same safeguards accorded to a defendant at a trial to determine his guilt. (Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 281 N.E.2d at 291.) It held that where a defendant confesses or admits a charge that he violated his probation in reliance upon an unfulfilled promise by the State’s Attorney, such confession or admission of the charge is not voluntary. (Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 100, 281 N.E.2d at 291.) The court further stated that “[¡Justice demands that [a defendant] be entitled to the protection of the same due-process requirements which pertain to pleas of guilty when he waives his right to a judicial determination of the charge that he violated his probation and confesses or admits the charges of the revocation petition.” Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 281 N.E.2d at 291.
Two years later, however, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745, clarified Pier. The court acknowledged that a probation revocation proceeding was comparable to the entry of a guilty plea, but only “insofar as consideration of the voluntariness of a defendant’s admissions made in both instances.” (Emphasis added.) (Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 224, 319 N.E.2d at 747.) It explained that Pier “merely expressed the view that due process required that a defendant’s admission must be voluntarily made.” (Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 225, 319 N.E.2d at 747.) Beard did not suggest that due process mandates that all the Rule 402 admonitions be given to a defendant in a probation revocation proceeding. To the contrary, the supreme court stated that an admission of a probation violation is significantly different in nature and effect from what is involved in a plea of guilty to the original charge (Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 226, 319 N.E.2d at 748) and, therefore, found “that Rule 402 is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings.” Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 226-27, 319 N.E.2d at 748.
Moreover, while a defendant is entitled to due process of law in proceedings to revoke probation (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S. Ct. 1756), there is a qualitative difference between a criminal proceeding and the revocation of probation (People v. Grayson (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 260, 264-65, 319 N.E.2d 43, 45). A probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding in which guilt or innocence is to be determined. “It takes place only after the defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and then has violated the conditions of the probation.” People v. Allegri (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 309, 313, 487 N.E.2d 606, 607.
Cases since Beard have determined the question of due process deprivations in probation revocation proceedings on a case-by-case basis, with little or no reference to Rule 402. Courts have determined that a defendant’s due process requirements in a probation revocation proceeding are: that the defendant have notice of the alleged violations (People v. Felton (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 684, 387 N.E.2d 1094), that revocation follows a hearing in which the defendant had an opportunity to be heard, (People v. Lee (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 396, 410 N.E.2d 646) and that the defendant was permitted to present evidence, confront witnesses, and be represented by counsel (People v. Cozad (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 664, 511 N.E.2d 211).
More recently, our supreme court has determined that due process requires a fair determination that the acts which formed the basis for the revocation petition did occur and that fairness be accorded a defendant during the proceedings. (Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 487 N.E.2d 606.) It has been reiterated by the courts, however, that a defendant at a probation revocation proceeding is not afforded the same protections afforded a defendant initially standing trial for the substantive offense. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d at 313-14, 487 N.E.2d at 607; see also Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S. Ct. 1756; People v. Hall (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 836, 480 N.E.2d 1387.
Defendant relies heavily upon People v. Followell (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 28, 518 N.E.2d 706, as analogous to the case here. Because the facts in Followell are diverse from the facts at bar, we find defendant’s argument to be unpersuasive.
The Followell court held that the defendant should have been admonished as to the specific allegations in the probation revocation petition, his right to a hearing with counsel present, his voluntariness in making the admission, and his understanding of the consequences of the admission, where he confessed to the contents of the probation revocation petition. (Followell, 165 Ill. App. 3d 28, 518 N.E.2d 706.) In Followell, five years had passed since the revocation petition had been filed and the defendant uttered only three words at the hearing. He had been placed under supervision for drug treatment, and the reviewing court was uncertain whether the defendant had been coerced to “confess” to the contents of the petition, whether he was aware of the allegations against him or whether he understood the consequences of his admission.
Unlike the defendants in Followell and Pier, defendant’s stipulation here was not tantamount to a guilty plea. Defendant here merely stipulated to what his probation officer would testify and not to guilt. People v. Smith (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 236, 319 N.E.2d 760, also relied upon by defendant, does not dictate a different result. Smith involves a stipulated bench trial where defendant stipulated to the evidence and the outcome. Here, defendant only stipulated to the evidence which would be presented in the event the probation officer testified. There was no stipulation as to the outcome of the court’s determination. Moreover, we find that the circumstances surrounding each of the probation revocation proceedings demonstrated both that defendant understood the terms of his probation and the consequences of his failure to comply with those terms. Defendant had been before the same judge in an earlier probation revocation proceeding and had been placed, and remained, in custody following the filing of the first petition to revoke probation and the sentencing hearing on that charge.
In addition, during the first probation revocation hearing, defendant was admonished by the trial judge, told that this would be his last chance, and asked if he understood the consequences for failure to abide by the probation terms. Furthermore, similar to Beard, in the instant case, there has never been a challenge to the conviction for which defendant was granted probation, and the trial court, at the time the guilty plea was entered, properly admonished defendant of his rights. In conclusion, we find that defendant was afforded due process of law during the revocation proceedings.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.
Affirmed.
O’CONNOR, J., concurs.