People v. County of Tazewell

22 Ill. 147
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 22 Ill. 147 (People v. County of Tazewell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. County of Tazewell, 22 Ill. 147 (Ill. 1859).

Opinion

Walker, J.

At an election held in Tazewell county on the 24th day of September, 1853, for and against the county subscribing for twenty-five thousand dollars to the capital stock of relators’ road, the majority required by law was favorable to such subscription. A part of the question submitted was whether an issue of bonds of the county in payment of the subscription, to draw seven per cent, interest per annum, payable semi-annually at the American Exchange Bank in New York should be made. At the September meeting, 1858, of the board of supervisors of Tazewell county, application was made to them, to subscribe for the stock, which they refused to do, and the shares of stock were tendered by the relators and refused, and the board also refused to issue the bonds of the county. And to compel a subscription and to issue county bonds in payment of the same, this application is made.

The return to the petition sets up numerous reasons why the subscription should not be made. We shall only notice a portion of them, as in the view we take of the case, it is not necessary to discuss the others. It is objected that the county had no right to issue bonds or other obligations, payable at any other place than at the county treasury. This court held in the case of Prettyman v. The Board of Supervi of Tazewell County, 19 Ill. R. 406, that it was only by virtue of the act of February, 1857, authorizing the County Courts of each county which had subscribed to the Tónica and Petersburg road, to make the interest of their bonds payable at any place they might choose. That act only applied to subscriptions to that particular road, and can have no application to any other. And it was there held, that the County Court had no power to issue bonds payable in the city of New York, for want of express authority by legislative enactment. States, counties and corporations, created for public convenience only, are not required to seek their creditors to discharge their indebtedness, but when payment is desired, the demand should be made at their treasury. That is the only place, at which payment can be legally insisted upon, and it is the only place, where the treasurer can legally have the public funds with which he is entrusted. To authorize the auditor to draw his warrants on the treasurer, payable in a sister State or in a foreign country, necessarily imposes an obligation on the treasurer, to provide funds at that place, to meet them. And his duties requiring him at the treasury, would require the employment of agents, the transmission of the funds at a risk of loss, and at a considerable expense, in charges, insurance and discounts, which are not incident to its payment at the treasury. And the same reasons apply with equal force, to cities, counties and public corporations, of a similar character. The legislature has conferred no such general power on such bodies, and in its absence, they have no power to make their indebtedness payable at any other place,' than at their treasury.

The next question we propose to consider is, whether.legislative enactments, authorizing counties and cities to subscribe for such stock, are compulsory, when the citizens have by vote determined in favor of a subscription. . That many acts authorized to be performed by such bodies are discretionary, and others are peremptory, will be readily conceded. That the mere grant of authority to such bodies, cannot be construed into a requirement of its performance, without discretion, is obvious. A large portion of their powers, are unquestionably of a discretionary character. But. when the law has imposed a duty and required its performance, there can be no discretion exercised, unless it be as to the time or mode of its performance, when neither are pointed out by the act enjoining the duty. To attempt the exercise of all the powers conferred upon those bodies, by the legislature, would seriously involve, if it did not bankrupt, every city, county and incorporated town in the State. Yet when the duty to act is enjoined, whether in express terms or by implication, there can be no choice but to perform the duty required. . Counties and cities are incorporations, created for public convenience, and to transact the public business of the communities embraced in their limits. They are dependent upon the legislature for their very creation, and from it, they derive all their authority to act. And it is therefore necessary to examine the various legislative enactments, to determine whether the power conferred upon counties to subscribe for stock in railroad companies is imperative or is only discretionary.

The first section of the act of November, 1849, (Scates’ Comp. 950,) provides, “ That whenever the citizens of any city or county in this State, are desirous that said city or county should subscribe for stock in any railroad company already organized or incorporated, or hereafter to be organized or incorporated under any law of this State, such city or county may, and are hereby, authorized to purchase or subscribe for shares of the capital stock in any such company, in any sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars for each of said cities or counties; and the stock so subscribed for or purchased, shall be under the control of the County Court of the county, or Common Council of the city making such subscription or purchase, in all respects as stock owned by individuals.” The second section, authorizes cities and counties to borrow money, or to issue their bonds in payment for such stock. The third section, authorizes the railroad company to which such subscription may have been made, to receive city or county bonds at par, in discharge of such subscriptions, and to dispose of them. The fourth section, provides, that no subscription or purchase shall be made or bond issued by any county or city under the provisions of the act, whereby any debt of such city or county shall be created, to pay such subscription, unless sanctioned by a majority of the votes of the county, at an election to be held to ascertain the fact, and points out the mode of submitting the question to a vote of the city or county. And by the last clause of this section it is provided, that “ No bonds shall be issued under the provisions of this act by any county or city, excepting for the amounts required to be paid at the time of subscription, and for amounts of and at the time when assessments upon all stockholders of said company shall be regularly assessed and made payable.”

By an amendatory act of March 1, 1854, (Scates’ Comp. 953,) the last clause of the fourth section of the act of 1849, was so modified, as to authorize the city council, or the county judges, of any city or county, having subscribed for stock in railroad companies, to issue and deliver the whole, or any portion of the bonds of such city or county, payable on such subscription, at any time when in their opinion the interest of the city or county might be promoted thereby, whether calls had been made or not, on other subscribers.

The first section gives the power to cities and counties to ■ make such subscriptions when desired by their citizens, and it contains no other limitation, except as to amount. To authorize their legally constituted agents to make a subscription, it was under this sectiononly necessary that it should be desired by their citizens, and 'within the limited amount. This section contains no language that can by any rule of interpretation, be held to impose it as a duty, to make such a subscription. It only confers the authority, and provides that they may subscribe for, or purchase stock, under its limitations and restrictions.

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Bluebook (online)
22 Ill. 147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-county-of-tazewell-ill-1859.