People v. Cooper

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 240054-U NOTICE Decision filed 05/07/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0054 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 22-CF-996 ) TROY L. COOPER, ) Honorable ) Jeffrey K. Watson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CLARKE ∗ delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Hackett ∗∗ concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed where, under plain-error review, the record does not establish a clear or obvious violation of his sixth amendment right to public trial, and although the trial court improperly referenced a factor inherent in the offense at sentencing, the error was forfeited and does not warrant relief under the plain-error doctrine or as ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2 Following a St. Clair County jury trial, the defendant, Troy L. Cooper, was convicted of

involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, the

defendant argues that (1) his constitutional right to a public trial was denied by the trial court when

∗ Justice Moore was originally assigned to the panel before his retirement. Justice Clarke was substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the oral argument recording. ∗∗ Justice Welch was originally assigned to the panel prior to his death. Justice Hackett was substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the oral argument recording.

1 it closed the courtroom to everyone after the actions of an unknown number of spectators caused

a disturbance, and (2) the trial court erred in considering a factor inherent in the offense of

involuntary manslaughter during sentencing. As an alternative to the sentencing issue, the

defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the sentencing error when it

occurred or in a motion to reconsider the sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 8, 2022, the defendant was indicted for the June 19, 2022, shooting death of 3-

year-old Joseph “Joe Joe” Lowe, and the aggravated battery with a firearm of 11-year-old Zion

Williams, who were relatives of the defendant. The charges included two counts of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (3) (West 2020)), aggravated battery with a firearm (id. § 12-

3.05(e)(1)), aggravated discharge of a firearm toward the vehicle the victims were in (id. § 24-

1.2(a)(2)), and two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The

UUWF counts were severed for a separate trial.

¶5 On June 5, 2023, a jury was selected, opening statements were given, and the jury heard

testimony from one of the State’s witnesses, Crystal Brooks (the mother of Lowe). The following

day, the record reflects that the trial court issued repeated admonishments to the gallery regarding

appropriate courtroom behavior. Early in the trial, the trial court stated:

“Ladies and gentlemen of the gallery, before we bring the jury in, I am catching

reactions, facial expressions, gasps or disagreement. That is not your role here. I want to

remind all of you that you are in a court of law. You are free to observe, and I know and I

understand that this is an emotional case. But your reactions can influence these people and

that may not be—you know, whichever side you’re here to support, you could inadvertently

be hurting that side by doing that. So I have to ensure that both parties get a fair trial. If

2 your conduct rises to the point, I’m going to ask the bailiff to have you removed. Okay? I

don’t want to do that. I know that you all—obviously you all have an interest in this matter

or you wouldn’t are [sic] here. And, again, you’re welcome to observe. But the reactions,

the gasps, I can’t tolerate that. I can’t have it. Does everybody understand that?

(Gallery acknowledges.)”

¶6 Later that same day, during the cross-examination of a witness, the bailiff interrupted court

proceedings to warn a member of the gallery about disruptive behavior, noting that if there were

any more interruptions, the spectator would be asked to leave. Soon after, outside the presence of

the jury, the trial court addressed the gallery:

“Ladies and gentlemen of the gallery, I’m going to remind you again, there are not

to be any outbursts. I will not have you disrupting my courtroom. Is anybody unclear about

that? One more outburst and I’m going to start banning people from this courtroom. If it

continues, I’m going to start sanctioning people. That includes contempt of court. Do we

all understand that?

(Gallery acknowledges.)

My patience is over now. I asked you nicely. Now I’m telling you. No other

disruptions from the gallery. Understood?

¶7 On June 7, 2023, during the lunch break of the third day of trial, a disturbance occurred

among members of the gallery in the hallway of the courthouse. At approximately 2:05 p.m., once

the trial court had reconvened in the presence of the jury, it stated:

3 “Back on the record in 22-CF-996, People versus Troy Cooper. Court is back in

session. The time is about 2:05. All parties are present. The jury is present here in the

courtroom.

During our lunch break we had some issues with the gallery. As a result of what

the Court can only discern as all of the gallery’s conduct, the Court will proceed in a closed

proceedings.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I apologize for whatever events took place in the

hallway. I didn’t see them. They were brought to my attention. There’s been some other

matters involving members of the gallery. The safety of everybody in this room is my first,

and foremost, concern.

As a result of that and with the assistance of our bailiffs and our sheriff’s

department, we will proceed in a closed proceeding from now on. Once you come in the

box, we will secure the door. We’re not going to allow members of the public back in.

They have forfeited that right by their own behavior.

So I apologize for the delay. I think we’ve got everything under control. Again, I

want to thank Alex in particular for his quick action in helping to diffuse the situation, the

members of our other security staff here, and the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Department

have completely diffused the situation. They have ensured that the members of the gallery

that have been here throughout the week have been removed from the premises. They will

not be coming back. Okay?”

¶8 Thereafter, Agent Ola Abdallah returned to the stand to complete cross-examination. Then

Dr. Matthew Matlock, an emergency room doctor, testified to treating Williams for a relatively

minor in-and-out gunshot wound to his arm. Lastly, Dr. Tatiana Bihun, who performed the autopsy

4 on the deceased victim, Lowe, testified that the minor had a single gunshot wound to the back of

the head, which caused his death. The State then rested, and the jury retired for the day at

approximately 2:45 p.m. Before the jury left the courtroom, the trial court stated:

“Folks, it’s brought to my attention, I’m going to make sure you get to your vehicles

safely. So we’ll have you escorted to your vehicles. Okay? I know some of you expressed

concern over that, so we will certainly be happy to provide that for you. Why don’t you

have them gather once they leave here out by the chief’s desk and then we’ll work out the

logistics.”

¶9 The next morning, on June 8, 2023, in the presence of the jury, the trial court stated:

“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, first of all, I’m getting better. Only 15 minutes

today. Again, there were some matters—I know some of you saw me out front today. There

were some matters that I had to address in particular with the events of yesterday.

So you know, additional measures are being taken today so that we don’t have any

incidences like we did yesterday. We have additional personnel. It has been the collective

decision after conferring with the Chief Judge and the Sheriff’s Department, any of the

folks that have been here all week that were involved in the incidents of yesterday will be

turned around at the courthouse steps, and they will not in [sic] allowed to attend these

proceedings going forward. So we have taken steps through the courthouse cameras to

identify those individuals. The deputy sheriffs are aware, and they will be diligently

working to continue to keep our courthouse safe.”

¶ 10 Following the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on the lesser-

included offense of involuntary manslaughter as it related to the first degree murder charge in

count I. Additionally, the jury found the allegation that the defendant personally discharged a

5 firearm that proximately caused the death of Lowe was proven. The jury found the defendant not

guilty on the remaining counts.

¶ 11 On December 27, 2023, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing. At the outset, the

trial court denied the defendant’s posttrial motion and proceeded to sentencing, noting it had

reviewed the presentence investigation report and relevant materials. The State introduced certified

copies of the defendant’s prior convictions—including burglary, escape, unlawful possession of a

firearm, and abuse and neglect of a child—and argued several statutory factors in aggravation

applied. The State emphasized that the defendant’s conduct “caused or threatened serious harm”

to numerous people present during the shooting. With respect to this argument, the State explicitly

stated that it was not asking the court to consider the defendant’s conduct in harming the deceased

child because “that’s inherently [part of] the offense of involuntary manslaughter.” The State urged

the court to impose an extended-term sentence based on the defendant’s criminal history, the

victim’s age, and the need for deterrence in light of “simply too much gun violence” in the

community.

¶ 12 In mitigation, defense counsel presented and read a letter from Priscilla Burton, a daycare

provider to the defendant’s children, which stated that the defendant is an active father and the

children have improved since their father has been home. Counsel argued that the defendant had

not intended to harm anyone but was instead attempting to break up a fight. The defendant

presented evidence that he had obtained employment, started a small business, and supported his

children while released on bond after the trial. The defendant delivered a lengthy statement in

allocution, apologizing to his family and asserting that he had been attempting to break up a fight.

¶ 13 The trial court, after hearing evidence and arguments, stated that the factors it was “going

to weigh in aggravation are the defendant’s conduct, which caused death, his history of criminal

6 activity, which includes the unlawful possession of a firearm, abuse and neglect of a child, assault,

escape, burglary,” and the need to deter others, and further observed that the defendant “should

never have had a gun to begin with” as a convicted felon and that the jury had specifically found

he personally discharged the firearm that caused the death of a child. After acknowledging that the

defendant did not intend to kill the child and noting the victim was “a three-year-old toddler” who

“wasn’t threatening harm to anybody that day,” the trial court found that a sentence of probation

would deprecate the seriousness of the crime and imposed an eight-year extended-term sentence

of imprisonment. This appeal timely followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, the defendant raises two issues. He first contends that his sixth amendment right

to a public trial was violated when the trial court allegedly closed the courtroom on June 7 and

maintained that closure thereafter. Next, he argues that the trial court improperly relied on a factor

inherent in involuntary manslaughter—namely, the victim’s death—in aggravation, warranting a

new sentencing hearing under plain-error or ineffective assistance principles.

¶ 16 A. Public Trial

¶ 17 The defendant argues that the court violated his sixth amendment right to a public trial by

ordering a complete closure of the courtroom on the afternoon of June 7 and, according to the

defendant, maintaining that closure for the remainder of the trial. He contends the closure failed to

satisfy the four-factor test required by Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), and constitutes

structural error requiring reversal. The defendant acknowledges that this claim is forfeited and

must be reviewed under plain-error analysis. Additionally, the defendant argues that if any

ambiguity exists regarding whether the June 7 closure continued into June 8, this court should

remand for a factual clarification hearing under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 329 (eff. July 1, 2017).

7 The State responds that (1) the closure lasted only a short period on June 7, (2) the courtroom

reopened the next morning to all except those specifically identified in the hallway disruption,

(3) the closure was justified under Waller, and (4) because the defendant failed to object, he must

satisfy the clear or obvious error threshold under People v. Radford, 2020 IL 123975, which he

cannot do.

¶ 18 Before addressing the merits, the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. The

defendant asserts that whether a public trial violation occurred is reviewed de novo, relying on

People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 19. The State argues for an abuse of discretion standard

of review, citing appellate court decisions applying that standard to a trial court’s factual

determinations regarding spectator conduct. See People v. Seyler, 144 Ill. App. 3d 250, 252 (1986);

People v. Cooper, 365 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282 (2006). Both standards apply, but to different

questions. We review the trial court’s factual determinations—such as findings about spectator

conduct or security concerns—for abuse of discretion. Id. But the ultimate question—whether the

closure violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial, and whether the forfeited

claim is reviewable under plain error—is a legal question reviewed de novo. See Schoonover, 2021

IL 124832, ¶¶ 19, 26.

¶ 19 Because the defendant did not object to the closure at trial or raise the issue in a posttrial

motion, the claim is forfeited and subject to the plain-error doctrine. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL

119445, ¶ 48. Under either prong of the plain-error doctrine, the threshold question is whether a

clear or obvious error occurred. Radford, 2020 IL 123975, ¶ 24. This threshold is especially

significant in courtroom-closure cases because a contemporaneous objection is “particularly

crucial” to allow the trial court to refine or explain its approach. Id. ¶ 37. A courtroom may be

closed only if (1) an overriding interest is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure is no broader than

8 necessary, (3) reasonable alternatives are considered, and (4) adequate findings support the

closure. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.

¶ 20 On this record, we cannot say the trial court committed a clear or obvious error. Here, the

record reflects escalating misconduct by members of the gallery. On June 6, the trial court

admonished spectators twice about audible reactions, disruptive conduct, and the potential for

removal. A bailiff also issued a warning. On June 7, during a recess for lunch, a disturbance in the

hallway required intervention by security personnel. When the trial court resumed at 2:05 p.m., it

announced it would “proceed in a closed proceeding from now on” due to what it could only

discern as “all of the gallery’s conduct.” Three witnesses then testified, and the jury broke for the

day at 2:45 p.m.

¶ 21 The defendant relies on the phrase “from now on” to argue a total closure persisted. The

following morning, however, the trial court informed the jury that additional security measures

had been implemented and that the “individuals involved in the incidents of yesterday” would not

be permitted to enter the courthouse. The trial court referenced surveillance footage used to

identify those individuals. Nothing in the record affirmatively indicates that the trial court

continued to bar all members of the public from attending. Although the defendant argues the

absence of an express rescission of the prior afternoon’s statement implies a continuing blanket

closure, the practical effect of the court’s actions on June 8—describing and implementing a

narrower, individualized exclusion—indicates that the broad clearing of the courtroom on June 7

did not persist. Where, as here, the record does not affirmatively establish a continued total closure,

and the defendant failed to object at the time, we do not presume one; any doubts arising from

gaps in the record are resolved against the appellant. See People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 344

(2008).

9 ¶ 22 To the extent the defendant argues that any ambiguity regarding June 8 requires a remand

for a Rule 329 hearing, we disagree. Rule 329 addresses “material omissions or inaccuracies” in

the record, not ambiguities created by the defendant’s failure to object. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 329 (eff.

July 1, 2017). The issue here is not an inaccurate transcript, but whether the defendant may rely

on ambiguity created by his failure to object to establish clear or obvious error. Under Radford, a

contemporaneous objection is “particularly crucial” in courtroom-closure cases so the trial court

can explain its reasoning and develop an accurate record. Radford, 2020 IL 123975, ¶ 37. Such an

objection “prevents a defendant from potentially remaining silent about a possible error and

waiting to raise the issue, seeking automatic reversal only if the case does not conclude in his

favor.” Id. When no objection is made and the record is therefore underdeveloped, any doubts

arising from that incomplete record are resolved against the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill.

2d 389, 392 (1984). Because the claimed ambiguity arises from the defendant’s failure to object

and not from any inaccuracy within the record, a Rule 329 hearing is neither necessary nor

appropriate.

¶ 23 We now turn to the Waller factors. As the defendant concedes, the first factor is satisfied:

the trial court had an overriding interest in ensuring the safety of the jurors, attorneys, witnesses,

court staff, and the orderly administration of justice. The June 7 hallway disturbance involved

enough individuals to raise immediate concern. As to the second factor, whether the closure was

no broader than necessary, the trial court’s initial clearing of the entire gallery on June 7, apart

from interns associated with either the State or defense counsel, was the result of an unexpected

security disturbance serious enough to require intervention and delay proceedings. It delayed the

trial court in recommencing proceedings by almost an hour, where the jury did not reconvene until

2:05 p.m. after lunch. Because the trial court did not observe the incident firsthand, reliance on

10 security personnel to discern the extent of the gallery’s involvement and conduct was unavoidable.

Further, the temporary closure was brief—approximately 40 minutes of testimony before the jury

broke for the day—and the trial court shifted to individualized exclusions the following morning.

In light of the fast-moving circumstances the trial court faced and the lack of any contemporaneous

objection, we cannot say the trial court’s temporary response to an immediate security disruption

amounted to a clear or obvious error under plain-error review. As to the third factor, the record

reveals the trial court considered alternatives. Before June 7, it issued multiple warnings and

attempted to manage the situation without removing spectators. On June 8, the trial court

implemented the less restrictive alternative of barring only the specifically identified individuals

involved in the disturbance, after it and security personnel had an opportunity to review

surveillance video. These steps, although not perfect, undermine the claim of clear or obvious

failure to consider reasonable alternatives. Regarding the fourth factor, the trial court articulated

on the record its concerns about the gallery’s conduct and the safety of all present. The trial court

even went so far as to have security personnel escort members of the jury to their vehicles. While

the findings were not extensive, Waller does not require ritualistic recitations, and Radford makes

clear that in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, a lack of detailed findings does not

automatically constitute clear or obvious error.

¶ 24 Accordingly, the defendant has not shown that the trial court’s actions amounted to a clear

or obvious Waller violation. In fact, the actions of the trial court appear necessary from this record

to ensure the safety of those present. The immediate safety concerns, the brevity of the closure,

the shift to targeted exclusions the following morning, and the absence of any contemporaneous

objection all weigh against finding plain error. Because the defendant has not satisfied the

threshold of plain error, we do not reach the second prong of plain error or conduct structural-error

11 analysis under People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959. We therefore decline to excuse the defendant’s

forfeiture.

¶ 25 B. Sentencing

¶ 26 The defendant next argues that the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in

involuntary manslaughter—namely, “the defendant’s conduct, which caused death”—as

aggravation, warranting a new sentencing hearing. The State concedes the reference was inartful

but asserts that the sentence rested on proper factors and that, under People v. Johnson, 2024 IL

130191, the claim cannot succeed on second-prong plain error; nor is first-prong plain error

established because the evidence was not closely balanced.

¶ 27 A court may not treat a factor implicit in the offense as aggravation. People v. Phelps, 211

Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2004); People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d 400, 404-05 (1981). Reversal is warranted if the

record fails to positively rebut reliance on the improper factor; conversely, remand is unnecessary

where the record shows the factor was incidental and the sentence was driven by proper

considerations. People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (2008). Because there was no objection and

no postsentencing motion, the claim is forfeited. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Under Johnson,

consideration of an improper aggravating factor is not structural error and therefore does not

qualify for second-prong plain error; such claims are instead evaluated, if at all, under first-prong

plain error review. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶¶ 90-92, 95.

¶ 28 Here, the trial court’s reference to “the defendant’s conduct, which caused death” was

improper because death is inherent in involuntary manslaughter. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 11.

Nonetheless, the defendant does not demonstrate first-prong plain error. As detailed in the

background section, the aggravating evidence presented at sentencing was substantial, and nothing

in the record suggests the mitigation evidence approached the same weight. Under first-prong plain

12 error, the defendant must show that the improper remark could reasonably have tipped the balance

of factors in his favor; here, we find that the sentencing evidence was not closely balanced.

¶ 29 The trial court emphasized defendant’s significant criminal history (burglary, escape, child

abuse/neglect, domestic assault, unlawful possession of a firearm), prior failures on probation,

deterrence, the victim’s age (three years) supporting extended-term eligibility, and the jury’s

personal-discharge finding. The court concluded that a sentence of probation would deprecate the

seriousness of the offense. It therefore imposed an eight‑year mid‑range extended‑term sentence,

two years below the State’s requested maximum, further indicating that the improper remark did

not control the outcome. Moreover, the record positively rebuts any inference that the improper

reference drove the outcome. The State expressly acknowledged that death is inherent in

involuntary manslaughter and stated it was not asking the court to rely on the victim’s death as

aggravation. The trial court’s analysis centered on the defendant’s criminal history, the need for

deterrence, the victim’s age, and the personal-discharge finding—all proper considerations. In

context, the isolated reference to death was incidental and not decisive, and thus not a basis for

relief under Heider or Johnson. First-prong plain error is not established.

¶ 30 The defendant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

improper factor at sentencing. To prevail, a defendant must show deficient performance and

prejudice—a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result would have been

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526

(1984). Assuming deficiency, the defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. For the reasons

discussed, the record shows the sentence rested on proper aggravation, and the court articulated

reasons independent of the improper reference. There is no reasonable probability that a different

13 sentence would have been imposed had counsel objected or filed a motion to reconsider.

Accordingly, the ineffective-assistance claim therefore fails.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence. The

defendant has not established a clear or obvious violation of his public-trial right, and his

sentencing claim is forfeited and does not warrant relief under the plain-error doctrine or as

ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 33 Affirmed.