People v. Cooper

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 230287-U NOTICE Decision filed 04/20/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0287 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-675 ) DUSTIN COOPER, ) Honorable ) Derek J. Girton, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CLARKE ∗ delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Hackett ** concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The defendant’s convictions and sentence are affirmed. We find that the defendant is not entitled to reversal, or to reversal with remand for new trial, because (1) it was not an abuse of discretion to transfer the defendant to adult criminal court, (2) the denial of the defendant’s Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous, (3) there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the defendant’s conviction of felony murder and the conviction under the statute in effect at the time was not unconstitutional, and (4) the defendant’s sentence was not unconstitutional as applied to him under the eighth amendment and the factual record is insufficiently developed to address his as-applied proportionate penalties clause claim.

¶2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Dustin Cooper, was found guilty of two counts of

first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(1), (3) (West 2018)) involving the deaths of 19-year-old

∗ Justice Moore was originally assigned to the panel before his retirement. Justice Clarke was substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to oral argument. ** Justice Welch was originally assigned to the panel prior to his death. Justice Hackett was substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to oral argument. 1 Wyatt Bailey and 16-year-old Clayvonte Sloan and one count of armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)).

The defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense. By agreement of the parties, the trial

court merged any remaining alternative counts of first degree murder and the armed robbery count

into the two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant on the murder

convictions to consecutive terms of 20 years’ imprisonment for the first degree murder of

Clayvonte Sloan (count IV) and 20 years’ imprisonment for the first degree murder of Wyatt

Bailey (count V) for an aggregate sentence of 40 years. This direct appeal follows.

¶3 On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the discretionary transfer to adult court, (2) the

denial of his Batson challenge, (3) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the felony-murder

convictions and the constitutionality of the felony-murder statute as applied to him, and (4) his

sentence under the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On January 19, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that

the defendant, then 15 years old, had committed multiple counts of first degree murder related to

the deaths of Clayvonte Sloan (the defendant’s cousin) and Wyatt Bailey, one count of armed

robbery, one count of robbery, and one count of mob action. The charges stem from an incident

that occurred on January 17, 2021, during which the defendant and several other teenagers—Sloan,

Ali Bryant, Jaevin Griggs, and Camarion Halthon—arranged to meet Bailey outside Bailey’s

residence to purchase cannabis. An altercation occurred during the encounter in which multiple

gunshots were fired, resulting in both Sloan and Wyatt being fatally shot and subsequently dying.

Following a detention hearing, the defendant was ordered to be placed in the temporary custody

of the Vermilion County Juvenile Detention Center. On February 2, 2021, the State filed a motion

2 to transfer the defendant to adult criminal court under section 5-805(3) of the Juvenile Court Act

of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 2018)) and permit prosecution under the criminal

laws, alleging the defendant planned an armed robbery, carried a firearm, and was a principal actor

in a shooting that resulted in two deaths.

¶6 A. Transfer Hearing

¶7 On July 27, 2021, the juvenile court held a hearing on the State’s motion to transfer. At the

discretionary transfer hearing, the State first presented testimony from Sergeant Dustin Heckerson

of the Vermilion County Sheriff’s Department regarding the investigation into the January 17,

2021 shooting. Heckerson testified that he reviewed surveillance footage from a residence at the

intersection of Covert and Wayne Drive in Oakwood, Illinois, near Bailey’s residence. The

residence had two cameras, which were both motion activated. Heckerson stated the videos

depicted events that occurred before and after the incident, but the shooting itself was not captured.

The videos showed a gold Chevrolet Impala circling the block several times before the incident,

then later fleeing north on Wayne Drive with its rear passenger door open. The gold Impala stopped

at a dead end on Covert Drive for a few seconds and then turned around and sped back in the

direction that it came. Heckerson also interviewed several witnesses. Brendan Cunningham and

Adriana Bloomfield, who were inside Bailey’s residence, reported that Bailey stepped outside

shortly before gunshots were heard; Cunningham then ran outside and found Bailey lying on the

ground with a gunshot wound while a gold vehicle drove away. Bloomfield stated that Wyatt had

been in contact with the defendant on Snapchat about purchasing “drugs.” Other witnesses

reported hearing gunshots and seeing the same gold Impala near a nearby dead end and observed

“the front passenger window roll down and a subject with a black arm throw[ ] a pistol into the

woods.” A handgun was later recovered from that same area. Heckerson further testified that the

3 driver of the gold Impala, Bryant, later provided a statement indicating that he drove the defendant,

Sloan, Griggs, and Halthon to Oakwood for a planned drug transaction with Bailey. According to

Bryant’s account, once they arrived, the defendant exited the vehicle and approached the residence.

Bailey then approached the vehicle and a struggle occurred between Bailey and Griggs over a

“drawstring bag.” According to Bryant, he observed a black handgun in the waistband of Bailey

during the struggle, and Sloan reached for the handgun in Bailey’s waistband. During the struggle,

the defendant approached from behind and struck Bailey in the back of the head with a handgun.

According to Bryant, Sloan was shot by Bailey while Bailey was simultaneously shot by Griggs.

After the shootings, the group fled the scene, discarding a firearm out of the vehicle at the dead

end before being stopped by police.

¶8 The State next called Michael Hartshorn, chief investigator for the Vermilion County

State’s Attorney’s Office, who testified regarding the evidence recovered during the investigation.

Hartshorn testified that he responded to the location where deputies had stopped a gold Chevrolet

Impala matching the suspect vehicle. He observed the vehicle contained scattered currency,

clothing, and blood-like substances in the rear seat. Inside the vehicle were five individuals,

including the defendant seated in the rear passenger seat, Griggs located in the rear, directly behind

the driver, and Sloan seated between them. Halthon was in the front passenger seat. Sloan was

unresponsive when officers discovered him and was transported to a hospital, where he later died

from gunshot wounds. Hartshorn was informed by other deputies that the occupants stated they

had gone to Oakwood to purchase marijuana. Hartshorn also testified that officers recovered two

firearms from the back seat area of the vehicle—a .40 caliber Glock with an extended magazine,

believed to belong to Bailey, and a 9-millimeter Polymer 80 handgun. Hartshorn further testified

that another witness, Jonathan Ventura, reported seeing the Impala drive through the neighborhood

4 multiple times before hearing gunshots and observing the vehicle flee. Hartshorn also reviewed

preliminary autopsy findings indicating Bailey died from multiple gunshot wounds, including a

close-range gunshot wound to the chest, while Sloan died from a gunshot wound to the abdomen.

¶9 Investigator Arik Bruens of the Vermilion County Sheriff’s Department testified regarding

his role in the investigation of the shooting. Bruens stated that he interviewed Halthon, one of the

occupants of the gold Chevrolet Impala, who reported that he and driver Bryant were contacted by

the defendant and agreed to drive to Oakwood so the defendant could purchase marijuana from

Bailey. According to Halthon, when the group arrived at Bailey’s residence, the defendant

attempted to complete the purchase, but Bailey produced a firearm and attempted to rob them.

Halthon stated that Bailey grabbed the defendant and pulled him from the vehicle, leading to a

struggle involving the defendant, Bailey, and Bryant. Halthon reported that Bryant exited the

vehicle during the altercation and, at one point, body-slammed Bailey to the ground while

attempting to take the firearm from him. During the struggle, gunshots were fired, resulting in

Sloan being shot and Bailey also being shot. The group then reentered the vehicle and fled the

scene before being stopped by law enforcement. Bruens further testified that digital evidence

showed Snapchat communications between the defendant and Bailey arranging the meeting at

Bailey’s residence for a drug transaction, during which the defendant indicated he intended to

spend approximately $150 on marijuana and $150 on “carts.” Bruens also testified that

investigators recovered photos and videos from phones showing individuals in possession of

firearms connected to the incident and that counterfeit currency was later found inside the suspect

vehicle.

¶ 10 At this stage of the transfer hearing, the State rested its case and presented no additional

witnesses. The State requested the juvenile court to take judicial notice of the juvenile case file,

5 including prior court reports, the social history investigation report, the detention center

information, and the juvenile’s positive marijuana test at admission. Defense counsel did not

object. The juvenile court admitted those materials for purposes of the hearing and also indicated

it would consider additional reports filed later in the case, including the psychological evaluation

completed by Dr. Michelle Hoy-Watkins and filed on June 28, 2021, and more recent court reports.

The defense did not present any evidence on the issue of probable cause, and the juvenile court

proceeded to argument. After considering the testimony, exhibits, and arguments of counsel, the

juvenile court found that the State had established probable cause that the defendant committed

the charged offenses. The juvenile court noted evidence that the defendant communicated with

Bailey to arrange the meeting and was personally involved in the altercation with Bailey. The

juvenile court further explained the law of accountability and concluded that there was sufficient

evidence that the defendant participated in both the planning and the commission of the offenses.

¶ 11 After a short recess, the juvenile court proceeded to the second portion of the transfer

hearing to determine whether it was in the best interests of the public to proceed under the Act or

prosecute the defendant as an adult. The State argued that it was in the public’s best interests for

the defendant to be prosecuted as an adult and began presenting exhibits relevant to the statutory

transfer factors. The juvenile court admitted, without objection, People’s Exhibit A, the

defendant’s birth certificate, and People’s Exhibits B and C, social history reports from the

defendant’s prior juvenile case and the present case. The State also introduced People’s Exhibit D,

a police report from the defendant’s earlier juvenile case describing an April 15, 2020, incident in

which the defendant fled from police and admitted dropping a stolen 9-millimeter handgun;

officers also recovered approximately 313 grams of cannabis, and the incident involved Clayvonte

Sloan and Jaevin Griggs, individuals the defendant had previously been ordered not to contact.

6 ¶ 12 The juvenile court further admitted People’s Exhibit E, the defendant’s school records, and

People’s Exhibit F, a psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Michelle Hoy-Watkins. With

respect to the circumstances of the offense, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of the

testimony presented during the probable cause portion of the hearing, which the court agreed to

consider. The State then introduced People’s Exhibit G, materials describing programs available

through the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ), and People’s Exhibit H, a juvenile

detention center court report.

¶ 13 The State called Tina Quick, a juvenile probation officer, who testified that she had

supervised the defendant beginning in July 2020 in connection with a prior juvenile matter. Quick

explained that the defendant had been placed on supervision and that her contact with him was

somewhat limited due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. She testified that she was unaware of

any abuse or neglect concerns involving the defendant based on her discussion with him and his

mother. She further testified that the defendant had admitted to marijuana use during that period,

but he was not recommended for treatment. She testified that he tested positive for marijuana when

admitted to the juvenile detention center in both the earlier juvenile case and the present case.

Lastly, she testified that the IDJJ provides services, such as schooling and counseling, for

committed juveniles.

¶ 14 Eliza Brooks, principal of North Ridge Middle School, testified on behalf of the defense.

Brooks testified the defendant attended the school during seventh and eighth grade and was

generally a good student who earned good grades, though he struggled in one class due to a conflict

with a teacher. Brooks stated she interacted with him frequently because he often came to her

office to talk about school and personal issues. She described the defendant as intelligent,

respectful, and able to be calmed and reasoned with when upset. Brooks testified that the defendant

7 was affected by his father’s incarceration and appeared to struggle with the absence of a male role

model, although he had a good relationship with his mother. She also observed him associating

with older students, particularly Jaevin Griggs, whom she believed had a negative influence on

him. Brooks was aware of an April 2020 incident in which the defendant reportedly ran from police

while in possession of a firearm and recalled one incident where he brought marijuana to school.

Despite those issues, Brooks believed the defendant had strong academic potential and would

benefit from counseling and supportive services.

¶ 15 Breya McGrown, the defendant’s mother, testified that his father was incarcerated for

much of the defendant’s life. His father briefly returned when he was young before later receiving

an 18-year sentence when the defendant was about 12 or 13, which she said deeply affected him.

She described additional trauma in the defendant’s life, including the 2019 murder of a family

friend who acted as a father figure and the death of the defendant’s cousin, Clayvonte Sloan, in

the incident underlying the case. McGrown testified that the defendant struggled emotionally

afterward, experiencing nightmares, sleep problems, and loss of appetite. She also stated that the

defendant lacked consistent male role models and that Jaevin Griggs was a negative influence on

the defendant. On the day of the incident, she believed the defendant had simply gone out briefly

with friends to ride around and go to Lincoln Park.

¶ 16 Robert Vickery, deputy director of programs for the IDJJ, testified about services available

in the juvenile system. He explained that committed youth undergo assessments for education,

mental health, trauma, and substance use, after which individualized treatment plans are

developed. IDJJ provides schooling, counseling, trauma-focused programming, substance-abuse

treatment, vocational training, and reentry planning. Vickery testified that juveniles committed for

first degree murder must remain in DJJ for at least five years or until age 21 and stated that

8 adolescents often mature significantly during that time and can benefit from the rehabilitative

services available in the juvenile system.

¶ 17 The psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Michelle Hoy-Watkins for the purposes of

the transfer hearing and admitted into evidence described the defendant’s personal history,

including the repeated incarceration of his father and the instability that resulted. The evaluation

also noted that the defendant had previously been the victim of gun violence on multiple occasions

during his childhood and adolescence. Dr. Hoy-Watkins concluded that the defendant displayed

characteristics associated with childhood trauma and was particularly susceptible to influence from

peers. She opined that the defendant would benefit from a structured environment providing

trauma-informed mental health treatment, education, and vocational programming and indicated

that rehabilitative services within the juvenile system could promote the defendant’s development

before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction.

¶ 18 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered the parties to submit final

arguments in writing. On August 25, 2021, the State filed its written argument with the juvenile

court. Therein, the State argued that the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s prior

delinquent history outweighed the benefits of juvenile treatment. The defendant previously had a

2020 case involving possession of cannabis and a firearm, during which he was placed on court

supervision with conditions prohibiting drug use, weapon possession, and contact with the very

individuals related to the present case. The State contended that the defendant violated these

conditions and orchestrated the underlying incident, arranging a marijuana transaction with Wyatt

Bailey, coordinating the trip to Bailey’s residence, and participating in a violent confrontation that

involved firearms and resulted in the deaths of Bailey and Clayvonte Sloan. The State emphasized

that the defendant’s active role, including “scouting” the location by driving around the residence

9 several times, exiting the vehicle and later striking the victim from behind with a handgun, and

engaging in a struggle over a gun or drugs, demonstrated planning and dangerous conduct, and

that his prior noncompliance and continued behavioral issues indicated he would not benefit

sufficiently from juvenile programming.

¶ 19 On September 20, 2021, the defendant filed his response arguing that he should remain in

juvenile court due to his youth, personal background, and rehabilitative potential. At 15 years old,

the defendant was developmentally immature and highly susceptible to peer influence. He

experienced significant instability, including a father repeatedly incarcerated, exposure to

community violence, and untreated trauma and mental health issues. He argued he had minimal

prior juvenile involvement and had not previously received mental health, substance abuse, or

rehabilitative services. He further argued that the psychological evaluation indicated depression,

anxiety, and trauma, while school and detention staff described him as respectful and capable of

functioning in structured environments. In addition, he contended that the offense arose from a

marijuana transaction, not premeditated robbery or homicide, and that juvenile placement would

allow access to structured treatment, education, and supervision through age 21, providing

meaningful rehabilitative opportunities.

¶ 20 On October 1, 2021, the State, in its reply, maintained that the defendant met the statutory

criteria for discretionary transfer. His age did not preclude adult prosecution, as Illinois law allows

minors as young as 13 to be transferred for murder. The State emphasized the defendant’s role as

the primary aggressor, orchestrating the transaction, initiating the confrontation, and engaging in

violent conduct. His prior offenses, repeated violations of court orders, and refusal to participate

meaningfully in services demonstrated a pattern of delinquency and a risk to public safety. While

the defense relied on psychological evaluations to argue for rehabilitation, the State noted that the

10 defendant’s noncompliance and escalating behavioral issues indicated juvenile supervision alone

would not mitigate the danger to the community. The State concluded that adult prosecution was

warranted.

¶ 21 On November 15, 2021, the juvenile court held a status hearing on the State’s motion to

transfer the defendant for prosecution under the criminal laws of Illinois. The juvenile court

reviewed evidence and arguments concerning the defendant’s age, prior history, circumstances of

the offense, mental and educational background, and potential for rehabilitation. The juvenile court

found that the defendant had turned 15 at the time of the offenses and had prior delinquent history,

including a 2020 drug and firearm related case, for which he was on supervision and had violated

court ordered restrictions. The juvenile court noted the defendant’s prior exposure to trauma, his

use of marijuana, and prior encounters with law enforcement, but found no evidence of

developmental disabilities or mental health conditions that caused the offenses. As to the

circumstances of the offense, the juvenile court found that the defendant was the primary planner

of a drug transaction that escalated to an armed robbery and resulted in the deaths of Wyatt Bailey

and Clayvonte Sloan. The defendant coordinated the transaction, approached the victim from

behind, used a firearm to strike Bailey, and actively participated in the violent confrontation. The

juvenile court found that the defendant’s conduct demonstrated leadership and planning, not mere

peer influence. The juvenile court balanced the statutory factors, including the seriousness of the

offense, prior record, potential for rehabilitation, and public safety. It concluded that public safety

required prosecution under adult criminal law where the defendant’s prior record, unwillingness

to comply with supervision and school directives, and the seriousness of the offense would

inadequately address the severity of his conduct and juvenile programming alone was insufficient

to mitigate risk. The juvenile court therefore granted the State’s motion, allowing prosecution

11 under the criminal laws, and dismissed the petition for adjudication of wardship to the extent that

criminal proceedings were initiated. The defendant was scheduled for bond court the following

day.

¶ 22 On November 16, 2021, the defendant was charged in adult criminal court by information,

which was later amended and then subsequently superseded by a bill of indictment on December

3, 2021, with a total of 10 counts. Counts I-IV charged the defendant as a principal and under a

theory of accountability for first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2), (3) (West 2020)), based

on alternate theories, related to the death of Clayvonte Sloan. Counts I-III included language

alleging a firearm enhancement, in that the defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused

the death of Sloan, or was armed with a firearm. Specifically, count IV charged the defendant with

felony murder predicated on the commission of the forcible felony of armed robbery. Counts V-

VIII were identical to counts I-IV but named the victim as Wyatt Bailey. Count IX charged the

defendant with armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)), and count X charged him with robbery (id. § 18-

1(a)).

¶ 23 B. Jury Selection

¶ 24 On July 18, 2022, jury selection began. Prior to the prospective jurors entering the

courtroom, the State dismissed counts I-III of the indictment and elected to proceed on the

remaining counts. The trial court questioned prospective jurors in panels of 14. Juror Latwaun

Cross was questioned as part of the first panel and stated he was 48 years old and lived in Danville,

Illinois. The trial court’s introductory questions to Juror Cross and his responses were as follows:

“[Q]: All right. Are you married? [A]: Yes. [Q]: Where are you employed at? [A]: Danville Metal Stamping. [Q]: How long have you been there? [A]: 15 years.

12 [Q]: Your wife? [A]: Employed. [Q]: Where? [A]: OSF here in Danville. [Q]: Do you have children? [A]: Yes, five. [Q]: How old are they? How old is your oldest? [A]: Oldest is, like, 34? [Q]: Employed? [A]: He live in Oklahoma. I don’t know where he work at. [Q]: Next one? [A]: The next one, she live in Dallas, Texas. She 34. [Q]: Do you know if she’s employed? [A]: No. [Q]: Next one? [A]: 33, from Iowa. I don’t know where she work at either. [Q]: Okay. [A]: I got a 30 year old, Urbana, and I don’t know where she work either. [Q]: All right. Last one? [A]: 19 from Danville. She work at Burger King.”

¶ 25 The trial court then asked the panel of jurors whether they had heard or read anything about

the case before today. Juror Cross raised his hand and said he had heard “[a] few things, a couple

things,” and he “actually work[s] with Natasha Bailey,” who was the mother of victim Wyatt

Bailey. He stated he had not formed any opinions and could be fair and impartial. When the trial

court asked whether anyone knew any of the witnesses on the list, Juror Cross again indicated that

he knew Natasha Bailey. Juror Cross stated that he had worked with her for about “four or five

years,” but she was not “a close friend.” Juror Cross also indicated he knew Jason Hicks, the

boyfriend of Natasha Bailey, from work, but could remain fair and impartial.

¶ 26 During the State’s opportunity to question the group of jurors, the State asked, “Have any—

you or any family member or close friend ever been charged with a crime?” Several jurors raised

their hands and discussed family members who had been previously or were currently charged

with a crime. Juror Cross did not raise his hand or otherwise indicate a response to the State’s

question. The State also asked if anyone knew the victims, Clayvonte Sloan or Wyatt Bailey. Juror

13 Cross indicated he knew Wyatt Bailey from work, because Bailey had also worked at the same

place for a while. Juror Cross stated he was familiar with Bailey “just from work”, and he could

remain fair and impartial. After voir dire of the first panel was completed, neither the State nor the

defense raised a for-cause challenge related to Juror Cross.

¶ 27 Subsequently, after voir dire of the second panel, the following exchange occurred:

“MR. MCKAY [(ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL)]: Judge, I actually have one more thing. Just over lunch, I had been talking to a police officer just about the last panel, just what do you think of various jurors? And he did mention that one of them, Mr. Cross, actually had a number of criminal convictions in his past. I did look him up on Jano, so I’m a little concerned that he didn’t volunteer that when asked if he, a family member or close friend had any criminal arrests or convictions in his past. So would actually make a motion to strike him for cause as a result of not being truthful with that. At least according to Jano, he had a number of them. MS. BEZNER [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: I think we’d like an opportunity to investigate that. I think it’s really interesting that the Attorney General went to go investigate the only black juror that’s been called so far. THE COURT: I think that’s the only one the officers brought to his attention. But at this point, I’ll just show we’ll continue that request. We’ll take—lets take a 15-minute break so you can take a look into that, if you want. If need be, we’ll bring Mr. Cross back and you can question him. MR. MCKAY: Judge, with that, we had sent the entire witness—the entire potential jury list to various officers that we know from past cases with the Danville Police Department. And so this was—when we’re inquiring about this, I just want to make the record that we didn’t just—we weren’t just picking out a single person. We had sent the entire list to one of the detectives over there. So that’s what that was.”

The trial court continued the request and took a short recess.

¶ 28 After the recess, the trial court revisited the State’s concern regarding Juror Cross. The

parties agreed that Juror Cross had been charged with four misdemeanors in 1997, 1998, 2003,

and 2004 that had been dismissed, and a 1998 DUI conviction after a plea. The State believed that

included in the four misdemeanors was a domestic battery, which resulted in a not guilty after trial,

and an “order of protection, domestic that was dismissed.” The State believed the Juror Cross’s

lack of response to its question was “not accurate.” The trial court stated it did not view the criminal

14 history as being significant; however, Juror Cross did not answer the question. Thus, the trial court

opted to question Juror Cross and give him an opportunity to explain.

¶ 29 Later, Juror Cross was brought into the courtroom for additional questioning. The

following exchange occurred between the trial court and Juror Cross:

“THE COURT: Mr. Cross, if you could just have a seat in the jury box. We’ve got to ask you a couple follow-up questions. First off, you didn’t do anything wrong. I think we did a poor job of asking you a couple questions, okay? So when we were going over the potential jurors, there were some questions to your answers to a couple of questions. All right? One of the questions was asked regarding to all the jurors, have you ever been charged with any type of a criminal offense before? Have you ever been charged with a criminal offense? JUROR CROSS: Yes, I have. I caught a DUI about 20 years ago. THE COURT: All right. Anything else? JUROR CROSS: Not that I was convicted of. THE COURT: Well that’s why we’re asking—anything you were charged with? JUROR CROSS: A domestic, domestic case. THE COURT: Approximately how long ago was that? JUROR CROSS: Probably about 25 years ago. THE COURT: All right. Both of those cases, or all of those cases were here in Vermilion County? JUROR CROSS: Yeah. THE COURT: All right. Anything about how you were treated in those cases that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial? JUROR CROSS: No. THE COURT: You—I think you said that in the domestic cases, those were dropped, or did you go to trial, or what happened? JUROR CROSS: I did go to trial. THE COURT: Okay. You went to trial and you were acquitted on one? JUROR CROSS: Yeah. THE COURT: All right. And then what happened to the DUI case? JUROR CROSS: I pled guilty. THE COURT: All right. That’s all been resolved years ago? JUROR CROSS: Yeah, many years ago. THE COURT: I think we asked you, I know we asked you if you knew [the defendant]. You didn’t know [him]? JUROR CROSS: No. THE COURT: Do you know any of his family? JUROR CROSS: I think I do. If that’s the ones in the back of the courtroom, I know a couple of those. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Are they people you socialize with, or you just know them to say hello to? JUROR CROSS: Just know them from being around.

15 THE COURT: All right. Anything about that relationship with them that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial? JUROR CROSS: No. THE COURT: All right. Who is it that you think that you know that’s in his family? JUROR CROSS: I couldn’t even call them by name. I really don’t know. THE COURT: Just people you see, you run into? JUROR CROSS: Yeah.”

The trial court then released Juror Cross from the courtroom, and the State withdrew its for-cause

challenge for Juror Cross.

¶ 30 When Juror Cross was tendered as part of the jury panel, the State exercised its first

peremptory strike. The State additionally moved to strike another juror, Ms. Berry, as part of the

panel. The defense raised a Batson challenge as to the strike of Juror Cross. The trial court reserved

the Batson challenge until the end of jury selection. The State exercised three more peremptory

strikes on Ms. Coombs, Ms. Martinez, and, as to an alternate juror, Ms. Koch.

¶ 31 The trial court then considered the defendant’s Batson challenge. Defense counsel argued,

“Mr. Cross is the only black person in the first 40 jurors. He’s the only black person that the State

struck. My client is black. He said absolutely nothing indicating he could not be fair and impartial.

There is no race-neutral reason for striking him. They struck him because he’s black.” Counsel

further noted that the State had struck a potential juror with a Hispanic last name who may also

have been a member of a minority group.

¶ 32 The trial court found a prima facie showing with respect to Juror Cross and asked the State

to provide its race-neutral rationales. The State responded there were

“[m]ultiple reasons why we don’t like Mr. Cross. First, he does have a criminal record. It might have been a while ago, but he does, nonetheless, have one. Also, maybe it’s a result of him being confused by the questions, or maybe not. I don’t, quite frankly, trust that. If it was a white juror, a Hispanic juror, and [sic] Asian juror, anybody, that’s going to be raising huge red flags. Also, he was a person with five kids and he says he doesn’t know what four of them do. That’s just weird and strange, and quite frankly, I don’t want someone weird and strange on my jury.

16 These are all race-neutral reasons, and also, he knows, apparently, [the defendant’s] family. He is not friends with them, but he’s nonetheless familiar with them. These are numerous rate-neutral [sic] reasons why we wouldn’t want Mr. Cross. Quite frankly, he knows the victim, and the victim’s mom, and he [sic] victim’s stepdad, Mr. Hicks. I don’t know what his opinions are. He says that, you know, it wouldn’t affect him, but that’s also a wild card. It’s too many wild cards on a single person that we have no interest in. These are all race-neutral reasons. It has nothing to do with his race whatsoever.”

The defense argued that there were multiple other jurors who did not know their children’s

occupation and knew people on the witness list.

¶ 33 The trial court denied the defendant’s Batson challenge, noting that Juror Cross “did know

the family of the victims, family of the [d]efendant,” and his familiarity with so many people

involved in the case was a valid race-neutral reason for excusing him. Additionally, the trial court

observed that it had excused another prospective juror for cause on a similar basis.

¶ 34 C. Trial Testimony

¶ 35 The jury trial began on July 19, 2022. At trial, the State presented testimony from multiple

witnesses regarding the events of January 17, 2021, in Oakwood, Illinois. No witness testified to

having directly observed the shootings. Evidence showed that the defendant contacted Wyatt

Bailey through Snapchat to arrange a marijuana purchase. Messages reflected that the defendant

planned to purchase marijuana and marijuana related products (cartridges), and Bailey provided

his address. Bailey gathered cannabis products into a black bag, recorded a video of the items and

sent it to the defendant via Snapchat, and exited his residence carrying the bag. Bailey also had his

firearm, a Glock handgun, in his sweatshirt pocket.

¶ 36 Shortly thereafter, multiple witnesses heard gunshots. Several individuals testified that they

observed a gold Chevrolet Impala in the area before and after the gunshots, including driving

through the neighborhood and then leaving at a high rate of speed. One witness observed a person

enter the rear passenger-side door of the vehicle as it drove away, and others described the rear

17 passenger-side door as open while the vehicle was in motion. No witness identified any occupant

of the vehicle or testified to observing anyone shoot Bailey.

¶ 37 Bailey was found lying on his back outside his residence with gunshot wounds. Testimony

described injuries to his chest, legs, and hip, as well as blunt force trauma to the back of his head

consistent with being struck. Evidence showed that items Bailey had taken outside, including the

cannabis bag, were no longer on his person, and the front pocket of his hoodie, where his firearm

was located, was ripped.

¶ 38 Witness testimony also addressed events near a ravine at the end of the street. After hearing

gunshots, a witness observed the Impala pull up in that area and saw an arm with African-American

skin extend from the front passenger-side window and throw a firearm into the nearby wooded

ravine. Additional evidence included video footage from that area depicting the vehicle turning

around, with the rear passenger-side window lowered. Law enforcement later recovered a Smith

& Wesson 9-millimeter handgun from that location. Firearms examination established that this

weapon fired the shell casings recovered from the scene, as well as the fired bullet recovered from

the ground near where Bailey was shot. In addition, the bullet removed from Bailey’s leg during

autopsy was determined to have been fired from that same Smith & Wesson. DNA testing further

identified Bailey’s DNA on the trigger of the firearm and Clayvonte Sloan’s DNA on the barrel.

¶ 39 Law enforcement stopped the Impala shortly after the shooting. The vehicle contained five

occupants, including the defendant, who was seated in the rear passenger-side seat. Clayvonte

Sloan was found unresponsive in the backseat between the rear passengers. Testimony described

the occupants as “scared” and “frantic,” and the defendant was observed shaking Sloan and stating

that someone in the vehicle had been shot. Sloan later died from a gunshot wound that entered his

lower abdomen and exited through his body, causing significant internal bleeding.

18 ¶ 40 Officers recovered two firearms from the rear seating area of the Impala, including a Glock

handgun associated with Bailey; testimony indicated that the firearms recovered from the vehicle

were inoperable at the time due to malfunctions. A fired bullet associated with the Glock was

located lodged in the rear bench seat in the area where Sloan had been seated. Officers also

recovered a black bag containing cannabis products from beneath the front passenger seat.

Testimony indicated that the contents of that bag were consistent with the cannabis products

depicted in the Snapchat video recorded by Bailey shortly before the shooting. In addition,

approximately $1,000 in currency was recovered from the vehicle, consisting of both U.S. currency

and counterfeit bills.

¶ 41 Gunshot residue (GSR) samples were collected from the occupants of the vehicle,

including the defendant, as well as from portions of the vehicle’s interior. Forensic scientist Shan

Mei-Jones testified that primer GSR consists of particles containing lead, barium, and antimony,

and that a positive result requires the confirmed presence of at least three tri-component particles.

The defendant tested positive on both hands. Griggs tested positive on both hands, and Bryant

tested positive on his right hand only, while Halthon’s samples were negative. Mei-Jones noted

that the samples were collected more than six hours after the shooting, which could have reduced

the number of detectable particles, yet the presence of GSR on the defendant’s hands remained

significant. She also identified GSR on portions of the vehicle’s interior, including areas near the

door panel, consistent with the discharge of a firearm within or in close proximity to the vehicle.

Mei-Jones explained that such residues may result from firing, handling, or being near a discharged

firearm, and that particles can transfer between individuals and surfaces.

¶ 42 The defense presented testimony from one witness, who testified that photographs

recovered from Bryant’s phone depicted him with a firearm prior to the incident. During

19 deliberations, the jury requested a definition of “proximately,” and the court instructed the jury

that the term meant “[i]mmediately by or after, very near, or close in time.”

¶ 43 The jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery and two counts of first degree murder

for the deaths of Wyatt Bailey and Clayvonte Sloan. The jury further found that the defendant

personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm or death to Bailey.

¶ 44 D. Post-Trial and Sentencing

¶ 45 On October 3, 2022, the trial court first held a hearing on the defendant’s amended motion

for acquittal or a new trial. The defendant’s amended motion raised several arguments, including

an as-applied constitutional challenge to the sentence because the mandatory minimum 40 year

sentence “leaves no discretion to the judge to craft an individualized sentences as required by

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (2019), and 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-105.” Additionally, in a separate sentencing memorandum filed October 3, 2022, the

defendant argued that, in order to comply with Buffer, the trial court must sentence him to less than

40 years imprisonment; thus, the 40-year mandatory minimum the defendant faces is

unconstitutional as applied, because it prevents the trial court from considering the required factors

under Miller and section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105

(West 2020)). At the hearing on the amended motion, defense counsel made several arguments in

support of acquittal or a new trial. However, in regard to the as-applied constitutional challenge to

the sentencing range, defense counsel did not make an argument but instead opted to “take that up

separately.” The State did not address that claim in its responsive arguments. The trial court, when

denying the defendant’s amended motion, stated, “As far as the minimum sentence being 40 years,

that’s been the law in the State for some time. I’m sure it’s been challenged many times. You’re

20 welcome to challenge it again on appeal, but at this point in time, I’m not going to find that was

unconstitutional.”

¶ 46 After denying the defendant’s amended motion, the trial court then proceeded to

sentencing. The State presented testimony from Logan Ingram, the probation officer who created

the presentence investigation report for the defendant, and Danville Police Officer Seth Talbot,

who recounted prior encounters with the defendant in 2020. Kathy Cooper, the grandmother of

victim Wyatt Bailey, provided a victim impact statement. The State argued in aggravation that the

defendant had demonstrated a lack of regard for human life, emphasizing the circumstances of the

offense, the defendant’s prior delinquency adjudication, and his supervision status at the time of

the shootings.

¶ 47 Defense counsel argued in mitigation, highlighting Cooper’s age and immaturity—he had

turned 15 just 11 days before the incident—his positive conduct while in juvenile detention, his

responsiveness to adult guidance, his traumatic childhood, and vulnerability to peer influence.

Counsel emphasized the prior findings of Dr. Hoy-Watkins contained in the psychological

evaluation report that was completed for the purposes of the transfer hearing. She noted the

defendant’s emotional maturation was underdeveloped, that his upbringing, including repeated

paternal incarceration, increased his susceptibility to peer influence, and that he had displayed

rehabilitation, including positive school performance and behavior while detained. A letter from

the mother of the second victim, Clayvonte Sloan, was read, indicating she did not wish the

defendant to serve time for her son’s death.

¶ 48 The trial court, considering the defendant’s youth and the mitigating evidence presented,

imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment on each count of first degree

murder, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 40 years. The trial court merged

21 the armed robbery conviction into the felony murder conviction and declined to apply a firearm-

enhancement for Bailey’s death, although it agreed that the evidence supported the jury’s finding

of personal discharge. The court noted it had the ability to sentence the defendant to more than 40

years, but after considering the defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances, it declined to

impose a sentence in excess of the minimum. Specifically, the trial court stated,

“The request for 70 years from the State, had he been 18 years old, was a [sic]

perfectly reasonable, and in fact, probably low. It would have been mandatory life. You

earned every bit of 70. I’m only giving you 40 because the case law tells me I have to find

extraordinary circumstances, and they are just not here.”

On April 24, 2023, at the hearing on the motion to reconsider the sentence, defense counsel stood

on her written motion. The motion to reconsider the sentence was subsequently denied. This appeal

followed. Additional facts are included in the analysis section where necessary.

¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 50 A. Discretionary Transfer

¶ 51 On appeal, the defendant first contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in

transferring him to adult criminal court by (1) misinterpreting his traumatic experiences as

maturity, (2) failing to accurately account for expert evidence of his emotional underdevelopment

and susceptibility to peer influence, (3) overemphasizing the seriousness of the offense, and

(4) failing to consider the availability and potential effectiveness of rehabilitative services in the

juvenile system. He contends that, in light of his age, minimal delinquency history, and capacity

for rehabilitation, he should have remained in juvenile court.

¶ 52 The State argues the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the defendant

to adult court. The juvenile court properly considered all statutory factors, including the

22 defendant’s age, history, circumstances of the offense, and public safety. The offenses involved

the death of two victims with a firearm, and the defendant had a prior history of delinquency and

school disciplinary issues. The juvenile court also found that juvenile services could still be

accessed if transferred. The State highlights that the defendant’s arguments merely dispute the

weight the juvenile court assigned to these factors, which is insufficient to overturn a transfer under

the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.

¶ 53 Whether a case was properly transferred to adult court is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1987). However, that discretion is limited and

controlled by the Act. People v. Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 21. Courts of review must

determine if there was sufficient evidence in the record as to each statutory factor to support the

transfer order. Id. “The mere recitation in the record that all statutory factors have been considered

is not enough to affirm a discretionary transfer order.” Id. In determining whether to transfer a

juvenile, the court must consider:

“(i) the age of the minor;

(ii) the history of the minor, including:

(A) any previous delinquent or criminal history of the minor,

(B) any previous abuse of neglect history of the minor, and

(C) any mental health, physical or educational history of the minor or combination

of these factors;

(iii) the circumstances of the offense, including:

(A) the seriousness of the offense,

(B) whether the minor is charged through accountability,

23 (C) whether there is evidence the offense was committed in an aggressive and

premeditated manner,

(D) whether there is evidence the offense caused serious bodily harm,

(E) whether there is evidence the minor possessed a deadly weapon;

(iv) the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system including whether there

are facilities or programs, or both, particularly available in the juvenile system;

(v) whether the security of the public requires sentencing under Chapter V of the Unified

Code of Corrections:

(A) the minor’s history of services, including the minor’s willingness to participate

meaningfully in available services;

(B) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated

before the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction;

(C) the adequacy of the punishment or services.

In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the

alleged offense and the minor’s prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed

in this subsection.” 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(b) (West 2020).

In addition to those statutory factors, the court must also weigh nonstatutory factors when making

its decision, “such as the resulting sentence if the minor is convicted under the Criminal Code.”

Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 20. When reviewing a juvenile court’s order transferring a

minor, a reviewing court does not reweigh the factors. People v. Harris, 2022 IL App (1st) 192509,

¶ 22.

¶ 54 Based on a thorough review of the record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the State’s motion to transfer the defendant for prosecution under the criminal laws. The

24 juvenile court conducted a full evidentiary hearing, heard arguments from counsel, and found

probable cause that the defendant committed the acts alleged, which included multiple counts of

first degree murder. Further, the juvenile court took under advisement whether it was in the best

interests of the public to proceed under the Act, requested counsel to submit final arguments in

writing, and explicitly considered all statutory factors enumerated in section 5-805(3)(b) of the

Act (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(b) (West 2020)) and nonstatutory factors. The juvenile court’s

decision reflects a careful balancing of the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation against the

public’s interest in protection from serious criminal conduct.

¶ 55 First, regarding the defendant’s age, the juvenile court noted that he had just turned 15 at

the time of the offenses. While acknowledging the emotional, intellectual, and social

characteristics inherent to youth, the juvenile court found that the defendant’s life experiences—

including prior encounters with law enforcement, having shots fired at him at ages 10 and 14, and

prior supervision for a gun and drug related armed robbery—reflected exposure beyond his

chronological years. Although expert testimony described his emotional maturity as

underdeveloped and tenuous, the juvenile court found that the defendant demonstrated leadership

in planning the drug transaction and bringing other young individuals into the criminal scheme,

indicating he was a leader rather than a follower.

¶ 56 Second, in evaluating the defendant’s history, the juvenile court emphasized his prior

delinquency, including a two-year period of juvenile supervision for an armed robbery with guns,

school disciplinary actions, and violations of prior supervision—including having contact with the

other codefendants related to this case. The juvenile court also considered prior trauma, including

the incarcerations of his father and experiences with gun violence, but found no evidence of abuse

25 or neglect requiring child protection intervention. The juvenile court concluded that prior

interventions—judicial, school, or otherwise—had failed to alter the defendant’s behavior.

¶ 57 Third, regarding the circumstances of the offenses, the juvenile court found the defendant

was facing the most serious of offenses and was charged as both a principal and through

accountability. Additionally, it determined there was evidence that the defendant planned the

underlying drug transaction and personally joined in the physical assault upon the victim, Bailey,

which demonstrated aggression and premeditation. Further, there was evidence that the offenses

caused the death of two victims, and the defendant possessed a firearm. These findings are

consistent with the statutory factors for discretionary transfer.

¶ 58 Fourth, the juvenile court considered the advantages of treatment in the juvenile justice

system. It acknowledged that rehabilitation programs exist and would remain available until age

21, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted as an adult. However, the defendant had

never participated in such programs and had previously minimized the need for substance abuse

or other interventions. The juvenile court concluded that while juvenile programming might

benefit him, his escalating aggressive conduct and lack of engagement with prior interventions

suggested a limited likelihood of rehabilitation before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction.

¶ 59 Finally, the juvenile court considered the public safety and adequacy of punishment factors.

The defendant’s violations of supervision, history of disciplinary issues, and continued

engagement in criminal behavior demonstrated a pattern of escalating “aggression, hostility, and

rejection of authority and discipline.” The juvenile court found that a juvenile sentence of five

years would inadequately reflect the gravity of the offenses or protect the public. Additionally, it

also explicitly considered the potential adult sentence if the defendant were convicted under the

criminal laws, noting that “if the minor were convicted of murder in criminal court he would serve

26 a minimum of 20 years in prison.” In weighing the statutory factors, the juvenile court properly

gave greater weight to the seriousness of the offenses and the defendant’s prior delinquency, as

required by statute.

¶ 60 Although the defendant argues that the court erred in considering certain factors or that it

should have assigned more weight to mitigating circumstances such as his age or influence from

older codefendants, such arguments merely challenge the weight given to the factors. Under

established Illinois law, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile

court or reverse a transfer order simply because it might have weighed the factors differently.

People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (2001).

¶ 61 Accordingly, the juvenile court carefully considered all required factors, properly weighed

the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s prior history, balanced the defendant’s

rehabilitative potential against public safety, and reached a reasoned conclusion that transfer to

adult court was warranted. Because the defendant’s arguments amount to a disagreement with the

weight assigned to those factors, we find the juvenile court acted within its discretion in

transferring the defendant.

¶ 62 B. Batson Challenge

¶ 63 The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenge under Batson

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to the State’s peremptory strike of Juror Cross, the only African-

American prospective juror, arguing that the State’s proffered reasons were pretextual and

unsupported by the record. Under Batson, a three-step process governs such claims: (1) the

defendant must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) if that showing is made,

the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike, and (3) the trial

court must then determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.

27 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98; People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 323-24 (2000). At the second step,

the State’s burden is minimal and requires only a facially race-neutral reason. Purkett v. Elem, 514

U.S. 765, 768 (1995). The ultimate question of discriminatory intent at the third step is a factual

determination, and a reviewing court will not disturb that finding unless it is clearly erroneous.

People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002). “Where more than one explanation has been offered for

the exclusion of a venire member, it is sufficient for our purposes if at least one of these

explanations is race neutral.” Id.

¶ 64 Here, after finding that the defendant made a prima facie showing, the trial court required

the State to articulate its reasons for striking Juror Cross. The State identified several concerns,

including Cross’s apparent lack of candor regarding his prior criminal history, his inability to

specify the occupations of most of his adult children, and his familiarity with both the defendant’s

family and the victim’s family, which the State characterized as rendering him a “wild card.” The

trial court denied the Batson challenge, relying in part on Cross’s familiarity with individuals

connected to both sides of the case. The defendant argues that these reasons were pretextual,

emphasizing that other prospective jurors exhibited similar characteristics but were not struck and

that the State misstated portions of Cross’s voir dire testimony. The State responds that its

concerns were supported by the record and that Cross’s combination of characteristics

distinguished him from other prospective jurors.

¶ 65 In denying the defendant’s posttrial motion on this issue, the trial court further explained

its reasoning, noting its understanding that the State had conducted background checks on all

prospective jurors, not solely Cross, and reiterating that Cross had acknowledged knowing the

victim and his mother, as well as having some familiarity with defendant’s family. The trial court

analogized this circumstance to its removal of another juror for cause based on concerns about

28 potential influence arising from familiarity, and emphasized that, under Batson, the State was

required only to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike, not one the court itself would

necessarily have exercised.

¶ 66 On this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s determination was clearly erroneous.

The State’s proffered reasons were facially race-neutral, and Cross’s acknowledged familiarity

with both the victim’s and the defendant’s families, some of whom were testifying witnesses, finds

support in the record and provides a rational, case-related basis for the strike. See People v. Britt,

265 Ill. App. 3d 129, 137-38 (1994) (the State’s concerns regarding a juror’s acquaintance with

potential witnesses are legitimate, race-neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge).

Although the defendant points to other jurors who also had some familiarity with individuals

connected to the case or were unable to identify their adult children’s occupations, the record

reflects that those jurors did not present the same combination of concerns identified by the State—

particularly Cross’s familiarity with both the victim’s and defendant’s families. Moreover, the trial

court was in the best position to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility and the juror’s demeanor, and

its determination is therefore entitled to substantial deference. Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S.

284, 303 (2019). Given the deference owed to the trial court’s credibility determinations and the

support in the record for the State’s race-neutral explanations, we cannot say the trial court’s ruling

was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s Batson

challenge.

¶ 67 C. Felony Murder Conviction

¶ 68 The defendant next argues that his conviction for first degree murder in the death of

Clayvonte Sloan must be vacated because (1) the version of the felony murder statute in effect at

29 the time of the offense was unconstitutional as applied to him and (2) the evidence was insufficient

to establish that he proximately caused Sloan’s death.

¶ 69 As to the defendant’s constitutional challenge, the constitutionality of a statute is a question

of law subject to de novo review. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 57. Statutes are presumed

constitutional, and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing a

constitutional violation. Id. A court must construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality if

reasonably possible. Id. Further, “neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Illinois Constitution

prevents statutes and statutory changes from having a beginning,” and the legislature may enact

changes prospectively without offending due process. People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 10;

see also People v. Brown, 2024 IL 129585, ¶¶ 30-37 (holding provisions of Public Act 101-652

apply prospectively).

¶ 70 Under the version of the felony murder statute in effect at the time of the offense, a

defendant commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause a death, he is

committing or attempting to commit a forcible felony. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020). At the

time, Illinois followed the proximate cause theory of felony murder, under which liability attached

for any death proximately resulting from the commission of a forcible felony, “notwithstanding

the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime.” People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247, 249

(1998); People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 465 (1997). The Illinois Supreme Court has rejected

challenges to the proximate cause theory as it then applied to felony murder and reaffirmed its

application, including in cases involving the death of a co-felon. People v. Klebanowski, 221 Ill.

2d 538, 554-55 (2006).

¶ 71 The defendant acknowledges that the statutory amendment narrowing felony murder

liability does not apply retroactively but argues that its enactment renders the prior version

30 unconstitutional as applied to him based on (1) the proximal timing of the amendment to the

offense and (2) his youth and the fact that Sloan was killed by a third party. The State responds

that the defendant had no due process right to the retroactive application of the amended statute

and that existing precedent forecloses his constitutional claim.

¶ 72 The defendant frames his claim as an as-applied constitutional challenge based on his

individual youth, cognitive development, and personal circumstances. Such claims ordinarily

require a sufficiently developed factual record. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37.

Although the record here contains information concerning the defendant’s youth and background,

including a psychological evaluation prepared in connection with the juvenile transfer

proceedings, it was not developed in the trial court for the purpose of litigating an as-applied

constitutional challenge to the felony murder statute. Nor was such an argument even raised by

counsel before the trial court.

¶ 73 If we found the defendant’s claim potentially meritorious, we would decline to consider it

on this record. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 38-39. However, for the reasons discussed

below, we find the defendant’s challenge fails as a matter of law, even accepting the defendant’s

premise that his youth and attendant circumstances diminish his culpability. Accordingly, there is

no need to delay resolving this issue. See People v. Watson, 2021 IL App (1st) 180034, ¶ 20.

¶ 74 On the merits, the defendant’s claim fails. The legislature’s decision to amend the statute

prospectively does not render the prior version unconstitutional, even where, as here, the

amendment occurred in close temporal proximity to the commission of the offense. Brown, 2024

IL 129585, ¶¶ 30-37; Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 10. As our supreme court has made clear,

the legislature may choose to change the law prospectively without offending constitutional

principles, and such changes do not undermine the validity of the prior statutory scheme. Id. Thus,

31 the timing of the amendment does not alter the analysis or provide a basis for concluding that the

statute, as previously written, is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.

¶ 75 Moreover, binding precedent has upheld the proximate cause theory as it then applied to

felony murder, including where the fatal act was committed by a third party. Klebanowski, 221 Ill.

2d at 554-55. Illinois courts have likewise rejected similar attempts to invalidate the statute based

on a defendant’s youth or evolving juvenile jurisprudence. See, e.g., Watson, 2021 IL App (1st)

180034, ¶¶ 49-52, 57; People v. O’Neal, 2021 IL App (4th) 200014, ¶ 64-66. These decisions

decline to extend juvenile sentencing jurisprudence to invalidate the felony murder statute on due

process grounds, recognizing that such principles do not alter the substantive scope of liability

under the statute.

¶ 76 Accordingly, even accepting the defendant’s premise regarding his youth and attendant

circumstances, he has not established that the felony murder statute, as applied to him, violates

due process. Thus, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of clearly establishing a

constitutional violation, and his challenge to the statute fails.

¶ 77 The defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove felony murder

beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant makes a claim that there was insufficient evidence

to sustain his conviction, this court reviews the evidence presented at trial in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime or crimes of which the defendant

was convicted. People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 416 (2007). We will not reverse a criminal

conviction unless the evidence presented at trial is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify a

reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. Id. We allow all reasonable inferences from the

record in favor of the prosecution, whether the evidence in the case is direct or circumstantial. Id.

32 There is no requirement that this court disregard inferences that flow from the evidence, or that

this court search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level

of reasonable doubt. Id. at 416-17. We do not retry the defendant; instead, leaving it to the trier of

fact to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable

inferences based upon all of the evidence properly before the trier of fact. Id. at 416.

¶ 78 To sustain a conviction for felony murder, the State was required to prove that the

defendant committed or attempted to commit a forcible felony and that Sloan’s death was

proximately caused by that felony. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020); People v. Hudson, 222 Ill.

2d 392, 401 (2006). Although foreseeability is not an element of felony murder where the killing

is committed by a co-offender, it is required under Illinois's proximate cause theory where, as here,

the fatal act is committed by a third party. See Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 465-66. Proximate cause

includes both cause in fact and legal cause, the latter of which is essentially a question of

foreseeability—whether the resulting harm is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a

likely consequence of his conduct. Id.

¶ 79 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could find that

the defendant participated in an armed robbery and that Sloan’s death was a direct and foreseeable

consequence of that offense. The evidence showed that the defendant arranged the meeting with

the victim, Bailey, for a marijuana transaction, arrived with multiple companions and firearms,

and the victim suffered injuries to the back of the head and fatal gunshot wounds from the firearm

that was discarded from the Impala into a nearby ravine. Further, following the incident, the group

possessed the victim’s bag of marijuana, both legitimate and counterfeit currency, and a firearm

belonging to the victim. Additionally, the defendant tested positive for gunshot residue on both of

his hands. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant intended to take

33 property by force. See People v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 387 (2007) (felony murder derives

its mental state from the underlying felony).

¶ 80 The jury could likewise find proximate cause. Illinois courts have consistently held that it

is reasonably foreseeable that a victim of a forcible felony will resist with deadly force, and that

such resistance may result in the death of a participant. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d at 249; Lowery, 178 Ill.

2d at 473. Here, the jury was properly instructed that it must find that Sloan’s death was a “direct

and foreseeable consequence” of the chain of events set in motion by the armed robbery. The

evidence supported such a finding, as the circumstances—an arranged meeting involving multiple

participants, firearms, and the taking of property—created a situation in which a violent response

was a reasonably foreseeable consequence under an objective standard.

¶ 81 The defendant’s argument that his youth rendered Sloan’s death unforeseeable is

unpersuasive. In making this claim, the defendant relies on principles from juvenile sentencing

cases, which recognize that juveniles are generally less mature and less able to evaluate risks and

foresee consequences than adults. See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72. Based on that, the

defendant argues that foreseeability should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable juvenile

rather than a reasonable person. As discussed above, Illinois felony murder liability does not turn

on a defendant’s subjective ability to anticipate the precise manner in which a death occurs, but

instead applies an objective standard tied to the foreseeable consequences of the underlying felony.

See Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401. The defendant’s reliance on juvenile sentencing jurisprudence is

misplaced, as those principles do not alter the substantive elements of felony murder or the

objective reasonable-person standard governing proximate cause. See Watson, 2021 IL App (1st)

180034, ¶¶ 40-43, 52. Because the law does not adjust foreseeability based on the offender’s youth,

the jury was entitled to apply the objective standard, and we will not disturb its finding on appeal.

34 ¶ 82 Accordingly, the defendant has not demonstrated that the felony murder statute was

unconstitutional as applied to him, and the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

State, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Sloan’s death was proximately

caused by the defendant’s commission of armed robbery. Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s

conviction on this count.

¶ 83 D. Sentencing

¶ 84 Lastly, the defendant contends that his aggregate 40-year sentence, imposed as two

mandatory consecutive 20-year terms for first degree murder, violates the eighth amendment and

the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. He argues that the

mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme precluded meaningful consideration of his youth,

rendering the sentence unconstitutional.

¶ 85 An as-applied constitutional challenge is a legal question that we review de novo. People

v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 18. The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment

and, under Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, forbids mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile

offenders, requiring that sentencing courts consider the mitigating qualities of youth before

imposing the harshest penalties. The Supreme Court subsequently clarified that discretionary

sentencing schemes satisfy this requirement so long as the sentencer considers an offender’s youth

and attendant circumstances before imposing a life-without-parole sentence. Jones v. Mississippi,

593 U.S. 98, 106 (2021). Under Illinois law, a prison term greater than 40 years imposed on a

juvenile constitutes a de facto life sentence that triggers Miller protections. People v. Buffer, 2019

IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42. Sentences of 40 years or less, by contrast, do not constitute de facto life

sentences. Id. Moreover, the proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) is violated

only where a penalty is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock

35 the moral sense of the community. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51. Successful as-applied

challenges to mandatory sentences remain rare. People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 33.

¶ 86 The defendant argues that, because the trial court was required to impose a 40-year

minimum, it lacked discretion to impose a lesser sentence even if his youth and attendant

characteristics warranted mitigation. He maintains that this constraint rendered the sentence

unconstitutional under both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. The

State responds that the sentence does not constitute a life or de facto life term, that the statutory

scheme is constitutional, and that each 20-year term is proportionate to the seriousness of the

offense

¶ 87 Here, the defendant’s aggregate sentence is 40 years, which does not exceed the threshold

established in Buffer and therefore does not constitute a de facto life sentence. Buffer, 2019 IL

122327, ¶¶ 41-42. Because Miller’s protections apply only to life or de facto life sentences, they

are not implicated here. Further, the record indicates that the trial court considered the defendant’s

youth and attendant characteristics in imposing the 40-year sentence. Moreover, nothing in Miller

or its progeny requires a sentencing court to have discretion to impose a sentence below a statutory

minimum where the sentence imposed is not life or its functional equivalent. Jones, 593 U.S. at

104-05 (explaining that a discretionary sentencing scheme allowing the sentencer to consider

youth and impose a lesser sentence than life without parole is constitutionally sufficient).

Accordingly, because the defendant did not receive a life or de facto life sentence, his eighth

amendment claim fails.

¶ 88 With respect to the defendant’s proportionate penalties claim, we are presented with a

different procedural posture. Unlike the eighth amendment, the proportionate penalties clause is

not limited to life or de facto life sentences, and a defendant may raise an as-applied challenge to

36 a sentence of any length. People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 42-43. Further, evolving science

regarding youth and brain development may, in an appropriate case, support such a claim. Id.

¶ 89 However, as our supreme court has repeatedly emphasized, as-applied constitutional

challenges are dependent upon a sufficiently developed evidentiary record. Id. ¶ 44; Harris, 2018

IL 121932, ¶ 39. Where such a record has not been developed in the circuit court, the claim is more

appropriately raised in a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Spencer, 2025 IL

130015, ¶ 45; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48.

¶ 90 Although the record in this case contains more information regarding the defendant’s youth

and background than others, including a psychological evaluation prepared in connection with the

juvenile transfer proceedings, the record was not developed for purposes of litigating an as-applied

proportionate penalties challenge. The defendant raised the issue in a posttrial motion, but the trial

court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, receive testimony, or make factual findings directed

toward how the defendant’s specific characteristics render the mandatory sentencing scheme

unconstitutional as applied to him. Thus, the record lacks the type of factual development

contemplated in Harris and Spencer.

¶ 91 Accordingly, while the defendant is not foreclosed from pursuing his as-applied

proportionate penalties claim, the present record is insufficient for this court to adjudicate that

claim on direct appeal. The proper vehicle for such a challenge is a postconviction proceeding,

commenced by the filing of a petition, which must, among other things, “clearly set forth the

respects in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020).

¶ 92 For these reasons, the defendant’s eighth amendment challenge fails on the merits, and his

proportionate penalties claim is better suited for postconviction review. The defendant’s sentence

is therefore affirmed.

37 ¶ 93 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 94 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

¶ 95 Affirmed.