People v. Cool

2023 IL App (4th) 210100-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 30, 2023
• Docket: 4-21-0100
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 210100-U FILED This Order was filed under January 30, 2023 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-21-0100 Carla Bender th not precedent except in the 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County BRANDON COOL, ) No. 17CF150 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer Hartmann Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: (1) The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated domestic battery and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the sentencing factors.

¶2 A Livingston County jury found defendant, Brandon Cool, guilty of one count of

aggravated domestic battery (great bodily harm) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2016)), for which

the trial court sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a posttrial motion and a

motion to reconsider his sentence.

¶3 Defendant raises three issues. First, he claims the State failed to prove he committed

aggravated domestic battery by causing great bodily harm to the victim. Second, defendant posits

the trial court committed error in sentencing by considering, as an aggravating factor, other

uncharged incidents of abuse of the victim by defendant. Third, defendant alleges the court failed to consider at sentencing, as mitigation, the impact imprisonment would have on defendant’s

family.

¶4 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 In May 2017, defendant was charged with aggravated domestic battery based on

strangulation (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2016)) and aggravated domestic battery based on

great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2016)). The matter proceeded to a jury trial on

both charges, and the jury found defendant guilty of the latter charge, based on causing great bodily

harm to Stacy Kindelberger (Stacy). The State presented three witnesses between its case-in-chief

and rebuttal, and defendant presented one during his case. Their testimony relevant to the issues

herein we summarize below.

¶7 Stacy testified she had been in a relationship with defendant, and at one time lived

with defendant in the home he shared with his mother. She moved from that residence after

defendant “assaulted” her (she repeated this account during cross-examination). Thereafter, on

May 6, 2017, Stacy and defendant were “hanging out” and “partying” with another couple, first at

the local races and then at Stacy’s home. Defendant started an argument with Stacy over the

attention he alleged she was giving the other male present, and his belief others had consumed

more of their drugs than he had. The other couple left Stacy’s home around 10 p.m. because

defendant “made them uncomfortable.” Defendant, however, stayed and kept arguing with Stacy

until approximately 3 a.m. At that time, Stacy told defendant to leave because she “was tired of

it.”

¶8 While defendant was leaving, Stacy described, he slammed the exterior door into

her face and punched her in the face. She did not recall everything that occurred because it

-2- happened so quickly but related the force of this contact caused her to lose her balance, hit the wall

across the room from the door, and fall to the floor. Defendant then sat on Stacy, grabbed her

throat, and choked her with one hand while punching her face with the other. She “started bucking

like a horse” and was “literally choking and gagging, spitting up blood everywhere.” During the

attack, defendant also “stomped” on Stacy’s head, face, neck, arm, and side. She testified

defendant’s beating caused her to go “in and out of consciousness,” and after one such episode,

she noticed defendant had left her home.

¶9 Defendant took Stacy’s phone when he left, which she knew because he answered

the call she made from her SafeLink phone. She also used the latter to call the police, and shortly

thereafter, Officer Derek Schumm arrived. Upon his arrival, Stacy related she was covered in

blood, her nose was bleeding, and she was still choking on that blood. She went to the hospital,

where it took personnel nearly “four and a half hours” to remove “the blood that was caked” on

her face so they could determine the extent of her injuries.

¶ 10 Stacy identified a photograph of the floor where defendant “pinned,” punched, and

choked her, which depicted blood smeared on the floor and splattered on the wall. She also

identified several photographs of her face before and after hospital personnel removed the blood.

The trial court admitted the foregoing exhibits, as well as several others evidencing bruising on

Stacy in several places. The State published to the jury the image of the floor and another image

depicting Stacy’s bloodied face.

¶ 11 At various times during her testimony, Stacy described her injuries as: (1) a broken

or caved-in right sinus cavity; (2) the loss of peripheral vision in her right eye; (3) the loss of

hearing in her right ear; and (4) being “completely bruised and swollen and beaten,” including

about her face, neck, and head.

-3- ¶ 12 Derek Schumm related he was the police officer for the City of Pontiac dispatched

to Stacy’s home. When Stacy answered the door, he “immediately observed” injuries to her face

and neck, evidenced by blood and bruising. He observed “a good amount of blood on the floor as

well as splattered on the kitchen wall.” Based on what Stacy told him, Schumm identified

defendant as a suspect and called defendant’s cell phone, but he did not answer. Schumm was

aware other officers tried to locate defendant but were unsuccessful. Schumm summoned an

ambulance for Stacy. Though Stacy was upset and in pain, Schumm was not concerned about her

inability to recall and describe the events of that night.

¶ 13 Defendant’s mother, Sheila Cool, testified on his behalf. She related defendant

arrived home at 11 p.m. or 11:30 p.m. on the night Stacy was injured and did not leave until around

7 a.m. the next day, when he boarded a train to St. Louis to help her nephew move. Cool testified

she was a light sleeper and, at the time, she had three dogs who would have alerted if anyone

entered or exited the home.

¶ 14 For its rebuttal case, the State proffered Johnathan Marion, a Pontiac police officer.

Marion testified on the night Stacy was beaten, he learned defendant was a suspect and, based on

previous contacts with defendant, he knew where defendant lived. Marion and another officer went

to the home defendant shared with his mother. Marion knocked “loudly” for around 10 minutes.

No one answered the door, and Marion heard no sound from inside the home other than possibly

the sound of a dog.

¶ 15 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery for causing Stacy

great bodily harm, and not guilty of the same offense based on strangulation.

¶ 16 As to defendant’s criminal history, the presentence investigation report (PSI)

disclosed the following adjudications: (1) two juvenile matters in which defendant had admitted

-4- the allegations of battery and agreed to informal periods of supervision, which were later

terminated unsuccessfully; (2) two theft convictions; (3) two criminal-damage-to-property

convictions; (4) two possession-of-drug-paraphernalia convictions; (5) a burglary conviction for

which his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to four years’ incarceration; (6) a

driving-under-the-influence (DUI) conviction for which he was sentenced to incarceration in the

county jail; and (7) another DUI conviction for which he was sentenced to three years’

imprisonment. The PSI also disclosed several pending matters, including a charge for violating an

order of protection (OP) based on the violations of the conditions of release by absconding, the

removal of the SCRAM (Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring) bracelet, and having a

large delinquent account balance.

¶ 17 Stacy’s victim impact statement described their “abusive relationship” and

defendant’s past acts of abuse toward her, including: (1) pushing her through walls; (2) throwing

televisions at her; (3) breaking her phone so she could not call for help; (4) tearing the electrical

box out of her home; (5) putting his head through a glass window; and (6) violating an OP 10

minutes after his release from custody.

¶ 18 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted the sources of information it

considered included the evidence at trial, the PSI, the information offered by the parties in

mitigation and aggravation, defendant’s allocution, and the victim impact statement. In addition,

the court discussed (1) the need for deterrence, (2) the possibility for defendant’s rehabilitation,

(3) the seriousness of defendant’s conduct, (4) defendant’s unwillingness to obey the law or accept

responsibility, (5) the need for punishment, and (6) the effect incarceration would have on

defendant’s family.

-5- ¶ 19 As to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct, the trial court noted, “[s]hort of killing

her,” it was “not too sure what else could have happened.” The “really horrendous beating”

defendant inflicted led to “very, very serious injuries,” producing the “worst pictures” the court

had ever viewed of a domestic battery victim. The court noted defendant’s extensive criminal

history and that, despite prior imprisonment, he had done nothing to alter his conduct. Defendant’s

history also was indicative of his poor rehabilitative potential and supported the need for

deterrence. The court also noted defendant was “on the run” for over two years, during which

period he took no steps to improve himself or address the underlying causes of his past actions.

Relative to rehabilitation, the court mentioned in passing defendant’s conduct was “not a one time

incident.” Finally, the court noted the fact defendant had a young child was unavailing as

mitigation at all, given he had the child during the period he had “absconded,” as described above.

¶ 20 The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years of imprisonment. Defendant filed a

posttrial motion and a motion to reconsider his sentence, both of which the court denied.

¶ 21 This appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Standard of Review

¶ 24 We will not reverse a conviction on appeal “for insufficient evidence unless the

evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt remains as to the defendant’s

guilt.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 26. We view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the State and consider whether any “rational trier of fact” could have concluded the evidence

established the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We do not retry the

accused, and we draw any reasonable inference in favor of the State. Id. Throughout, the fact

finder’s responsibility is to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts within the evidence, and draw

-6- reasonable inferences therefrom. We will not substitute our judgment “for that of the trier of fact

on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Brown,

2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.

¶ 25 B. Aggravated Domestic Battery Based on Great Bodily Harm

¶ 26 Defendant was charged and convicted of “committing a domestic battery” while

“knowingly caus[ing] great bodily harm” pursuant to section 12-3.3(a) of the Criminal Code of

2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2016)). He argues the State failed to prove

defendant caused “great bodily harm.”

¶ 27 There is no precise definition of what constitutes “great bodily harm,” but such

injury is necessarily greater than what could support a simple battery and depends on the degree

of injury. People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 69. Whether a victim’s injuries meet

this standard is for the fact finder to determine. Id. We recognize a beating can produce injuries

qualifying as “great bodily harm” even when those injuries are not permanent and do not linger.

Id. ¶ 70.

¶ 28 In Kinnerson, the defendant beat the victim, seriously injuring her face. Id. ¶ 71.

She reported to the 911 operator the defendant had beaten her, blackening both of her eyes, splitting

her lip, and causing her to urinate on herself. Id. A paramedic who treated her described her swollen

face and eyes, deformed nose, and bloodied mouth. Id. The State also presented photographs of

the injuries. Id. We found “a rationale [sic] trier of fact could have found defendant inflicted great

bodily harm.” Id. ¶ 72. Thus, the testimony and photographs comprised evidence sufficient to

support the defendant’s conviction pursuant to section 12-3.3(a) of the Criminal Code, having

provided detail about the severity of the beating and the scope of the injuries. Id. ¶ 74.

-7- ¶ 29 Herein, Stacy described defendant’s brutal attack and the nature and extent of her

injuries. She testified how defendant slammed the door into her face, punched her in the face,

knocked her down, then choked and punched her some more. Defendant persisted, Stacy testified,

as she was choking, gagging, and spitting up blood. She described how defendant “stomped” all

over her face and torso, and caused her to lose consciousness. She noted it took hospital personnel

over four hours to clean the dried blood off her face. As well, Stacy detailed the injuries about her

head and face, and the partial loss of her ability to hear and see. Finally, Stacy identified

photographs of her injuries and the scene of the attack, showing blood spattered on both the floor

and wall.

¶ 30 Officer Schumm’s testimony supported Stacy’s descriptions. He noted he

“immediately observed” Stacy’s bloodied and bruised head and face. He also described the “good

amount of blood on the floor as well as splattered on the kitchen wall.”

¶ 31 Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence to establish the severe nature

of defendant’s attack, and the severe type and breadth of Stacy’s injuries. Thus, a rational trier of

fact could have found defendant caused “great bodily harm” to Stacy. Such determination was the

province of the jury, and we will not second-guess its judgment on the sufficiency or credibility of

the evidence.

¶ 32 We reject defendant’s assertion Kinnerson required the State to present a medical

expert witness to prove “great bodily harm.” Kinnerson does not suggest such a requirement, as

the “medical” testimony relative to the injuries was from a paramedic describing the victim’s

appearance. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 15. An observation anyone could have made

of bruising, swelling, and deformity is simply not evidence requiring medical expertise.

-8- ¶ 33 Therefore, we find the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction

for aggravated domestic battery based on great bodily harm.

¶ 34 C. Sentencing Factors and Standard of Review

¶ 35 Trial courts have broad discretionary sentencing powers, and we will not reverse a

sentence absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000). We give

such deference because the trial courts are usually in a better position to determine an appropriate

sentence, having the opportunity to assess the defendant’s characteristics, including credibility and

demeanor. Id. at 209. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court solely because

we would weigh the sentencing factors differently. Id. A trial court has discretion to conclude a

sentencing factor deserves little weight, or that it is aggravating. People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133,

160 (1996).

¶ 36 The sentencing court is not required to articulate each factor it relies on when

imposing its sentence. People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11. We presume the court

has considered all mitigation evidence and other factors relevant to sentencing. Id. To rebut this

presumption, the defendant must demonstrate affirmatively the trial court did not consider such

factors. Id.

¶ 37 D. Other Allegations of Abuse

¶ 38 Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by considering

as an aggravating factor Stacy’s statements about defendant’s prior abuse. He claims her

statements are not credible, but he does not claim they were not relevant. Stacy referenced a prior

“assault” during her testimony, and described several other instances in her victim impact

statement.

-9- ¶ 39 A trial court’s wide discretion at sentencing includes the power to consider various

types of information so long as it is relevant and reliable. People v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 490

(1992).

¶ 40 We disagree the record demonstrates the trial court relied on the other allegations

of abuse. The court referenced the prior abuse, but we do not believe the context suggests the court

considered it as an aggravating factor. Instead, the record demonstrates the court relied on

numerous other factors, such as the manner in which defendant committed the offense, his prior

criminal history, and his repeated failures to take steps to become a law-abiding member of society.

See, e.g., People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 330-31 (1992). In short, the court appropriately

concentrated on defendant’s record, character, and the nature of the offense.

¶ 41 However, even if the trial court relied on the prior abuse allegations, it would have

been proper. As to the statements at trial, contrary to defendant’s argument, he did have an

opportunity to cross-examine Stacy about at least one of the statements. In fact, the record shows

defendant confirmed Stacy alleged another incident of defendant’s abuse during his

cross-examination of her, but he did not follow-up to obtain any additional detail. We recognize

this may have been a strategic decision so as not to draw the jury’s attention, but nevertheless he

did have the opportunity. As well, the court and jury would have had the ability to assess Stacy’s

credibility, and we will not substitute our judgment for theirs.

¶ 42 As to the descriptions of prior abuse in the victim impact statement, it would have

been well within the trial court’s discretion to consider those as aggravating factors. People v.

Hestand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 272, 281 (2005).

¶ 43 Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering other allegations

regarding defendant’s prior abuse of Stacy.

- 10 - ¶ 44 E. Impact of Incarceration on Defendant’s Family

¶ 45 Defendant posits the trial court failed to consider the impact his imprisonment

would have on his family, specifically his sons, a 14-year-old and a 30-month-old. He argues

section 5-5-3.1(a)(18) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.1(a)(18) (West 2016)) required the court to consider the negative impact his incarceration might

have on his children.

¶ 46 Notably, the trial court specifically mentioned defendant’s young child and

specifically concluded the child was not a mitigating factor in defendant’s case. In short, the court

considered the negative effect defendant’s imprisonment would have on his family, but determined

the factor carried little weight as mitigation. It is such consideration and assessment that is required

by section 5-5-3.1(a)(18) of the Unified Code, which provides a sentencing court with factors

relative to a parent’s absence “to be considered in assessing this factor in mitigation.” Id. In other

words, a sentencing court is required to consider the impact of incarceration, but is not required to

give it any particular weight.

¶ 47 The foregoing is consistent with the wide discretion afforded sentencing courts to

consider various types of information and determine what weight to place on each factor. As well,

we presume the trial court considered all factors in mitigation, as defendant has not affirmatively

demonstrated otherwise.

¶ 48 Thus, the trial court did not commit error by failing to consider the impact of

defendant’s incarceration on his family.

¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 51 Affirmed.

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