People v. Conover

403 N.E.2d 708, 83 Ill. App. 3d 87, 38 Ill. Dec. 477, 1980 Ill. App. LEXIS 2668

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 9, 1980
• Docket: 78-255
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL

delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Everett Junior Conover was convicted of burglary, and was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge noted defendant’s prior record and Ms failure to appear for sentencing. As aggravating factors, the court cited defendant’s prior record, the need for deterrence and the fact that defendant received compensation for the offense by receiving part of the proceeds. No mitigating factors were found. On appeal defendant challenges the lawfulness of the sentence, aleging that the trial court improperly considered the fact that defendant received some of the proceeds of the burglary as the aggravating factor of receiving compensation for committing the offense.

Section 5 — 5—3.2 of the new sentencing act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2) lists seven factors in aggravation which are to be accorded weight in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment or as reasons to impose a more severe sentence. One of these factors is that “the defendant received compensation for committing the offense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(2).) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding this factor to be present in the instant case where his only “compensation” was a share of the items taken in the burglary.

No cases or statutes have been cited to us defining the word “compensation” as used in criminal law, nor are we aware of any authorities assigning a specialized meaning to the word. In the context of section 5 — 5—3.2, we think the word is used in the ordinary sense, meaning “payment” or “remuneration.” (See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 463 (1971).) Defendant argues that this aggravating factor should be considered only in those cases where someone not involved in the actual commission of the crime has paid the defendant to commit the crime.

We note that the legislature could easily have used language similar to that used in section 9 — 1(b)(5), where one of the aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty is stated as follows:

“5. The defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder * * *.”(Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(5).)

However, different language was used for aggravating factors affecting a sentence of imprisonment.

We believe the legislature intended “compensation” in the sentencing act to include both crimes for hire and crimes where items or money are taken. Thus, where a defendant receives payment by sharing in the proceeds of the crime, the trial court may consider that an aggravating factor in determining sentence.

Since the trial court did not err in considering this aggravating factor in the case at bar, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hancock County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

SCOTT, J., concurs.