People v. Coleman

2025 IL App (4th) 241081-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241081-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is May 21, 2025 NO. 4-24-1081 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County SALLY J. COLEMAN, ) No. 23CF2431 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Brendan A. Maher, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The record does not rebut the representations that defense counsel made in her certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶2 In the circuit court of Winnebago County, defendant, Sally J. Coleman, pleaded

guilty to one count of aggravated arson (see 720 ILCS 5/20-1.1 (West 2022)) in return for 10

years’ imprisonment and the dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. Afterward, she

filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, which the court denied. Defendant appeals,

contending that defense counsel failed to fulfill her duties under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Pursuant to Rule 604(d), however, defense counsel certified that she

had fulfilled those duties. We conclude, de novo, that the record does not rebut the

representations that she made in her certificate. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s

judgment. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On April 1, 2024, a grand jury returned an indictment against defendant. The

indictment was made up of three counts: count I, aggravated arson (see id.); count II, aggravated

battery (see id. § 12-3.05(d)(4)); and count III, threatening a public official (see id. § 12-9(a)).

¶5 At a hearing that same day, defendant proposed entering a negotiated guilty plea.

The agreement between her and the State was that she would plead guilty to count I of the

indictment and, in return, she would receive 10 years’ imprisonment and the State would dismiss

the remaining two counts of the indictment.

¶6 After swearing in defendant, the circuit court proceeded to admonish her. First,

the court ascertained from her that she was 56 years old, that her highest level of education was a

GED, and that the only medications she had been taking were blood pressure pills and ibuprofen.

Then, after reviewing the terms of the plea agreement with her, the court read count I of the

indictment to her. The court explained to her that, as charged in count I, the offense of

aggravated arson was a Class X felony: “an extended term eligible Class X felony offense

punishable by a minimum term in prison of 6 years and a maximum term in prison of up to 60

years,” followed by 18 months of mandatory supervised release. (Defendant previously served a

sentence of imprisonment for aggravated arson in Winnebago County case No. 06-CF-58.) The

court further explained that the maximum fine was $25,000; defendant would not be eligible for

probation; and when she was released from prison, she would have to register as an arsonist. The

court then asked her, “[D]o you understand this offense of aggravated arson and the sentencing

ranges that could go along with it?” She answered, “Yes.” The court then asked her, “And is it

the charge that today you’re prepared to plead guilty to?” She answered, “Yes, sir.”

¶7 Next, the circuit court requested from the prosecutor “a fact proffer with respect

-2- to the events of October 16, 2023, as it relates to aggravated arson.” The prosecutor read a

proffer, the substance of which was as follows. On October 16, 2023, Investigator Carden of the

Rockford Fire Department investigated a fire at Olesen Plaza, a residential building. Defendant,

an occupant of apartment No. 804, was standing nearby. She was threatening people at the scene

and was detained. Carden found that five separate fires appeared to have been set on three

separate floors of the apartment building. The fire damage was to various doors in the building.

In Carden’s opinion, someone had set fire to the doors intentionally. Security video showed

defendant setting the fires with a yellow spray can and a lighter. In defendant’s apartment,

investigators found a yellow spray can that appeared to match the yellow spray can in the

security video. Also, the police found a lighter on defendant’s person. When the prosecutor

finished reading this proffer, the court asked defendant if she had been “able to hear and

understand” it. She answered, “Yes.” The court then asked her:

“[U]nderstanding those are the facts the State believes and expects it could prove

against you if you went to a trial but they’re also the facts that you’re accepting

and pleading guilty to here this morning, do you remain willing to plead guilty to

this offense of aggravated arson?”

She answered, “Yes.” Then, in response to the court’s inquiry, defense counsel stipulated that

those were the facts in the discovery materials and that, “if proven at trial beyond a reasonable

doubt,” those facts “would support the entry of a judgment of conviction.”

¶8 The circuit court then proceeded to admonish defendant on her trial rights. She

acknowledged her understanding that, on all three counts of the indictment, she had the right to a

jury trial in which she would be presumed innocent and in which she could not be convicted

unless the State proved her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. She acknowledged her

-3- understanding that she could have either a trial by a jury of 12 citizens or a trial by a judge alone

and that which kind of trial she had would be up to her alone. She acknowledged her

understanding that, regardless of which kind of trial she chose, she would have the right, with the

assistance of an attorney, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against her and to call

witnesses on her own behalf—and to obtain a court order compelling the attendance of witnesses

if they refused to attend voluntarily. Defendant acknowledged her understanding that, before,

during, and after the trial, she would have the right to be represented by an attorney. This

attorney, the court explained, could be one whom she herself chose and hired, or, alternatively, if

she could not afford an attorney, an attorney would be appointed to represent her at no cost to

her. Defendant acknowledged her understanding that if she pleaded guilty to count I, there would

be no trial of any kind on that count and that, instead, she would be convicted and sentenced on

that count on the basis of her guilty plea.

¶9 The circuit court then asked defendant if she was willing to plead guilty to

aggravated arson. She answered in the affirmative. The court asked her if she was willing to give

up her right to have a trial on that charge. She answered in the affirmative. The court asked her if

anyone had used force or threats to compel her to enter into the plea agreement. She denied that

anyone had done so. The court asked her if anyone had tried to talk her into pleading guilty

against her will. She answered, “No.” The court asked her if she believed she had been given

enough time to meet with defense counsel and to discuss going to trial versus entering a

negotiated guilty plea. Defendant answered in the affirmative. The court asked defendant if she

had received a sufficient opportunity to go through the discovery materials with defense counsel

and seek legal advice from her. Defendant answered in the affirmative.

¶ 10 The circuit court asked defendant if she was satisfied with the legal advice and

-4- representation she had received from defense counsel. Defendant answered, “Sort of.” The court

asked her to explain. She answered:

“When I looked at the discovery of the fire, I had told the State I’ll take 10

years. But the fire wasn’t that bad, Your Honor. It wasn’t that bad at all. I mean, I

could have pretty much took a push broom and cleaned it up within four hours.”

The court pointed out to defendant that, regardless of whether the fire damage was minimal, the

fire could have spread and people could have died. Defendant expressed relief that no one had

died. The court reminded her, “The issue is, for my purposes, whether you believe you’ve been

well represented by your attorney.” Defendant then responded, “Yes, I do.” The court asked her

again, “In other words, you’re satisfied with [defense counsel’s] representation of you?” She

answered, “Yes, sir.”

¶ 11 After reconfirming with defendant that she still wanted to plead guilty to count I

and that she did not wish to go to trial, and after reconfirming that she understood the agreed-

upon sentence, including the requirement that she serve at least 85% of the 10-year term of

imprisonment, the circuit court found the proposed guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary,

accepted it, and entered judgment on it. The remaining two counts of the indictment were

dismissed, and the court sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon sentence of 10 years’

imprisonment, with 168 days of presentence credit.

¶ 12 On April 30, 2024, defense counsel filed, along with a Rule 604(d) certificate (see

Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024)), a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the

judgment. The motion requested this relief on the following two grounds:

“1. That the defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

waive [her] rights to jury trial, nor did the defendant fully understand or

-5- comprehend the admonishments of the Court pursuant to [Illinois] Supreme Court

Rule 402 [(eff. July 1, 2012)] at the time of the entry of the plea of guilty.

2. That shortly before the plea, the Defendant learned that her friend Allen

Crawford passed away. The Defendant was not planning to proceed with the plea,

but went along with it because she was distracted by grief.”

¶ 13 On July 13, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw the

guilty plea. At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel notified the court that defendant had

written her a letter complaining of her performance and requesting that defense counsel add a

claim of ineffective assistance to the postplea motion. Also, defense counsel mentioned that

defendant had filed a complaint against her with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary

Commission (ARDC). Defense counsel recommended the appointment of “conflict counsel to

represent [defendant] in the motion.”

¶ 14 The circuit court responded that, before it appointed new defense counsel, it

wanted to hear from defendant (1) why she had filed an ARDC complaint against defense

counsel and (2) how defense counsel had been ineffective in representing her.

¶ 15 Defendant complained that defense counsel had delayed in conveying to her the

State’s plea offer. Then defendant argued that because the fire damage was minimal, the case

was really a misdemeanor instead of a felony. In defendant’s view, defense counsel had

“railroaded” her into pleading guilty to a felony, whereas, more appropriately, she should have

been sentenced to no more than time served. Then defendant accused police officers and county

jail officials of committing wrongs against her.

¶ 16 The circuit court asked defendant to explain why, if the State’s offer was

unacceptable to her and defense counsel had given her ineffective assistance, she agreed to enter

-6- the negotiated guilty plea—and why, during the admonishments at the guilty plea hearing, she

answered “yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes” to the court’s questions. She explained:

“I spaced out in court, Judge. My best friend had just passed. So *** when

you was talking to me, I was thinking about her, how she was asking for

breakfast, and she asked to use the bathroom, went in there throwing up, throwing

up blood. So when you was talking to me and asking me that, I kind of spaced

out. I’m not going to lie. I space out. And I was thinking about her because they

had just told me she had passed.”

The court responded that if, at the guilty plea hearing, defendant had raised “concerns about

being distracted by the grief of [her] friend,” the court “would certainly have understood that if

[defendant] wanted to plead guilty at a different time.” At the guilty plea hearing, however,

defendant said nothing about being distracted by grief, nor did she “say anything about [defense

counsel] being difficult to work with, ineffective.” Defendant again explained that she had

“space[d] out in court.” Also, she pointed out that other defendants convicted of arson in other

cases had been treated more leniently. The court responded, “It doesn’t matter. This is your case.

All we’re focused on is you and your case and how this went down.” The court remarked, “And

what you’re telling me does not come close to rising to the level of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim against [defense counsel].”

¶ 17 The circuit court concluded that there was no reason to believe that defense

counsel had been ineffective and there were no grounds for allowing defendant to withdraw her

guilty plea.

¶ 18 Defense counsel persisted in her view that defendant “ha[d] the right to have an

attorney representing her at the motion to withdraw plea, even though it’s forecasted how it’s

-7- likely to *** pan out.” The circuit court disagreed because the participation of defense counsel in

a Krankel inquiry was not always necessary. See People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).

¶ 19 Defense counsel and the circuit court then had the following exchange:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, yes, Your Honor. But *** one of the

issues that she had raised with me, which is an issue that I did put in my motion in

writing, was her grief over *** her friend, so it, it wasn’t only ineffectiveness, it

was also whether or not that affected the voluntariness of the plea.

THE COURT: Right. Well—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I think *** she has the right to flush that

out with the Court with the assistance of counsel.

THE COURT: I’m not sure if that’s—I mean, I guess I could have made a

record of having read that. And *** it doesn’t contradict the transcript. [I]t’s a so

what. And, I mean, to me, even looking at that, it’s a so what. So she has had grief

over something. She still made the decision, and she still was placed under oath

and testified to everything that she testified to. She raised no concerns about her

grief. And if she raised them after the fact, I don’t know what that has to do with

it even; so [‘]I was grief-stricken and I made the wrong decision.[’] [‘]But you did

it anyway.[’] ”

The court again pointed out that defendant could have said, at the guilty plea hearing, “ [‘]I’ve

got grief; I’ve got an issue; I just would like to set this over.[’] ” Instead, she “expressed a little

bit of concern and then plowed through it,” thereby signifying that “she made a fully informed

decision to plead guilty to a charge.”

¶ 20 Then there was the following exchange between the attorneys and the circuit

-8- court:

“[PROSECUTOR]: At this time, the motion is denied; is that correct?

THE COURT: Yes. For now, it’s motion denied, pro se defendant’s

motion’s denied.

[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, Your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And, again, *** with keeping the record clear, I

did file a motion to withdraw on her behalf.

THE COURT: Yes.”

¶ 21 On July 31, 2024, the circuit court entered an order reading, “Defense motion to

withdraw guilty plea is heard and denied for the reasons stated on the record.”

¶ 22 This appeal followed.

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 A. The Lack of an Oral Argument at the Postplea Hearing

¶ 25 At the guilty plea hearing, defense counsel appeared to be under the impression

that because defendant had expressed dissatisfaction with defense counsel’s performance and

had filed a complaint against her with the ARDC, an appointment of “conflict counsel” was

necessary to argue the postplea motion that defense counsel had filed. We see no reason,

however, why defense counsel would have been disqualified from arguing her own postplea

motion. It is true that, after entering the negotiated guilty plea, defendant criticized defense

counsel, and it is true that an attorney should not be expected to argue his or her own

ineffectiveness (People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285, 296 (2004)). The postplea motion, however,

contained no claim of ineffective assistance.

¶ 26 Defendant quotes People v. Barnes, 291 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (1997): “It is well

-9- settled that a defendant has the right to the aid of an attorney in the preparation and presentation

of a motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), and such a motion should not be denied until that

representation has been obtained.” (Emphasis added.) The way that Rule 604(d) reads, however,

the “presentation of any defects in” the “proceedings of the plea of guilty” is made through “any

amendments to the [postplea] motion”:

“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the

attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means

or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the

entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of

proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing

hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate

presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R.

604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 27 On April 30, 2024, defense counsel filed a certificate that tracked the language of

Rule 604(d):

“1. I have consulted with the Defendant in person, by mail, by phone or by

electronic means to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the entry of

the plea of guilty and in the sentence;

2. I have examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea

of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing; and

3. I have made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate

presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”

¶ 28 Defendant admits that this Rule 604(d) certificate is “facially compliant.” The

- 10 - question for us, therefore, which we decide de novo (see People v. Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th)

190658, ¶ 30), is whether the record refutes the certificate (see id. ¶ 36). We do not see how the

lack of an oral argument by defense counsel on the postplea motion refutes any of the

representations in her Rule 604(d) certificate. Where does Rule 604(d) say anything about oral

argument? Defense counsel prepared a postplea motion that presented defendant’s claim that

distraction over the death of her friend vitiated the knowingness and voluntariness of her guilty

plea. This claim in the postplea motion was not dependent on its being orally reiterated at the

postplea hearing. Attorneys are permitted to present their contentions to the court in writing.

¶ 29 Claims in a postplea motion are not lost or forfeited if defense counsel, for

whatever reason, chooses not to orally argue them. Seemingly, from a legal point of view, little

could have been said at the postplea hearing beyond what the motion already said: paragraph 1

claimed, essentially, that the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and

paragraph 2 explained why. Defendant does not specify what legal argument should have been

made orally. The issue at the postplea hearing was factual: As a result of defendant’s being

distracted by the alleged death of her friend, was defendant’s guilty plea unknowing,

unintelligent, or involuntary? In other words, was defendant so “spaced out” that she could not

understand the circuit court’s admonishments at the plea hearing, and, as a result, there was no

intelligent assent or acknowledgment behind the numerous sworn affirmative answers she gave?

Only defendant could recount her subjective experience at the plea hearing—and in response to

the court’s questioning at the postplea hearing, she purported to do so.

¶ 30 We acknowledge defendant’s point that, at all critical stages of a criminal

proceeding, including the postplea stage, a defendant is entitled to receive effective assistance

from counsel. See People v. Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d 765, 771 (1990). We further acknowledge

- 11 - defendant’s point that “a denial of counsel at any critical stage” is, per se, reversible error,

without any showing of prejudice from the denial. See People v. Allen, 220 Ill. App. 3d 772, 781

(1991). At the postplea hearing, however, defendant was not denied counsel. Defendant was

represented by defense counsel, who was there at the hearing making arguments on defendant’s

behalf; it is just that defense counsel did not make much of an argument on the postplea motion

she had filed. We are unaware of any case holding, however, that making little or no oral

argument on a written motion is necessarily ineffective assistance. Again, the lack of an oral

argument does not take away from what is set forth, in black and white, in the motion. It can be

“within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” to let a written motion speak for

itself. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). In the light of the transcript of the

guilty plea hearing, the postplea motion was unserious—the motion simply was not arguable—

and it was not objectively unreasonable to refrain from compounding that unseriousness with an

unserious oral argument. “Defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a fruitless

argument.” People v. Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st) 100310, ¶ 133.

¶ 31 Even if no reasonable attorney would have forgone an oral argument on the

postplea motion, defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability of a different outcome

had an oral argument been made. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Defendant does not tell us

what arguments defense counsel should have made at the postplea hearing and how, in the light

of the painstaking admonishments at the plea hearing, those arguments would have created a

reasonable probability of a different outcome, namely, a granting of the motion to withdraw the

guilty plea. See id.

¶ 32 B. The Sufficiency of the Postplea Motion

¶ 33 According to defendant, the record refutes the certification by defense counsel

- 12 - that she “made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate presentation of any

defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Defendant criticizes the

postplea motion in that, although paragraph 1 of the motion alleged that she “did not fully

understand or comprehend the admonishments of the Court,” the motion fails to explain the

reason for her lack of full understanding or comprehension.

¶ 34 We disagree that paragraph 1 of the postplea motion is unexplained. The next

paragraph of the motion explains that, during the admonishments, defendant “was distracted by

her grief” over her friend who had passed away. Being “distracted” means being “mentally

confused, troubled, or remote” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 364 (11th ed. 2020)).

The alleged distraction ties in with the allegation that defendant “did not fully understand or

comprehend the admonishments of the Court.”

¶ 35 C. The Circuit Court’s Mistaken Reference

¶ 36 Defendant complains, “The [circuit] court erroneously believed that [defendant]

filed the motion to withdraw the guilty plea pro se and the court should have known that the

motion was prepared by defense counsel.” It is true the court said, “Pro se defendant’s motion’s

denied,” but the court merely misspoke, defense counsel immediately pointed out the error, and

by saying, “Yes,” the court signified its acceptance of the correction.

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 39 Affirmed.

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