2025 IL App (1st) 221228-U No. 1-22-1228 Order filed February 20, 2025 FIRST DISTRICT FOURTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 21 CR 7949 ) DONNELL COLEMAN, ) Honorable ) Joseph M. Claps, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lyle and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court judgment is affirmed where defendant’s acquittal of attempted first degree murder is not legally inconsistent with findings of guilt for armed habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Donnell Coleman was found guilty of armed habitual
criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) and aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS
5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2020)) and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 22 years and 12 years,
respectively. On appeal, defendant argues that his convictions are legally inconsistent with his
acquittal of attempted first degree murder. We affirm. No. 1-22-1228
¶3 Defendant was charged with six counts of attempted first degree murder with a firearm of
Ida Patterson, single counts of aggravated battery of Patterson, armed habitual criminal, and
aggravated discharge of a firearm at Patterson, three counts of aggravated domestic battery of
Patterson, two counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and two counts of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. All counts arose from an incident on April 5, 2021, wherein
defendant allegedly discharged a firearm which injured Patterson.
¶4 At trial, Patterson identified defendant as her cousin. She lived across the street from him,
and they did not see “eye-to-eye.”
¶5 On April 5, 2021, at approximately 10 p.m., Patterson sat on her porch with other people.
At the same time, defendant was on his porch with other people. Patterson observed two
individuals walk toward defendant’s porch, and the people on the porch argue with the individuals.
Then, Patterson heard a gunshot at defendant’s residence, and an individual ran across the street
saying, “[h]e shooting at us.” Someone passed a firearm to defendant, who shot at the group on
Patterson’s porch. Defendant and “Omarion” fired at one another, and defendant chased Omarion
around a vehicle, shooting at him. Defendant then stood in the street, turned, looked at Patterson,
and shot her four times.
¶6 Patterson agreed that she had viewed POD camera footage of the incident with the
prosecutor, which the State published. Patterson identified the individuals in the video, including
defendant. Patterson also reviewed photographs of the scene and the individuals present, which
were admitted into evidence. No exhibits from the trial are included in the appellate record.
¶7 Chicago police detective Bernardo Rodarte testified that on April 5, 2021, he went to the
scene and observed “puddles of blood, blood soaked clothing, and several vehicles that were shot,”
with shell casings on the street, sidewalk, and grass.
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¶8 The State then proceeded by stipulation. The parties first stipulated that, if called, Officer
Crocker would testify that he responded to the scene while wearing a body-worn camera. 1 Crocker
would identify an individual in the footage as defendant. The State then published the body camera
footage. The parties also stipulated that Dr. Nicholas Ludmer examined Patterson on April 5, 2021,
and identified gunshot wounds “to her left hip, left elbow, lateral flank and left breast.” The parties
further stipulated that defendant did not possess a valid Firearm Owners Identification card or a
valid concealed carry license on April 5, 2024. Lastly, the parties stipulated that defendant was
convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in case numbers 19 CR 92101 and 11 CR
1603501. The State introduced certified copies of his convictions.
¶9 Prior to closing arguments, the State nol-prossed the charge for aggravated battery of
Patterson. The court found defendant guilty of armed habitual criminal, aggravated discharge of a
firearm, both counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and both counts of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. It found defendant not guilty of the attempted first degree
murder of Patterson and aggravated domestic battery of Patterson counts.
¶ 10 In ruling, the court commented that the POD camera video showed defendant walking in
the street while other people are shooting. Defendant fired multiple shots and appeared to target a
person “crouching and running around” a vehicle. The court noted the State’s argument that
defendant fired at the porch where Patterson was, but found this was not visible in the video. but
the video did establish that defendant discharged a firearm “multiple times at several people” other
than Patterson. The court noted that the State did not need to prove the identity of a specific person
with respect to the aggravated discharge of a firearm charge.
1 Officer Crocker’s first name does not appear in the record on appeal.
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¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion “to reconsider” arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt because Patterson’s testimony was inconsistent and incomplete as to
whether defendant possessed a firearm. The court denied the motion. After a hearing, the court
merged the unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon and aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon counts into the armed habitual criminal count. It imposed concurrent prison terms of 22
years for armed habitual criminal and 12 years for aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that the State “failed to prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt” of armed habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a firearm because “[t]he same
evidence” that led to his acquittal of first degree murder should have led to his acquittal of armed
habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶ 13 As an initial matter, although defendant frames his claim as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, he essentially argues that the verdicts are legally inconsistent. See People v.
Dryden, 363 Ill. App. 3d 447, 451 (2006); see also People v. Reed, 396 Ill. App. 3d 636, 649 (2009)
(sufficiency of the evidence review “ ‘should not be confused with the problems caused by
inconsistent verdicts’ ” (quoting United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984)).
¶ 14 “Legally inconsistent verdicts occur when an essential element of each crime must, by the
very nature of the verdicts, have been found to exist and to not exist even though the offenses arise
out of the same set of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Price, 221 Ill. 2d 182,
188 (2006). Verdicts are not legally inconsistent when the charges have different elements. People
v. Cruz, 2021 IL App (1st) 190132, ¶ 67.
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2025 IL App (1st) 221228-U No. 1-22-1228 Order filed February 20, 2025 FIRST DISTRICT FOURTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 21 CR 7949 ) DONNELL COLEMAN, ) Honorable ) Joseph M. Claps, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lyle and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court judgment is affirmed where defendant’s acquittal of attempted first degree murder is not legally inconsistent with findings of guilt for armed habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Donnell Coleman was found guilty of armed habitual
criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) and aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS
5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2020)) and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 22 years and 12 years,
respectively. On appeal, defendant argues that his convictions are legally inconsistent with his
acquittal of attempted first degree murder. We affirm. No. 1-22-1228
¶3 Defendant was charged with six counts of attempted first degree murder with a firearm of
Ida Patterson, single counts of aggravated battery of Patterson, armed habitual criminal, and
aggravated discharge of a firearm at Patterson, three counts of aggravated domestic battery of
Patterson, two counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and two counts of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. All counts arose from an incident on April 5, 2021, wherein
defendant allegedly discharged a firearm which injured Patterson.
¶4 At trial, Patterson identified defendant as her cousin. She lived across the street from him,
and they did not see “eye-to-eye.”
¶5 On April 5, 2021, at approximately 10 p.m., Patterson sat on her porch with other people.
At the same time, defendant was on his porch with other people. Patterson observed two
individuals walk toward defendant’s porch, and the people on the porch argue with the individuals.
Then, Patterson heard a gunshot at defendant’s residence, and an individual ran across the street
saying, “[h]e shooting at us.” Someone passed a firearm to defendant, who shot at the group on
Patterson’s porch. Defendant and “Omarion” fired at one another, and defendant chased Omarion
around a vehicle, shooting at him. Defendant then stood in the street, turned, looked at Patterson,
and shot her four times.
¶6 Patterson agreed that she had viewed POD camera footage of the incident with the
prosecutor, which the State published. Patterson identified the individuals in the video, including
defendant. Patterson also reviewed photographs of the scene and the individuals present, which
were admitted into evidence. No exhibits from the trial are included in the appellate record.
¶7 Chicago police detective Bernardo Rodarte testified that on April 5, 2021, he went to the
scene and observed “puddles of blood, blood soaked clothing, and several vehicles that were shot,”
with shell casings on the street, sidewalk, and grass.
-2- No. 1-22-1228
¶8 The State then proceeded by stipulation. The parties first stipulated that, if called, Officer
Crocker would testify that he responded to the scene while wearing a body-worn camera. 1 Crocker
would identify an individual in the footage as defendant. The State then published the body camera
footage. The parties also stipulated that Dr. Nicholas Ludmer examined Patterson on April 5, 2021,
and identified gunshot wounds “to her left hip, left elbow, lateral flank and left breast.” The parties
further stipulated that defendant did not possess a valid Firearm Owners Identification card or a
valid concealed carry license on April 5, 2024. Lastly, the parties stipulated that defendant was
convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in case numbers 19 CR 92101 and 11 CR
1603501. The State introduced certified copies of his convictions.
¶9 Prior to closing arguments, the State nol-prossed the charge for aggravated battery of
Patterson. The court found defendant guilty of armed habitual criminal, aggravated discharge of a
firearm, both counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and both counts of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. It found defendant not guilty of the attempted first degree
murder of Patterson and aggravated domestic battery of Patterson counts.
¶ 10 In ruling, the court commented that the POD camera video showed defendant walking in
the street while other people are shooting. Defendant fired multiple shots and appeared to target a
person “crouching and running around” a vehicle. The court noted the State’s argument that
defendant fired at the porch where Patterson was, but found this was not visible in the video. but
the video did establish that defendant discharged a firearm “multiple times at several people” other
than Patterson. The court noted that the State did not need to prove the identity of a specific person
with respect to the aggravated discharge of a firearm charge.
1 Officer Crocker’s first name does not appear in the record on appeal.
-3- No. 1-22-1228
¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion “to reconsider” arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt because Patterson’s testimony was inconsistent and incomplete as to
whether defendant possessed a firearm. The court denied the motion. After a hearing, the court
merged the unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon and aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon counts into the armed habitual criminal count. It imposed concurrent prison terms of 22
years for armed habitual criminal and 12 years for aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that the State “failed to prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt” of armed habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a firearm because “[t]he same
evidence” that led to his acquittal of first degree murder should have led to his acquittal of armed
habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶ 13 As an initial matter, although defendant frames his claim as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, he essentially argues that the verdicts are legally inconsistent. See People v.
Dryden, 363 Ill. App. 3d 447, 451 (2006); see also People v. Reed, 396 Ill. App. 3d 636, 649 (2009)
(sufficiency of the evidence review “ ‘should not be confused with the problems caused by
inconsistent verdicts’ ” (quoting United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984)).
¶ 14 “Legally inconsistent verdicts occur when an essential element of each crime must, by the
very nature of the verdicts, have been found to exist and to not exist even though the offenses arise
out of the same set of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Price, 221 Ill. 2d 182,
188 (2006). Verdicts are not legally inconsistent when the charges have different elements. People
v. Cruz, 2021 IL App (1st) 190132, ¶ 67. Whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of
law which we review de novo. Price, 221 Ill. 2d at 189.
¶ 15 As defendant did not object at trial and assert this question of law in a posttrial motion, the
issue is forfeited on appeal. People v. Brand, 2021 IL 125945, ¶ 32. The State argues that defendant
-4- No. 1-22-1228
forfeited an argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for his failure
to support that argument in his brief. However, the State does not argue that defendant’s claim that
the verdicts were inconsistent was forfeited on review and thus has forfeited any argument
regarding defendant’s forfeiture. People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 13. Accordingly,
we address the merits of defendant’s claim.
¶ 16 Defendant’s contention is without merit. In People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 133-34 (2003),
the Illinois Supreme Court held that “defendants in Illinois can no longer challenge convictions on
the sole basis that they are legally inconsistent with acquittals on other charges.” Jones involved a
jury trial, but the supreme court expanded its reasoning to verdicts in bench trials in People v.
McCoy, 207 Ill. 2d 352, 357-58 (2003), noting the presumption that “a trial judge knows the law.”
McCoy found it need not address whether the defendant’s two convictions were legally
inconsistent with an acquittal in that case because, “[e]ven if the verdict was inconsistent, the trial
court’s findings of guilt stand.” Id. at 358 (a conviction which is legally inconsistent with an
acquittal is not a basis for reversal under Jones); see also People v. Alexander, 2017 IL App (1st)
142170, ¶ 38.
¶ 17 Under Jones and McCoy, defendant’s claim that his convictions for armed habitual criminal
and aggravated discharge of a firearm must be reversed as they are legally inconsistent with his
acquittal for attempted first degree murder fails. See McCoy, 207 Ill. 2d at 357-58. As defendant’s
convictions would stand despite legal inconsistency, we need not determine whether his
convictions are legally inconsistent with the acquittal. See id. at 358.
¶ 18 Nevertheless, defendant’s acquittal of attempted first degree murder is not legally
inconsistent with his convictions for armed habitual criminal and aggravated discharge of a
firearm.
-5- No. 1-22-1228
¶ 19 Attempted first degree murder requires the State to prove that “(1) defendant performed an
act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of murder, and (2) defendant possessed
the criminal intent to kill the victim.” People v. Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 142085, ¶ 52; 720
ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2020). Attempted murder is a specific intent crime, so the State
must prove the defendant had the specific intent to kill. Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 142085,
¶ 52.
¶ 20 In contrast, neither armed habitual criminal nor, as charged here, aggravated discharge of
a firearm require a specific intent to kill. An armed habitual criminal charge requires the State to
prove a defendant’s possession of a firearm after having been convicted of two or more qualifying
offenses. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 133663, ¶ 15; 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2020). To
prove aggravated discharge of a firearm as charged, the State needed to prove that defendant
knowingly or intentionally “discharge[d] a firearm in the direction of another person.” 720 ILCS
5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2020). As neither of defendant’s two convictions required the State to prove
a specific intent to kill, the verdicts were not legally inconsistent with an acquittal for attempted
first degree murder. 2 See Cruz, 2021 IL App (1st) 190132, ¶ 67.
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
2 Defendant also asserts that the trial court did not discuss the basis for rendering its verdicts, and recites the court’s ruling verbatim. We note that the POD camera video, which the court referenced heavily in its ruling, is not included in the record on appeal. Defendant, as the appellant, has the burden to present a record sufficient to support his claims of error, and any doubts or deficiencies arising from an incomplete record will be resolved against him. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).
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