NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 190883-U FILED This Order was filed under September 8, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-19-0883 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County JOSHUA L. COLEMAN, ) No. 18DT638 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Pablo A. Eves, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress as the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).
¶2 In June 2019, defendant, Joshua L. Coleman, filed a motion to suppress evidence,
contending the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. In a subsequent stipulated bench trial, the court
found defendant guilty of driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or more (625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016)). Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 Following a traffic accident in October 2018, Bloomington police officer Anna
Legner issued defendant two traffic citations for (1) DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016))
and (2) driving with a BAC of 0.08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016)). A law
enforcement sworn report indicated defendant had a BAC of 0.206 and “showed impairment”
during field sobriety tests conducted at the police station.
¶5 In April 2019, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing Officer
Legner (1) exceeded the limits of an investigatory stop and (2) lacked probable cause to arrest
defendant. In addition, defendant argued his field sobriety and breathalyzer test results, obtained
after his arrest, were in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
¶6 In June 2019, the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress.
Defendant testified on October 27, 2018, he “wrecked [his] truck.” (We note the parties refer to
both October 26 and 27 as the date of the accident. The accident occurred shortly after midnight
on October 27, 2018.) A police officer who responded to the scene asked defendant if he had
been drinking, and defendant responded “yeah, a little bit.” The officer handcuffed defendant and
placed him in the back of a squad car. Defendant confirmed the officer did not conduct field
sobriety tests or request he provide a breath sample. On cross-examination, defendant confirmed
he was in a two-vehicle accident and he had first met the other driver at the bar before the
accident. He testified that he was “kind of stunned” after the air bags went off and, when he was
speaking to the police officer, he was “still dazed” but did not need medical attention.
¶7 Following defendant’s testimony, the trial court denied the suppression motion
which alleged Officer Legner had exceeded the limits of an investigatory stop. As to whether
Legner lacked probable cause to arrest defendant, the court determined defendant presented a
prima facie case and the burden shifted to the State.
-2- ¶8 Officer Legner then testified she was trained in accident site investigation and
DUI investigation. On the night of October 26, 2018, at approximately 12:30 a.m., she was
called to an accident scene. The caller reported “two subjects were speeding and wrecked.”
Legner testified that when she arrived at the scene of the accident, “I saw a telephone pole cut in
half. There were wires on the ground. The accident scene if I remember right spanned like pretty
much half the block. And because the two vehicles had hit each other there were vehicle parts all
over the roadway.” Legner approached defendant’s vehicle while her partner approached the
other driver. Defendant’s truck had heavy front-end damage. Legner testified she “noticed
[defendant’s] eyes were bloodshot and glassy and his speech and mannerisms were very slow
while he was speaking with [her].” She did not smell alcohol until after she placed defendant in
her squad car, noting the colder air can make it more difficult to smell. Legner asked defendant if
he had been drinking and defendant responded “a little bit.” Legner testified defendant informed
her he had been drinking at Cadillac Jack’s since “about 7:30,” approximately five hours before
the accident. After direct examination, the State played a portion of Officer Legner’s body-worn
camera (bodycam) footage.
¶9 On cross-examination, Legner confirmed she did not request defendant provide a
breath sample prior to his arrest and did not consider conducting field sobriety tests at the scene
of the accident because “[t]here were wires down, there was a pole that could drop at any minute,
there were vehicle parts everywhere. That would not be safe.” Defense counsel played a portion
of the bodycam video after defendant was placed in the squad car. After the video played, Legner
acknowledged she did, “for a moment,” consider conducting field sobriety tests at the accident
scene but “decided not to.” On redirect examination, Legner explained why she decided against
conducting field sobriety tests at the scene: “Well, there was two things. Like I said just because
-3- of the safety of the scene, but also my partner, I do believe he ended up doing fields there. We’re
not going to do fields right next to each other. That’s just not a good idea. It’s common sense.”
¶ 10 The trial court first determined defendant was under arrest when he was placed in
handcuffs in the back of Legner’s squad car. The court reviewed the evidence, noting, “I found
Officer Legner to be more credible than [defendant].” The court acknowledged defendant’s
testimony was sufficient to shift the burden, and then found:
“Officer Legner testified and I thought she testified credibly that her
observations included what she saw when she came upon the scene including the
accident scene spanning a half a block with vehicle parts all over the roadway
where two vehicles had collided and vehicle—I’m sorry—and wires and a
telephone pole hit. That was about the best description of it, and I think that was
consistent with what we saw in the video.
Most importantly I was able to observe thanks to the body cam Officer
Legner’s initial approach and interaction with [defendant]. [Defendant] was
positively IDed without objection. He—he said various things on the video. The
officer added that she also observed his eyes to be bloodshot and glassy. And
her testimony was that his speech and mannerisms were very slow in speaking
with her. And when asked if he had consumed any alcohol he said a little bit.
Those are all I think consistent with what we saw there. Also, it was
determined by the video that he had been at Cadillac’s. I think he meant Cadillac
Jack’s. I’m not sure. But there was further testimony that the drinking had—he
had been there since 7:30 p.m. I’m not sure that was on this particular video.
-4- I’m not considering the fact that there was a later smell of alcohol as the
officer placed [defendant] into the back of the squad car because that observation
wasn’t made before the determination to arrest if that was arrest which I believe it
was.
So the Court considers whether or not bloodshot, glassy eyes; the speech
and mannerisms being very slow in speaking with the officer; advising the officer
he drank a little bit at Cadillac’s since 7:30 p.m. is enough taken into
consideration along with the accident.
I’m not sure that would have been enough. But I think the body cam
answers the question for me from what I observed which was in addition to the
testimony. Also slow response times from the Defendant to Officer Legner’s
questions as well as multiple statements that he didn’t know what happened
although he was the driver of a truck in a two-car accident. I really don’t know
what happened, I don’t know what happened more than two times, several times
in fact about what happened that night.
And so I think also what I noticed was someone who was I think able to
hold his liquor and then able to drive and then able to have a cigarette, was not in
a daze when he was talking with the officer but rather trying to figure out what he
was going to do next.
And so I think between all of that and the demeanor that I observed I think
that you were clearly under the influence of alcohol that night and the officer was
a hundred percent correct in arresting and there was more than enough probable
cause.”
-5- The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
¶ 11 In December 2019, defendant’s stipulated bench trial commenced. The
evidentiary stipulation stated:
“1. On October 27, 2018, Officer Anna Legner of the Bloomington Police
Department responded to a motor vehicle accident near the intersection of South
Morris Avenue and Oakland Avenue in McLean County, Illinois.
2. Defendant was the driver of one of the vehicles involved in the
accident.
3. Defendant submitted a breath sample into EC/IR-II revealing a blood
alcohol content of 0.206%.”
Based on this stipulation, the court found defendant guilty of driving with a BAC of 0.08 or
more. The court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ court supervision.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress where there was insufficient evidence to establish Officer Legner had probable cause to
arrest defendant.
¶ 15 A. Forfeiture
¶ 16 Initially, the State contends defendant’s argument is forfeited because he failed to
raise it in a posttrial motion. Ordinarily, a defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a
posttrial motion to preserve an issue for review. People v. Hestand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 272, 279,
838 N.E.2d 318, 324 (2005). However, under the “constitutional-issue exception,”
“constitutional issues that were properly raised at trial and may be raised later in a postconviction
-6- petition” are not subject to forfeiture for failing to file a posttrial motion. People v. Cregan, 2014
IL 113600, ¶ 16, 10 N.E.3d 1196. Because the matter proceeded to a stipulated bench trial with
the understanding defendant was preserving the argument he made in his motion to suppress and
because the matter could have been raised in a postconviction petition, we find defendant’s claim
is subject to review under the constitutional-issue exception. See Cregan, 2014 IL 113600,
¶¶ 15-20 (finding the constitutional-issue exception applied to permit review of the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress asserting a violation of constitutional rights, despite
the defendant’s failure to raise the issue in a posttrial motion).
¶ 17 B. Standard of Review
¶ 18 A bifurcated standard of review is employed when reviewing a trial court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress. People v. Holmes, 2017 IL 120407, ¶ 9, 90 N.E.3d 412. The trial court’s
factual findings are accorded great deference and will be reversed only if they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 55, 32 N.E.3d 535. This
deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the trial court is in a superior
position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses’
demeanor, and resolve conflicts in testimony. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d
799, 805 (2003). We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on whether the arrest was supported
by probable cause. People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 268, 830 N.E.2d 541, 548 (2005).
¶ 19 In his reply brief, defendant argues that we should review the video from Legner’s
body camera de novo, citing People v. Flores, 315 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391-94, 734 N.E.2d 63,
66-69 (2000). In Flores, the facts surrounding the defendant’s statement to the police were not in
dispute. Flores, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 392. The appellate court determined, while a motion to
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact, “[w]here the facts are essentially uncontroverted
-7- and the credibility of witnesses is not at issue, de novo review is appropriate.” Flores, 315 Ill.
App. 3d at 391-92.
¶ 20 Flores is inapplicable here as the credibility of witnesses and the disputed issues
of fact were central to the motion to suppress. Where the facts are in dispute, a video is an
element in determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact were against the manifest weight
of the evidence; its existence neither justifies nor requires de novo review of the court’s factual
findings. See People v. Valle, 405 Ill. App. 3d 46, 56, 939 N.E.3d 10, 18 (2010) (“[C]ases such
as People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 662 N.E.2d 1328 (1996) (which endorses de novo review
when videos in the appellate record resolve all issues of fact) are inapplicable in a case such as
this one, where videos in the record do not resolve all issues of fact.”). The trial court in the
present case made findings of fact based on both the video and the testimony of parties. Further,
based on the separate accounts of the video made by defendant and the State, there appear to be
different interpretations of the scene the bodycam footage depicts. Therefore, we see no reason to
depart from the bifurcated standard of review and review all of the trial court’s findings of fact
under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. See Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 55.
¶ 21 C. Probable Cause
¶ 22 “Probable cause to arrest exists when the totality of the facts known to the officer
at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the
arrestee has committed a crime.” People v. Meo, 2018 IL App (2d) 170135, ¶ 25, 102 N.E.3d
751. Defendant was charged with a DUI under sections 11-501(a)(1) and (2) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (2) (West 2016)), which provides that a person shall not
drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or with a
BAC of 0.08 or more. A person is under the influence of alcohol when he is “ ‘less able, either
-8- mentally or physically, or both, to exercise clear judgment, and with steady hands and nerves
operate an automobile with safety to himself and to the public.’ ” People v. Bostelman, 325 Ill.
App. 3d 22, 34, 756 N.E.2d 953, 962 (2001) (quoting People v. Seefeldt, 122 Ill. App. 3d 106,
108, 445 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1983)). We note defendant’s actual physical control of the vehicle is
not in question here.
¶ 23 In People v. Wingren, 167 Ill. App. 3d 313, 320, 521 N.E.2d 130, 135 (1988), the
court observed that “[p]robable cause to arrest a motorist for DUI has been commonly
established by the testimony of the arresting officer, in spite of the defendant’s contradictory
testimony, that the motorist had about him or her the odor or strong odor of alcohol, had slurred
speech or had red and glassy eyes.” Generally, such observations “are supplemented by other
observations apparent to the officer or inferred from his observations such as speeding, weaving,
erratic driving, driving on the wrong side of the road, being stuck in a ditch [citation] or, as in the
case at bar, being in a vehicle while stuck in the mud.” Wingren, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 321.
¶ 24 In arguing that probable cause was absent here, defendant relies, in part, on
People v. Motzko, 2017 IL App (3d) 160154, ¶ 23, 78 N.E.3d 517, where the appellate court
upheld the trial court’s conclusion that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant for
DUI. The Motzko court cited People v. Day, 2016 IL App (3d) 150852, ¶¶ 23, 37-38, 67 N.E.3d
607, for the proposition that, absent further corroboration, the odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes,
and slurred speech do not give rise to probable cause that the defendant has committed DUI.
Motzko, 2017 IL App (3d) 160154, ¶ 23.
¶ 25 Importantly, the trial court in Motzko determined that the police officer was not
credible. Motzko, 2017 IL App (3d) 160154, ¶ 26. Because the presumption ran in favor of the
trial court’s factual determinations, the appellate court determined that there was no probable
-9- cause to arrest the defendant for DUI. Motzko, 2017 IL App (3d) 160154, ¶ 26. Here, the trial
court found Legner to be credible, specifically finding “Officer Legner to be more credible than
[defendant].” Thus, our presumption runs in favor of the officer’s testimony, which provides
evidence to support a finding that a reasonably prudent person would believe defendant was
under the influence of alcohol. Thus, Motzko is inapposite.
¶ 26 Day is also distinguishable from the case at bar. In Day, the officer administered
field sobriety tests in an improper fashion by asking the defendant to perform them on a wet
surface while it was raining, and, regardless, the defendant’s performance of the tests was
reasonable and not enough to lead a reasonable person to believe he was under the influence of
alcohol. Day, 2016 IL App (3d) 150852, ¶ 32. Further, the officer testified the defendant only
slurred his words when counting down from numbers 69 to 44. Day, 2016 IL App (3d) 150852,
¶ 35. The court determined that,
“[T]he defendant’s admitted consumption of alcohol and glassy eyes were not
corroborated in any significant way by any other factors. By all accounts, the
defendant’s driving on the night in question had been nothing short of perfect. He
had not been involved in any sort of accident. He was able to communicate
clearly and effectively with [the officer].” Day, 2016 IL App (3d) 150852, ¶ 37.
The court held that “any suspicions aroused by bloodshot and glassy eyes, unless confirmed by
some other factor—such as poor driving, stumbling, falling, or an inability to communicate
clearly—do not rise to the level of probable cause.” Day, 2016 IL App (3d) 150852, ¶ 38.
¶ 27 Unlike the defendant in Day, in this case there is corroborating evidence beyond
bloodshot and glassy eyes. Defendant had been in a significant accident with debris stretching
half the block. Moreover, Officer Legner observed defendant’s speech and mannerisms were
- 10 - slow. These were signs of poor driving and an inability to communicate clearly—factors the
court in Day mentioned as potentially supportive of a finding of probable cause. See Day, 2016
IL App (3d) 150852, ¶ 38.
¶ 28 In totality, Officer Legner received a report of two cars speeding and arrived on
the scene of a significant accident. Legner spoke to defendant, who had bloodshot and glassy
eyes, slow speech and mannerisms, and admitted to drinking prior to the accident. Under these
circumstances, a reasonably cautious person would believe defendant had committed a DUI.
Legner’s testimony was not perfect. As defendant notes, Legner testified defendant informed her
he had been drinking since 7:30 p.m. even though he did not disclose the time he began drinking
until after he was in the squad car. However, one misstatement did not render the entirety of
Legner’s testimony incredible.
¶ 29 In addition, as the trial court determined from its own viewing of the bodycam
footage, defendant’s responses to Legner’s questions were slow, and he repeatedly stated he did
not know what had happened. Defendant told Legner, “I don’t even know what I slammed into.”
Although Legner did not ask defendant to perform field sobriety tests at the scene of the
accident, performance on field sobriety tests is merely one of several factors which could support
a finding of probable cause to arrest. In this instance, Officer Legner clearly used her discretion
to determine the scene of the accident was not a safe place to perform such tests, and there was
sufficient evidence of impairment that such tests were not immediately necessary. The record
shows a reasonably prudent person could find that defendant was under the influence of alcohol
on the night of the accident. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining Legner had
probable cause to arrest defendant.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
- 11 - ¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 32 Affirm.
- 12 -