Hood, P.J.
Defendant appeals, by leave granted, from an order denying his motion for relief from judgment. We affirm.
In March 1994, defendant was released from jail after serving sentences for convictions unrelated to the present action. The sentencing terms also required that defendant remain on a tether for six [367]*367months. However, on March 8, 1994, defendant cut off his tether unit and absconded. On March 14, 1994, a bench warrant was issued for defendant’s probation violation. On March 17, 1994, police officers were stopped behind a vehicle waiting at a traffic light. Defendant got out of the vehicle and spoke to the driver. The traffic signal turned green, but the vehicle did not proceed through the light. Eventually, defendant moved away from the vehicle and headed toward a gas station. He did not respond to a police officer’s request to talk. Defendant then fled, and the police gave chase. Defendant turned to look over his shoulder and, consequently, ran into a police cruiser, which rendered defendant unconscious. A loaded pistol was found on defendant, and he was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424.
Defendant was taken to the county jail known as the Kent County Correctional Facility. Defendant was booked, but, dining processing, he exchanged words with the jail staff. Defendant was known to various deputies because of his prior contact with law enforcement officers. As a result of defendant’s exchange and prior contact, it was determined that defendant would be placed in a classification cell, a cell monitored by cameras in order to observe inmate conduct. Once defendant realized that he was being placed in a monitored cell, he threw his belongings, assumed a “stance” position, and refused to enter the cell. A “code green” call was issued that signified an inmate problem, and an estimated ten deputies' converged on the area. Defendant was placed in the classification cell without further incident. However, the cell door closed before all jail personnel could exit, [368]*368and Deputy Randy Heuvelman found himself locked in the cell with defendant. Defendant assaulted Deputy Heuvelman, using his fists to strike the deputy in the head. Consequently, defendant was charged with assault of a corrections officer, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3), and being an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, and sentenced to three to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant’s conviction was affirmed.1
In a separate jury trial, defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, and being an habitual offender, fourth offense. Defendant was sentenced to five to twenty years’ imprisonment. However, defendant’s convictions were reversed on appeal.2 This Court held that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because defendant was not lawfully arrested. Specifically, this Court held that the three “misdemeanors” offered as a basis for defendant’s arrest, aiding and abetting a traffic violation, trespassing, and wilful failure to obey the lawful directions of an officer, were unlawful. Accordingly, defendant’s convictions were reversed and the matter was remanded.
Thereafter, defendant moved, in the trial court, for relief from the judgment regarding his conviction of assault of a corrections officer. Defendant argued that, because his arrest for the carrying a concealed weapon offense was deemed unlawful, he was not [369]*369“lawfully imprisoned” at the time of the assault on a corrections officer. Accordingly, defendant requested that his conviction be set aside. The trial court held that the police had a proper purpose for detaining defendant because of the outstanding bench warrant, which, in turn, validated the arrest. The trial court also held that a subsequent finding that the police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant did not render his detention unlawful. We affirm, albeit on other grounds.
Defendant’s contention that the prosecution was required to prove that he was lawfully imprisoned at the time of the assault involves an issue of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 620; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). At the time of defendant’s offense, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) provided:
A person lawfully imprisoned in a jail, other place of confinement established by law for any term, or lawfully imprisoned for any purpose at any other place, including but not limited to hospitals and other health care facilities or awaiting examination, trial, arraignment, sentence, or after sentence awaiting or during transfer to or from a prison, for a crime or offense, or charged with a crime or offense who, without being discharged from the place of confinement, or other lawful imprisonment by due process of law, through the use of violence, threats of violence or dangerous weapons, assaults an employee of the place of confinement or other custodian knowing the person to be an employee or custodian or breaks the place of confinement and escapes, or breaks the place of confinement although an escape is not actually made, is guilty of a felony. [Emphasis added.]
[370]*370In People v Neal, 232 Mich App 801; 592 NW2d 92 (1998), vacated 232 Mich App 801 (1998),3 the defendant was incarcerated at a state prison when an altercation between inmates and guards occurred. The defendant was charged with three counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. At the close of the proofs, the prosecutor requested that an instruction for assault of a corrections officer be given. The trial court granted the request, and the jury acquitted the defendant of the original charges, but found the defendant guilty of three counts of assault of a corrections officer. The defendant moved to have his convictions set aside, but did not challenge the lawfulness of his incarceration in the state prison. Rather, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution’s proof of lawful imprisonment. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. On appeal, this Court noted that “the prosecution must establish the lawfulness of the imprisonment as part of its prima facie case of assault of an employee of a place of confinement.” Neal, supra, 232 Mich App 804. However, this Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction because lawful imprisonment could be inferred from evidence that the defendant was incarcerated in a state prison. Id.
The present case before us is factually and legally distinguishable. Defendant argues that his conviction [371]*371must be set aside because the reversal of his conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, which charge caused his placement in the county jail, rendered his imprisonment unlawful. However, examination of MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) reveals that it does not punish conduct only when an individual is “lawfully imprisoned.” Rather, the statute penalizes assaultive conduct upon a corrections officer at various stages of a criminal proceeding. It punishes a defendant who has been convicted of a crime and is serving time in a jail, prison, hospital, or other confined location. However, it also punishes assaultive conduct when a defendant is merely “awaiting examination, trial, arraignment, sentence . . .
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Hood, P.J.
Defendant appeals, by leave granted, from an order denying his motion for relief from judgment. We affirm.
In March 1994, defendant was released from jail after serving sentences for convictions unrelated to the present action. The sentencing terms also required that defendant remain on a tether for six [367]*367months. However, on March 8, 1994, defendant cut off his tether unit and absconded. On March 14, 1994, a bench warrant was issued for defendant’s probation violation. On March 17, 1994, police officers were stopped behind a vehicle waiting at a traffic light. Defendant got out of the vehicle and spoke to the driver. The traffic signal turned green, but the vehicle did not proceed through the light. Eventually, defendant moved away from the vehicle and headed toward a gas station. He did not respond to a police officer’s request to talk. Defendant then fled, and the police gave chase. Defendant turned to look over his shoulder and, consequently, ran into a police cruiser, which rendered defendant unconscious. A loaded pistol was found on defendant, and he was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424.
Defendant was taken to the county jail known as the Kent County Correctional Facility. Defendant was booked, but, dining processing, he exchanged words with the jail staff. Defendant was known to various deputies because of his prior contact with law enforcement officers. As a result of defendant’s exchange and prior contact, it was determined that defendant would be placed in a classification cell, a cell monitored by cameras in order to observe inmate conduct. Once defendant realized that he was being placed in a monitored cell, he threw his belongings, assumed a “stance” position, and refused to enter the cell. A “code green” call was issued that signified an inmate problem, and an estimated ten deputies' converged on the area. Defendant was placed in the classification cell without further incident. However, the cell door closed before all jail personnel could exit, [368]*368and Deputy Randy Heuvelman found himself locked in the cell with defendant. Defendant assaulted Deputy Heuvelman, using his fists to strike the deputy in the head. Consequently, defendant was charged with assault of a corrections officer, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3), and being an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, and sentenced to three to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant’s conviction was affirmed.1
In a separate jury trial, defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, and being an habitual offender, fourth offense. Defendant was sentenced to five to twenty years’ imprisonment. However, defendant’s convictions were reversed on appeal.2 This Court held that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because defendant was not lawfully arrested. Specifically, this Court held that the three “misdemeanors” offered as a basis for defendant’s arrest, aiding and abetting a traffic violation, trespassing, and wilful failure to obey the lawful directions of an officer, were unlawful. Accordingly, defendant’s convictions were reversed and the matter was remanded.
Thereafter, defendant moved, in the trial court, for relief from the judgment regarding his conviction of assault of a corrections officer. Defendant argued that, because his arrest for the carrying a concealed weapon offense was deemed unlawful, he was not [369]*369“lawfully imprisoned” at the time of the assault on a corrections officer. Accordingly, defendant requested that his conviction be set aside. The trial court held that the police had a proper purpose for detaining defendant because of the outstanding bench warrant, which, in turn, validated the arrest. The trial court also held that a subsequent finding that the police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant did not render his detention unlawful. We affirm, albeit on other grounds.
Defendant’s contention that the prosecution was required to prove that he was lawfully imprisoned at the time of the assault involves an issue of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 620; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). At the time of defendant’s offense, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) provided:
A person lawfully imprisoned in a jail, other place of confinement established by law for any term, or lawfully imprisoned for any purpose at any other place, including but not limited to hospitals and other health care facilities or awaiting examination, trial, arraignment, sentence, or after sentence awaiting or during transfer to or from a prison, for a crime or offense, or charged with a crime or offense who, without being discharged from the place of confinement, or other lawful imprisonment by due process of law, through the use of violence, threats of violence or dangerous weapons, assaults an employee of the place of confinement or other custodian knowing the person to be an employee or custodian or breaks the place of confinement and escapes, or breaks the place of confinement although an escape is not actually made, is guilty of a felony. [Emphasis added.]
[370]*370In People v Neal, 232 Mich App 801; 592 NW2d 92 (1998), vacated 232 Mich App 801 (1998),3 the defendant was incarcerated at a state prison when an altercation between inmates and guards occurred. The defendant was charged with three counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. At the close of the proofs, the prosecutor requested that an instruction for assault of a corrections officer be given. The trial court granted the request, and the jury acquitted the defendant of the original charges, but found the defendant guilty of three counts of assault of a corrections officer. The defendant moved to have his convictions set aside, but did not challenge the lawfulness of his incarceration in the state prison. Rather, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution’s proof of lawful imprisonment. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. On appeal, this Court noted that “the prosecution must establish the lawfulness of the imprisonment as part of its prima facie case of assault of an employee of a place of confinement.” Neal, supra, 232 Mich App 804. However, this Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction because lawful imprisonment could be inferred from evidence that the defendant was incarcerated in a state prison. Id.
The present case before us is factually and legally distinguishable. Defendant argues that his conviction [371]*371must be set aside because the reversal of his conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, which charge caused his placement in the county jail, rendered his imprisonment unlawful. However, examination of MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) reveals that it does not punish conduct only when an individual is “lawfully imprisoned.” Rather, the statute penalizes assaultive conduct upon a corrections officer at various stages of a criminal proceeding. It punishes a defendant who has been convicted of a crime and is serving time in a jail, prison, hospital, or other confined location. However, it also punishes assaultive conduct when a defendant is merely “awaiting examination, trial, arraignment, sentence . . . .” MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). Additionally, the statute penalizes assaultive conduct that occurs after a crime is charged, but before discharge from a place of confinement, or assaultive conduct that occurs after sentencing, but before entry into a place of confinement.
In drafting MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3), the Legislature failed to include the requirement that a defendant be “lawfully imprisoned” at all stages in a criminal proceeding. Specifically, the term “lawfully imprisoned” was not included in reference to a defendant who has initial contact with the criminal justice system, but has not yet been given the opportunity to protest confinement at a preliminary examination or trial. “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 99; 586 NW2d 732 (1998). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as written because the Legislature must have intended the meaning it expressed. Id. Accordingly, we hold [372]*372that the Legislature did not intend to require that the prosecution prove that a defendant was “lawfully imprisoned” when he is charged with assaulting a corrections officer while awaiting examination. Review of the felony complaint in the present case reveals that defendant was charged with assault of an employee of the place of confinement “while awaiting examination.” Because the Legislature did not require that the prosecution prove that a defendant was lawfully imprisoned while “awaiting examination, trial, arraignment, [or] sentence,” the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment.
We also note that our statutory interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent in enacting MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). The House Legislative Analysis for 1976 PA 188 indicates that the purpose of the legislation was to elevate an assault upon corrections staff from a misdemeanor to a felony because of inadequate protections to corrections staff. House Legislative Analysis, HB 5117, July 1, 1976. The interpretation urged by defendant would require proof of “lawful imprisonment” when the proceedings at which such imprisonment could be challenged, such as examination or trial, have not yet been held. There is no indication that the Legislature intended the constrained interpretation urged by defendant.
Affirmed.4
Fitzgerald, J., concurred.