Mackenzie, J.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 to 60 years and appealed by right. This Court affirmed defendant’s conviction, Docket No. 48218, unpublished opinion of February 12, 1981, and defendant filed with the Supreme Court a letter application for review of his conviction pursuant to Administrative Order 1977-4, 400 Mich
lxvii. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of
People v Paintman,
412 Mich 518; 315 NW2d 418 (1982), and
Edwards v Arizona,
451 US 477; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981). 417 Mich 851 (1982).
At issue is testimony concerning statements defendant made to the police which were admitted, not in the prosecution’s case in chief but in rebuttal, to impeach defendant’s credibility by showing that he made prior statements inconsistent with his testimony. It is well-settled that, even assuming that the statements were obtained in violation of the rule stated in
Miranda v Arizona,
384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), the statements could be used for impeachment purposes.
Harris v New York,
401 US 222; 91 S Ct 643; 28 L Ed 2d 1 (1971);
Oregon v Hass,
420 US 714; 95 S Ct 1215; 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975). However, in
People v Esters,
417 Mich 34; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a case affirmed by an equally divided Court, three justices declined to apply
Harris
and
Hass
to a violation of the rule stated in
Paintman
and
Edwards.
I
In his opinion for reversal in
Esters, supra,
Justice Williams drew the following distinction:
"In
Harris, supra,
the Supreme Court allowed a statement made by a defendant who had not been advised of his right to appointed counsel in violation of
Miranda
to be used for impeachment purposes. Unlike
Harris,
the
Edwards
decision concerned a defendant who had not only been advised of his
Miranda
rights, but who had invoked his right to have counsel present.
Harris
is therefore distinguished.” 417 Mich 63.
However, this distinction was rejected in
Oregon v Hass.
See, for example, the Court’s statement of the issue:
"This case presents a variation of the fact situation encountered by the Court in
Harris v New York,
401 US 222 (1971): When a suspect, who is in the custody of a state police officer, has been given full
Miranda
warnings and accepts them, and then later states that he would like to telephone a lawyer but is told that this cannot be done until the officer and the suspect reach the station, and the suspect then provides inculpatory information, is that information admissible in evidence solely for impeachment purposes after the suspect has taken the stand and testified contrarily to the inculpatory information, or is it inadmissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?” (Footnote omitted.) 420 US 714-715.
Like Edwards, Hass had invoked his right to counsel. See also
Mincey v Arizona,
437 US 385, 397-403; 98 S Ct 2408; 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978). For a recent decision in which defendant’s statements were held admissible for impeachment purposes despite a violation of the
Edwards
rule, see
United States v Hinckley,
672 F2d 115, 118, 134, fn 119 (CA DC, 1982). For other cases in which defendant’s statements were held admissible for impeachment purposes despite violations of defendant’s right to counsel, see
United States v Frank,
520 F2d 1287, 1291 (CA 2, 1975),
United States v Taxe,
540 F2d 961, 968-969 (CA 9, 1976),
United States v McManaman,
606 F2d 919, 924-925 (CA 10, 1979),
People v Ricco,
56 NY2d 320; 452 NYS2d 340; 437 NE2d 1097 (1982), and
State v Cody,
323 NW2d 863 (SD, 1982).
Moreover, the
Harris
decision placed considerable reliance on
Walder v United States,
347 US 62; 74 S Ct 354; 98 L Ed 503 (1954), a case in which
the Court held that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure was admissible for impeachment purposes. The use of this analogy in
Harris
suggests that the
Harris
rule is to be construed broadly.
In his opinion for reversal in
Esters, supra,
p 64, Justice Williams also attempted to distinguish
Harris
from
Edwards
on the baiss of the following language in
Edwards, supra,
451 US 484:
"Schneckloth [v Bustamonte,
412 US 218, 226; 93 S Ct 2041; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)] itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, however sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness of Edwards’ admission may be, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. It is thus apparent that the decision below misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked.”
This language from
Edwards
does not support a conclusion that
Harris
and
Hass
do not apply when the rule stated in
Edwards
is violated. In
Edwards,
the lower courts erred by holding that defendant’s statement was admissible because it was voluntary without regard to whether defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, but it is the voluntariness of defendant’s statement which determines whether it is admissible under
Harris
and
Hass
for impeachment purposes. See
Mincey v Arizona, supra.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with Justice Coleman, who held in her opinion in
Esters, supra,
that
Harris
and
Hass
apply as a matter of federal constitutional law to statements obtained
in violation of the rule stated in
Edwards
and
Paintman.
II
Justices Kavanagh and Levin stated that they would, on Michigan constitutional grounds, join in the conclusion reached by Justice Williams. Because the opinion of Justice Williams contains no reference to the Michigan Constitution or to any case decided on Michigan constitutional grounds, it is not clear whether Justice Williams shares their view of the Michigan Constitution. However, as only three justices at the most have adopted this view of the Michigan Constitution, no binding precedent has been established.
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Mackenzie, J.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 to 60 years and appealed by right. This Court affirmed defendant’s conviction, Docket No. 48218, unpublished opinion of February 12, 1981, and defendant filed with the Supreme Court a letter application for review of his conviction pursuant to Administrative Order 1977-4, 400 Mich
lxvii. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of
People v Paintman,
412 Mich 518; 315 NW2d 418 (1982), and
Edwards v Arizona,
451 US 477; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981). 417 Mich 851 (1982).
At issue is testimony concerning statements defendant made to the police which were admitted, not in the prosecution’s case in chief but in rebuttal, to impeach defendant’s credibility by showing that he made prior statements inconsistent with his testimony. It is well-settled that, even assuming that the statements were obtained in violation of the rule stated in
Miranda v Arizona,
384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), the statements could be used for impeachment purposes.
Harris v New York,
401 US 222; 91 S Ct 643; 28 L Ed 2d 1 (1971);
Oregon v Hass,
420 US 714; 95 S Ct 1215; 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975). However, in
People v Esters,
417 Mich 34; 331 NW2d 211 (1982), a case affirmed by an equally divided Court, three justices declined to apply
Harris
and
Hass
to a violation of the rule stated in
Paintman
and
Edwards.
I
In his opinion for reversal in
Esters, supra,
Justice Williams drew the following distinction:
"In
Harris, supra,
the Supreme Court allowed a statement made by a defendant who had not been advised of his right to appointed counsel in violation of
Miranda
to be used for impeachment purposes. Unlike
Harris,
the
Edwards
decision concerned a defendant who had not only been advised of his
Miranda
rights, but who had invoked his right to have counsel present.
Harris
is therefore distinguished.” 417 Mich 63.
However, this distinction was rejected in
Oregon v Hass.
See, for example, the Court’s statement of the issue:
"This case presents a variation of the fact situation encountered by the Court in
Harris v New York,
401 US 222 (1971): When a suspect, who is in the custody of a state police officer, has been given full
Miranda
warnings and accepts them, and then later states that he would like to telephone a lawyer but is told that this cannot be done until the officer and the suspect reach the station, and the suspect then provides inculpatory information, is that information admissible in evidence solely for impeachment purposes after the suspect has taken the stand and testified contrarily to the inculpatory information, or is it inadmissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?” (Footnote omitted.) 420 US 714-715.
Like Edwards, Hass had invoked his right to counsel. See also
Mincey v Arizona,
437 US 385, 397-403; 98 S Ct 2408; 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978). For a recent decision in which defendant’s statements were held admissible for impeachment purposes despite a violation of the
Edwards
rule, see
United States v Hinckley,
672 F2d 115, 118, 134, fn 119 (CA DC, 1982). For other cases in which defendant’s statements were held admissible for impeachment purposes despite violations of defendant’s right to counsel, see
United States v Frank,
520 F2d 1287, 1291 (CA 2, 1975),
United States v Taxe,
540 F2d 961, 968-969 (CA 9, 1976),
United States v McManaman,
606 F2d 919, 924-925 (CA 10, 1979),
People v Ricco,
56 NY2d 320; 452 NYS2d 340; 437 NE2d 1097 (1982), and
State v Cody,
323 NW2d 863 (SD, 1982).
Moreover, the
Harris
decision placed considerable reliance on
Walder v United States,
347 US 62; 74 S Ct 354; 98 L Ed 503 (1954), a case in which
the Court held that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure was admissible for impeachment purposes. The use of this analogy in
Harris
suggests that the
Harris
rule is to be construed broadly.
In his opinion for reversal in
Esters, supra,
p 64, Justice Williams also attempted to distinguish
Harris
from
Edwards
on the baiss of the following language in
Edwards, supra,
451 US 484:
"Schneckloth [v Bustamonte,
412 US 218, 226; 93 S Ct 2041; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)] itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, however sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness of Edwards’ admission may be, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. It is thus apparent that the decision below misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked.”
This language from
Edwards
does not support a conclusion that
Harris
and
Hass
do not apply when the rule stated in
Edwards
is violated. In
Edwards,
the lower courts erred by holding that defendant’s statement was admissible because it was voluntary without regard to whether defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, but it is the voluntariness of defendant’s statement which determines whether it is admissible under
Harris
and
Hass
for impeachment purposes. See
Mincey v Arizona, supra.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with Justice Coleman, who held in her opinion in
Esters, supra,
that
Harris
and
Hass
apply as a matter of federal constitutional law to statements obtained
in violation of the rule stated in
Edwards
and
Paintman.
II
Justices Kavanagh and Levin stated that they would, on Michigan constitutional grounds, join in the conclusion reached by Justice Williams. Because the opinion of Justice Williams contains no reference to the Michigan Constitution or to any case decided on Michigan constitutional grounds, it is not clear whether Justice Williams shares their view of the Michigan Constitution. However, as only three justices at the most have adopted this view of the Michigan Constitution, no binding precedent has been established.
Harris
and
Hass
state an exception to the federal constitutional rule established in
Miranda
and explained and refined in
Edwards.
There is no authority holding that the Michigan Constitution requires the results reached in
Miranda
and
Edwards.
See
People v Belanger,
120 Mich App 752, 761; 327 NW2d 554 (1982). Absent such authority, it is difficult to understand how the Michigan Constitution can require an exception to the rule stated in
Harris
and
Hass
for statements obtained in violation of the rule stated in
Edwards.
In
Harris, supra,
401 US 225-226, the Court explained its reasoning as follows:
"The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner’s credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.
"The shield provided by
Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”
We see nothing in the Michigan Constitution which casts doubt on the validity of this reasoning. We see nothing in the Michigan Constitution or in
Edwards
which suggests a reason for a different result when the
Edwards
rule is violated. Accordingly, we find that the use of defendant’s prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes was not error.
Affirmed.