People v. Clark

2025 IL App (5th) 240499-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 240499-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/26/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-24-0499, 5-24-0500, 5-24-0501, Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for 5-24-0502, 5-24-0503 cons. limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) Nos. 18-CF-1244, 18-CF-1871, ) 20-CF-2545, 21-CF-771, BILLY CLARK, ) 22-CF-233 ) Honorable Timothy D. Berkley, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Sholar concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion requesting additional sentencing credit despite the motion requesting an order nunc pro tunc.

¶2 Defendant, Billy Clark, appeals the trial court’s order denying his request to recalculate his

time served. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On March 21, 2022, defendant pled guilty to offenses relating to motor vehicles (625 ILCS

5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2018)) in case No. 18-CF-1244, offenses relating to motor vehicles (id.) in

case No. 18-CF-1871, burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2020)) in case No. 20-CF-2545,

offenses relating to a motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020)) in case No. 21-CF-771,

1 and offenses relating to a motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2022)) in case No. 22-CF-

233. In exchange for his plea, defendant was to be sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for each

offense to be served at 50% and to be served concurrently with each other, the remaining charges

in those cases would be dismissed, and case Nos. 18-CF-2647, 19-CF-1557, 19-CF-1879, 21-CF-

1774, and 21-CF-2174 would be dismissed.

¶5 During the plea hearing, the State informed the trial court of the specific offenses to which

defendant would plead guilty and the agreed sentence for the offenses. The court confirmed that

the sentences were to be served concurrently to each other and to a sentence imposed in a St. Clair

County case. It then stated, “And he’s going to get credit for time served and everybody agrees

that the mittimus will be stayed for three weeks, is that correct?” Both parties agreed. The court

asked defendant if he understood the terms of the agreement, and he answered affirmatively. After

the State provided the factual basis for each count and the court admonished defendant of his rights,

the court accepted defendant’s plea. Upon the court’s questioning, defense counsel and the State

waived the presentence investigation report and stipulated to defendant’s prior criminal history.

¶6 The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years’ imprisonment to be served at 50% for each

charge, all to run concurrently with each other and defendant’s sentence in a St. Clair County case.

The court also stated, “You will receive credit for all time served as set forth on the blue sheet.”

The court asked if the sentence was what defendant expected, and he answered affirmatively.

¶7 The same day as the plea hearing on March 21, 2022, a form document titled “CREDIT

FOR TIME SERVED” was filed in each case. The document listed the amount of credit for time

served as 171 days for August 20, 2018, to February 6, 2019, 281 days for June 18, 2019, to March

24, 2020, 179 days for July 18, 2021, to January 13, 2022, and 56 days for January 25, 2022, to

March 21, 2022. It listed the total number of days of credit for time served as 687. Thereafter, the

2 document stated, “THESE DAYS HAVE BEEN DETERMINED AND SIGNED AS CORRECT

BY COUNSEL BEFORE MITTIMUS ISSUE.” Below that was a spot for the state’s attorney and

defense counsel to sign; however, only the state’s attorney signed in the proper spot. The last full

paragraph of the document stated:

“DEFENDANT READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING

I HAVE READ THIS DOCUMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE

RECEIVED CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED REGARDING THIS MATTER

BEFORE THE COURT.”

Below this paragraph was a line for defendant to sign his name; however, defense counsel signed

in defendant’s spot. Defendant did not sign the paper. The document was also signed by the judge.

¶8 The written judgment order filed in each case stated that the trial court entered judgment

of 15 years’ imprisonment with one-year mandatory supervised release. It further stated that

defendant was entitled to receive credit for time served in custody from August 20, 2018, to

February 6, 2019, from June 18, 2019, to March 24, 2020, from July 18, 2021, to January 13, 2022,

and from January 25, 2022, to the date of the judgment. The order further noted that the sentence

was to run concurrent with case Nos. 18-CF-1871, 20-CF-2545, 21-CF-771, and 22-CF-233.

¶9 On June 21, 2022, the trial court entered an amended judgment, increasing the credit for

time served to total 772 days. The amended judgment provided that defendant received credit for

time served from August 20, 2018, to February 6, 2019, from June 18, 2019, to March 24, 2020,

from July 18, 2021, to January 13, 2022, and from January 25, 2022, to the date of the amended

judgment.

¶ 10 Defendant did not file a postplea motion or a direct appeal. However, on November 15,

2023, defendant filed a motion for order nunc pro tunc. The motion asserted the credit for time

3 served was incorrect where the trial court did not give defendant credit for his work as a trustee

while in jail that defendant was entitled to receive pursuant to section 5-4.5-100 of the Unified

Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West 2022)). The motion requested the court

issue an order nunc pro tunc indicating defendant receive credit for 545 days spent in the Madison

County jail prior to sentencing.

¶ 11 On December 12, 2023, the trial court filed an order dismissing defendant’s motion for

order nunc pro tunc for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court found that defendant’s

motion was essentially a request to amend the mittimus, which the court lacked jurisdiction to

consider 30 days after the entry of the judgment. The order further noted that nothing in the order

foreclosed defendant’s ability to request the Director of Corrections award earned sentencing

credit under section 3-6-3 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West Supp. 2023)).

¶ 12 On February 12, 2024, defendant filed a second motion for order nunc pro tunc. The

motion again argued that pursuant to section 5-4.5-100 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100 (West

2024)) defendant was entitled to 1,071 days credit for time served. The motion requested the trial

court issue an order nunc pro tunc indicating defendant would receive credit for 774 days spent in

the Madison County jail prior to sentencing. Attached to the petition were documents from the

Madison County Sheriff’s Office, confirming defendant’s incarceration information and work as

a trustee during his jail time. Correspondence from Captain Jerry Endicott, included in that

documentation, stated that defendant worked a total of 297 days as a trustee over the time period

of August 21, 2018, to January 14, 2022.

¶ 13 On February 21, 2024, the trial court filed an order again dismissing defendant’s motion

for an order nunc pro tunc for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that defendant should seek relief

from the director of the Department of Corrections under section 3-6-3 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/3-

4 6-3 (West Supp. 2023)). It further noted that defendant should “take heed of this court having twice

dismissed the defendant’s motions for additional pretrial custody credit,” stating that the director

of the Department of Corrections would conduct a hearing to revoke up to 180 days of sentence

credit if the court made a specific finding that a filing was frivolous. This court granted defendant

leave to file a late notice of appeal on July 9, 2024.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion requesting

additional credit for time served for lack of jurisdiction and requests this court remand for a hearing

on his motion. The State agrees that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s request

for additional credit but argues that the trial court properly denied the motion because defendant

was precluded from seeking further sentencing credit where the credit for time served was a term

of the plea agreement.

¶ 16 “Because decisions issued without subject matter jurisdiction are void, this court has an

independent duty to ensure that the trial court and this court have jurisdiction over a case.” People

v. Arriaga, 2023 IL App (5th) 220076, ¶ 12. The appellate court has no jurisdictional authority to

consider the merits of an appeal from a void order. See People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 307

(2003).

¶ 17 “Normally, the authority of a trial court to alter a sentence terminates *** 30 days”

following the entry of a final judgment. Id. at 303. However, the trial court possesses the continuing

power to enforce the judgment or correct “clerical errors or matters of form so that the record

conformed to the judgment actually rendered.” Id. at 306-07. Nunc pro tunc orders are a means to

allow the trial court to correct the record to reflect that which was previously done. People v.

Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1991).

5 ¶ 18 Defendant here designated his motion as a motion for a nunc pro tunc order. However, the

substance of the motion did not request the court to correct the record to reflect what the court

previously ordered. Rather, the motion alleged the trial court’s presentence custody credit

determination was incorrect. As such, defendant improperly utilized a motion for a nunc pro tunc

order to request modification of the sentencing order. See People v. Coleman, 2017 IL App (4th)

160770, ¶ 22. Previously, these circumstances would have required dismissal of defendant’s

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See People v. Scheurich, 2019 IL App (4th) 160441, ¶ 22; People

v. Blancas, 2019 IL App (1st) 171127, ¶ 17.

¶ 19 However, effective March 1, 2019, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 provides the trial court

with retained jurisdiction to correct—inter alia—“[e]rrors in the calculation of presentence

custody credit” on the court’s own motion or on the motion of any party. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(a)(3)

(eff. Mar. 1, 2019). While defendant’s motion did not refer to Rule 472, the rule nevertheless

afforded the court jurisdiction to determine the issue. Id.; see People v. Wells, 2024 IL 129402,

¶ 16 (finding defendant’s sentencing credit argument not forfeited and addressing such argument

although defendant titled his motion as a motion for a nunc pro tunc order rather than a motion

under Rule 472). Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider

defendant’s motion requesting additional sentencing credit.

¶ 20 Because the trial court did not address the motion on the merits, the parties raise arguments

on appeal that were never presented to or developed in the trial court. Also, as defendant admits,

the record is unclear as to the precise amount of additional credit defendant sought. “The limited

record, including a *** lack of findings by the circuit court, precludes us from a definitive

determination of whether defendant is entitled to sentencing credit ***.” People v. Scheurich, 2024

IL App (5th) 230357-U, ¶ 25. We therefore remand for the trial court to timely consider

6 defendant’s request for additional credit for time served and the parties’ argument related thereto.

See id.

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 The trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s motion requesting additional credit for time

served. We remand for a hearing on defendant’s motion requesting additional sentence credit

where the parties can present their respective arguments.

¶ 23 Reversed and remanded.