NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230751-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 7, 2024 NO. 4-23-0751 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4 th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County RYAN LANE CLARK, ) No. 16CF621 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John S. Lowry, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record did not refute postplea counsel’s contention he strictly complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 17, 2017).
¶2 In September 2016, the State charged defendant with six counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(1), (2), (8) (West 2014)) in connection with the
November 27, 2014, sexual assault of the victim, C.M.W. The State subsequently dismissed four
counts when defendant waived a jury, leaving two Class X felony charges.
¶3 In November 2017, defendant entered an open plea of guilty to one count of
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2014)), a Class 1 felony, and the State
dismissed the remaining charge. Among its admonitions, the trial court informed defendant of
the sentencing ranges for the charges, including defendant’s sentence would include a term of three years to life of mandatory supervised release (MSR). However, the court did not inform
defendant he could be held in prison upon completion of his term if he did not obtain housing in
compliance with the conditions of his MSR, a procedure known as being “violated at the door.”
See Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Board, 2014 IL 117155, ¶ 9, 21 N.E.3d 423.
¶4 Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw the plea, arguing he was pressured
into accepting the State’s plea offer. Defendant later filed a pro se supplemental motion,
alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him he could be held in prison if he
did not obtain housing in compliance with the terms of his MSR. The motion was denied, and
defendant appealed. The appellate court granted defendant’s motion for a summary remand for
compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶5 On remand, new counsel amended the motion to withdraw the plea and filed a
Rule 604(d) certificate. The new motion did not mention defendant’s allegation trial counsel
failed to inform him of the consequences of failing to obtain suitable housing upon completion of
his prison term. Defendant filed amendments to the motion that also did not mention the issue.
The issue also was not raised at the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied the motion.
¶6 On appeal, defendant contends his postplea counsel failed to strictly comply with
Rule 604(d) by failing to amend his motion to withdraw the plea to allege he was not properly
admonished of the possibility of being held in prison if he did not obtain suitable housing upon
release. We affirm.
¶7 I. BACKGROUND
¶8 The State charged defendant in connection with the sexual assault of C.M.W. On
November 1, 2017, the day before trial, the parties discussed with the trial court a final plea offer
under which defendant would plead guilty to one count of criminal sexual assault. The court
-2- admonished defendant the crime was a Class 1 felony with a potential sentence of 4 to 15 years’
incarceration served at 85%, followed by a term of 3 years to life of MSR. The court
admonished defendant, if he went to trial and was found guilty, he would be facing two Class X
felonies with potential sentences of 6 to 30 years’ incarceration, served at 85%, that were
required to be served consecutively and with a term of 3 years to life of MSR.
¶9 The next day, defendant accepted the plea offer. The trial court again admonished
defendant of the sentencing ranges. The court also admonished defendant of his right to plead
not guilty and his right to a jury trial. The court confirmed no threats or promises were made in
exchange for defendant’s plea. Defendant stated he understood the plea, had discussed the
matter with trial counsel, and was satisfied with counsel’s representation.
¶ 10 The State gave a factual basis for the plea, telling the trial court, on November 27,
2014, Rockford police officers met with C.M.W. regarding a criminal sexual assault. C.M.W.
reported she was walking home when a man approached her in a car and asked if she wanted a
ride. It was cold outside, so C.M.W. got into the car. The man drove to the area of 11th Street
and told her to get in the back seat of the car. C.M.W. felt threatened and forced to do what he
wanted. C.M.W. reported the man had her remove her clothing, pulled his pants down, and put
his penis in her vagina, with his arm around her neck, causing her head to hit the door. The man
opened the door, and C.M.W. crawled out and fell to her knees in the snowy parking lot. The
man told C.M.W. if she screamed, he would hit her in the face. The man then sexually assaulted
C.M.W. again. C.M.W. gave a description of the man to the police, who noted a handprint in the
snow at the scene, corroborating C.M.W.’s report. Evidence from a sexual assault kit matched
defendant. C.M.W. then identified defendant in a photo lineup as the person who sexually
assaulted her.
-3- ¶ 11 The trial court accepted the plea. During the plea proceedings, nothing was
mentioned concerning the possibility defendant could be held in prison after completion of his
prison term if he were unable to find suitable housing to meet the conditions of his MSR.
¶ 12 On November 30, 2017, defendant, through his trial counsel, moved to withdraw
the plea, arguing he was pressured into accepting the State’s plea offer and did not have
sufficient time to contemplate the plea offer. Counsel also filed a certificate facially in
compliance with Rule 604(d). The State filed a response.
¶ 13 On February 5, 2018, defendant filed a pro se supplemental motion, alleging, in
part, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him, once he “reached MSR,” if he did not
find “a house worthy to parole,” he would be “forced to stay in prison for that time, meaning
even more prison time than was promised.” Defendant did not state he would have rejected the
plea had he known this.
¶ 14 In a section entitled “New Evidence,” defendant alleged he had been informed the
victim had recanted “her story about a gun; that her story and charges against [him] were based
on.” He stated, had he known that, he would not have accepted the plea. Defendant also
included a section labeled “Innocence,” stating the act was consensual, “[n]ot only by my words,
but also by pictures and [C.M.W.’s] own testimony.” Defendant did not provide further details
concerning the alleged “pictures” or “testimony.” Neither counsel’s motion nor defendant’s
supplemental motion included any affidavits.
¶ 15 The trial court held a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464
N.E.2d 1045 (1984)), during which defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance were
discussed, but issues concerning MSR were not raised. The court declined to find trial counsel
neglected defendant’s case and later found counsel’s conduct in advising defendant to plead
-4- guilty was a matter of strategy. However, the court appointed a public defender to represent
defendant on his motion to withdraw the plea.
¶ 16 New counsel filed an amended motion that did not mention the failure of trial
counsel to inform defendant of the possibility he could be held in prison if he failed to obtain
suitable housing at the end of his prison term. As to any possible defense, counsel wrote,
“Defendant believes that statements by the victim subsequent to the plea are contradictory to
statements she made to police, and if known at the time he would not have entered a plea of
guilt.” On June 5, 2018, counsel filed an amended motion, adding a Rockford police report and
C.M.W.’s written victim-impact statement in support of that allegation. The police report stated
defendant pointed a gun at C.M.W. In the victim impact statement, C.M.W. stated defendant
told her he had a gun. In another defense exhibit in the record, consisting of C.M.W.’s written
statement to police, C.M.W. stated she did not see the gun after she got in the back seat. No
affidavits were included. Counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion, and defendant’s trial counsel returned to the case.
¶ 17 At sentencing, defendant maintained his innocence, stating the act was a
consensual “sex-for-money transaction.” The State presented evidence defendant had a
substantial criminal history and had been accused of sexually assaulting two other victims, with
both assaults occurring near 11th Street. The trial court sentenced defendant to 14 years’
incarceration, served at 85%, with 3 years to natural life of MSR. Trial counsel filed a motion to
reconsider the sentence without filing a Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied the motion,
and defendant appealed. The appellate court granted defendant’s motion for summary remand
for compliance with Rule 604(d).
-5- ¶ 18 On remand, new postplea counsel filed a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea
and filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate. The new motion did not mention defendant’s
claim trial counsel failed to inform him of the consequences of failing to obtain suitable housing
upon completion of his prison term. Defendant filed pro se amendments to the motion and
various pro se affidavits that also did not mention the issue. The issue also was not raised at the
hearing on the motion, during which both defendant and trial counsel testified. Defendant
repeated in his motion and testimony his claim C.M.W.’s statements were contradictory and said
he would have gone to trial had he known of those contradictions. The trial court denied the
motion.
¶ 19 This appeal followed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, defendant contends postplea counsel failed to strictly comply with
Rule 604(d). Defendant recognizes counsel filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate but
argues the record refutes counsel’s certification he strictly complied with Rule 604(d) because
counsel failed to allege defendant’s pro se claim his plea was involuntary because of ineffective
assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to inform him he could be held in prison upon
completion of his prison term if he did not obtain housing in compliance with the conditions of
MSR. Thus, he requests a remand for new postplea proceedings.
¶ 22 Rule 604(d) requires a defendant challenging a guilty plea to file a motion to
withdraw the plea within 30 days of the date that the sentence is imposed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d)
(eff. July 17, 2017). The motion must be in writing and state the grounds for challenging the
plea. When the motion is based on facts that do not appear in the record, it must be supported by
an affidavit. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 17, 2017). “The trial court shall then determine
-6- whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires
counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 17, 2017). The rule
then provides:
“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the
attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means
or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the
entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of
proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing
hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate
presentation of any defects in those proceedings.
The motion shall be heard promptly and, if [the motion] is allowed, the
trial court shall modify the sentence or vacate the judgment and permit the
defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty and plead anew.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d)
(eff. July 17, 2017).
“Under Rule 604(d), any issue not raised in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or to reconsider a
sentence after a guilty plea is forfeited.” People v. Thompson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 488, 492, 874
N.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2007).
¶ 23 The attorney’s certificate must strictly comply with the requirements of Rule
604(d). See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35, 630 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1994). If the certificate
does not satisfy this standard, a reviewing court must remand the case to the trial court for
proceedings that strictly comply with the rule. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33, 630 N.E.2d at 792.
¶ 24 When counsel files a facially valid certificate of compliance, we may consult the
record to determine whether counsel actually fulfilled his or her obligations under Rule 604(d).
-7- People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 8, 87 N.E.3d 441. We further note, in People v.
Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369, 692 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (1998), our supreme court rejected the
premise the strict-compliance standard must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois
courts to grant multiple remands and new hearings following an initial remand for Rule 604(d)
compliance. Once the remedy for lack of strict compliance has been granted through a remand
and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard, technical noncompliance with Rule 604(d) will
not require successive remands and rehearings. See People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (3d) 160019,
¶ 24, 72 N.E.3d 421. However, “Shirley does not stand for the blanket proposition that a matter
may only be remanded one time for compliance with Rule 604(d).” Evans, 2017 IL App (3d)
160019, ¶ 24. If the defendant was deprived of a full and fair hearing, a remand would be
appropriate. See Tejada-Soto, 2012 IL App (2d) 110188, ¶ 16, 966 N.E.2d 375; People v.
Bridges, 2021 IL App (2d) 190778-U, ¶ 23 (cited as persuasive authority under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 23). We review de novo the question of whether defense counsel complied with Rule
604(d). People v. Grice, 371 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815, 867 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (2007).
¶ 25 First, we note defendant does not contend he was denied a hearing. Defendant
had two hearings on motions to withdraw the plea and testified at both. Defendant instead takes
issue with trial counsel’s failure to advance the claim from his pro se motion concerning the
potential he could be held indefinitely in prison after the completion of his prison term if he were
unable to obtain housing compliant with the terms of his MSR. Thus, he alleges the record
rebuts postplea counsel’s assertion he strictly complied with Rule 604(d) when postplea counsel
failed to amend the motion to withdraw the plea to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel
on the matter.
-8- ¶ 26 The State argues only that defendant failed to show prejudice based on trial
counsel’s failure to inform him of the MSR implications. Thus, the State asserts the record does
not refute postplea counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate because defendant’s underlying claim lacks
merit.
¶ 27 A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty. People v.
Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520, 922 N.E.2d 330, 338 (2009). “Rather, he must show a manifest
injustice under the facts involved to obtain leave to withdraw his plea.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) People v. Beasley, 2017 IL App (4th) 150291, ¶ 32, 85 N.E.3d 568.
“In considering such a motion, the court shall evaluate whether the guilty plea
was entered through a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or if there is
doubt of the guilt of the accused and the ends of justice would be better served by
submitting the case to trial.” People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 40, 733 N.E.2d
1235, 1237 (2000).
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 519, 922 N.E.2d at 338.
¶ 28 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the standard set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23, 965
N.E.2d 1109. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant.” People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (2010). A
defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to satisfy either
prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d
302, 317-18, 939 N.E.2d 310, 319 (2010). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show, but
-9- for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v. Houston, 229 Ill. 2d 1, 4, 890 N.E.2d 424, 426 (2008).
¶ 29 In the context of required admonitions from the trial court, for a defendant to
knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, due process generally requires he or she must be advised
of the direct consequences of a guilty plea. People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 35, 983 N.E.2d
439. “[A] direct consequence of a guilty plea is one which has a definite, immediate and largely
automatic effect on the range of a defendant’s sentence.” Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 35. “[A]
defendant need not be advised by the trial court of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.”
Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 36. “A collateral consequence is one which the circuit court has no
authority to impose, and results from an action that may or may not be taken by an agency that
the trial court does not control.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hughes, 2012 IL 112817,
¶ 36; see People v. Schmidt, 2021 IL App (4th) 200480-U, ¶ 24 (cited as persuasive authority
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23) (applying the above principles).
“ ‘Violating an offender at the door is a legal fiction wherein it is imagined that
the offender is released from custody, placed on MSR, but when he leaves the
institution he is in violation of his supervision terms and he is immediately placed
back in custody. In reality, the offender simply remains incarcerated until a MSR
prerequisite is satisfied. This can continue until either (1) the term of MSR
expires, or (2) the prerequisite is satisfied.’ ” Cordrey, 2014 IL 117155, ¶ 9
(quoting Armato v. Grounds, 944 F. Supp. 2d 627, 631 n.3 (C.D. Ill. 2013)).
This procedure is also sometimes referred to as a “turnaround practice.” See People v. Shaw,
2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶ 14. Because defendant’s MSR term may be three years to natural
- 10 - life, there is the possibility, were he “violated at the door” repeatedly, he could spend the rest of
his natural life in prison. See Schmidt, 2021 IL App (4th) 200480-U, ¶ 24.
¶ 30 However, decisions related to a defendant’s MSR term are made by the prisoner
review board, which the trial court does not control. Schmidt, 2021 IL App (4th) 200480-U,
¶ 25. Therefore, this possible consequence is a collateral consequence of a defendant’s guilty
plea, and the court has no duty to admonish a defendant of such consequences. Schmidt, 2021 IL
App (4th) 200480-U, ¶ 25 (citing Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520-21, 922 N.E.2d at 338, and People
v. McDonald, 2018 IL App (3d) 150507, ¶ 32, 95 N.E.3d 1). Thus, the lack of admonitions from
the court does not call into question the constitutional voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty plea.
Schmidt, 2021 IL App (4th) 200480-U, ¶ 25 (citing Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 521-22, 922 N.E.2d
at 339). Likewise, again in the context of admonitions required from the court, postplea counsel
need not raise the matter of lack of proper admonitions by the court in a motion to withdraw the
plea, because legally unmeritorious amendments are not “necessary” amendments for purposes
of Rule 604(d). Schmidt, 2021 IL App (4th) 200480-U, ¶ 31.
¶ 31 While the above principles apply to admonitions provided by the trial court, the
First District in Shaw, addressed the issue in relation to counsel’s failure to advise a defendant
about the “turnaround practice” at issue. In remanding the defendant’s postconviction petition
for third-stage proceedings, the appellate court also specifically noted the matter was a collateral
consequence of the plea. Shaw, 2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶ 38. However, the appellate court
ultimately held a pro se postconviction petitioner, who had been “violated at the door,” made a
substantial showing of a deprivation of a constitutional right when the trial court, in defense
counsel’s presence, misinformed the defendant at his guilty-plea proceeding by stating the parole
process could not change the date of the defendant’s release, and counsel did not correct the
- 11 - court on the matter. Shaw, 2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶¶ 42-45. Thus, unlike here, the issue in
Shaw encompassed more than counsel’s simple failure to advise the defendant of a collateral
consequence of the plea because it instead involved counsel’s failure to correct “affirmative
misinformation.”
¶ 32 The Shaw court also noted, until recently, courts examining claims concerning the
validity of guilty pleas applied the same test as for due process concerning the required
admonitions by the trial court, holding plea counsel was not required to advise a client of the
collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Shaw, 2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶ 49. However
narrow exceptions have been recognized. In particular, in circumstances such as the failure to
advise of the collateral consequences of deportation, where consequences are severe, certain to
occur, enmeshed in the criminal process, and are predictably important to a defendant’s calculus,
they are not categorically excluded from Strickland’s purview, despite being traditionally
categorized as collateral. Shaw, 2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶ 51. The Shaw court ultimately
found the risk of being “violated at the door” per the “turnaround practice” and being held
indefinitely beyond the conclusion of one’s prison term was such a consequence, although the
court also again noted the circumstances of the case involved affirmative misinformation. Shaw,
2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶¶ 52, 55. The Shaw court went on to determine the defendant also
established prejudice because he alleged more than a bare assertion he would have gone to trial if
properly advised. Shaw, 2023 IL App (1st) 221358, ¶ 60.
¶ 33 The State does not meaningfully dispute and seems to agree with Shaw’s analysis
pertaining to an attorney’s obligation to advise his or her client of the collateral consequences of
being “violated at the door.” We note what occurred in Shaw, where erroneous advice was given
to the defendant, was not remotely similar to what occurred in this case. In any event, we need
- 12 - not determine the extent, if any, of an attorney’s obligation to advise a client of the “turnaround
practice,” because we agree with the State the record here does not show defendant suffered
prejudice.
¶ 34 For a defendant to suffer prejudice from counsel’s failure to advise him of the
issue, there must be “ ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” People v. Brown,
2017 IL 121681, ¶ 26, 102 N.E.3d 205 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
Specifically, the defendant “ ‘must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.’ ” Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 40 (quoting
People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29, 67 N.E.3d 233). This requires “consideration of the
specific circumstances” of the defendant’s case. Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 41.
¶ 35 In moving to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant is not required to present “a
claim of innocence or a plausible defense.” Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 45. However, a
defendant still “must raise more than a bare allegation that, absent counsel’s errors, he would
have spurned the guilty plea and proceeded to a trial.” People v. Tucek, 2019 IL App (2d)
160788, ¶ 18, 125 N.E.3d 402. Further, “[a] conclusory allegation that a defendant would not
have pleaded guilty and would have demanded a trial is insufficient to establish prejudice.”
Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29, 67 N.E.3d 233; see Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 47. “Courts should
not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have
pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017).
¶ 36 Here, defendant never filed an affidavit averring counsel actually failed to inform
him of the matter and failed to allege even a bare assertion he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have demanded a trial had he been informed of the “turnaround practice.” Even giving
- 13 - defendant the benefit of the doubt in that he made such an assertion in relation to other claims in
his pro se motion, defendant failed to provide any facts supporting the conclusion he would have
rejected the plea offer based on the potential application of the “turnaround practice.” Thus, he
failed to sufficiently allege prejudice.
¶ 37 Furthermore, the record casts doubt on whether it would have been rational for
defendant to reject the plea offer. Absent the plea, defendant faced two charges punishable by 6
to 30 years’ incarceration, required to be served consecutively. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West
2014); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2) (West 2014). Thus, he would have faced an overall sentence of
12 to 60 years’ imprisonment. The record also does not support the conclusion defendant would
have received a sentence close to the minimum term, and it would be mere speculation to reach
such a conclusion. Thus, by pleading guilty, defendant potentially avoided significant additional
time in prison. Further, the “turnaround practice” would still be applicable to him had he gone to
trial. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2014). Under these circumstances, it is not evident
from the record it would have been rational for defendant to reject the plea offer based on the
existence of that practice. See People v. Davis, 2022 IL App (4th) 210733-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (cited as
persuasive authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 38 Defendant argues his decision would have been rational because he had a defense.
However, the record shows merely minor contradictions regarding when or whether the victim
saw a gun during the assault. Contrary to defendant’s assertions, those contradictions do not
prove his innocence. Instead, defendant has done nothing to put forth a plausible defense other
than attacking the credibility of C.M.W., when other evidence in the record supported a finding
of his guilt. See generally Tucek, 2019 IL App (2d) 160788, ¶ 20.
- 14 - ¶ 39 Finally, defendant argues the underlying merits are irrelevant to the issue of strict
compliance. We disagree. “Compliance with Rule 604(d) requires counsel to consider bases
relevant to the particular ground on which a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea and to
amend the motion with those bases deemed ‘necessary for adequate presentation of any defects
in those proceedings.’ ” People v. Jefferson, 2023 IL App (4th) 220814-U, ¶ 29 (quoting Ill. S.
Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017)). “Compliance with Rule 604(d) does not require the
advancement of any particular ground for withdrawal of a guilty plea.” Jefferson, 2023 IL App
(4th) 220814-U, ¶ 29. As previously noted, “[l]egally unmeritorious amendments are not
‘necessary’ amendments.” Schmidt, 2021 IL App (4th) 200480-U, ¶ 31. Here, the record does
not show an amendment based on trial counsel’s failure to advise defendant of the “turnaround
practice” would have merit. Thus, the record does not refute counsel’s facially valid Rule 604(d)
certificate.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s
motion to withdraw his plea.
¶ 42 Affirmed.
- 15 -