People v. Parker

2025 IL App (4th) 241253-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241253-U FILED This Order was filed under April 11, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-1253 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Jersey County CHRISTOPHER L. PARKER, ) No. 07CF176 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Allison Lorton, ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s petition for habeas corpus relief.

¶2 Defendant, Christopher L. Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for

habeas corpus relief, arguing the trial court erred by denying the petition because it alleged that

an event had taken place subsequent to his conviction for criminal sexual assault that entitled

him to release from all custody, including mandatory supervised release (MSR). Specifically,

defendant argued that the application of certain statutory provisions related to indeterminate

MSR terms for sex offenders, as applied to him, violated his rights under the eighth and

fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (see U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV)

by subjecting him to over six years of imprisonment after he had completed his determinate sentence of five years and three months’ imprisonment. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In January 2008, defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-

13(a)(2) (West 2006)). (While the information states defendant was charged under section 12-

13(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (id.), the substantive allegations in the information

describe the offense of criminal sexual assault as set forth in section 12-13(a)(1) of the Criminal

Code of 1961 (id. § 12-13(a)(1)).) He was subsequently sentenced to five years and three

months’ imprisonment, with an MSR term of two years. In September 2008, defendant filed a

pro se postconviction petition, which was dismissed.

¶5 In February 2009, defendant, pro se, filed a successive postconviction petition, in

which he claimed his guilty plea was involuntary where he was admonished at the plea hearing

that he would receive a two-year term of MSR, but his prison records showed he actually

received an MSR term of three years to life. The trial court granted defendant’s request to

withdraw his guilty plea. In June 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal sexual

assault pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and the court sentenced him to five years and

three months’ imprisonment, with an MSR term of three years to life.

¶6 Defendant has served his prison sentence of five years and three months, but his

indeterminate MSR term has not yet terminated. According to defendant’s pro se filings, he was

reincarcerated several times after being placed on MSR for violating the terms of his MSR.

Defendant, pro se, has filed numerous petitions related to his continued imprisonment.

¶7 Relevant to this appeal, on June 30, 2023, defendant filed a pro se petition for

habeas corpus relief, which alleged that he was released on MSR on July 3, 2012. The petition

alleged that defendant was reincarcerated from September 2012 until May 2015 and from

-2- September 2015 until May 2019 because he was unable to afford housing which the Illinois

Department of Corrections (DOC) would approve. The petition further alleged that, pursuant to

section 3-14-2.5(e) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5(e) (West

2022)), these two periods of reincarceration did not count toward his indeterminate MSR term.

The petition asserted that the statutory scheme comprised of sections 5-5-8(d)(1)(4), 3-3-7(b-

1)(1), and 3-14-2.5(e) of the Code (id. §§ 5-5-8(d)(1)(4), 3-3-7(b-1)(1), 3-14-2.5(e)), as applied

to defendant, “inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the [eighth amendment]” by

forcing him “to endure more than 6 years [of] prolonged incarceration.” The petition also alleged

that this statutory scheme, as applied, violated defendant’s right to equal protection under the

fourteenth amendment. The petition cited Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2019),

as supporting authority.

¶8 On July 11, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for habeas corpus

relief on the basis that such relief is not available to a petitioner who is currently serving a term

of MSR. On July 21, 2023, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his petition for

habeas corpus relief. Defendant contends that his petition alleged violations of his constitutional

rights which constituted occurrences subsequent to his conviction that entitled him to release

from all custody, including MSR. Specifically, defendant argues that, subsequent to his

conviction, the statutory scheme comprised of sections 5-5-8(d)(1)(4), 3-3-7(b-1)(1), and 3-14-

2.5(e) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-8(d)(1)(4), 3-3-7(b-1)(1), 3-14-2.5(e) (West 2022)) subjected

him to the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment of prolonged incarceration in violation of the Eighth

-3- *** Amendment.” He also argues that this statutory scheme denied him equal protection of the

law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.

¶ 11 Habeas corpus proceedings are governed by article X of the Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/art. X (West 2022)). Pursuant to section 102, “[e]very person imprisoned

or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, except as herein otherwise provided, may apply for

habeas corpus in the manner provided in Article X of this Act, to obtain relief from such

imprisonment or restraint, if it proved to be unlawful.” Id. § 10-102. “Under habeas corpus, the

sole remedy is a prisoner’s immediate discharge from custody.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Adcock v. Snyder, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1098 (2004).

¶ 12 Habeas corpus relief may be granted only on one of the seven grounds specified

in section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2022)). Beacham v.

Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008). “A complaint for order of habeas corpus may not be used to

review proceedings that do not exhibit one of these defects, even though the alleged error

involves a denial of constitutional rights.” Id.

¶ 13 Relevant to this appeal, section 10-124(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735

ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2022)) provides that a prisoner “in custody by virtue of process from any

court legally constituted” may be discharged “[w]here, though the original imprisonment was

lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the

party has become entitled to be discharged.” Our supreme court has stated that, “[u]nder this

provision, a prisoner who has satisfied the judgment under which he is confined may invoke the

writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release from imprisonment.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 123 Ill.

2d 291, 295 (1988). However, “habeas corpus does not lie if the person is in custody by virtue of

a final judgment of any circuit court, or of any proceeding for the enforcement of such judgment,

-4- unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired.” Id. “A prisoner is

not entitled to a discharge from prison until his [MSR] is served, because [MSR] is a part of a

sentence.” Taylor v. Cowan, 339 Ill. App. 3d 406, 410 (2003).

¶ 14 When the trial court determines that a habeas corpus petition is insufficient on its

face to warrant relief under article X, the court may sua sponte deny the petition. Hennings v.

Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 31 (2008). We review the denial of a habeas corpus petition de novo,

and we may affirm the ruling of the trial court for any reason supported by the record. Ragel v.

Scott, 2018 IL App (4th) 170322, ¶ 19.

¶ 15 Initially, we observe that although defendant named “Melinda Eddy” as the

defendant in the caption of the habeas corpus petition, he filed the petition in the underlying

criminal case, his motion to reconsider the denial of the petition contained the caption of the

underlying criminal case, and the State participated in this appeal as the appellee. We note,

however, that our supreme court has stated that the proper defendant in a habeas corpus

proceeding is the petitioner’s current custodian. Hennings, 229 Ill. 2d at 23-24, n.2. We also note

that, according to DOC’s website, defendant is no longer in prison, but was released on MSR in

July 2024. See Illinois Department of Corrections-Inmate Search, Illinois Department of

Corrections, https://idoc.illinois.gov/offender/inmatesearch.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2025); see

also People v. Young, 355 Ill. App. 3d 317, 321 n.1 (2005) (“[W]e may take judicial notice of

information that [DOC] has provided on its website.”). While both of these issues might be fatal

to defendant’s habeas corpus claim, we do not address them in this appeal because they were not

identified or briefed by the parties.

¶ 16 Instead, we find the trial court properly denied defendant’s habeas corpus petition

because the allegations in the petition did not demonstrate that he was entitled to discharge.

-5- Defendant was sentenced to five years and three months’ imprisonment, with an indeterminate

MSR term of three years to natural life. Defendant has completed his determinate prison

sentence, but his indeterminate MSR term has not yet terminated. Accordingly, he has not yet

satisfied the judgment under which he was confined. See Faheem-El, 123 Ill. 2d at 295; Taylor,

339 Ill. App. 3d at 410.

¶ 17 We reject defendant’s reliance on Murphy. In Murphy, a class comprised of

indigent sex offenders filed a lawsuit under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code

(42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the Attorney General of Illinois and the Director of DOC, alleging

that the way the defendants implemented Illinois’s statutory scheme governing MSR for sex

offenders violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by subjecting them to indefinite

imprisonment due to their inability to secure qualifying MSR host sites. Murphy, 390 F. Supp. 3d

at 738, 750.

¶ 18 The Murphy court held that the defendants implemented the statutory scheme at

issue in a way that violated the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection by “creat[ing] an illegal

classification based on wealth, which indefinitely deprive[d the plaintiffs] of their liberty as a

result of their incapacity to pay.” Id. at 759. The Murphy court also held that the requirement that

plaintiffs find a compliant host site before being released from prison onto MSR violated the

eighth amendment as applied to the plaintiffs because it punished them for their homeless status

through prolonged incarceration. Id. at 764. The court reserved its ruling on the proper remedy

and subsequently entered a permanent injunction, directing the defendants to submit a

compliance plan outlining steps to ensure that no member of the plaintiff class remained in

prison due to an inability to locate an MSR host site by October 31, 2021. Id. at 766; Murphy v.

Raoul, 2021 WL 12306062, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2021).

-6- ¶ 19 Thus, at most, Murphy may support an argument that an incarcerated sex offender

subject to an indeterminate MSR term who has been held past the expiration of his or her

determinate prison sentence should be released onto MSR if his or her prolonged incarceration is

solely due to indigency and/or homelessness. However, this remedy is not available in a

habeas corpus proceeding. See Adcock, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 1098 (“Under habeas corpus, the sole

remedy is a prisoner’s immediate discharge from custody.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.));

Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430-31 (1998) (“[W]hile petitioner’s

challenge to the [MSR] revocation proceedings might affect the manner in which he would serve

his term of [MSR], it would not entitle him to actual release or discharge.”). Moreover, as

previously noted, it appears defendant has already received this relief, as DOC’s website

indicates that defendant is no longer in prison but was released on MSR in July 2024. Murphy

does not support defendant’s argument, made both in his habeas corpus petition and on appeal,

that he is entitled to an immediate discharge from all custody, including MSR.

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

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