People v. Butler

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Butler

179 N.W.2d 215, 23 Mich. App. 643

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedJuly 16, 1970

DocketDocket 8,249

StatusPublished

Cited by12 cases

This text of 179 N.W.2d 215 (People v. Butler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Butler, 179 N.W.2d 215, 23 Mich. App. 643 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

On March 20, 1969, defendant Gary Butler stood mute at his arraignment on a charge of possession of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of MCLA § 257.254 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.1954). Shortly thereafter, a second count was added, to wit: unlawfully driving away an automobile. ** Defendant pled guilty to the second count on May 7, 1969.

The sole issue raised on appeal concerns the propriety of the actions of the trial court in light of the constitutional requirements in accepting a guilty plea as outlined in the case of Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274). Defendant contends that the Boykin decision requires a trial judge to obtain a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege to trial by jury and confrontation by one’s accusers prior to accepting a guilty plea.

Since defendant entered his plea on May 7, 1969, and Boykin was decided on June 2, 1969, the later decision does not affect the outcome of the present case. This Court has definitively stated that Boykin does not have retroactive application. See People v. Taylor (1970), 23 Mich App 595.

*645 At present, procedure for accepting guilty pleas is governed by GCR 1963, 785.3, and MCLA § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1058). A court is required to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequences of his plea. The court is also required to examine the accused for purposes of determining if the plea was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made, the form and manner of this examination being within the discretion of the trial court. See People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267; People v. Gill (1967), 8 Mich App 89; and People v. Schwartz (1967), 6 Mich App 581.

The record in the present case indicates that the above requirements were satisfied and nothing exists which would show that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made or that defendant did not know the nature of the charge or the consequence of his plea. Nothing in the briefs or record persuades this Court that a miscarriage of justice has taken place.

Affirmed.

**

MCLA § 750.413 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.645).

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Per Curiam.

On March 20, 1969, defendant Gary Butler stood mute at his arraignment on a charge of possession of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of MCLA § 257.254 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.1954). Shortly thereafter, a second count was added, to wit: unlawfully driving away an automobile. ** Defendant pled guilty to the second count on May 7, 1969.

The sole issue raised on appeal concerns the propriety of the actions of the trial court in light of the constitutional requirements in accepting a guilty plea as outlined in the case of Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274). Defendant contends that the Boykin decision requires a trial judge to obtain a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege to trial by jury and confrontation by one’s accusers prior to accepting a guilty plea.

Since defendant entered his plea on May 7, 1969, and Boykin was decided on June 2, 1969, the later decision does not affect the outcome of the present case. This Court has definitively stated that Boykin does not have retroactive application. See People v. Taylor (1970), 23 Mich App 595.

*645 At present, procedure for accepting guilty pleas is governed by GCR 1963, 785.3, and MCLA § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1058). A court is required to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequences of his plea. The court is also required to examine the accused for purposes of determining if the plea was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made, the form and manner of this examination being within the discretion of the trial court. See People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267; People v. Gill (1967), 8 Mich App 89; and People v. Schwartz (1967), 6 Mich App 581.

The record in the present case indicates that the above requirements were satisfied and nothing exists which would show that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made or that defendant did not know the nature of the charge or the consequence of his plea. Nothing in the briefs or record persuades this Court that a miscarriage of justice has taken place.

Affirmed.

**

MCLA § 750.413 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.645).

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179 N.W.2d 215, 23 Mich. App. 643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-butler-michctapp-1970.

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