T. M. Burns, J.
The facts of this case have been set forth adequately in the dissent of Judge Walsh. There is no question but that Airman Michael Hall, a member of the United States Air Force, agreed to assist the Michigan State Police in their investigation of drug trafficking in Marquette County. He agreed to do this after meeting with two members of the State Police in an office of an Air Force special agent. His participation in the drug investigation was approved by the Air Force base commander and, in return for his services, Airman Hall not only had criminal charges pending against him by the civilian authorities dropped, but was also told that his assistance would have a bearing on a decision of the Air Force whether to treat him as a "high risk” with regard to separate Federal drug charges. It was also understood that after completion of the investigation Airman Hall would be transferred to a new base where he would continue to assist the Air Force Office of Special Investigation.
The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, provides:
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
We agree with the conclusion of the lower court that the use of Airman Hall in the investigation of this crime was a direct violation of the act and [212]*212that his trial testimony therefore should be excluded.
The intent of Congress in promulgating this act was explained by a United States District Court of New York in Wrynn v United States, 200 F Supp 457, 464-465 (ED NY, 1961):
"The legislative history leaves little doubt that the statute is indeed meant 'to preclude the Army [or Air Force] from assisting local law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties’ (Gillars v United States, 1950, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 16, 182 F. 2d 962, 972. Compare Chandler v United States, 1st Cir., 1949, 171 F.2d 921, 936). The view had been taken by Attorney General Caleb Cushing in 1854 that under Section 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, United States Marshals, like Sheriffs, could raise a posse comitatus comprising every person in the district above fifteen years of age 'whatever may be their occupation, whether civilian or not * * * including the military of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines, all of whom are alike bound to obey the commands of a Sheriff or Marshall.’ 1854, 6 Op.A.G. 466, 471, 473. As Cushing saw it, 'The fact that they are organized as military bodies, under the immediate command of their own officers, does not in any wise affect their legal character. They are still the posse comitatus.’ 6 Op.A.G. 466, 473. Attorney General Charles Devens in 1878 took the same view of the law as it had been before the passage earlier in the same year, of Section 15 of the 1878 Act [the original version of the Posse Comitatus Act], and he stated that the practice had been to permit the military to be used in subordination to the marshals when such aid was needed to enforce process and he considered the practice to be sanctioned both by custom and by opinions of earlier Attorneys General (1878, 16 Op.A.G. 162, 163).
"When Section 15 was debated in the Senate the validity of Cushing’s opinion was questioned by Senator Sargent & 7 Cong. Rec. 4247). Mr. Knott, who introduced the Section as an amendment to the Appropriation Bill, assumed only the existence and not the legitimacy of the practice (7 Cong. Rec. 3849) and argued the [213]*213importance of stopping such uses of the military, under adequate punitive sanctions except where the Congress had expressly authorized the use (7 Cong. Rec. 3846-3847). He envisaged the penalty he proposed as applying to everyone, from the Commander in Chief to the lowest officer, who presumed to take upon himself to decide when he would use the military force in violation of the law of the land (7 Cong. Rec. 3847, 3851) and visualized the statute as forbidding every employment of the Army or any part of it in aid of civil law enforcement unless under explicit statutory authorization (7 Cong. Rec. 3849). See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 331-334 (Presidential powers). The Senate amended the bill by adding the reference to express Constitutional authorization and by deleting so much of the House Bill’s language as referred to use of the military 'under the pretext’ of executing the laws (7 Cong. Rec. 4240). The senate debate indicated a sense that the section was not limited by the expression 'as a posse comitatus or otherwise’ but was to operate as if the prohibition ran— simpliciter — against the use of the Army to execute the laws, without reference to whether employed as a posse comitatus or as a portion of the Army (7 Cong. Rec. 4241, 4245).”
As is evident, the Posse Comitatus Act was designed to prohibit the use of military personnel as agents for the enforcement of civil law.
The plaintiff in Wrynn was injured when an Air Force helicopter attempting to land struck a small tree and sent splinters of wood into the plaintiff’s left leg. At the time of the accident, the helicopter was assisting local law enforcement officials in their effort to apprehend two prisoners who had escaped from the county penal farm. Plaintiff brought an action in negligence but a judgment of no cause of action was entered for several reasons, one of which was that plaintiff was precluded from recovering against the United States by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act which made use [214]*214of the helicopter unauthorized at the time of the accident:
"Given the statute and its continuing vitality, the use of the helicopter and its personnel here to aid in executing the laws of New York was a forbidden use. It could not have been authorized on behalf of the United States by any action short of a Congressional enactment. There could be no Air Force undertaking or enterprise in the premises to which its personnel or equipment could be lawfully assigned and, in consequence, the absence of any defect in formal orders, the absence of any element of self interest on the part of the officers and the presence of an obvious public safety objective are irrelevant. They cannot bring the case within the narrow area in which agents of the government can be found to be acting within the scope of their employment although beyond their actual authority * * * because there was here no activity that could be authorized, no legally cognizable 'scope of employment’ to which the questioned conduct could be related.” Id, at 465.
We believe that Wrynn controls our disposition of this case. Here, as in Wrynn, Air Force commanding officers authorized the use of Air Force personnel for local civilian law enforcement purposes. The fact that Wrynn also involved the use of a helicopter is irrelevant because the Posse Comitatus Act does not forbid the use of military material by civilian police authorities. United States v Red Feather, 392 F Supp 916 (SD, 1975). In the instant case, as in Wrynn, the Air Force personnel involved received some form of military compensation for their activity.
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T. M. Burns, J.
The facts of this case have been set forth adequately in the dissent of Judge Walsh. There is no question but that Airman Michael Hall, a member of the United States Air Force, agreed to assist the Michigan State Police in their investigation of drug trafficking in Marquette County. He agreed to do this after meeting with two members of the State Police in an office of an Air Force special agent. His participation in the drug investigation was approved by the Air Force base commander and, in return for his services, Airman Hall not only had criminal charges pending against him by the civilian authorities dropped, but was also told that his assistance would have a bearing on a decision of the Air Force whether to treat him as a "high risk” with regard to separate Federal drug charges. It was also understood that after completion of the investigation Airman Hall would be transferred to a new base where he would continue to assist the Air Force Office of Special Investigation.
The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, provides:
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
We agree with the conclusion of the lower court that the use of Airman Hall in the investigation of this crime was a direct violation of the act and [212]*212that his trial testimony therefore should be excluded.
The intent of Congress in promulgating this act was explained by a United States District Court of New York in Wrynn v United States, 200 F Supp 457, 464-465 (ED NY, 1961):
"The legislative history leaves little doubt that the statute is indeed meant 'to preclude the Army [or Air Force] from assisting local law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties’ (Gillars v United States, 1950, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 16, 182 F. 2d 962, 972. Compare Chandler v United States, 1st Cir., 1949, 171 F.2d 921, 936). The view had been taken by Attorney General Caleb Cushing in 1854 that under Section 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, United States Marshals, like Sheriffs, could raise a posse comitatus comprising every person in the district above fifteen years of age 'whatever may be their occupation, whether civilian or not * * * including the military of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines, all of whom are alike bound to obey the commands of a Sheriff or Marshall.’ 1854, 6 Op.A.G. 466, 471, 473. As Cushing saw it, 'The fact that they are organized as military bodies, under the immediate command of their own officers, does not in any wise affect their legal character. They are still the posse comitatus.’ 6 Op.A.G. 466, 473. Attorney General Charles Devens in 1878 took the same view of the law as it had been before the passage earlier in the same year, of Section 15 of the 1878 Act [the original version of the Posse Comitatus Act], and he stated that the practice had been to permit the military to be used in subordination to the marshals when such aid was needed to enforce process and he considered the practice to be sanctioned both by custom and by opinions of earlier Attorneys General (1878, 16 Op.A.G. 162, 163).
"When Section 15 was debated in the Senate the validity of Cushing’s opinion was questioned by Senator Sargent & 7 Cong. Rec. 4247). Mr. Knott, who introduced the Section as an amendment to the Appropriation Bill, assumed only the existence and not the legitimacy of the practice (7 Cong. Rec. 3849) and argued the [213]*213importance of stopping such uses of the military, under adequate punitive sanctions except where the Congress had expressly authorized the use (7 Cong. Rec. 3846-3847). He envisaged the penalty he proposed as applying to everyone, from the Commander in Chief to the lowest officer, who presumed to take upon himself to decide when he would use the military force in violation of the law of the land (7 Cong. Rec. 3847, 3851) and visualized the statute as forbidding every employment of the Army or any part of it in aid of civil law enforcement unless under explicit statutory authorization (7 Cong. Rec. 3849). See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 331-334 (Presidential powers). The Senate amended the bill by adding the reference to express Constitutional authorization and by deleting so much of the House Bill’s language as referred to use of the military 'under the pretext’ of executing the laws (7 Cong. Rec. 4240). The senate debate indicated a sense that the section was not limited by the expression 'as a posse comitatus or otherwise’ but was to operate as if the prohibition ran— simpliciter — against the use of the Army to execute the laws, without reference to whether employed as a posse comitatus or as a portion of the Army (7 Cong. Rec. 4241, 4245).”
As is evident, the Posse Comitatus Act was designed to prohibit the use of military personnel as agents for the enforcement of civil law.
The plaintiff in Wrynn was injured when an Air Force helicopter attempting to land struck a small tree and sent splinters of wood into the plaintiff’s left leg. At the time of the accident, the helicopter was assisting local law enforcement officials in their effort to apprehend two prisoners who had escaped from the county penal farm. Plaintiff brought an action in negligence but a judgment of no cause of action was entered for several reasons, one of which was that plaintiff was precluded from recovering against the United States by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act which made use [214]*214of the helicopter unauthorized at the time of the accident:
"Given the statute and its continuing vitality, the use of the helicopter and its personnel here to aid in executing the laws of New York was a forbidden use. It could not have been authorized on behalf of the United States by any action short of a Congressional enactment. There could be no Air Force undertaking or enterprise in the premises to which its personnel or equipment could be lawfully assigned and, in consequence, the absence of any defect in formal orders, the absence of any element of self interest on the part of the officers and the presence of an obvious public safety objective are irrelevant. They cannot bring the case within the narrow area in which agents of the government can be found to be acting within the scope of their employment although beyond their actual authority * * * because there was here no activity that could be authorized, no legally cognizable 'scope of employment’ to which the questioned conduct could be related.” Id, at 465.
We believe that Wrynn controls our disposition of this case. Here, as in Wrynn, Air Force commanding officers authorized the use of Air Force personnel for local civilian law enforcement purposes. The fact that Wrynn also involved the use of a helicopter is irrelevant because the Posse Comitatus Act does not forbid the use of military material by civilian police authorities. United States v Red Feather, 392 F Supp 916 (SD, 1975). In the instant case, as in Wrynn, the Air Force personnel involved received some form of military compensation for their activity. Although the compensation received by Airman Hall in this case was not monetary, it was sufficient to make the Air Force a willing participant in Airman Hall’s undercover assistance to the State Police.
Although we recognize that if we were to use [215]*215the standard stated in United States v McArthur, 419 F Supp 186, 194 (ND, 1976), aff'd 541 F2d 1275 (CA 8, 1976), cert den sub nom Casper v United States, 430 US 970; 97 S Ct 1654; 52 L Ed 2d 362 (1977), we would not be required to find a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in this case, we decline to follow that test. The McArthur, court stated the question before it as whether military personnel were used by civilian law enforcement authorities "in such manner that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, either presently or prospectively”.
There is nothing in the language of the Posse Comitatus Act that authorizes such an interpretation of it or requires that citizens be subjected "to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory .in nature” in order for it to be violated. The act merely states that military personnel may not be used to enforce local laws. Although it is clear that the subjugation of civilians to military power would violate the act, so does the use of military personnel as undercover agents for civilian authorities. It matters not whether the victim even knows that the undercover agent is in the military. As long as the victim is subjected to civilian power or authority by the use of military personnel, the act is violated. State v Danko, 219 Kan 490; 548 P2d 819 (1976). To the extent that some cases would require a showing that military personnel assumed a greater authority than that permitted civilians in order for the act to have been violated, those cases were wrongly decided.1
[216]*216Appellant argues that, even if the Posse Comitatus Act were violated, Airman Hall’s testimony should not be excluded at trial because the exclusionary rule does not apply to violation of statutes but is limited to violations of the constitution.
Although Michigan courts, cognizant of the policy expressed in Const 1963, art 1, § 11, have declined to adopt suppression of the evidence as a remedy for unlawful police conduct in situations involving violations of Michigan statutes, see, People v Livingston, 64 Mich App 247; 236 NW2d 63 (1975), the Posse Comitatus Act is a Federal statute and we are bound by the Federal policy when interpreting it. In Lee v Florida, 392 US 378, 385-387; 88 S Ct 2096; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a violation of the Federal Communications Act required mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence obtained where this remedy was the only effective way of removing the incentive to disregard the act. Our investigation of the Posse Comitatus Act has failed to uncover any case in which violators of it were prosecuted. Thus, the only real sanction remaining to dissuade persons who would violate its provisions is the sanction of an exclusionary rule. Therefore, we hold that the lower court did not err when it held that Airman Hall could not testify at the defendants’ trials.
Affirmed.
Bronson, J., concurred.