JUSTICE FITZGERALD
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Bernard Bunch was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court determined that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and reversed defendant’s conviction. 327 Ill. App. 3d 979. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence proceeded simultaneously with his trial. Officer Lukensmeyer testified that at 1:10 a.m. on February 1, 2000, he was working alone in a marked police vehicle in the area of 35th Street and Wentworth Avenue in Chicago. He observed a 1990 Pontiac, which was proceeding westbound on 35th Street, slow down and come to a brief stop. Lukensmeyer did not see the car’s brake lights activate. As the Pontiac continued on its way, Lukensmeyer shined his MARS lights, his take-down lights, and his bright headlights onto the rear of the car. Lukensmeyer testified that he saw the driver lean forward twice toward the dashboard before the driver pulled the vehicle over and stopped. One other person was in the car, defendant, who was in the front passenger seat. Lukensmeyer approached the vehicle on the driver’s side and commanded to both, “Don’t move.” Lukensmeyer then asked the driver for his license. When the driver could not provide a license, Lukensmeyer asked him to step out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest. He handcuffed the driver and walked him to the rear of the car.
According to Lukensmeyer, he then walked around to the passenger side and asked defendant to exit the car and step to the rear of the vehicle, where the driver was standing. Lukensmeyer testified that he asked defendant out of the car so that he could take charge of the vehicle, i.e., because the driver was arrested Lukensmeyer was going to have the car transported to the station where it would be towed to an impound lot. At some point during the traffic stop, Lukensmeyer learned that the driver was the owner of the vehicle, but he could not recall whether this occurred before or after he asked defendant to exit the car.
Lukensmeyer testified further that after defendant exited the vehicle, he asked him, “What’s your name? Where you [sic] coming from?” When questioned as to why he asked defendant his name, Lukensmeyer responded, “I’m a policeman[.] I want[ed] to know who he was and I was curious to find out exactly who he was. That’s all.”
Defendant provided his name and additionally asked Lukensmeyer why the driver was being arrested. Lukensmeyer answered defendant’s question. During this conversation, in which the two men were about one foot apart, Lukensmeyer twice shined his flashlight in defendant’s face. Lukensmeyer explained that when he is working nights, he shines his flashlight in everyone’s face because there is a “[sjtrong possibility they may have something in their mouths.” Lukensmeyer denied that he questioned defendant merely to see if there was anything in defendant’s mouth. Both times Lukensmeyer shined his flashlight in defendant’s face, he observed a small, clear plastic item, containing something white, in defendant’s mouth. Based on 35 years of experience as a police officer and his participation in more than 2,000 narcotics arrests, Lukensmeyer believed that the white substance was either heroin or cocaine. Lukensmeyer informed defendant he was under arrest, and ordered him to spit the object out of his mouth, which he did. Lukensmeyer recovered one plastic bag containing a white powder. Lukensmeyer handcuffed defendant and called for assistance. During his search of the Pontiac, Lukensmeyer recovered two similar plastic bags, also containing what he believed to be heroin, from a space in the dashboard. At this point, according to Lukensmeyer, defendant made an unsolicited statement that “[a]ll the heroin you found is mine.” Lukensmeyer later tested the brakes on defendant’s vehicle, which were working properly. The parties stipulated to the chain of custody and that the white powder tested positive for the presence of heroin.
In connection with his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, defendant argued that the officer did not have probable cause to ask him to exit the vehicle, to step to the rear of the car, or to interrogate him. The State maintained that moving defendant to the rear of the vehicle was minimally intrusive and that no interrogation took place. Rather, defendant engaged the officer in conversation.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion. In its oral ruling, the trial court indicated that it found the officer’s testimony straightforward and credible. The trial court concluded that there was nothing impermissible in asking defendant his name and that moving defendant to the rear of the car had no legal significance. The trial court further noted that the officer had numerous reasons to have a conversation with defendant, including explaining to him the reason for the arrest and determining if defendant could be an alternative driver. According to the trial court, shining the flashlight in defendant’s face merely allowed the officer to assess defendant at 1 o’clock in the morning. Finally, the trial court found that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant, based on his observation of the object in defendant’s mouth.
Following the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, the bench trial continued with defendant’s testimony. Defendant offered a different version of the vehicle stop. Defendant testified that when the driver of the vehicle, his brother, asked Officer Lukensmeyer why he stopped them, the officer replied, “Because I saw two black men in the car.” The officer made no mention of the Pontiac’s brake lights and never examined them. According to defendant, after arresting and cuffing his brother, Lukensmeyer placed his brother in the police vehicle. He then approached defendant and asked him to get out of the car. Once outside the vehicle, Lukensmeyer told defendant to turn around and then placed handcuffs on him, saying that it was for the officer’s own safety. As Lukensmeyer spoke to him, the officer shined a flashlight in defendant’s face. Defendant testified that he did not have anything in his mouth and that the officer never asked him to spit out anything. After placing defendant in the police car, Lukensmeyer removed a black case from the trunk and returned to the Pontiac. A short while later, Lukensmeyer returned to the police car and told defendant and his brother that he found drugs inside their car. Defendant denied having narcotics in his possession that day and denied telling Lukensmeyer that any drugs in the car belonged to him.
The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance and subsequently sentenced him to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the arrest of defendant violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV). 327 Ill. App. 3d at 983-84. The appellate court stated, in relevant part:
“[A] police officer has to have some lawful authority to ask a defendant for identification ***.
In this case, the officer did more than ask for identification.
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JUSTICE FITZGERALD
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Bernard Bunch was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court determined that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and reversed defendant’s conviction. 327 Ill. App. 3d 979. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence proceeded simultaneously with his trial. Officer Lukensmeyer testified that at 1:10 a.m. on February 1, 2000, he was working alone in a marked police vehicle in the area of 35th Street and Wentworth Avenue in Chicago. He observed a 1990 Pontiac, which was proceeding westbound on 35th Street, slow down and come to a brief stop. Lukensmeyer did not see the car’s brake lights activate. As the Pontiac continued on its way, Lukensmeyer shined his MARS lights, his take-down lights, and his bright headlights onto the rear of the car. Lukensmeyer testified that he saw the driver lean forward twice toward the dashboard before the driver pulled the vehicle over and stopped. One other person was in the car, defendant, who was in the front passenger seat. Lukensmeyer approached the vehicle on the driver’s side and commanded to both, “Don’t move.” Lukensmeyer then asked the driver for his license. When the driver could not provide a license, Lukensmeyer asked him to step out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest. He handcuffed the driver and walked him to the rear of the car.
According to Lukensmeyer, he then walked around to the passenger side and asked defendant to exit the car and step to the rear of the vehicle, where the driver was standing. Lukensmeyer testified that he asked defendant out of the car so that he could take charge of the vehicle, i.e., because the driver was arrested Lukensmeyer was going to have the car transported to the station where it would be towed to an impound lot. At some point during the traffic stop, Lukensmeyer learned that the driver was the owner of the vehicle, but he could not recall whether this occurred before or after he asked defendant to exit the car.
Lukensmeyer testified further that after defendant exited the vehicle, he asked him, “What’s your name? Where you [sic] coming from?” When questioned as to why he asked defendant his name, Lukensmeyer responded, “I’m a policeman[.] I want[ed] to know who he was and I was curious to find out exactly who he was. That’s all.”
Defendant provided his name and additionally asked Lukensmeyer why the driver was being arrested. Lukensmeyer answered defendant’s question. During this conversation, in which the two men were about one foot apart, Lukensmeyer twice shined his flashlight in defendant’s face. Lukensmeyer explained that when he is working nights, he shines his flashlight in everyone’s face because there is a “[sjtrong possibility they may have something in their mouths.” Lukensmeyer denied that he questioned defendant merely to see if there was anything in defendant’s mouth. Both times Lukensmeyer shined his flashlight in defendant’s face, he observed a small, clear plastic item, containing something white, in defendant’s mouth. Based on 35 years of experience as a police officer and his participation in more than 2,000 narcotics arrests, Lukensmeyer believed that the white substance was either heroin or cocaine. Lukensmeyer informed defendant he was under arrest, and ordered him to spit the object out of his mouth, which he did. Lukensmeyer recovered one plastic bag containing a white powder. Lukensmeyer handcuffed defendant and called for assistance. During his search of the Pontiac, Lukensmeyer recovered two similar plastic bags, also containing what he believed to be heroin, from a space in the dashboard. At this point, according to Lukensmeyer, defendant made an unsolicited statement that “[a]ll the heroin you found is mine.” Lukensmeyer later tested the brakes on defendant’s vehicle, which were working properly. The parties stipulated to the chain of custody and that the white powder tested positive for the presence of heroin.
In connection with his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, defendant argued that the officer did not have probable cause to ask him to exit the vehicle, to step to the rear of the car, or to interrogate him. The State maintained that moving defendant to the rear of the vehicle was minimally intrusive and that no interrogation took place. Rather, defendant engaged the officer in conversation.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion. In its oral ruling, the trial court indicated that it found the officer’s testimony straightforward and credible. The trial court concluded that there was nothing impermissible in asking defendant his name and that moving defendant to the rear of the car had no legal significance. The trial court further noted that the officer had numerous reasons to have a conversation with defendant, including explaining to him the reason for the arrest and determining if defendant could be an alternative driver. According to the trial court, shining the flashlight in defendant’s face merely allowed the officer to assess defendant at 1 o’clock in the morning. Finally, the trial court found that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant, based on his observation of the object in defendant’s mouth.
Following the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, the bench trial continued with defendant’s testimony. Defendant offered a different version of the vehicle stop. Defendant testified that when the driver of the vehicle, his brother, asked Officer Lukensmeyer why he stopped them, the officer replied, “Because I saw two black men in the car.” The officer made no mention of the Pontiac’s brake lights and never examined them. According to defendant, after arresting and cuffing his brother, Lukensmeyer placed his brother in the police vehicle. He then approached defendant and asked him to get out of the car. Once outside the vehicle, Lukensmeyer told defendant to turn around and then placed handcuffs on him, saying that it was for the officer’s own safety. As Lukensmeyer spoke to him, the officer shined a flashlight in defendant’s face. Defendant testified that he did not have anything in his mouth and that the officer never asked him to spit out anything. After placing defendant in the police car, Lukensmeyer removed a black case from the trunk and returned to the Pontiac. A short while later, Lukensmeyer returned to the police car and told defendant and his brother that he found drugs inside their car. Defendant denied having narcotics in his possession that day and denied telling Lukensmeyer that any drugs in the car belonged to him.
The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance and subsequently sentenced him to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the arrest of defendant violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV). 327 Ill. App. 3d at 983-84. The appellate court stated, in relevant part:
“[A] police officer has to have some lawful authority to ask a defendant for identification ***.
In this case, the officer did more than ask for identification. He ordered the defendant out of the car and to the rear of it because he was ‘curious.’ The defendant submitted. We believe the defendant was detained at that point without lawful authority. Curiosity is not a good reason to detain. Everything that flowed directly from that unlawful detention must be suppressed.” 327 Ill. App. 3d at 983.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
ANALYSIS
I
Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. This deferential standard applies when the disposition of the suppression motion turns on factual determinations and credibility assessments. Where, however, no dispute exists as to the facts or witness credibility, the trial court’s ruling will be reviewed de novo. People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01 (2001); People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12 (1998). In the present case, the trial court found Officer Lukensmeyer’s testimony credible. Such finding was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we conduct de novo review under the officer’s version of events. See People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 274-75 (2002); Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 412.
II
Before considering the merits of this appeal, we briefly review the principles relevant to deciding whether a vehicle stop comports with fourth amendment jurisprudence.
The temporary detention of individuals — passengers and drivers alike — during a vehicle stop constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of the fourth amendment. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (2003), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). Vehicle stops are, therefore, subject to the fourth amendment’s requirement of reasonableness. Because a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226. A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: “(1) ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,’ and (2) ‘whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
In this case, no issue exists concerning the lawfulness of the initial stop of the vehicle — the first prong of the Terry analysis. Rather, this appeal concerns the lawfulness of the officer’s conduct following the initial stop, and thus concerns the second prong of the Terry analysis. Under the second prong we consider the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233. That is, “ ‘an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,’ ” and “ ‘the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.’ ” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233, quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (plurality op.). With these principles in mind, we consider the State’s arguments on appeal.
A
The State first maintains that Officer Lukensmeyer could lawfully direct defendant to exit the vehicle. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997) (holding that, consistent with the fourth amendment, “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop”); Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 420 (following Wilson and holding that the officer’s command to the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle to return to the car was not an unreasonable seizure); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001) (“it is well established that following a lawful traffic stop, police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop without violating the protections of the fourth amendment”).
Defendant concedes that Officer Lukensmeyer could lawfully direct defendant to exit the vehicle so that the officer could take charge of the car and have it towed. In light of defendant’s concession, there is no reason to consider this point further.
B
The State next argues that the officer’s questioning of defendant, after he exited the vehicle, did not implicate fourth amendment protections. In analyzing this issue, we consider our recent decision in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003).
In Gonzalez, police stopped a vehicle for not having a front license plate. While one of the officers processed the driver, the other officer approached the passenger, who was not suspected of any criminal conduct, and requested identification. The passenger complied, and the ensuing encounter between the officer and the passenger resulted in a search of the passenger’s person, revealing a packet of cocaine. The passenger was arrested and charged. The passenger later challenged the officer’s request for identification, arguing that it was an unreasonable seizure under our federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6.
In resolving the passenger’s constitutional challenge, we formulated the following general framework for analyzing whether police questioning during the course of a traffic stop satisfies the second prong of the Terry analysis:
“[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related to the initial justification for the stop. If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no fourth amendment violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.
We concluded in Gonzalez that no fourth amendment violation occurred. Although the request for identification was not related to the purpose of the stop or supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, the request did not prolong the passenger’s detention because it was made during the course of the stop while the driver was being processed. Further, the facially innocuous question, which the passenger could decline to answer, did not change the fundamental nature of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236.
Applying the Gonzalez framework to the facts in the present case, we reach a different result. We note first that the questions the officer put to defendant (“What’s your name? Where you [sic] coming from?”) were not related to the purpose of the stop — operating a vehicle without brake lights. The officer’s questions also were not supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. Prior to being approached by Officer Lukensmeyer, defendant was simply a passive occupant of the car. Although the trial court indicated that the officer had “numerous” reasons to have a conversation with defendant, including explaining to him the reason for the arrest and determining if defendant could be an alternative driver, the questions the officer actually posed were not objectively related to either of these reasons.
Because the questioning of defendant was not related to the stop and not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, we must consider whether the questioning prolonged defendant’s detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236. Significantly, in Gonzalez, the officer’s request for identification took place while the driver was being processed and the purpose of the stop had yet to be completed. Thus, the officer’s request did not prolong the passenger’s detention. In contrast, the questioning of defendant in the present case occurred after the purpose of the stop was concluded. That is, the questioning occurred after the driver had been placed under arrest, the officer had already decided to have the car towed, and defendant was directed to exit the vehicle for that purpose. Thus, unlike the request put to the passenger in Gonzalez, the officer’s questioning of defendant in the instant case fails to satisfy the second prong of the Terry analysis because it prolonged defendant’s detention beyond the completion of the purpose of the stop.
The State maintains, however, that the initial detention of defendant, incidental to the stop of the vehicle, ended when defendant exited the car. What followed, according to the State, was a consensual conversation between defendant and the officer. We disagree. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by our decision in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999).
In Brownlee, police stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. Officers Guerrero and Maxey obtained the identities of the driver and the three passengers. The officers checked for outstanding warrants, found none, and decided not to issue any traffic citations. The officers decided, however, to ask the driver for permission to search the car. After the driver consented to the search, all of the occupants were ordered out of the car. The search revealed marijuana and all four individuals were arrested. One of the passengers moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the continued detention and search of the car were unrelated to the original basis for the vehicle stop and any consent was the product of the unlawful detention. The circuit court granted the motion; the appellate court reversed. People v. Brownlee, 293 Ill. App. 3d 315 (1997).
On appeal to this court, the State maintained that the conclusion of the traffic stop was merely followed by a consensual conversation between the officer and the driver that resulted in a voluntary consent to search the vehicle. In other words, the driver was not seized when he gave consent to search the vehicle. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 516. We rejected this argument.
We proceeded from the well-established proposition that a person is seized “ ‘when, by means of physical force or a show of authority,’ that person’s ‘freedom of movement is restrained.’ ” Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 517, quoting United Stated v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). In determining whether the driver was seized at the point that he gave consent to search the vehicle, we considered whether “ ‘if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 517, quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
The facts in Brownlee, as established by the officers’ testimony, revealed that, after deciding not to issue any citations, the officers returned to the vehicle. With Officer Guerrero standing on the driver’s side of the car, and Officer Maxey standing on the passenger side, Guerrero returned to the driver his license and insurance card and explained that no citations would be issued. Although the traffic stop at that point had concluded, the officers continued to flank the vehicle and paused for a couple of minutes, saying nothing. Following this pause, Guerrero asked the driver for permission to search the vehicle. We determined that, “[g]iven these circumstances, we can find no fault with the circuit court’s conclusion that the officers’ actions constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable person would conclude that he or she was not free to leave.” Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520. We explained that “[a] reasonable person in this driver’s situation would likely conclude that, if he or she drove away, then the two officers would soon be in hot pursuit.” Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520. We noted that the State made no attempt to show that the officers’ continued detention of the vehicle was in any way reasonable or objectively justified, or that the officers’ detention was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of a Terry investigative seizure. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 521. Accordingly, the illegal detention tainted the subsequent consent to search. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 521.
In the present case, Officer Lukensmeyer’s testimony indicates that the purpose of the traffic stop concluded when the officer decided to have the vehicle towed and directed defendant to exit the car. The officer’s directions to defendant, however, continued. The officer directed defendant to move to the rear of the vehicle, where the driver — who was already under arrest and handcuffed— was standing. Then, positioning himself just a foot from defendant and shining his flashlight in defendant’s face, the officer asked him, “What’s your name? Where you [sic] coming from?” Given these circumstances, we conclude that the officer’s actions constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable person would conclude that he or she was not free to leave.
The State draws our attention to the fact that prior to defendant’s arrest, the officer did not draw his gun, place defendant in handcuffs, physically touch defendant, or indicate in any way that defendant was suspected of criminal conduct. Although true, these facts are not dispositive of whether the conversation was consensual. The officer’s show of authority, as in Brownlee, manifested itself in other ways.
The State also points to the fact that defendant not only responded to one of the officer’s questions, but asked the officer his own question — why the driver was being arrested. The State argues that a “reasonable person, if they felt ‘seized’ *** would not further engage that officer in conversation which is not even related to his own arrest.” We do not find defendant’s concern about the arrest of the driver — defendant’s brother — indicative of whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Accordingly, we reject the State’s argument that the questioning of defendant was the product of a consensual encounter.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that defendant’s detention, following the conclusion of the purpose of the traffic stop, was unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and tainted the resulting discovery of the heroin. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellate court reversing the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Under the circumstances, we do not consider the State’s argument that the arrest of defendant was supported by probable cause.
Affirmed.