Neff, RJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of conspiracy to commit arson, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and arson of a dwelling, MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267, for which he was sentenced to eleven months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
i
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendant induced Raymond Turner (hereafter Turner) to set fire to a house in Three Rivers that defendant was purchasing on land contract. The fire chief and a state police fire marshal established that the fire was arson, probably started by flammable liquids on the front porch. Turner’s body was found in a river near the house two days after the fire. A pathologist established the cause of death as drowning.
Turner’s wife, Deanna Turner, testified that on the day before the fire Turner drove with defendant to defendant’s house for a conversation, and returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Turner told Deanna that defendant had asked him to bum down a house in Three Rivers, and that Turner was going to do it because he needed the money. Deanna testified that Turner told her that defendant had given him money to buy gasoline. Deanna testified that she [295]*295tried, unsuccessfully, to dissuade Turner from setting the fire.
Turner’s brother, Scott Turner, testified pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor in which the thirty years’ imprisonment he faced as an habitual offender for his part in the commission of the arson would be reduced to two years’ probation. Scott testified that on the night of the fire, Turner told him that he needed help burning down a house for the insurance money. Scott testified that when he could not talk Turner out of committing the arson, he drove Turner toward defendant’s house and dropped him off.
Sergeant Earl Stark of the Three Rivers Police Department testified regarding his investigation of the fire and the finding of Turner’s body. Stark testified that he obtained statements from both Deanna and Scott, both of which implicated defendant in the arson. At trial, the defense theory was that Stark, the lead investigator, had a personal dislike for defendant and that he threatened Scott into implicating defendant and that Stark also convinced Deanna to accuse defendant of asking Ray Turner to commit the arson.
n
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to present evidence regarding Stark’s credibility. We find that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting defendant’s presentation of character evidence and that this error warrants reversal of defendant’s convictions.
A
Stark testified on cross-examination that he had a reputation for truthfulness. Defendant then sought to [296]*296challenge this testimony by asking Stark about a specific instance in which Stark allegedly falsified an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant in an unrelated case. The trial court refused to permit this line of questioning.
Defendant also sought to present the testimony of Michael Costello, one of Stark’s fellow officers. Costello would have rebutted Stark’s testimony that Stark has a reputation for truthfulness in the community and would have described the circumstances surrounding the alleged false affidavit. Costello also would have criticized Stark’s investigative methods, particularly those surrounding his obtaining of Scott’s confession and his interview with Deanna. The trial court excluded Costello’s proposed testimony.
B
At issue here is the applicability of MRE 608, which provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or [297]*297untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
We have reviewed carefully Costello’s1 proposed testimony and find that the trial court’s decision to exclude it was an abuse of discretion. Under MRE 608(a), it was appropriate for Costello to offer opinion evidence regarding Stark’s credibility and to testify regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness.
We further find that it was an abuse of discretion to limit defendant’s cross-examination of Stark regarding the alleged false affidavit. Although MRE 608(b) prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence regarding specific instances of Stark’s conduct, the rule clearly permits the cross-examination of Stark regarding such matters.
c
The prosecution concedes that Costello’s testimony would have been relevant pursuant to rule 608(a). It insists, however, that the testimony was properly excluded under MRE 403, which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The prosecution suggests that because Stark was not an eyewitness to the alleged offenses, his role was “merely investigative” and his “personal credibility is tangential at best.”
[298]*298This argument misses the mark. Although not an eyewitness to the alleged arson, Stark was instrumental in gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. Stark obtained both Scott Turner’s confession and Deanna Turner’s statement, the veracity of which was hotly contested at trial. Stark’s method of gathering evidence was at issue here; thus, the excluded evidence had significant probative value and its omission may well have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a reversal of his convictions and a new trial. People v George, 213 Mich App 632, 635; 540 NW2d 487 (1995).2
III
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose that, at the time of trial, Deanna was under investigation for felony welfare fraud. An arrest warrant was authorized after defendant’s first trial, which ended in a mistrial, but not served until after defendant was convicted in a second trial. After defendant was sentenced, the charges against Deanna were reduced from two felonies to a single misdemeanor pursuant to a plea agreement and she was sentenced to twenty-four months’ probation.
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Neff, RJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of conspiracy to commit arson, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and arson of a dwelling, MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267, for which he was sentenced to eleven months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
i
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendant induced Raymond Turner (hereafter Turner) to set fire to a house in Three Rivers that defendant was purchasing on land contract. The fire chief and a state police fire marshal established that the fire was arson, probably started by flammable liquids on the front porch. Turner’s body was found in a river near the house two days after the fire. A pathologist established the cause of death as drowning.
Turner’s wife, Deanna Turner, testified that on the day before the fire Turner drove with defendant to defendant’s house for a conversation, and returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Turner told Deanna that defendant had asked him to bum down a house in Three Rivers, and that Turner was going to do it because he needed the money. Deanna testified that Turner told her that defendant had given him money to buy gasoline. Deanna testified that she [295]*295tried, unsuccessfully, to dissuade Turner from setting the fire.
Turner’s brother, Scott Turner, testified pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor in which the thirty years’ imprisonment he faced as an habitual offender for his part in the commission of the arson would be reduced to two years’ probation. Scott testified that on the night of the fire, Turner told him that he needed help burning down a house for the insurance money. Scott testified that when he could not talk Turner out of committing the arson, he drove Turner toward defendant’s house and dropped him off.
Sergeant Earl Stark of the Three Rivers Police Department testified regarding his investigation of the fire and the finding of Turner’s body. Stark testified that he obtained statements from both Deanna and Scott, both of which implicated defendant in the arson. At trial, the defense theory was that Stark, the lead investigator, had a personal dislike for defendant and that he threatened Scott into implicating defendant and that Stark also convinced Deanna to accuse defendant of asking Ray Turner to commit the arson.
n
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to present evidence regarding Stark’s credibility. We find that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting defendant’s presentation of character evidence and that this error warrants reversal of defendant’s convictions.
A
Stark testified on cross-examination that he had a reputation for truthfulness. Defendant then sought to [296]*296challenge this testimony by asking Stark about a specific instance in which Stark allegedly falsified an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant in an unrelated case. The trial court refused to permit this line of questioning.
Defendant also sought to present the testimony of Michael Costello, one of Stark’s fellow officers. Costello would have rebutted Stark’s testimony that Stark has a reputation for truthfulness in the community and would have described the circumstances surrounding the alleged false affidavit. Costello also would have criticized Stark’s investigative methods, particularly those surrounding his obtaining of Scott’s confession and his interview with Deanna. The trial court excluded Costello’s proposed testimony.
B
At issue here is the applicability of MRE 608, which provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or [297]*297untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
We have reviewed carefully Costello’s1 proposed testimony and find that the trial court’s decision to exclude it was an abuse of discretion. Under MRE 608(a), it was appropriate for Costello to offer opinion evidence regarding Stark’s credibility and to testify regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness.
We further find that it was an abuse of discretion to limit defendant’s cross-examination of Stark regarding the alleged false affidavit. Although MRE 608(b) prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence regarding specific instances of Stark’s conduct, the rule clearly permits the cross-examination of Stark regarding such matters.
c
The prosecution concedes that Costello’s testimony would have been relevant pursuant to rule 608(a). It insists, however, that the testimony was properly excluded under MRE 403, which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The prosecution suggests that because Stark was not an eyewitness to the alleged offenses, his role was “merely investigative” and his “personal credibility is tangential at best.”
[298]*298This argument misses the mark. Although not an eyewitness to the alleged arson, Stark was instrumental in gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. Stark obtained both Scott Turner’s confession and Deanna Turner’s statement, the veracity of which was hotly contested at trial. Stark’s method of gathering evidence was at issue here; thus, the excluded evidence had significant probative value and its omission may well have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a reversal of his convictions and a new trial. People v George, 213 Mich App 632, 635; 540 NW2d 487 (1995).2
III
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose that, at the time of trial, Deanna was under investigation for felony welfare fraud. An arrest warrant was authorized after defendant’s first trial, which ended in a mistrial, but not served until after defendant was convicted in a second trial. After defendant was sentenced, the charges against Deanna were reduced from two felonies to a single misdemeanor pursuant to a plea agreement and she was sentenced to twenty-four months’ probation.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s handling of the fraud charges against Deanna was instrumental in inducing her to testify against defend[299]*299ant and that the prosecutor violated the disclosure order by not revealing the investigation. Because we reverse defendant’s convictions, this issue is moot. On retrial, defendant will be able to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the charges against Deanna.
IV
Defendant argues that the prosecutor made improper remarks during rebuttal argument. We find no error in the prosecutor’s comment that the police reports were not evidence. However, we agree with defendant that the following remark was improper:
He [defense counsel] says where is the witness that saw Deanna and Raymond at the garage. The witness was [defendant] himself [Emphasis added.]
Although we reverse defendant’s convictions on other grounds, we note that prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify. See People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 538; 554 NW2d 362 (1996). We caution prosecutors to refrain from making such remarks in the future. See People v Guenther, 188 Mich App 174, 178; 469 NW2d 59 (1991).
v
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce, during rebuttal, certain prior consistent statements made by Deanna. Because this issue may arise on retrial, we will address it briefly.
Deanna testified on direct examination that before she spoke with Stark, she told her father the facts [300]*300surrounding Turner’s disappearance. The prosecutor did not elicit the details of Deanna’s conversation with her father. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deanna the following questions in support of the theory that Stark, who disliked defendant, had improperly influenced Deanna to fabricate her accusations against defendant.3
Q. And when the two of you were alone in this car — you and Sergeant Stark — did Sergeant Stark tell you that he wanted some information about Glen Brownridge and whether he was involved in this?
A. I don’t recall.
Q. While you were alone in this car with Sergeant Stark did he tell you that he did not like Glen Brownridge?
A. No.
Q. Did Sergeant Stark tell you that he wanted your cooperation in bringing this case against Glen Brownridge while you were in the car?
[301]*301A. I don’t recall. I just told him what happened.
Over defendant’s objection, the prosecutor was permitted on rebuttal to present the testimony of Constance Baker, Deanna’s stepmother. Baker testified that she was a witness to the conversation between Deanna and her father. Baker testified that Deanna told her father that defendant had asked Turner to bum the house down for the insurance money. Baker also gave other details of this conversation that were consistent with Deanna’s testimony at trial.
Defendant argues, as he did at trial, that a proper foundation was not laid for the admission of Baker’s testimony, as required by MRE 801(d)(1)(B), and that her testimony was outside the proper scope of rebuttal. We disagree and find no error in the court’s admission of Baker’s testimony.
MRE 801(d)(1)(B) excludes from the definition of hearsay a prior statement of a witness when
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
Baker’s testimony fits squarely within this rule. Deanna testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination concerning her prior statement to her father. This prior statement was consistent with Deanna’s testimony at trial and was offered to rebut the defense theory that Stark had convinced Deanna to testify that defendant asked Turner to bum the [302]*302house. Finally, Deanna’s statement to her father took place before her initial meeting with Stark, thus preceding the alleged improper influence.
Defendant insists that the prosecutor should have first confronted Deanna with the contents of her prior consistent statement. Defendant posits that only then would Deanna have been “subject to cross-examination concerning the statement” as required by MRE 801(d)(1)(B). We disagree.
Nothing in MRE 801(d)(1)(B) prohibits a third party from testifying with regard to the declarant’s prior statement. A prior statement need not be introduced during the witness’ direct or redirect testimony in order for the right of cross-examination to be exercised. Here, both Deanna and Baker were in court and subject to cross-examination regarding their memories of past events and their motives to falsify, and Deanna could easily have been recalled after Baker’s testimony. Where, as here, the requirements of MRE 801(d)(1)(B) are satisfied, the admission of a prior consistent statement through a third party is appropriate.4
Defendant also challenges the admission of Baker’s testimony as being beyond the proper scope of rebuttal. We review the admission of rebuttal evidence for [303]*303a clear abuse of discretion. People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398; 547 NW2d 673 (1996).
The test of whether rebuttal evidence was properly admitted is whether it is properly responsive to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the defendant. Id. at 399. As demonstrated above, Baker’s testimony was in response to the defense theory that Stark persuaded Deanna to implicate defendant in the arson. The trial court’s decision to admit this rebuttal evidence was a proper exercise of its discretion.
vi
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting Deanna and Scott to testify about Turner’s statements implicating defendant in the scheme to bum down defendant’s house. We address this issue because it may arise on retrial.
The trial court admitted Deanna’s and Scott’s testimony regarding Turner’s statements as a statement against penal interest. Where, as here, the declarant is unavailable as a witness, MRE 804(b)(3) provides that the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
[304]*304The trial court erred in admitting the statements at issue under MRE 804(b)(3) because, at the time the statements were made, they were not against Turner’s penal interest. We have found no Michigan decision addressing the admissibility of declarations made before the alleged offense was committed, but two cases from other jurisdictions are instructive. In State v Fredette, 462 A2d 17 (Me, 1983), the declarant’s statement, that he intended to accept money from the defendant to kill the defendant’s husband, was determined to be not against his penal interest. At most, the statement reflected an intent to possibly commit a crime. Id. at 22
Likewise, in Merritt v Chonowski, 58 Ill App 3d 192; 373 NE2d 1060 (1978), a drunk driver’s admission that he had consumed six mixed drinks was held to be inadmissible as a statement against penal interest because the driver “made his declaration before the accident occurred at which time he had no reason to believe that he was going to become hable for an injury to another person. The declaration must be against one’s pecuniary interest at the time the statement is made or it fails to qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
In the present case, Turner’s statements demonstrate an intent to commit a crime without anything more. Therefore, they were not statements against his penal interest at the time they were made.
The prosecution argues that even if the statements were inadmissible under MRE 804(b)(3), they were admissible under at least two other theories: as a [305]*305statement of a coconspirator or as a present sense impression.
To the extent that Scott was an accomplice with Turner in carrying out the arson, the statement might have been admissible as a statement of a coconspirator under MRE 801(d)(2)(E). However, as defendant correctly notes, hearsay statements of a coconspirator are not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule unless and until the existence of the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence. People v Vega, 413 Mich 773, 780; 321 NW2d 675 (1982). This was not done in the present case.5
We agree with the prosecution, however, that Deanna’s and Scott’s testimony regarding Turner’s statements to them may be admissible under MRE 803(3) as a present sense impression. This rule excepts from the hearsay rule “[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health) . . . .”
Under this rule, hearsay statements are admissible to show that a declarant acted in accordance with his stated intention. Turner’s declarations of intent to [306]*306bum down defendant’s house were certainly relevant, and, insofar as the statements had some bearing on the issue of defendant’s conduct, they may properly be admitted. On retrial, therefore, the trial court should carefully examine each of the challenged hearsay statements and rule on the admissibility of each statement under MRE 803(3).
Defendant argues that Deanna’s testimony regarding Turner’s statements is barred by the spousal communication privilege contained in MCL 600.2162(2); MSA 27A.2162(2). We disagree. This privilege was waived where Deanna failed to object and testified for the prosecution at trial, and Turner was unable to object because of his death. See Benson v Morgan, 50 Mich 77, 79; 14 NW 705 (1883).
vn
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that he should not have been bound over on charges of both arson and conspiracy to commit arson and that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted of both offenses. We disagree.
Defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to bind him over on the conspiracy charge because there was no independent evidence of a conspiracy. This argument is without merit because a deficiency in the evidence at the preliminary examination does not require reversal where the defendant received a fair trial and was not otherwise prejudiced by the error. People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 600-601; 460 NW2d 520 (1990).
[307]*307B
Defendant also argues that his convictions of both arson and conspiracy to commit arson violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. We disagree.
It is well settled that conspiracy is a crime separate and distinct from the substantive crime that is its object. People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 374; 478 NW2d 901 (1991). The conspiracy statute punishes the planning of the offense and focuses upon the alleged “ ‘special dangers’ ” resulting from group action. People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 93; 351 NW2d 255 (1984) (citation omitted). “ ‘The guilt or innocence of a conspirator does not depend upon the accomplishment of the goals of the conspiracy.’ ” Sammons, supra at 374 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s separate convictions and punishment for both conspiracy to commit arson and arson do not constitute double jeopardy.
Defendant maintains that his conspiracy conviction violates “Wharton’s Rule.” Again, we disagree.
Wharton’s Rule operates as a substantive limitation on the scope of the crime of conspiracy and provides that an agreement by two persons to commit a crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy where the target crime requires the participation of two persons. People v Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 107; 514 NW2d 493 (1994). The applicability of the rule depends on the nature of the target offense: that is, the focus is on the elements of the crime rather than on the factual circumstances of the particular case. People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 573; 330 NW2d 314 (1982). Thus, if the offense could logically be accomplished [308]*308by a single individual, Wharton’s Rule does not apply. Id.
The substantive crime at issue here is arson, an offense that may be accomplished by a single individual. The fact that the arson in the present case may have been committed through the cooperation of defendant, Turner, and Scott is of no moment. Defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit arson does not violate Wharton’s Rule.
vm
The prosecution raises the following issues in its cross appeal:
The prosecution argues that on retrial it should be permitted to amend the information and add a count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), based on the handgun discovered on Ray Turner’s body. The prosecution sought to add this count before defendant’s first trial. The trial court denied the motion, stating that it was not timely and would be unduly prejudicial to defendant because it was filed so long after the preliminary examination. The prosecution neither sought leave to appeal the trial court’s ruling nor renewed this motion before defendant’s second trial.' Accordingly, we find that the prosecution has failed to preserve this issue for our consideration.
The prosecution also challenges the trial court’s scoring of offense variables 18 and 19. Because we reverse defendant’s convictions, this issue is moot. However, we note that our Supreme Court has [309]*309recently held that a scoring error neither violates the law nor provides a cognizable claim for relief. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 176; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
D. A. Roberson, J., concurred.