People v. Boyer

2020 IL App (2d) 200028-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 2, 2020
• Docket: 2-20-0028
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (2d) 200028-U No. 2-20-0028 Order filed December 2, 2020

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 19-DV-274 ) CHARLES EDWARD BOYER, ) Honorable ) Joshua A. Dieden, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s claim that the State failed to prove his actions were not a reasonable exercise of parental discipline and, thus, failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is forfeited for failure to raise that defense in the trial court.

¶2 Defendant, Charles Edward Boyer, was charged with two counts of domestic battery. 720

ILCS 5/12-3.2(1)(1), (2) (West 2018). Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of both

counts, the trial court merged count II into count I, and the court sentenced defendant to one year

of conditional discharge. The dispositive issue raised on appeal is whether defendant raised in the

trial court his defense that he was reasonably disciplining his daughter, M.B., when the incident 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

occurred. We determine that defendant forfeited any claim that he was reasonably disciplining

M.B. when the incident occurred, as he failed to raise that defense in the trial court. Accordingly,

we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The counts charging defendant with domestic battery alleged, in relevant part, that

defendant knowingly and without legal justification battered his daughter, M.B., when defendant

pulled on M.B.’s arm.

¶5 The uncontradicted evidence presented at trial revealed that, on March 4, 2019, M.B. was

at home with defendant and two of M.B.’s siblings. M.B. who was 16 years old and had a bedroom

in the lower level of the home, had stayed home from school that day because she did not feel well.

At around 8:30 p.m., M.B. went to the kitchen to make herself some Ramen noodles. Defendant,

who had half of his left foot amputated and parts of his left Achilles tendon cut, was sitting in the

kitchen with his left foot propped up on a chair. While in the kitchen, M.B. was streaming music

through her phone that she kept in her pocket and was listening to the music through corded

earbuds. M.B. boiled some water and was washing some dishes she had left in the sink when

defendant began tapping her on her right shoulder.

¶6 Conflicting evidence was presented as to what happened next. According to M.B., she told

defendant she did not want to talk, as she was in a bad mood, and she continued washing dishes.

Defendant then stood up, walked over to M.B., and yanked M.B.’s corded earbuds out of her ears

so that defendant could talk to her. M.B., who was scared, stated that defendant was angry because

she had not listened to him. Defendant began yelling at M.B., telling her that she should not ignore

him. M.B. stated that defendant then grabbed the upper part of her left arm “very hard,” pulled on

her hair, which she had in a ponytail, and continued yelling at her. M.B. tried to push defendant

-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

away, but defendant would not let go. M.B. then began hitting defendant on the head to get

defendant to let her go. After a while, defendant let go of M.B., and M.B. went downstairs to her

bedroom. While in her room, M.B. cried and texted her mother. In one text, M.B. said that

“[defendant] grabbed my [sic] and pulled my hair and scratched me.”

¶7 Defendant presented a different account of what happened. Defendant, who was 61 years

old, tried to get M.B.’s attention in the kitchen, M.B. just groaned or growled at him, and she then

turned away. This “annoyed” defendant. Defendant explained that “[he does not] think children

should be allowed to dictate to their parents when they’ll let them talk to them.” After M.B. ignored

him, defendant reached out with his hand to touch M.B.’s arm, hoping to get her attention and talk

to her about the fact that she had not been taking care of her dog that day. M.B. again growled and

pulled away from defendant. Defendant stood up, used one crutch to hop over to M.B., and pulled

M.B.’s left earbud out in a nonviolent way. Defendant “took ahold of [M.B.’s] arm gently” so that

“[M.B. would] turn toward [defendant].” Defendant elaborated that he grabbed the upper portion

of M.B.’s left arm, with an amount of force he described as “nothing special,” and asked M.B.,

“[W]hat do you think you’re doing?” M.B. tried to yank her arm away, causing defendant to lose

his balance. M.B. pulled defendant closer to her, defendant held on tighter to M.B., and M.B.

rammed herself into defendant. Defendant “h[e]ld on for dear life,” trying not to “face plant” for

the second time that day, and M.B. grabbed the crutch defendant was not using. M.B. then hit

defendant with the crutch. Eventually, M.B. stopped using the crutch to hit defendant, used her

hand to hit defendant, who ended up “draped” across a kitchen chair. M.B. barreled past defendant,

telling defendant that she had had a bad day and did not want to be yelled at.

¶8 Uncontradicted evidence revealed what happened next. Defendant testified that, after M.B.

went to her room, he called the police, because, given some past events, he wanted to document

-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

the incident. Officer Dennis Stachura testified that he arrived at the house at around 8:55 p.m.

Defendant, who was “shaken up” and a “little agitated,” admitted to the officer that he grabbed

M.B.’s arm to talk to her and pulled the corded earbuds out of M.B.’s ears so that she could hear

defendant. Defendant told the officer that, right after defendant did that, M.B. began hitting

defendant on the head. The officer, who examined defendant, did not see any injuries to

defendant’s head. After talking to defendant, the officer spoke to M.B. M.B., who was crying and

shaking, told the officer that defendant grabbed her ponytail before pulling her corded earbuds out.

M.B. also told the officer that defendant grabbed her arm. The officer’s photograph of M.B.’s arm

was admitted at trial. The officer described what was depicted in the photograph, noting that one

“can distinctly see finger marks in [M.B.’s] bicep area where [one] can visibly see fingers.”

¶9 After the trial court found defendant guilty and sentenced him, defendant filed a motion to

reconsider and a motion for a new trial. Defendant claimed, among other things, that he did not

intend to harm M.B. Rather, “[defendant] was simply as a parent, trying to speak to [M.B.] and

not tolerate her disrespectful behavior of ignoring him.” The trial court denied these motions. This

timely appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Specifically, he claims that the State failed to prove that his actions toward M.B.

were not a reasonable exercise of parental discipline. The State responds that defendant forfeited

any defense of reasonable parental discipline by failing to raise it in the trial court. Because

resolving the forfeiture issue does not require us to defer to the trial court’s findings or reasoning,

our review is de novo. See People v. Mitchell, 353 Ill. App. 3d 838, 844 (2004).

-4- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

¶ 12 In addressing the forfeiture issue, we begin with some background. As noted, defendant

was charged with domestic battery. “A person commits domestic battery if he or she knowingly

without legal justification by any means *** [c]auses bodily harm to any family or household

member.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2018). Illinois common law recognizes that reasonable

parental discipline is an affirmative defense to domestic battery. People v. Green, 2011 IL App

(2d) 091123, ¶ 16. Although reasonable parental discipline is not explicitly defined, our supreme

court has recognized that reasonableness in this context does not cover every type of harm directed

at one’s child. Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395, 397 (1869). Rather, reasonableness is something less

than “wanton and needless cruelty” inflicted “upon [one’s] child, either by imprisonment *** or

by inhuman beating[.]” Id. Similarly, what constitutes discipline is not boundless. Discipline

encompasses that conduct “necessary to control, train, and educate” one’s child. Black’s Law

Dictionary 1288 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “parental-discipline privilege”).

¶ 13 The mere fact that parents may reasonably discipline their children does not mean that the

affirmative defense of reasonable parental discipline is automatically raised in every domestic

battery case where a parent is charged with harming his child. In any proceeding, a defendant who

has a defense must raise it in some way. The law is clear that, when a defendant is charged with a

felony, he must notify the State before trial commences of all defenses he wishes to raise. See Ill.

S. Ct. R. 411 (eff. Dec. 9. 2011) (discovery rules under Illinois Supreme Court Rules apply in all

cases where the defendant is charged with a felony); Ill. S. Ct. R. 413(d) (eff. July 1, 1982)

(defendant charged with a felony must inform the State about any defense the defendant wishes to

advance at trial).

¶ 14 These notification requirements do not apply when a defendant is charged, as here, with a

misdemeanor. People v. Williams, 87 Ill. 2d 161, 164 (1981); see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(b) (West

-5- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

2018) (domestic battery is a Class A misdemeanor). Moreover, in a misdemeanor prosecution, the

State must give the defendant evidence negating his guilt, but the defendant has no obligation to

provide the State with discovery. Williams, 87 Ill. 2d at 165-66 (citing People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill.

2d 572, 575 (1974)).

¶ 15 The question remains, then, how a defendant charged with a misdemeanor raises a defense.

Neither party has cited any authority addressing that issue. In conducting our own research, we

found insightful People v. Costello, 2014 IL App (3d) 121001. There, the defendant was charged

with violating an order of protection that required him to turn over all firearms, including several

specified weapons, that he kept in his home. Id. ¶ 3. At a stipulated bench trial, evidence was

presented that the police did not see firearms in the defendant’s home when they served the order

of protection or executed a subsequent warrant. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant was convicted of violating

the order of protection, a misdemeanor, and he appealed. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 8.

¶ 16 On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of violating the order of protection, because the State failed to present evidence that he possessed

any firearms and, thus, could comply with the order of protection. Id. ¶ 10. In addressing that

argument, the appellate court noted that the defendant never raised in the trial court the common-

law affirmative defense of impossibility. Id. ¶ 13. The court determined that, because the State did

not present any evidence supporting that defense, the defendant was required to raise the defense

by presenting “some evidence” that it was impossible for him to comply with the order of

protection. Id. ¶ 16. The court explained that the defendant failed to present “some” evidence of

impossibility, as the mere fact that the authorities did not see any firearms in the defendant’s home

did not exclude the possibility that the defendant hid his firearms at another location. Id. ¶ 17. If

-6- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

the defendant did so, it would not be impossible for him to comply with the order of protection by

surrendering his firearms to the authorities. Id.

¶ 17 Here, like in Costello, defendant was charged with a misdemeanor and claims that he raised

at his bench trial a common-law affirmative defense. We, like the court in Costello, must conclude

that defendant did not raise his defense, as neither side presented “some evidence” indicating that

he was reasonably disciplining M.B. when the incident occurred. In his brief, defendant claims

that “[w]hile [reasonable parental discipline] was not explicitly argued by defense counsel at trial,

the defendant did clearly testify that he believed [M.B.’s] behavior was unacceptable and he did

what he felt he had to do to get her to listen to him despite her best efforts to ignore him.” (White

Brief 7) Though defendant testified that children should not ignore their parents, he did not indicate

that he grabbed M.B.’s arm to discipline her in any way. He testified that he grabbed M.B.’s arm

“gently” to get her attention so that she would turn toward him. He said that when M.B. tried to

pull away, he held her arm tighter to prevent himself from falling to the floor. Defendant made it

clear that he never intended to harm M.B.

¶ 18 Similarly, the State’s evidence did not present “some evidence” that defendant grabbed

M.B.’s arm to discipline her. M.B.’s and Stachura’s testimony, coupled with the text M.B. sent to

her mother and the picture of M.B.’s bruised arm, tended to show that defendant grabbed M.B. out

of frustration or anger.

¶ 19 Defendant argues that, because the defense of reasonable parental discipline is not

statutorily codified, he did not have to formally raise it in the trial court. This is true under Costello,

which teaches that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor may raise a common-law defense at

a bench trial by simply presenting “some evidence” supporting that defense. Costello, 2014 IL

-7- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

App (3d) 121001, ¶ 16. Here, however, defendant raised the defense neither formally nor through

the quantum of evidence mentioned in Costello.

¶ 20 Having concluded that defendant did not raise a defense of reasonable parental discipline,

we now must consider what effect that has on defendant’s case. The State argues that, because

defendant never raised his defense in the trial court, he has forfeited on appeal any claim that his

actions were justified. We agree.

¶ 21 Instructive on this point is People v. Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209. There, the

defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. Id. ¶ 3. Evidence presented at the defendant’s

bench trial revealed that the defendant attempted to bite a hospital security officer while the officer

was securing the defendant’s restraints. Id. ¶ 6. The defendant testified that he never intended to

bite the officer. Id. ¶ 10. Rather, the defendant claimed that he was biting at the restraints to free

his hand when the officer put his hand close to the defendant’s mouth. Id.

¶ 22 On appeal, the defendant argued that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense and

prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 16. The State responded that the defendant was

raising self-defense for the first time on appeal. Id. We agreed with the State that self-defense was

not raised below. Not only did the defendant not formally raise the defense at trial, there was not

enough evidence of self-defense to require the trial court to consider the defense. Id. ¶ 17. Because

the defense was not raised below, the defendant forfeited it on appeal. Id.

¶ 23 Here, no evidence was presented suggesting that defendant was reasonably disciplining

M.B. when he grabbed her arm. Therefore, because the defense of reasonable parental discipline

was not raised below, we conclude, under Bardsley, that defendant forfeited on appeal his claim

that he was justified in grabbing M.B.’s arm.

-8- 2020 IL App (2d) 200028

¶ 24 Defendant argues that, if this court concludes that the defense of reasonable parental

discipline was forfeited, he is entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel was clearly

ineffective. We will not consider whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective, as defendant

is raising this argument for the first time in his reply brief. People v. Accardo, 139 Ill. App. 3d

813, 816-17 (1985).

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

-9-