People v. Boyd

2024 IL App (5th) 230824-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 12, 2024
• Docket: 5-23-0824
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (5th) 230824-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 01/12/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0824 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Wayne County. ) v. ) No. 23-CF-173 ) JEFFREY T. BOYD, ) Honorable ) Sonja L. Ligon, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Boie concurred in the judgment. Presiding Justice Vaughan specially concurred.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Because the State’s petition for pretrial detention was untimely pursuant to section 110-6.1(c)(1), the circuit court did not have the authority to detain the defendant; therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

¶2 The defendant, Jeffrey Boyd, appeals the Wayne County circuit court’s order regarding his

pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725

ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),

commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today Act (Act). 1 See Pub.

1 The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act. Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n.1. 1 Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v.

Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). 2

¶3 On September 14, 2023, the State charged the defendant by information with aggravated

possession of a stolen firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-3.9(a)(4) (West 2022)) and residential burglary (id.

§ 19-3(a)). Defendant’s bond was set at $100,000, requiring the deposit of 10%, and counsel was

appointed to represent him.

¶4 On September 18, 2023, the effective date of the Act, the State filed a verified petition to

detain the defendant pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).

At the hearing on that petition, the State proffered that the evidence would show that the three gun

safes were emptied at a residential home, and a lengthy recitation of facts to support that the

defendant stole the guns, including witness statements. Because of the “volume of the guns and

ammunition,” 25 to 50 long guns and pistols with approximately 7000 rounds of ammunition, the

State argued the defendant was a threat to the community and should be detained. Defense counsel

argued that the State did not prove that the proof was evident or the presumption great that the

defendant committed the offenses. A witness, the defendant’s mother, also testified that she needed

care from the defendant.

¶5 The circuit court found that the offenses were detainable, the proof was evident and the

presumption great that the defendant committed the offenses, and the defendant posed a threat to

a person or persons in the community. The court also found that there were not any conditions or

any combination of conditions that could mitigate the real and present danger posed by the

2 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case was due on or before January 5, 2024, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based on the high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending the deadline. 2 defendant. The court entered its order that the defendant should remain detained, from which the

defendant timely appealed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).

¶6 On appeal, the defendant contends that because he had been ordered released on cash bond

prior to the effective date of the Act, the State lacked the authority to petition for detention, and

the circuit court thus erred in detaining him. The defendant asks this court to reverse the circuit

court’s detention order and remand for further proceedings.

¶7 On December 8, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal, arguing

that the notice of appeal did not include grounds for the relief requested. The notice of appeal is

jurisdictional, and pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2), the defendant may also file

a memorandum. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). Here, the defendant filed a supporting

memorandum, including the grounds for the relief requested in the notice of appeal. Accordingly,

the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

¶8 The defendant argues that the State was not permitted to file a petition to detain him due to

the timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 110-6.1(c)(1) (West

2022)). The defendant was charged on September 14, 2023, before the Act took effect. Bond was

set at $100,000 and the defendant was eligible to be released on bail if he posted 10% of that

amount. He was apparently not able to post the 10% and remained in jail when the Act took effect.

¶9 The Code separates those persons who were arrested before the Act took effect into three

categories. See id. § 110-7.5. The defendant belongs to the second category—persons who remain

in pretrial detention after being ordered released with pretrial conditions. Id. § 110-7.5(b). Section

110-7.5(b) provides that “any person who remains in pretrial detention after having been ordered

released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing security, shall be entitled

to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” Id. Section 110-5(e) provides:

3 “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered

released with pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the

reason for continued detention. *** The inability of the defendant to pay for a

condition of release or any other ineligibility for a condition of pretrial release shall

not be used as a justification for the pretrial detention of that defendant.” Id. § 110-

5(e).

¶ 10 As discussed in this court’s People v. Rios opinion, defendants who were arrested before

the Act took effect have two options:

“Under sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5(e), a defendant may file a motion seeking a

hearing to have their pretrial conditions reviewed anew. Alternatively, a defendant

may elect to stay in detention until such time as the previously set monetary security

may be paid. A defendant may elect this option so that [he or she] may be released

under the terms of the original bail.” People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724,

¶ 16.

When the defendant asks the court for pretrial release pursuant to the Code, the defendant is asking

the circuit court to review appropriate pretrial conditions again. Id. At that point, “ ‘the matter

returns to the proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for the most lenient pretrial

release conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.’ ” People v. Gray, 2023 IL App

(3d) 230435, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 23).

¶ 11 Section 110-6.1 addresses the subject of “denial of pretrial release.” Section 110-6.1(c)(1)

discusses the timing of the State’s petition asking the court to deny pretrial release.

“A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance

before a judge, or within the 21 calendar days, except as provided in Section 110-

4 6, after arrest and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant;

provided that while such petition is pending before the court, the defendant if

previously released shall not be detained.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022).

¶ 12 The defendant argues that the State’s verified petition asking the court to hold him in

pretrial detention was not timely pursuant to section 110-6.1(c)(1) because the petition was filed

after his first appearance before a judge. Id. This issue was recently addressed in Rios, 2023 IL

App (5th) 230724, which we find dispositive.

¶ 13 In Rios, the defendant was arrested prior to the effective date of the Act. Id. ¶ 3. The circuit

court set the defendant’s bond and ordered other conditions of pretrial release. Id. The defendant

remained in pretrial detention following the effective date of the Act. Id. ¶ 5. The State filed a

petition to deny the defendant’s pretrial release. Id. The circuit court, finding that the defendant

should be detained under the dangerousness standard, granted the State’s petition, and the

defendant appealed. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The Rios court found that the plain language of the Code in section

110-6.1(c)(1) provided a deadline for the State to file a petition to detain a defendant but that none

of the exceptions to the deadline applied to defendants who remained in pretrial detention

following the effective date of the Act. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Thus, the court in Rios found that the State’s

petition to detain under section 110-6.1(c)(1) was untimely. Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 14 Based on our review of the record, and any memoranda submitted, we find that because

the State’s petition for pretrial detention was untimely pursuant to section 110-6.1(c)(1), the circuit

court did not have the authority to detain the defendant.

¶ 15 Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 16 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 17 PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN, specially concurring:

5 ¶ 18 I agree the State’s verified petition was untimely filed under section 110-6.1(c). However,

I write separately to address the majority’s reliance on People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435,

¶ 14 (quoting People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 23), for the proposition that “ ‘that

matter returns to the proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for the most lenient

pretrial release conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.’ ”

¶ 19 First, the Jones decision reached an opposite conclusion to that presented in People v. Rios,

2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16, and People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 23098, ¶ 23. See Jones,

2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶¶ 19-22 (respectfully disagreeing with the decisions in Rios and

Vingara finding that the State’s petitions were untimely filed). The decision in Jones specifically

found that the State was not barred by the timing restrictions in section 110-6.1(c) and found “the

statutory interpretation in Vingara and Rios leads to absurd results.” Id. ¶¶ 20-21. The Jones court

further stated that “the holdings in Vingara and Rios prevent the State from responding to a

defendant’s motion for pretrial release” (id. ¶ 23) and then goes on to presciently note the

irreconcilability of the decisions by stating, “However, following the logic presented in those

cases, once a defendant elects ‘to have their pretrial conditions reviewed anew’ [citation], the

matter returns to the proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for the most lenient

pretrial release conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.” Id. The Jones court

clearly questioned the validity of the Rios and Vingara decisions, and therefore, my colleagues’

reliance on this decision, or any other case quoting Jones, is confounding.

¶ 20 Second, I believe Jones incorrectly states that the case “goes back to the proverbial square

one.” While the State may argue for increased conditions when defendant files a motion to modify

pretrial conditions, the statute does not allow for the State to request detention as if the case were

newly filed. The statute only allows the State to bring a verified petition requesting detention “at

6 the first appearance before a judge, or within the 21 calendar days *** after arrest and release of

the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant” (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)) or if

the State presents “a verified application setting forth in detail any new facts not known or

obtainable at the time of the filing of the previous petition” (id. § 110-6.1(d)(2)).

¶ 21 The State is similarly limited to certain circumstances in order to file a petition to revoke

pretrial release and request detention. Id. § 110-6(a). Those circumstances require the defendant

to have been previously granted pretrial release for a felony or Class A misdemeanor and later be

charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that occurred while defendant was on pretrial

release or if the defendant was previously provided pretrial release conditions and is charged with

violation of a protective order or was previously convicted of a violation of a protective order and

the subject of the protective order is the same person as the victim in the current matter. Id. All

other defendants may not have their pretrial release revoked and the court’s authority is limited to

imposing sanctions for violations of pretrial release (id. § 110-6(b)-(d)), which include a written

or verbal admonishment, a modification of defendant’s pretrial conditions, or imprisonment in the

county jail for a period not exceeding 30 days (id. § 110-6(f)).

¶ 22 What is important to note is that the State had the authority to request the detention of

defendant before the effective date of the Act. Id. § 110-6.1(a). Here, by deciding not to file a

petition requesting pretrial detention at defendant’s first appearance, the State acquiesced in

allowing defendant’s pretrial release. To allow the State to later request detention, in response to

a defendant’s motion to modify conditions of release—without some intervening event—has no

basis in either the current or former statute. See id. § 110-6.1(a) (only allowing for verified petition

by the State to deny bail if petition is filed at the first appearance or within 21 calendar days after

defendant’s arrest and release); id. § 110-6.1(c)(1) (same); id. § 110-6(f) (allowing for revocation

7 of bail if defendant committed a forcible felony or Class 2 or greater offense under an Act related

to controlled substances, cannabis, or methamphetamine, or statutorily listed charges involving

aggravated battery and unlawful restraint against the same victim that is a family or household

member of the previous charge); id. § 110-6 (allowing revocation of pretrial release for defendants

who have been previously granted pretrial release for a felony or Class A misdemeanor and later

charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that occurred while defendant was on pretrial

release or if the defendant was previously provided pretrial release conditions and is charged with

violation of a protective order or was previously convicted of a violation of a protective order and

the subject of the protective order is the same person as the victim in the current matter).

¶ 23 As such, the “proverbial square one” is a misnomer. Timeliness for requesting a

defendant’s detention has, in modern times, always been required early in the case. 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022); 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2020). Requesting detention is not a

moving target that depends on whether the defendant later files for a modification of pretrial

release conditions. The State’s opportunity to determine whether it wishes to allow for pretrial

release (which previously included bail), or request detention of the defendant is limited under

both the current and prior statutes. Similarly, under both the prior and current statute, a petition to

revoke pretrial release has always required an intervening event. Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a)

(West 2022) with 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2020).

¶ 24 For these reasons, I specially concur.