People v. Bell
Opinion
2025 IL App (4th) 240929 FILED August 19, 2025 NO. 4-24-0929 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County CLAYTON T. BELL, ) No. 22CF331 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John P. Vespa, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Clayton T. Bell, born on April 21, 2005, appeals the 14-year sentence
he received after pleading guilty to aggravated driving under the influence (aggravated DUI) (625
ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2022)) and reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2022)).
Among the arguments defendant asserts on appeal is the trial court erred in finding he was provided
the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing after counsel failed to produce evidence relevant
to the youth-based factors in mitigation (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)) and failed to
object to unauthorized victim impact evidence. We agree with defendant, reverse the imposed
sentence, and remand for resentencing with directions.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 11, 2022, defendant was charged with the above offenses following a
motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of 15-year-old Mia Dusek. The sentencing range for the aggravated DUI charge was 3 to 14 years, with the possibility of probation in “extraordinary
circumstances.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (West 2022).
¶4 A. Plea Hearing
¶5 In March 2023, represented by counsel Kevin Sullivan, defendant entered an open
guilty plea to both charges. At the plea hearing, the State provided the factual basis. On February
27, 2022, at approximately 12:15 a.m., officers were dispatched to a vehicle crash with a deceased
female, Mia. When Eric Strauss, a deputy with the Peoria County Sheriff’s Office, arrived, he
observed a black 2009 Ford registered to Kristin Bell, defendant’s mother, resting on its top. A
debris trail showed the Ford exited the roadway at the top of a hill, rolled over multiple times, and
struck an embankment. Two males, defendant and Mia’s brother, Reece Dusek, sat near the Ford.
Mia “had obvious signs of severe head trauma” and appeared to have been ejected from the vehicle.
Deputy Strauss assisted defendant to his feet. He smelled alcohol coming from defendant. At one
point, defendant attempted to flee. Defendant and Reece were transported to the hospital, where
defendant’s blood alcohol content tested at 0.141. Deputy Strauss spoke to Alayna Rudebek, who
was also in the Ford at the time of the crash. Alayna reported Reece had been recording on his
phone when the crash occurred. Alayna further reported, earlier that evening, they had been
drinking at a friend’s house. Reece reported everyone had been drinking and defendant had
“something like similar to six, seven, eight, too much” to drink. Reece further reported defendant
“was driving like an idiot and was speeding up the hill.” Reece believed they were going
approximately 80 miles per hour. The State reported the sentencing range for aggravated DUI was
3 to 14 years, to be served at 85%, and the sentencing range for reckless homicide was 2 to 5 years.
¶6 B. Presentence Investigation Report
¶7 Before sentencing, a presentence investigation report was filed. According to the
-2- report, defendant was a recent high-school graduate, who took honors and Advanced Placement
classes and graduated cum laude. Defendant’s record from Limestone Community High School
indicates incidents of “IDV ID violations,” “class misconduct,” “failure to attend,” “tardy,” and
truancy.” The “class misconduct” report resulted from defendant’s “messing around and fake
fighting another student.” After being told to stop, defendant did the same with another student.
The truancy report was for two missed days in December 2020. Defendant participated in track,
cross country, basketball, football, madrigal club, and National Honor Society. He was named an
Illinois State Scholar. Defendant worked as a lifeguard in the summers of 2021 and 2022.
Defendant had been admitted to Iowa State University of Science and Technology.
¶8 Defendant reported having four close friends. In the past, most of his friends drank
alcohol and smoked cannabis. Since the offenses occurred, his friends stopped doing so. Regarding
“associates,” defendant said half are involved in underage drinking and the consumption of
cannabis. Defendant reported first consuming alcohol at age 15. He did not drink regularly but
only socially with his friends and “once in a blue moon.” When he would do so, he would drink
three to four drinks. Defendant first smoked cannabis at age 15. Since the present offenses, he
admitted smoking cannabis two to three times. On November 28, 2022, defendant tested positive
for cannabis. Defendant completed an alcohol and drug evaluation. He was classified as a moderate
risk. After the offense, defendant attended counseling sessions for two to three months. Defendant
blamed himself for the offense. When asked what a fair sentence would be, defendant responded
it would be “probation and loss of [his] license,” with a “huge fine, community service, treatment
program[,] and some jail time.” When asked about Mia, defendant stated he felt terrible and
thought “about it every hour of every day, it never leaves.” When asked what the victims feel
toward him, defendant said, “Hatred, it is deserved,” and “Hopefully some forgiveness.”
-3- ¶9 Attached to the presentence investigation report is the Alcohol and Drug Evaluation
Uniform Report. See 77 Ill. Adm. Code 2060.120, amended at 46 Ill. Reg. 17,369 (eff. Feb. 4,
2022). Defendant stated, on the night of the crash, he began drinking alcohol around 9 to 10 p.m.
and consumed six to seven seltzer drinks. Defendant reported he also smoked marijuana around
11 p.m., taking three to four hits off a pen.
¶ 10 The presentence investigation report includes a questionnaire completed by
defendant’s mother, Kristin. Defendant resided with his mother and younger brother after his
parents divorced when he was seven. Kristin reported defendant’s relationship with her was
excellent and with his father as “good but infrequent.” Kristin reported defendant had “a counselor
he talks to regarding the accident and grief.” She stated defendant, at the time she completed the
questionnaire, was experiencing “[r]emorse, sadness, anxiety about these proceedings.”
¶ 11 Twenty-four letters or statements, made on behalf of Mia and her family, were
attached to the presentence investigation report. Among those statements was a letter from Jim
Manning. Jim called Mia his stepdaughter. He and Mia’s mother, Deborah Beaupre (Deb), had
been dating six years and had become became engaged just before Mia’s death. Jim told of the
pain Deb’s family experienced daily. He stated the crash was no “accident,” as defendant “left a
birthday party that night drunk out of his mind with three young teenagers in his vehicle.” Jim
stated the girls were screaming “I don’t want to die” and Reece yelled “value your life” while
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2025 IL App (4th) 240929 FILED August 19, 2025 NO. 4-24-0929 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County CLAYTON T. BELL, ) No. 22CF331 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John P. Vespa, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Clayton T. Bell, born on April 21, 2005, appeals the 14-year sentence
he received after pleading guilty to aggravated driving under the influence (aggravated DUI) (625
ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2022)) and reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2022)).
Among the arguments defendant asserts on appeal is the trial court erred in finding he was provided
the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing after counsel failed to produce evidence relevant
to the youth-based factors in mitigation (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)) and failed to
object to unauthorized victim impact evidence. We agree with defendant, reverse the imposed
sentence, and remand for resentencing with directions.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 11, 2022, defendant was charged with the above offenses following a
motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of 15-year-old Mia Dusek. The sentencing range for the aggravated DUI charge was 3 to 14 years, with the possibility of probation in “extraordinary
circumstances.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (West 2022).
¶4 A. Plea Hearing
¶5 In March 2023, represented by counsel Kevin Sullivan, defendant entered an open
guilty plea to both charges. At the plea hearing, the State provided the factual basis. On February
27, 2022, at approximately 12:15 a.m., officers were dispatched to a vehicle crash with a deceased
female, Mia. When Eric Strauss, a deputy with the Peoria County Sheriff’s Office, arrived, he
observed a black 2009 Ford registered to Kristin Bell, defendant’s mother, resting on its top. A
debris trail showed the Ford exited the roadway at the top of a hill, rolled over multiple times, and
struck an embankment. Two males, defendant and Mia’s brother, Reece Dusek, sat near the Ford.
Mia “had obvious signs of severe head trauma” and appeared to have been ejected from the vehicle.
Deputy Strauss assisted defendant to his feet. He smelled alcohol coming from defendant. At one
point, defendant attempted to flee. Defendant and Reece were transported to the hospital, where
defendant’s blood alcohol content tested at 0.141. Deputy Strauss spoke to Alayna Rudebek, who
was also in the Ford at the time of the crash. Alayna reported Reece had been recording on his
phone when the crash occurred. Alayna further reported, earlier that evening, they had been
drinking at a friend’s house. Reece reported everyone had been drinking and defendant had
“something like similar to six, seven, eight, too much” to drink. Reece further reported defendant
“was driving like an idiot and was speeding up the hill.” Reece believed they were going
approximately 80 miles per hour. The State reported the sentencing range for aggravated DUI was
3 to 14 years, to be served at 85%, and the sentencing range for reckless homicide was 2 to 5 years.
¶6 B. Presentence Investigation Report
¶7 Before sentencing, a presentence investigation report was filed. According to the
-2- report, defendant was a recent high-school graduate, who took honors and Advanced Placement
classes and graduated cum laude. Defendant’s record from Limestone Community High School
indicates incidents of “IDV ID violations,” “class misconduct,” “failure to attend,” “tardy,” and
truancy.” The “class misconduct” report resulted from defendant’s “messing around and fake
fighting another student.” After being told to stop, defendant did the same with another student.
The truancy report was for two missed days in December 2020. Defendant participated in track,
cross country, basketball, football, madrigal club, and National Honor Society. He was named an
Illinois State Scholar. Defendant worked as a lifeguard in the summers of 2021 and 2022.
Defendant had been admitted to Iowa State University of Science and Technology.
¶8 Defendant reported having four close friends. In the past, most of his friends drank
alcohol and smoked cannabis. Since the offenses occurred, his friends stopped doing so. Regarding
“associates,” defendant said half are involved in underage drinking and the consumption of
cannabis. Defendant reported first consuming alcohol at age 15. He did not drink regularly but
only socially with his friends and “once in a blue moon.” When he would do so, he would drink
three to four drinks. Defendant first smoked cannabis at age 15. Since the present offenses, he
admitted smoking cannabis two to three times. On November 28, 2022, defendant tested positive
for cannabis. Defendant completed an alcohol and drug evaluation. He was classified as a moderate
risk. After the offense, defendant attended counseling sessions for two to three months. Defendant
blamed himself for the offense. When asked what a fair sentence would be, defendant responded
it would be “probation and loss of [his] license,” with a “huge fine, community service, treatment
program[,] and some jail time.” When asked about Mia, defendant stated he felt terrible and
thought “about it every hour of every day, it never leaves.” When asked what the victims feel
toward him, defendant said, “Hatred, it is deserved,” and “Hopefully some forgiveness.”
-3- ¶9 Attached to the presentence investigation report is the Alcohol and Drug Evaluation
Uniform Report. See 77 Ill. Adm. Code 2060.120, amended at 46 Ill. Reg. 17,369 (eff. Feb. 4,
2022). Defendant stated, on the night of the crash, he began drinking alcohol around 9 to 10 p.m.
and consumed six to seven seltzer drinks. Defendant reported he also smoked marijuana around
11 p.m., taking three to four hits off a pen.
¶ 10 The presentence investigation report includes a questionnaire completed by
defendant’s mother, Kristin. Defendant resided with his mother and younger brother after his
parents divorced when he was seven. Kristin reported defendant’s relationship with her was
excellent and with his father as “good but infrequent.” Kristin reported defendant had “a counselor
he talks to regarding the accident and grief.” She stated defendant, at the time she completed the
questionnaire, was experiencing “[r]emorse, sadness, anxiety about these proceedings.”
¶ 11 Twenty-four letters or statements, made on behalf of Mia and her family, were
attached to the presentence investigation report. Among those statements was a letter from Jim
Manning. Jim called Mia his stepdaughter. He and Mia’s mother, Deborah Beaupre (Deb), had
been dating six years and had become became engaged just before Mia’s death. Jim told of the
pain Deb’s family experienced daily. He stated the crash was no “accident,” as defendant “left a
birthday party that night drunk out of his mind with three young teenagers in his vehicle.” Jim
stated the girls were screaming “I don’t want to die” and Reece yelled “value your life” while
defendant “never took his foot off the gas.” Multiple coworkers of Deb at Studio B Salon expressed
how Deb felt “ruined” and reported her business had been affected. MacKinsey Manning, Jim’s
daughter, wrote in a letter how she had not met defendant but, at a track meet in May 2022,
defendant walked past her, Jim, Deb, and the family “with his head held high and a smug look on
his face.” MacKinsey asked the trial court to take into consideration defendant’s “lack of remorse
-4- and callousness towards Mia’s family.” Chuck E. Tate, the lead pastor at Rock Church, wrote he
had not, in his 32-year ministry, seen anyone impacted by a loss the way Deb had been impacted
by the loss of Mia. Tate mentioned only her children, fiancé Jim, and immediate family kept her
going.
¶ 12 On behalf of defendant, four letters were attached. Darin Driscoll, the dean of
students and assistant track coach at Limestone Community High School, wrote he had the
pleasure of knowing defendant for over six years. Driscoll wrote he had had conversations with
defendant “about the incident, choices made, and the consequences of choices.” Driscoll believed
the crash was an isolated incident and defendant would not let the same happen again. Brian Glaza,
the track coach at Limestone Community High School, wrote he had known defendant for four
years. Glaza called defendant “a phenomenal teammate who frequently places the needs of our
team above his own, taking younger athletes under his wing.” Glaza wrote, “Looking back on the
incident at hand, in the immediate aftermath, [defendant] was a shell of himself, and in some ways,
he still is.” Although defendant did not state as much, his “feeling of guilt over the situation ***
was palpable, and it still is.” Glaza wrote defendant is not a person who freely commits wrongdoing
with no conscience. Glaza reported defendant felt guilt for his actions and continued to feel it.
Shane Seals, a teacher who had taught defendant for three years, opined defendant was not a danger
and could have a positive influence. Stacey Seals wrote about the interactions she had with
defendant in the prior year. Defendant tried out for the unified basketball team, a competitive team
where kids with and without disabilities play together.
¶ 13 C. Sentencing Hearing
¶ 14 Defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on June 20, 2023. The State began by
playing a short audio clip of the “moments” preceding the crash. In the clip, which captures
-5- approximately eight seconds before the crash as they are heading up the hill, Reece says to
defendant “slow down” and then twice yells “value your life.” One can hear, in what sounds like
one of the girl’s voices “I don’t want to die” and screaming.
¶ 15 After the presentation of the video, family and friends of Mia and Deb read victim-
impact statements for the trial court. Cody Ryan Meeks read the letter for his wife Becky Meeks,
a coworker and friend of Deb. Cody read Mia was a “wonderful young lady who had her entire
life ahead of her.” Mia was a “bright light.” At times, when Becky arrived at work, she would find
Deb with tears in her eyes. Deb would say, “I’m ruined, Becky.” Kevin Cassidy, the father of one
of Mia’s longtime friends, read his letter revisiting memories of his daughter and Mia and
lamenting the loss of Mia’s future. Cassidy wrote, though time has passed, Mia’s “absence fails to
wain [sic] for” Mia’s mother, siblings, extended family, and friends. Kyleigh Miller read that Mia
was her best friend. Miller stated the passage of time did not ease her pain but worsened it. Miller
lost her fellow graduate, her maid of honor, and the godmother to her future children. Kenny
Beaupre, Mia’s uncle, read that, “[o]ut of all of us, Mia had the biggest joy of life.” Kenny reported
the family was not doing well, and “a large sadness [hung] over all of us every day.” Susan
Beaupre, Mia’s aunt, shared the effect of the loss on her two 11-year-old granddaughters, who
adored Mia, “one of their most favorite people on the planet.” Susan urged the court to send a
strong message not to drive under the influence of alcohol. Jim described Mia as an incredible
athlete and a straight-A student who had a bright future. At Mia’s celebration of life, Jim stated,
students and teachers spoke of how special Mia was. Mia would lunch with someone sitting alone
and smile at or say hello to individuals in the school hallways. Jim reported Deb relived the
accident daily, while defendant finished his senior year of high school, ran cross-country and two
seasons of track, drove a float in the homecoming parade, and graduated with his class. Jim stated
-6- a 30-year sentence would not be enough.
¶ 16 Deb also read her letter to the trial court. Deb told the court her life was destroyed
when Mia died. Deb spends her life seeing counselors; attending grief classes and retreats;
suffering from anxiety, panic, and depression; and medicating. Deb lost most of her business at
the salon. Deb reported defendant, in the more than 470 days since Mia’s death, had not apologized
to the family. Since the accident, Deb was invited to speak to students at high schools about the
consequences of their decisions. When she spoke at Limestone Community High School,
approximately six weeks after the accident, defendant “opted out of attending.” Deb stated
defendant “walks around the school so cavalier like nothing has ever happened,” and “he had the
nerve to even drive the float at the school’s homecoming parade.” While on pretrial services,
defendant was “still smoking pot,” having a positive drug test for cannabis in November of the
previous year.
¶ 17 The prosecutor began her argument by telling the trial court, “[Y]ou know that I
have done murder trials and gone through sentencing hearings, and those have never affected me
more than this.” The prosecutor stated her son had just turned 15 and gotten his driver’s license
and her biggest fear was experiencing what Mia’s family had. The prosecutor emphasized
defendant did not show when Deb gave the presentation at the school about the dangers of drunk
driving, defendant did not apologize to the family, defendant drove a float in the homecoming
parade, and defendant had a positive drug test in November 2022. The prosecutor felt embarrassed
that she had not been able to hold it together. The prosecutor asked for the maximum sentence.
¶ 18 After the State’s argument, the trial court asked defense counsel, Sullivan, if he had
any argument. Sullivan began by telling the trial court, the State, and everyone in the courtroom,
“[A]nything I’m going to say to the Court and part of my argument is not in any way intending to
-7- denigrate the memory of Mia.” He acknowledged his job was to advocate for his client. Because
Sullivan’s strategy at sentencing is key to this court’s decision, the rest of his argument, including
questions by the court, is below:
“There has been a lot of talk that my client has gone through
life since this terrible accident carefree, holding his head up,
unaffected. And I think that is just not the case. He may not have
worn it on his sleeve every moment of every day, but he internalized
it, and he never forgot—he never forgot about it. He will never
forget about it. He will have a life sentence of what happened on that
fateful evening, and he will live with that no matter what this Court
does.
My client accepted my advice throughout this process to
remain silent. I perfectly understand from—as his attorney why he
did not go to that assembly that day at Limestone. I think he would
not have certainly—he did not want to be the spectacle himself—
and that likely would have happened—and take away anything that
[Deb] wanted to impart to all those other kids.
I think everyone in this courtroom, Judge, wishes we were
not here at this point in time for the reasons we are. That is especially
true of [defendant]. Despite comments and perspectives to the
contrary, my client is contrite. My client is exceptionally and forever
remorseful. There is no question that Mia did not deserve to have
her life taken so prematurely. There is no question her family didn’t
-8- deserve this. And I wish there was something I could do or say to
either bring her back herself or soften the impact of this tragic
accident.
Judge, these cases are difficult, I’m sure, for the Courts. I’m
sure they are difficult for prosecutors, and I can tell you as a defense
attorney they are difficult because you see and we see a lot of
intentional acts that result in great tragedies. We are dealing here,
not necessarily with an intentional act, we are dealing with a reckless
act, that was speeding. And, unfortunately, the ultimate
consequences were paid because, again, it was a reckless act, but in
no way was this intended. This was not foreseen by him at that point
in time. Nobody thought this would happen because I think kids that
are that age are impervious to those sort of dangers and warnings,
and I think they think they are untouchable so to speak.
THE COURT: How about when the other people in the car
warned him?
MR. SULLIVAN: I understand that occurred, and that
occurred shortly before the collision occurred. I could not tell from
that video the speed at which that vehicle was traveling. And I don’t
know what impact that would have had. And I don’t know if there
was a process underway where he was starting to slow down or not.
I couldn’t tell that from the video. But I still don’t think that at that
moment that he, like most people in his situation at age 16, would
-9- anticipate or appreciate the ultimate consequences of an accident
that did, in fact, occur.
I think the Court has to take into consideration that he was
16 when this occurred. He was old enough to have a driver’s license,
not old enough to vote. Not old enough to do a lot of things. This
hill out on Pfeiffer Road near Limestone High School, west of the
airport is a dangerous road. I don’t think that anything that’s
happened in February of 2022 or even today is going to stop kids
from taking advantage of that attractive nuisance so to speak.
Obviously, people 16 years of age, 15 years of age, everybody under
21, the law says it’s illegal to drink. No question about that. I would
submit to [Y]our Honor that after the dust settles from this event
today, this sentencing, regardless of what the Court does, as long as
there is liquor stores and bars serving people that age, kids are going
to continue to go back to those, another attractive nuisance. That just
seems to be what kids do.
Perhaps if my client was traveling five miles an hour less,
his vehicle wouldn’t have moved in a way it did. We would not be
here discussing this. My client—and I ask the Court to consider this
as a factor in mitigation—pled guilty. He admitted he was wrong,
prepared to accept the consequence of his actions. He did not want
the family to have to endure a trial where there would have been a
lot of graphic evidence presented. And I think that is one of the
- 10 - considerations he had in entering a plea before the Court.
He will obviously be separated from his family. They don’t
deserve that unfortunately. They weren’t the ones that caused this,
but they will suffer the same way any parent would from separating
from your now 18-year-old—or 17-year-old, excuse me—no, 18-
year-old son who was on the verge on the precipice of moving on
with life.
I also ask the Court to consider cost of incarceration this day
and age. I think the courts are required to consider that in
formulating a sentence and take the—place the appropriate weight
on that.
In terms of the formal—or the statutory factors in mitigation,
Judge, I think the following apply: [defendant] did not contemplate
that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious physical
harm. Through insurance, he either has or will compensate the
family of Mia. There is no history of prior delinquency or criminal
activity. Obviously, having led a law-abiding life for a substantial
period of time, albeit he was 16 at the time. The impact of this entire
case and the real tears you have seen here today suggest that this
type of conduct by him was the result of—was unlikely to recur. He
is going to address the Court during his—make a statement in
allocution. I think the Court will consider that he is very sincere
about his feelings. I think that, again, there will be separation from
- 11 - his family. I think that’s a factor to consider.
Your Honor, when we look at the statutory factors in
aggravation, the one that applies across the board, and it was in some
of the letters as well, was the sentence is necessary to deter others
from committing the same crime. I think that is also a factor that’s
taken into consideration in this particular statute, which has a unique
sentencing scheme which says 3 to 14 years is the range; however,
probation is possible if the Court finds exceptional circumstances.
We don’t know what exceptional circumstances are. There is no
statutory definition. There is no common law definition. But this
Court can think, as many people maybe do think, well, let’s lock him
up, throw away the key for 14 years, be done with this. [Defendant]
goes off to the Department of Corrections and has to serve 85
percent of that. Is that a deterrence? Again, I submit when the dust
settles, he will be forgotten. Kids will forget about the situation.
That’s not going to result in real deterrence in a situation like this.
THE COURT: How about if it’s only a deterrent for a year?
I agree people will forget about [defendant] eventually.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, you know, as Mr. Manning said, the
kids at Limestone haven’t changed their attitude. The kids are still
getting alcohol from some liquor store on the south side.
THE COURT: Maybe I will change it real soon.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, what I’m proposing, Judge, is one
- 12 - option the Court could consider is finding because of his youth and
inexperience behind the wheel that that could be an exceptional
circumstance. You have four years to keep him under your thumb
on probation. You can put him on a speaking engagement. He can
be affiliated with [Mothers Against Drunk Driving], any sort of
driver improvement programs. He could be part of the victim impact
panel. He could *** could make a sandwich board and picket liquor
stores and bars that sell to underage kids. That may have an impact.
THE COURT: By the way, has he done any of those yet?
MR. SULLIVAN: He has not.
THE COURT: Yet you said he is full of remorse.
MR. SULLIVAN: That’s correct.
THE COURT: Would you agree—and I’m not trying to be
funny. Would you agree he has kept that remorse very well hidden?
MR. SULLIVAN: No. Maybe in public. He did go on with
life, but I can tell you behind the scenes, it’s been rough. And it
should be. I’m not *** making light of that. He wanted to complete
school. He did. He wanted to pursue track and field which shows
discipline. You know, I guess that’s the wrong thing to do in the
eyes of some people. But *** I’m trying to spare a second life in this
situation. I don’t know what he should have done other than perhaps
turned himself in, gone into court early. Stayed home. Done
absolutely nothing.
- 13 - THE COURT: Done a handful of things that you said that I
could have him do. The things you just listed.
MR. SULLIVAN: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Saying that should be part of your list right
now, too.
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Make him the poster child. And I
think who better to talk about the feelings, the remorse, the impact
of this. I’m hoping some day Mia’s family will have it in them to
maybe forgive him. Never forget it, but maybe forgive. Maybe not.
It would be a tremendous event going forward, which I hope there
are many, many years that this could be done, Mia’s mother and my
client could ever get together and do a presentation together. I was
bad. This is the result. I think that would be exceptionally powerful.
I think that would get national attention. They may think that’s silly.
I’m trying to—we can’t change the past. We can’t change
the consequences of that terrible accident in February of 2022. What
I hope we can do is push something forward. We can have some
good come out of this. You can warehouse him for 14 years, and
that’s fine. And maybe that’s the message that the family wants ***
an eye for an eye. I’m proposing pass it forward to do some good
because the good that can be done will never outweigh what
happens, but if it spares one person, one family, one community
anything, there is something good that comes out of it.
- 14 - We talked about the two aspects of any punishment,
rehabilitation, punishment. Any sentence, I should say,
rehabilitation, punishment. I would agree that somebody that has a
long list of priors maybe rehabilitation is not in the cards. How better
to allow him to rehabilitate than to get out there and try to stop it
from happening again. And I think the Court has the authority to do
it.
If the Court is not so inclined, I understand. I’m asking the
Court for a lesser sentence, perhaps a boot camp sentence. Impact
incarceration, that does put him out—and I think this Court could
make, as a condition of mandatory supervised release, the things we
just talked about, the suggestions, going forward, do this for your
community, for other people. Be out there in the public eye telling
them what not to do.
Otherwise, Judge, I would ask for your consideration. My
client is an otherwise good person. Made a terrible decision that
night. I think you could find any number of people that could have
happened to, that, *** cause an accident such as this. Certainly could
have happened to me when I was his age. I’m not naive enough to
say it couldn’t have happened to my kids when they were that age.
It’s a tragedy. It’s still an accident. It was reckless. It was not
intentional. And I ask the Court for all of its consideration towards
[defendant]. Thank you.”
- 15 - ¶ 19 The trial court asked the State if there was cannabis use that night. The State
reported defendant admitted he “hit the pin [sic] a couple of times that night.”
¶ 20 Defendant made a statement in allocution. Defendant reported, since waking up in
the hospital to the news, the events of that night “never left [his] mind.” Defendant stated he had
been “plagued by the terrible things that [he] did that night.” As defendant continued with his
statement, the trial court interrupted and asked, “[W]hen you were driving the float in the
homecoming parade you were full of guilt and shame; is that right?” Defendant responded he was.
Defendant apologized to Deb, Jim, and his own family.
¶ 21 The trial court ruled as follows:
“I have considered the presentence investigation report, the
evidence presented, the arguments, the statement of allocution, the
statement from victims, the financial impact of incarceration, the
statutory matters in mitigation and aggravation, which I will specify
in a minute. The history and character of the defendant. The
defendant’s education, job history, statements on his behalf, and the
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, which I will specify in a
minute.
Having due regard for the circumstances and nature of the
offense I find as follows: Statutory factors in mitigation are: The
defendant has no history of criminal activity. That’s it for statutory
factors in mitigation. Statutory factors in aggravation are: The
sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same
crime. That’s it for statutory factors in aggravation.
- 16 - And I want everybody to know that I don’t like how long it
took this case to get to a sentencing hearing. Very unhappy about it.
Who is the judge, though, it’s me. I signed off on every order that
continued this. No one ever said, let’s let him get through high
school. That was never said to me. [Counsel] had reasons. ***
Imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public. I
told you guys a minute ago—or a while ago, seeing that video, I
didn’t even know it existed prior to today. See that video and hearing
that video, the other people in the car screaming and begging for the
defendant to slow down. I don’t want to die. Value your life, are two
of the things that were said. That chills me to the bone. In addition
to being a judge, I’m a human being. I have feelings. That bothered
the heck out of me that video. You’ll see how far it bothered me in
a minute.
I don’t agree with defendant when he says every minute of
every day he has felt remorseful. His actions show the opposite,
which will impact what I say about his rehabilitation prospects,
which is big for appellate courts.
Now it’s not required that the defendant while he awaits
sentencing join a monastery, for instance. It’s not required that he
go to church every day. When people see you, though, driving a float
in the homecoming parade, for instance, and there were a handful of
things. That’s the one that sticks in my mind the most. And then you
- 17 - come in and say every minute of every day you felt remorse. Well,
you must have been a big downer for your friends, which I’m
guessing was not the case. Meaning, I don’t believe the defendant. I
can word this a lot more harshly, but I won’t.
I made the point earlier that you can’t keep clean while you
are awaiting sentencing? Are you kidding me? Is this some kind of
joke? Okay. That reflects on your prospects for rehabilitation. I think
when you are faced in your life, [defendant], the time period where
you had to be the most clean and decent was from the day you killed
Mia Dusek to today when you are going to be sentenced. At a
minimum in your life, keep clean for that period of time. Which of
those do I have to say? Right, Kevin Sullivan? I recognize—I know
the answer to that. And you couldn’t do it, which scares me
regarding your prospects for rehabilitation.
Plus the event occurred because of cannabis and alcohol. If
someone wants to say, oh, it was only because of alcohol, I’ve got
no evidence of that. But, anyway, it’s definite that cannabis was
consumed by the defendant that evening.
I know all about Pfeiffer Road. 85 in a 30 apparently is
undisputed. I don’t know why when other people in the car are
pleading with you to slow down why you don’t. I don’t believe
defendant’s claim of remorse. I’m a former criminal defense
attorney and Kevin Sullivan has got to believe what he has got to
- 18 - do. Kevin Sullivan has nothing to do with this. He has got a job to
do.
I’m finding that there is not any extraordinary circumstances
that would allow for probation. And I’m about to say how many
years he is going to get. ***[A]ny outbursts you go to jail. I’m
sentencing [defendant] to serve 14 years in the Department of
Corrections, which is the most I can give him. That will be served
at 85 percent.”
¶ 22 D. Motion to Reconsider Sentence
¶ 23 In August 2023, defendant, represented by counsel Michael Doubet, filed a motion
to reconsider his sentence. In the motion to reconsider, defendant argued, in part, the following:
(1) the trial court erred by not considering youth-based sentencing factors; (2) the sentence was
excessive; (3) unauthorized victim-impact evidence was admitted; (4) the sentence was based, in
part, on inaccurate information; and (4) Sullivan provided ineffective assistance, as counsel failed
to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing, did not object to the State’s
presentation of unauthorized victim-impact evidence, and failed to disclose his connection to Jim
Manning.
¶ 24 Attached to the motion to reconsider is an affidavit by Alayna, who was seated next
to Mia when the crash occurred. Alayna averred she had been friends with defendant, Reece, and
Mia “for many years.” On February 27, 2022, she attended a party in Rose Estates. Alayna arrived
at the party with Mia and Reece. Defendant was already there. All four of them consumed alcoholic
beverages at the party. Near the end of the evening, defendant and Reece said they were going to
the gas station to get “polarpops.” Mia asked Reece if Alayna and she could ride with them. Reece
- 19 - at first refused. After Mia continued to ask him, Reece agreed to let them go along. Defendant did
not volunteer to drive. Alayna wrote, “[W]e asked [defendant] to drive and he finally agreed.”
When they turned onto Pfeiffer Road, Mia and Alayna were yelling to defendant to “speed up”
and “catch air.” Reece was laughing in the front seat and pulled out his phone to record them
“getting air.” Reece and Alayna did not lose consciousness after the accident. Alayna averred the
video shown is not a complete video of the incident. Alayna stated, “I am one of a few people who
have seen the entire video in which you can hear Mia and I telling [defendant] to go faster and ‘get
air.’ ” At the scene of the crash, Alayna told officers who interviewed her that Mia was saying to
“get air” before the accident. Alayna further averred, “The phrase in the video of Reece saying,
‘value your life,’ was taken out of context.” Alayna stated Reece said that “in a frequent manner”
and said that “sarcastically to push [defendant] to go faster.” Alayna continued:
“The statements said and screams in the car just before the accident
were not those of terrified teens begging [defendant] to slow down,
it was just the opposite. It was the sound of teens who had been
drinking pushing their friend to drive faster so that they could ‘catch
air’ on the hill and get a good video to show later.”
Alayna concluded by stating Sullivan had not contacted her.
¶ 25 Also attached were two letters intended to clear up misstatements to the trial court.
One is a letter from Glaza to the trial judge, stating: “It has come to my attention that there is belief
that [defendant] drove the truck pulling the homecoming float for the cross[-]country team. This
is wholly untrue, and I know this because I drove the truck.” Glaza attached a photograph as proof.
Billy Weaks, defendant’s school counselor at Limestone Community High School, stated he
worked with defendant over the last four years regarding scheduling and “social/emotional
- 20 - concerns.” Weaks stated defendant did not attend the drunk-driving presentation at which Deb
spoke at Weaks’s urging. Weaks said, “[O]ut of respect for [Deb], and other students I advised
[defendant] not to attend the presentation.”
¶ 26 E. Hearing on the Motion to Reconsider
¶ 27 The hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider began on December 7, 2023. The
trial court started the hearing by stating it would, on that day, hear testimony from Sullivan. The
court stated, “There are claims made by defense that I don’t know how *** Sullivan is going to
answer as I sit here right now, and those answers might zip it up all nice and neat right now.”
Doubet called Sullivan to testify.
¶ 28 Sullivan testified he had been a practicing attorney in Peoria County for 36 or 37
years. Three of his cases for aggravated DUIs involved juvenile defendants. Sullivan’s father was
a judge. Jim, Deb’s fiancé, was also an attorney, and Jim’s father was a judge in Peoria. Sullivan
testified he and Jim were not close friends. They did not “pal around or socialize.” Sullivan did
not give any business to Jim but did to his firm. Sullivan had no financial relationship with either
Jim or his firm. Sullivan had a business relationship with Jim’s brother, a financial adviser, who
oversaw some of Sullivan’s accounts. Sullivan believed he disclosed to defendant’s parents his
relationship to Jim’s brother. When Sullivan took the case, he did not know Jim was involved.
Sullivan believed he had heard at some point Jim was in a relationship with Mia’s mother, but he
did not talk to Jim about it. Not until the sentencing hearing was it confirmed to Sullivan that Jim
was in a relationship with Mia’s mother.
¶ 29 According to Sullivan, when he took the case, he reviewed the discovery, including
police reports and the body camera video, with defendant’s parents. He did not know if he showed
them the video captured by Reece. The parents had indicated at one point they did not want to see
- 21 - any further photographs, as they were rather gruesome. Because the parents “were pretty sensitive
to it,” he tried to take that into consideration. Sullivan was certain he reviewed the discovery with
defendant in the office. Sullivan talked about “this is what this is going to show, this is what this
will show.” Sullivan and defendant discussed his trying to leave the scene. As part of the evidence,
Sullivan stated he was certain he reviewed the body camera video in which Deputy Matthew
Kaufman was taking a statement from Alayna, but Sullivan stated it did not “ring at a bell” at that
time. He remembered reading the report where Alayna told Deputy Kaufman Mia had said
something like “catch air.”
¶ 30 After counsel asked, “Did you believe that that video would be advantageous to
[defendant’s] case, or would it be hurting his case,” Sullivan responded by describing his strategy:
“My strategy on that was it was not going to help his
situation at this stage of the proceedings to blame the victim because
it was going to be viewed as he was the captain of the ship, the
driver, and if they told him to do something, he’s expected to follow
the rules.
I thought it would aggravate the situation, in all honesty, and
I also thought that when the State played the very brief one or two
second video *** where there was screaming and indicating slowing
down, that it was apparent in the courtroom, without mentioning it
publicly, that that video had already been on.
It wasn’t pulled out a split second in the moment of peril,
and I was hoping that that would have been taken into consideration
that that video was on for another reason other than the peril or the
- 22 - unfortunate accident that ensured.”
¶ 31 Sullivan did not remember talking to Alayna. He testified he “may have earlier on
in the case but not in anticipation of sentencing.” Sullivan thought “trying to pass the blame here”
“may have looked worse to the Court.” When counsel asked if Alayna’s statement would have
given context to the video and helped mitigate the situation, Sullivan reiterated, “I think it was
dangerous to do that, and my strategy was not to do that because it could have made it worse.” He
did not believe “it was a time for recrimination against Mia.” Sullivan believed he could get the
mitigating evidence of the context in “[b]y implication and argument,” even though he could have
gotten the testimony from Alayna.
¶ 32 Sullivan testified he was familiar with the juvenile factors in mitigation. After
counsel asked why he did not use them at sentencing, Sullivan replied it was because the statute
says the court “shall” and, “[w]ith regard to the other statutory factors, those are more
discretionary. I thought these were mandatory, and when the Court would pronounce sentence, the
Court would consider these.” Sullivan agreed he did not argue the juvenile sentencing factors. He
talked to defendant’s parents “about the other factors in mitigation.” When counsel asked about
the application of whether the youth “was subjected to outside pressure including peer pressure,
familial pressure, and negative influencing,” Sullivan agreed he did not raise this for the same
reason. He believed it would be considered by the trial court. He believed “[i]t was argued in [his]
summation.”
¶ 33 Sullivan testified he did not argue “Mia’s provocation” because he did not believe
it was appropriate to do so. Sullivan stated he believed he “may have said that they encouraged
him to do other—to drive in a certain fashion, and that is how the video came into play.” Sullivan
did not like to put a young person on the stand, even though he was to present evidence in
- 23 - mitigation. When counsel asked if he presented evidence in mitigation, Sullivan pointed to the
letters regarding defendant’s character that were attached to the presentence investigation report,
which he believed could mitigate the State’s evidence without placing blame. Sullivan testified he
did not reach out to any of defendant’s teachers, his coach, or the school counselor to determine
if defendant was remorseful.
¶ 34 Sullivan acknowledged he did not object when individuals testified regarding their
victim-impact statements, stating, “It wasn’t the time for me to interrupt people that were
grieving.” He acknowledged he probably had the statements ahead of time. He said Jim “[c]ould
have been a household member,” but Sullivan did not know. When counsel asked if only one of
those who read their victim-impact statements was qualified as a representative under the statute,
Sullivan responded the trial court “has the discretion there.” Sullivan, pointing to the statute, said,
“It says so here.” After Doubet showed Sullivan the language stating the trial court had discretion
to permit a number of statutorily defined representatives, and not discretion in determining who
are representatives, Sullivan responded, “Well, I consciously decided it would have been
insensitive and it would have been detrimental to our case if I would have interrupted at that point.”
¶ 35 Doubet asked Sullivan if he, at any time, went over and explained to defendant
about his statement in allocution. Sullivan stated, “I believe I sent him a guideline as to what I
thought he should put in there.” Sullivan stated, “We certainly talked about it. I indicated you can’t
pass blame. You got to own your mistake.” Sullivan went through defendant’s statement “[j]ust
before” sentencing.
¶ 36 On examination by the State, Sullivan testified he and Jim were “cordial” with each
other if they saw each other in public. They may see each other at a bar function and shake hands.
When asked about his strategy, Sullivan testified, “I didn’t want to appear that we were shifting
- 24 - the blame in any way or not accepting responsibility which I think is an important factor for a court
when it comes to sentencing.” Sullivan testified it would have looked bad to place blame on Mia’s
brother: “I think that would have done more damage in that situation, because again, as the driver
of that vehicle, whether you’re 16 or 61, you’re supposed to be the responsible party, and you’re
held to a higher standard as the driver.”
¶ 37 Sullivan stated there were letters on behalf of defendant in the presentence
investigation report, and he expected the trial court to review them before sentencing. Sullivan
testified, in his draft of the motion to reconsider the sentence, he wrote he did not believe the court
touched on the youth factors in mitigation. Sullivan stated, “I probably would have presented more
and maybe gone over and above in the situation, but again, that’s easy to say now. I believed at
this point that brevity was going to be advantageous and would have more than ensured a lesser
sentence.”
¶ 38 On redirect examination, Sullivan stated he believed there were five people in the
car. Doubet asked where Sullivan learned information about the crash; Sullivan responded,
“Probably it was Alayna. It was whoever else was in the back seat. I’m trying to think of the girl.
There was a third girl back there, I believe. There’s five in the car.” Sullivan agreed he did not do
the “one thing that could mitigate the entire context of that negative video.” On recross-
examination, the State asked if, in his argument at sentencing, he provided context about what
happened before the crash, and Sullivan responded, “Attempted to, yes.”
¶ 39 After Sullivan’s testimony, the hearing was continued and did not resume until June
2024. Doubet began by stating, when they “last left off,” Sullivan testified as the first witness on
the motion to reconsider. Doubet wished to call other witnesses, including Alayna, Glaza, Weaks,
and defendant’s parents. Doubet argued Sullivan made statements that were not accurate and
- 25 - Doubet wanted witnesses to counter those statements. Doubet argued it was newly discovered Jim
was not a representative under the statute and should not have been allowed to make a victim-
impact statement. The State countered by arguing “there actually is no new evidence” and
maintained no further testimony needed to be introduced.
¶ 40 The trial court agreed and allowed no new evidence on the motion to reconsider the
sentence. Doubet asked to be permitted to make an offer of proof, which the court allowed. In his
offer of proof, Doubet called Glaza, Weaks, Alayna, and Kristin.
¶ 41 Glaza testified, as the cross-country coach, he was responsible for organizing the
float for the 2022 homecoming parade. Glaza secured defendant’s grandfather’s truck to pull the
float. Glaza drove, while defendant rode on the float with the other cross-country athletes.
According to Glaza, riding on the float is “seen as kind of an expectation for those involved in
those activities or sports to participate.” Glaza encouraged defendant’s participation.
¶ 42 Weaks testified, as he stated in his letter supporting the motion to reconsider, he
told defendant not to attend the drunk-driving presentation at which Deb spoke. Alayna testified.
Her testimony reflects the information in her affidavit. She added she was 16 when the crash
occurred. Mia was seated in the middle of the back seat. Alayna further testified she told officers
at the scene of the crash that Mia had urged defendant to “catch air.”
¶ 43 Doubet called Kristin to counter Sullivan’s testimony he did not know Jim was
involved until sentencing. At the very first meeting after the accident, Kristin stated they told
Sullivan that Jim would be involved in the case. Sullivan said he knew Jim’s father very well, and
“[t]he families would do holidays together.” Jim’s brother was a stockbroker. Jim’s father and
Sullivan’s father “competed for office together and they were close. They did holidays and things
of that nature together.” During the second and third meetings with Sullivan, Kristin reported
- 26 - Sullivan told them “he had intentionally sent real estate business to Jim Manning during this case,”
alluding to getting “a feel for where Jim’s head was at” and “the family’s heads were at.”
¶ 44 The State called Michael Hrdlicka, a court security supervisor and former deputy
correctional superintendent with the Peoria County jail. Hrdlicka testified about an incident where
defendant struck a fellow detainee in his face. A person with defendant stated the victim was
taunting defendant about the fact defendant had a 14-year sentence.
¶ 45 On June 20, 2024, the trial court entered its order, finding Sullivan provided
effective assistance and denying defendant’s motion to reconsider:
“Original attorney Kevin Sullivan was not ‘ineffective’ per
[Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)]. His decisions were
based on sound trial strategy and were made to avoid an accusation
of ‘victim blaming,’ which would have resulted had he presented
evidence now claimed to show that the decedent, Mia Dusek, should
share the blame for the actions which caused her death.
Any alleged deficiency of attorney Sullivan were not ‘… so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed
the Defendant by the Sixth Amendment’.
The second prong of Strickland, that Defendant must
demonstrate that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different, also fails.
The only claim by defense that is not covered herein is
regarding the reason Defendant did not attend a forum at
- 27 - Defendant’s high school wherein the decedent’s Mother was a
speaker (regarding driving while intoxicated). Any alleged failure
by attorney Sullivan on this point falls short of establishing errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the Defendant by the Sixth Amendment’. This also does
not establish a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
The Court repeated the claim that [defendant] drove the
Homecoming float because that was the information the Court was
given. It is this Court’s opinion that the people in a float who are
having the most fun (lacking constant remorse) are those atop the
float (where the Defendant was located), not those driving the float.
Sullivan’s alleged failure here to point out that discrepancy, whether
inadvertent or not, worked to the advantage of the Defendant.
The claim that the Defendant had to endure statements
accurately describing him (that he killed someone) would not have
impacted the Court in a way favoring the Defendant.
This Court saw and heard the Defendant and is in the sole
position of observing the Defendant and determining his alleged
remorse and found that there was practically none.
[Defendant] was disingenuous and lacking remorse
throughout these proceedings. His claim of ‘I will ultimately accept
any punishment that the Court deems fit and will strive to continue
- 28 - to improve throughout my punishment’, stated while exercising his
right of Allocution at his sentencing hearing, was only to gain favor
with the Court, with a false, grandiose statement, that he never
intended to fulfill. This cunning display suggests poor prospects for
rehabilitation.
The Youth-Based Sentencing Factors were sufficiently
considered by the Court. The Court was not sufficiently artful or
explicit in detailing same.”
¶ 46 This appeal followed.
¶ 47 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 48 A. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)
¶ 49 The State begins its appellee’s brief by arguing defendant’s statement of facts does
not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The State maintains
defendant’s “selective presentation ignores critical State’s evidence, including audio recordings of
terrified passengers moments before the crash,” as well as evidence showing defendant’s blood-
alcohol content of 0.141 and his speeding at 80 miles per hour in a 30 mile-per-hour zone despite
the passengers’ pleas. The State further argues defendant’s statement of facts improperly contains
argument. The State asks this court to disregard such statements.
¶ 50 We agree with the State. Rule 341(h)(6) requires the statement of facts to “contain
the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument
or comment.” Id. Defendant’s brief forgoes any description of the sentencing hearing, only
mentioning the hearing occurred. Defendant also, when summarizing the motion to reconsider his
sentence, interjects argument at the end of the summary of each issue. For example, after
- 29 - describing his first issue, defendant adds, “These unauthorized statements [led] to the Trial Court
being biased against [defendant] at his sentencing hearing.” As the State requests, we disregard
those portions of defendant’s statement of facts.
¶ 51 B. Effectiveness of Counsel
¶ 52 The right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. This right applies “at all critical stages
of a criminal proceeding,” including at sentencing. People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th)
210498, ¶ 40. The right to counsel is denied when counsel makes errors so serious the attorney
was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by our constitutions. People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d
356, 369 (1995).
¶ 53 To establish the denial of the right to counsel on a claim counsel’s assistance was
deficient at sentencing, one must prove both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). When a defendant raises a claim his or her sentencing counsel
provided ineffective assistance, the Strickland test requires proof “ ‘counsel’s performance fell
below minimal professional standards’ ” and “ ‘a reasonable probability exists that the defendant’s
sentence was affected.’ ” People v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88 (quoting People v.
Sharp, 2015 IL App (1st) 130438, ¶ 122).
¶ 54 Beginning with the first prong of the Strickland test, we measure counsel’s
performance using “ ‘an objective standard of competence under prevailing professional norms,’ ”
while recognizing the strong presumption counsel provided adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions while exercising reasonable professional judgment. People v. Brown, 2023
IL 126852, ¶ 26 (quoting People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999)). Thus, a defendant seeking to
prove he was denied the effective assistance of counsel must overcome the strong presumption
- 30 - counsel’s actions were a matter of sound trial strategy. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498,
¶ 40. To overcome that presumption requires proof counsel’s strategy was so unsound he or she
entirely failed to “ ‘conduct meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case.’ ” People v.
Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 (quoting People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 355-56 (2007)). A
mistake in trial strategy or an error in judgment by defense counsel does not alone render counsel’s
representation constitutionally deficient. Id.
¶ 55 When the trial court makes a finding on the merits as to the effectiveness of counsel,
we will reverse that decision only if we find the court’s decision manifestly erroneous. See
generally People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. Error is manifest error when it “is clearly
evident, plain, and indisputable.” Id.
¶ 56 On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s finding of effectiveness,
contending the ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant argues Sullivan
provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) argue the youth-based sentencing factors in section
5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)), (2) investigate
or present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, (3) object to the unauthorized victim-
impact statements, and (4) disclose his prior relationship with Jim Manning.
¶ 57 The State counters by arguing Sullivan’s representation was reasonable and his
decisions at sentencing were based on sound trial strategy. The State maintains Sullivan engaged
in a “comprehensive and deliberate investigation” and concluded, “[r]ather than risk the severe
backlash of appearing to shift blame onto a fifteen[-]year[-]old victim,” he should focus on well-
established mitigating factors such as defendant’s youth, his clean record, his acceptance of
responsibility through his guilty plea, and his expression of remorse.
¶ 58 When tasked with representing defendant at sentencing, Sullivan faced the
- 31 - unenviable task of representing a minor who committed aggravated DUI, resulting in the death of
another minor. The trial court would soon consider statutory mitigating and aggravating factors
(see id. §§ 5-5-3.1, 5-5-3.2) in fashioning a sentence “ ‘according to the seriousness of the offense
and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.’ ” Merriweather, 2022 IL
App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11). In doing so, the court would consider
“ ‘the particular circumstances of each case, including factors such as the defendant’s credibility,
demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.’ ” Id. ¶ 32
(quoting People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36).
¶ 59 Because defendant was a minor when the crash occurred, the additional
youth-based sentencing factors of section 5-4.5-105(a) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)),
which a sentencing court must apply to all offenders under the age of 18 at the time of the offense,
were available to mitigate the potential sentence. See Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498,
¶ 31. These factors include the following:
“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at
the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and
consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or
developmental disability, or both, if any;
(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure,
including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;
(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and
social background, including any history of parental neglect ***;
(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of
rehabilitation, or both;
- 32 - (5) the circumstances of the offense;
(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in
the offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before
the offense;
(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate
in his or her defense;
(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and
(9) Any other information the court finds relevant and
reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate.” 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022).
¶ 60 Sullivan knew the State would produce the video of the seconds before the crash, a
video—when viewed with no context—portraying defendant as one acting in defiance of his
riders’ pleas. The weight of the eight-second segment of the video is substantial. One can hear a
female voice in the backseat saying, “I don’t want to die.” One can hear a male voice, presumably
Reece, say, “slow down,” “slow down,” and then yell, “value your life.” Sullivan also knew,
however, the video did not portray the whole story. A passenger in that vehicle, Alayna, told police
at the scene of the crash that Mia had been telling defendant to “catch air.” Instead of making use
of the mandatory sentencing factors a sentencing court must consider in mitigation for his youthful
client, particularly the factor requiring consideration of “peer pressure,” Sullivan decided to leave
the video segment unchallenged and allow the trial court to judge defendant’s conduct that night
based on the State’s presentation of those eight seconds. He did not talk to Alayna. Sullivan elected
a strategy of accepting responsibility and not shifting blame to Mia, believing casting any blame
on the deceased 15-year-old would result in a greater sentence.
- 33 - ¶ 61 Sullivan’s own words reveal his sentencing strategy was built on the premise the
culpability of an offender under the age of 18 is the same as the culpability of an adult offender:
“again, as the driver of that vehicle, whether you’re 16 or 61 you’re supposed to be the responsible
party, and you’re held to a higher standard as the driver.” This premise is faulty, as Illinois law
plainly recognizes “the diminished culpability of youthful offenders.” See id. § 5-4.5-115(j). To
reflect the “diminished culpability of youthful offenders,” Illinois requires a sentencing court to
consider youth-based factors to mitigate youth sentences: “the court, at the sentencing hearing ***,
shall consider the following additional factors in mitigation in determining the appropriate
sentence.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 5-4.5-105(a).
¶ 62 As the law requires consideration of the youth-based sentencing factors, such as the
existence of peer pressure, we reject the idea an argument seeking application of those factors in
these circumstances could be seen as “shifting blame.” The youth-based sentencing factors are
relevant to examine a defendant’s level of culpability and his or her state of mind in committing
the offense. Without explaining the context with evidence available to him, Sullivan failed to use
key evidence from a passenger in the car to show defendant acted, not in callous disregard to his
passengers, but in a manner consistent with the wishes and encouragement of his peers. One can
accept full responsibility while also explaining one’s mindset in the commission of an offense.
¶ 63 At no point while employing his sentencing strategy in the hearing did Sullivan
mention, much less argue on his client’s behalf, the application of the youth-based sentencing
factors in mitigation. At best, Sullivan briefly touched on defendant’s youth but focused on the
statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation that apply to all criminal defendants and argued,
without pointing to any evidence, defendant showed remorse. According to his own testimony,
Sullivan did not urge the court’s consideration of youth-based sentencing factors but instead
- 34 - employed the tack of believing the trial court would consider them, as they are mandatory factors.
¶ 64 Sullivan’s strategy of ignoring relevant youth-based sentencing factors appears to
have left him unprepared to respond to issues plainly troubling the trial court. The court directly
questioned Sullivan about defendant’s lack of remorse. Sullivan could only attest to his own
observations of defendant, which the court did not believe. However, the presentence investigation
report and supporting materials contained evidence showing defendant’s community involvement,
Kristin’s and Glaza’s brief statements defendant showed remorse, and evidence defendant had
attended counseling. In addition, when the trial court touched on the importance of deterrence,
stating, as to the kids who were still obtaining alcohol, “Maybe I will change it real soon,” Sullivan
was unable to guide the court to case law showing less weight should be afforded to deterrence in
the sentencing of juvenile offenders. According to the United States Supreme Court, deterrence
does not work for youth, as their characteristics of impetuosity and immaturity make juvenile
offenders less likely to consider potential punishment. See People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (4th)
200666, ¶ 25 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012)).
¶ 65 Sullivan’s strategy also left the other key piece of the State’s evidence
unchallenged. After the trial court viewed the unchallenged and unmitigated video showing
defendant continuing up the hill as the occupants said, “slow down,” “value your life,” and “I don’t
want to die,” the court heard from seven individuals who described the loss suffered by Mia’s
friends and family. These individuals also described defendant’s conduct in the year after the crash
and requested the maximum sentence. Sullivan’s strategy prevented him from objecting to these
cumulative statements made by individuals not statutorily authorized to provide them. Section 6(a-
1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 120/6(a-1) (West 2022)) expressly limits
victim-impact statements “to those made by actual victims or their representatives” (People v.
- 35 - Larson, 2022 IL App (3d) 190482, ¶ 39) and defines “representatives” as “ ‘the spouse, guardian,
grandparent, or other immediate family or household member of an injured or deceased person’ ”
(id. ¶ 36 (quoting 725 ILCS 120/6(a-1) (West 2018))). Subsection (a-1)’s limitation on victim-
impact statements “was, presumably, imposed in recognition of that fact that victim impact
evidence may become so excessive as to deprive a defendant of a fair sentencing and thus violate
his or her right to due process.” Id. ¶ 39. According to the evidence and argument, of the seven,
only Deb, Mia’s mother, is a “representative.” Sullivan’s strategy thus left these statements, and
the content within them, unchallenged and available for the court’s consideration at sentencing
(see 725 ILCS 120/6(a-1) (West 2022)). Interestingly, we note Sullivan’s testimony shows he was
not aware of the statutory language limiting the statements to defined representatives. Sullivan
believed the trial court had discretion to allow all to testify and consciously decided not to
challenge it.
¶ 66 The State, in its brief, contends the language of section 6(a-1) is a floor and the trial
court had discretion to allow nonrepresentatives to read victim-impact statements. We are not
convinced. The language of section 6(a-1) is direct. The only discretion granted to the trial court
by that language is discretion “to permit one or more of the representatives to present an oral
impact statement” and to consider the permitted statements “along with all other appropriate
factors in determining the sentence of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The two cases cited
by the State provide no support. One citation by the State is a page that does not exist (page 468)
in a case involving sentence credit. See People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 454-63 (1996). The
other is People v. Rose, 384 Ill. App. 3d 937, 940-41 (2008), which at best shows a trial court has
broad discretion to consider reliable and relevant evidence at sentencing but does not show a court
may allow evidence expressly limited by statute.
- 36 - ¶ 67 It “is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable” (see Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98)
the trial court erred in finding Sullivan’s representation reasonable. Sullivan did not address the
youth-based sentencing factors in mitigation, particularly the factor involving “peer pressure,” or
present evidence and argument related to those factors. No reasonable attorney in the same
circumstances would have ignored the youth-based sentencing factors and left their youthful client
to be sentenced based on incomplete information. Sullivan’s strategy was so unsound and
unreasonable it left the State’s case against defendant without a meaningful adversarial challenge.
¶ 68 Turning to the second prong of Strickland, we find the trial court erred in finding
no reasonable probability exists the length of defendant’s sentence was affected by counsel’s
unsound strategy. See Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88. The sentencing range for every
adult or juvenile committing aggravated DUI causing the death of one person is 3 to 14 years. 625
ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (West 2022). Defendant was sentenced to the maximum. Reece’s video
was played at the start of the hearing. Without any context or description of the events before the
crash, the court viewed and weighed the evidence, including defendant’s statement of allocution,
with the impression defendant acted contrary to the pleas of his young passengers. The effect on
the sentencing court is evident, as the court stated the following regarding the video before
imposing the maximum sentence: “That chills me to the bone. In addition to being a judge, I’m a
human being. I have feelings. That bothered the heck out of me that video. You’ll see how far it
bothered me in a minute.”
¶ 69 Had the trial court been presented with the youth-based mitigating evidence of peer
pressure or influence and “the level of planning by the defendant before the offense” (see 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(6) (West 2022)), including Alayna’s testimony all four were drinking,
defendant was asked to drive, and defendant was encouraged to “catch air” before he sped up the
- 37 - hill, it is “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable” (see Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98) a
reasonable probability exists defendant would not have been sentenced to the maximum authorized
by statute. The trial court erred in finding otherwise.
¶ 70 We, therefore, remand for resentencing. On remand, we direct the appointment of
a new judge to preside over resentencing. We question whether the original judge would fairly
sentence defendant on remand. In the order on defendant’s motion to reconsider, the sentencing
judge stated he considered the juvenile mitigating factors of section 5-4.5-105. The record
contradicts that statement. At the sentencing hearing, neither defense counsel, the State, nor the
trial court mentioned the statutory juvenile factors in mitigation. The judge’s own pronouncement
at sentencing undermines any assertion these factors were considered before he imposed the
maximum sentence allowed for even adult offenders: “Statutory factors in mitigation are: The
defendant has no history of criminal activity. That’s it for statutory factors in mitigation.” While
defense counsel did not present sufficient evidence on these factors, the court remained obligated
to consider and apply them to the evidence before it. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022).
Moreover, the court allowed and viewed excessive and unauthorized victim-impact evidence. In
the interests of fairness and the appearance of propriety, defendant’s sentence should be imposed
by a judge who has not heard the presentation of that evidence.
¶ 71 Having found resentencing necessary, we need not address defendant’s remaining
claims of sentencing error.
¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 73 We reverse defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing by a new judge.
¶ 74 Reversed and remanded with directions.
- 38 - People v. Bell, 2025 IL App (4th) 240929
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 22-CF- 331; the Hon. John P. Vespa, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael Doubet, of Peoria, for appellant. for Appellant:
Attorneys Jodi Hoos, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Edward for R. Psenicka, and John G. Barrett, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Appellee: Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
- 39 -
2025 IL App (4th) 240929 (People v. Bell) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.