NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 210580-U
Order filed March 30, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, ) Mercer County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-21-0580 v. ) Circuit No. 06-CF-40 ) RYAN SPENCER ROSS BELL, ) The Honorable ) James G. Conway, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: On remand, the trial court erred by failing to vacate its 2017 amended sentencing order as directed by this court in its 2021 Rule 23 order. The court properly denied the defendant’s section 2-1401 motion to withdraw his 2006 guilty plea, concluding that he failed to establish a valid legal basis for his request after the abolition of the void sentence rule in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916.
¶2 In 2006, defendant entered a partially negotiated guilty plea to one count of felony
criminal sexual assault in return for the State’s agreement to dismiss six other criminal charges and was sentenced to 20 years in prison and 2 years of mandatory supervised release. The
mandatory MSR term for criminal sexual assault was three years to life. This court upheld
defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal in 2008. Since that ruling, defendant has
filed numerous postconviction motions and petitions.
¶3 In the present appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his section
2-1401 motion to withdraw his guilty plea after a remand from this court’s 2021 order (People v.
Bell, 2021 IL App (3d) 190528-U). We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw
defendant’s plea and vacate its 2017 amended sentencing order.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Because the procedural history in this case is extensive, we recite only those portions that
are relevant to the present appeal. In May 2006, 18-year-old defendant Ryan Spencer Ross Bell
was charged in Mercer County circuit court with seven counts of criminal sexual assault and
battery arising out of repeated sexual assaults of a 15-year-old girl at an underage drinking party
in defendant’s Aledo, Illinois, apartment. Those seven counts were: (1) Class 1 felony criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2) (West 2016)), alleging the sexual penetration of the
victim’s vagina with defendant’s penis while the victim was unable to give consent; (2) criminal
sexual assault (id.), alleging defendant inserted an object into the vagina of the victim, who was
unable to give consent; (3) criminal sexual assault (id.), alleging he inserted another object into
the vagina of the victim, who was unable to give consent; (4) battery (id. § 12-3(a)(2)), alleging
that defendant urinated on the victim’s face; (5) battery (id.), alleging he slapped the victim’s
face; (6) criminal sexual assault by accountability (id. § 5-2(c)), alleging defendant held down
the victim, who was unable to give consent, while a second boy put his penis in the victim’s
2 vagina; and (7) criminal sexual assault by accountability (id.), alleging he held down the victim,
who was unable to give consent, while a third boy put his penis in the victim’s vagina.
¶6 On October 24, 2006, defendant entered a partially negotiated plea, pleading guilty to
count 1 (Class 1 felony criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-13(a)(2)) in exchange for the State’s
agreement to drop counts II through VII. The State provided an extensive factual basis
supporting the charges. Because defendant had previously been convicted of a Class 1 felony,
residential burglary, he was eligible for an extended prison sentence.
¶7 Before the trial court accepted the partially negotiated plea agreement, defendant was
admonished that he faced a possible sentence of 8 to 30 years in prison. After a sentencing
hearing, he was sentenced to 20 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) “followed
by a requisite period of mandatory supervised release [MSR] for that crime, that would be three
years.” The trial court’s written order, however, specified “two (2) year[s]” MSR.
¶8 Defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea and/or reconsider his
sentence, but it was denied. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment in 2008, concluding that the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea was not error
and the sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion. People v. Bell, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1220
(2008).
¶9 Subsequently, defendant filed his first postconviction petition, alleging that he should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the State had failed to disclose certain audio and
video statements, as well as other exculpatory evidence. The State filed an unsuccessful motion
to dismiss, and the petition advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing in August 2009 before
being denied. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed in 2011, finding no prejudice because
the undisclosed evidence was not material in light of “the weight of the evidence against
3 defendant” that included corroboration of the victim’s account by six witnesses. People v. Bell,
2011 IL App (3d) 090846-U, ¶ 26.
¶ 10 Before seeking leave to file, defendant filed a second postconviction petition in April
2012 that alleged his sentence was void because the law did not provide for a two-year MSR.
The trial court granted the State’s petition to dismiss the second postconviction petition in 2013,
concluding that defendant had not established prejudice because any error in advising him about
the applicable MSR period was cured when the Illinois Prisoner Review Board entered an order
directing him to be released after three years of MSR. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider,
and the trial court vacated its prior order. In May 2013, the court issued a written opinion and
order granting the State’s motion to dismiss; defendant appealed.
¶ 11 This court permitted the office of the State Appellate Defender to withdraw from the
representation in an order entered pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). We
affirmed the dismissal of defendant’s second postconviction petition in February 2015 (People v.
Bell, No. 3-13-0349 (2015) (unpublished dispositional order)), finding that defendant’s petition
was untimely and he had not established his lack of culpability for the untimely filing. The order
also found that defendant “waived the issue of improper MSR admonishment because he failed
to raise it” earlier and concluded that his petition failed “to make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation.” In addition, the court found that defendant’s claim was speculative and
not yet ripe for adjudication because he might still be released from MSR before the end of the
maximum sentence stated in the trial court’s admonishment, 30 years in prison plus 2 years of
MSR. Bell, No. 3-13-0349, pages 4-5.
¶ 12 Continuing, this court found sua sponte that defendant’s two-year MSR period was void
when the statute mandated a term of three years to life. Bell, No. 3-13-349, page 5 (citing People
4 v. Thompson, 209 6 Ill. 2d 19, 23 (2004)). Therefore, the court “vacate[d] the defendant’s void
MSR term and remand[ed] this cause to the trial court with directions to impose a proper MSR
term of three years to life.” Bell, No. 3-13-0349, page 5.
¶ 13 In September 2017, the trial court entered an amended sentencing order correcting
Defendant’s MSR to reflect a term of “three (3) years to life.” He filed a section 2-1401 motion
(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2019)) seeking to withdraw his plea in January 2019 and alleging that
the corrected sentencing order was void because it was filed 10 years after his conviction. The
State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s motion, arguing that this court’s 2015 order barred it
under principles of res judicata.
¶ 14 At the 2019 hearing on defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, he argued the trial court
lost jurisdiction to amend his sentence 30 days after it was entered. The trial court dismissed that
motion with prejudice for lack of merit, and defendant appealed. In its Rule 23 order finding that
the dismissal was erroneous, this court relied on the reasoning in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL
116916. People v. Bell, 2021 IL App (3d) 190528-U. The court agreed with defendant that both
its 2015 order vacating his MSR term and the trial court’s 2017 amended sentencing order were
void under Castleberry. Id. ¶ 12. Because Castleberry deemed a MSR term that failed to
conform to the statute “voidable, not void,” this court lacked jurisdiction to vacate defendant’s
MSR term in 2015. Id. ¶ 17. Accordingly, this court remanded the cause to the trial court for an
initial review of the merits of defendant’s section 2-1401 motion to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 15 In the trial court, the State again filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that defendant’s
sentence was not void and that he had not stated a right to resentencing. After a hearing, the trial
court denied defendant’s motion in November 2021, finding that voiding part of defendant’s
sentence did not void his underlying plea. Alternatively, the court found that defendant’s
5 successive motion was barred by res judicata because “Defendant litigated his original Section
2-1401 Motion in 2007” and the denial of that motion was upheld on appeal.
¶ 16 The trial court added that the 2015 appellate decision affirming the guilty plea precluded
any later contention that the plea was involuntarily entered. Because this court determined in
2021 that the MSR term was voidable, not void, the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the
error. The trial court’s order included two attachments. In the first, the court suggested that this
court’s 2021 decision may have decided sub silentio that defendant’s second section 2-1401
motion was improper because a voidable sentence cannot be collaterally attacked. If so,
defendant should have pursued a hearing to enter a corrected sentence. In the second attachment,
the court noted that the “Prisoner Review Board Discharge” shown in the record expressly stated
that defendant would be discharged after serving three years of MSR, consistent with the
statutory mandate. Defendant appeals from the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 The present appeal addresses two primary questions: (1) should the trial court have
vacated its 2017 “Amended Sentencing Order,” correcting defendant’s MSR term to be 3 years
to life? and (2) was it error to deny defendant’s section 2-1401 motion to withdraw his guilty
plea? We review both questions de novo. People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318, 322 (2009).
¶ 19 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to vacate its 2017 amended
sentencing order as directed in this court’s 2021 order and, consequently, by denying his section
2-1401 petition. He asserts that it “is a settled issue despite the trial court’s insistence that the
‘Appellate Order is not void.’ ” Citing our 2021 decision (Bell, 2021 IL App (3d) 190528-U, ¶
19), defendant maintains that “the issue is no longer a subject of debate. Accordingly, [his] 2-
1401 petition should have been granted, and the amended sentencing judgment should have been
6 vacated as void,” leaving only the issue of the proper remedy to be imposed. For its part, the
State concedes in its appellate brief that both this court’s 2015 order and the trial court’s 2017
amended sentencing judgment are void.
¶ 20 In our 2021 order, this court held that our 2015 “order vacating defendant’s MSR term
and the circuit court’s sentencing judgment were void and subject to collateral attack.” Bell, 2021
IL App (3d) 190528-U, ¶ 19. Under the law of the case doctrine, on remand the trial court was
bound to adhere to that legal finding. “The law of the case doctrine generally bars relitigation of
an issue previously decided in the same case. People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 [276 Ill.
Dec. 343, 794 N.E.2d 238] (2002). Thus, the determination of a question of law by an appellate
court in the first appeal may be binding on the court in a second appeal. Krautsack v. Anderson,
223 Ill. 2d 541, 552 [308 Ill. Dec. 302, 861 N.E.2d 633] (2006).” People v. Coty, 2020 IL
123972, ¶ 20. Because the trial court was bound by this court’s 2021 judgment, it erred by not
vacating its 2017 amended sentencing order as directed.
¶ 21 Defendant also asserts, however, that it was error to deny his section 2-1401 petition
because, as a matter of settled law, the appellate order was void, “despite the trial court’s
insistence that the ‘Appellate Order is not void.’ ” That argument appears to misapprehend which
appellate order the trial court was referencing. Defendant interprets the trial court’s statement
that the “Appellate Order is not void” as an abandonment of our finding that our 2015 order was
void under Castleberry. The trial court’s written order and opinion makes it abundantly clear,
however, that the court was referring to this court’s 2008 order upholding defendant’s conviction
and sentence on appeal. Because the trial court’s statement was not erroneous, we will next
address the propriety of its denial of defendant’s section 2-1401 petition.
7 ¶ 22 Defendant argues that “[b]ecause the Appellate Court has already established that its
order vacating [his] sentence was void and that the amended sentencing judgment that was
entered thereafter was void, [he] met the burden of proof on his 2-1401 petition,” requiring this
court to decide only the proper remedy to be granted. In support, he cites People v. White, 2011
IL 109616. In that case, the defendant was properly admonished during his plea hearing that the
base sentence for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years in prison; he was not, however,
informed that he also faced a mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement, making his minimum
sentence 35 years in prison. The defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement with
the State and received the bargained-for prison term of 28 years, which was below the statutory
minimum. Unable to modify the defendant’s sentence to include the 15-year mandatory
enhancement without also effectively reducing his base sentence below the statutory 20-year
minimum, our supreme court held that he had to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed to trial if he wished. People v. Donelson, 2013 IL 113603, ¶ 26 (citing White, 2011 IL
109616, ¶¶ 19, 31).
¶ 23 In Donelson, the court distinguished White both because the defendant in Donelson did
not allege that he was improperly admonished about the applicable individual sentencing ranges
when he entered his plea and because his 50-year agreed-to sentence could be reconfigured to
accommodate the statutory sentencing mandates while still providing him with the benefit of his
plea bargain. Defendant argues that Donelson does not apply here because the State incorrectly
stated the applicable MSR term at his plea hearing and his 20-year sentence cannot be
reconfigured to conform to the law. Because the parties’ mistake of law cannot be remedied in
any other way, defendant asserts that they must be returned to their pre-plea positions, with the
8 cause being remanded with directions to allow him to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial, the
remedy in White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 31.
¶ 24 In People v. Smith, 2015 IL 116572, ¶ 34, however, our supreme court held “that White
does not apply retroactively to convictions which were final at the time White was decided” in
2011. Nonetheless, defendant maintains that White is applicable because his case was not “final”
until after the entry of the trial court’s 2017 amended sentencing order that correctly required
him to serve an MSR term of three years to life, citing People v. Lyles, 208 Ill. App. 3d 370, 375
(1990), in support.
¶ 25 In Lyles, the defendant was convicted on two counts of murder and one count of
involuntary manslaughter, offenses for which he was sentenced to death and 14 years in prison,
respectively. Those sentences were stayed during his direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
in which he argued the State’s discriminatory use of peremptory challenges denied him a fair
trial. Lyles, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 373. Rejecting that claim, the supreme court determined that the
defendant had failed to establish that the State purposefully excluded African Americans from
the jury venire. Although the court rejected the defendant’s discrimination claim, it ultimately
remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing based on the prosecutor’s serious
misconduct during closing arguments. People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 413 (1985).
¶ 26 While Lyles’s appeal was pending before our supreme court, the United States Supreme
Court issued its decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), repudiating the
discriminatory use of the State’s peremptory challenges. The year after Batson was decided, the
defendant in Lyles was resentenced to natural life without parole. He again appealed to the
appellate court, arguing that he was entitled to a new hearing on his Batson claim because that
decision was “applicable retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal or not yet final at the
9 time that Batson was announced.” Lyles, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 373. The court determined that
Batson would generally apply in that scenario because the case was not final until after
resentencing was completed on remand, which occurred after Batson was issued. Id. at 375.
Because the supreme court had previously rejected the merits of the defendant’s discrimination
claim, however, the appellate court declined to “give Batson retroactive effect in this case,”
finding that “a relitigation of defendant's claim is directly barred by the preclusion doctrine of the
law of the case.” Id. at 375.
¶ 27 We find that Lyles is readily distinguishable from the instant case. As our supreme court
has explained, “ ‘the final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence.’ (People v. Warship, 59
Ill. 2d 125, 130 (1974)).” Id. Moreover, the court has held that ‘[a] judgment is final if it
determines the litigation on the merits so that if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed
with the execution on the judgment.’ (Relph v. Board of Education, 84 Ill. 2d 436, 441 (1981)).”
Id. The appellate court in Lyles properly applied those principles to conclude that the defendant’s
sentence there was not final until his initial appeal was resolved and his resentencing was
completed on remand. Id.
¶ 28 In contrast, here defendant was originally sentenced in 2007, and this court upheld both
his conviction and sentence in 2008, obviating any need for remand. Because defendant’s case
was not remanded to the trial court as it was in Lyles, his conviction and sentence became final
for purposes of our retroactivity analysis after this court issued its 2008 decision.
¶ 29 We note that if we adopted defendant’s argument a criminal defendant’s conviction and
sentence might never be deemed “final” because the original judgment would always be subject
to potential modification in a postconviction proceeding. Under defendant’s view of Lyle, his
judgment would be “final” only so long as he chose not to challenge it in another postconviction
10 challenge. Defendant’s own lengthy history of postconviction filings, stretching from his direct
appeal in 2007 to his present filings, exemplifies how repeated postconviction actions may be
used to delay a finding that the trial court’s original judgment was final. Thus, we conclude that
because defendant’s conviction became final after his initial appeal was resolved in 2008, three
years prior to the decision in White, that case does not apply retroactively to this case. See
People v. Smith, 2015 IL 116572, ¶ 34.
¶ 30 Finally, defendant argues that his conviction, sentence, and plea agreement should be
vacated and he should be allowed to enter a new plea under the reasoning in People v. Strom,
2012 IL App (3d) 100198. There, the defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual assault and was
sentenced to four years in prison and two years of MSR, which, as here, failed to comport with
the mandatory MSR term of three years to life for that offense. The trial court denied the
defendant’s postconviction petition, and he appealed. During the pendency of that appeal, the
defendant became eligible to start his MSR term, which the DOC had unilaterally modified to
comply with the statutory mandate of three years to life. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5. The appellate court
concluded that
“when the parties agree to a sentence that is unauthorized by statute, the
entire plea agreement is void because the defendant was not properly
admonished with regard to the possible penalties he might face. This is
true even if the prosecutor, defendant, and judge agree to a lesser sentence
than is authorized by law.” Id. § 9 (citing White, 2011 IL 109616).
The court added that the only proper remedy for the imposition of a void plea term, such as an
invalid MSR term, is to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial if he
so chooses. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Defendant argues that the same remedy must be applied here.
11 ¶ 31 Unlike in Strom, however, this court has previously ruled that defendant’s statutorily
nonconforming MSR term was voidable, not void, based on our supreme court’s 2015 decision
in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916. Bell, 2021 IL App (3d) 190528-U, ¶ 17. In that case,
the supreme court abolished the void sentencing rule, which stated that “ ‘[a] sentence which
does not conform to a statutory requirement is void.’ ” Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 1
(quoting People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995)). Thus, unlike in Strom, both Castleberry
and the law of the case here dictate that defendant’s original MSR term is merely voidable, not
void. To the extent that the rationale applied in Strom may survive the abolition of the void
sentence rule, an issue not currently before this court, we reject defendant’s claim that we must
grant the same remedy here and vacate defendant’s conviction, sentence, and plea agreement,
permitting him to proceed to trial. Because defendant has not established a valid legal basis to
support the relief requested in his section 2-1401 motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial
court did not err by denying that motion.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we vacate the Mercer County circuit court’s 2017 amended
sentencing order and affirm its denial of defendant’s section 2-1401 motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
¶ 34 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.