People v. Bell

2020 IL App (4th) 170883-U

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 170883-U April 23, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-17-0883 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County TYRE BELL, ) No. 16CF156 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Turner and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two offenses: driving with a suspended license and obstructing a peace officer.

¶2 In October 2016, following a bench trial, the court found defendant, Tyre Bell

guilty of driving with a suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2016)), a Class 4 felony,

and obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016)), a Class A misdemeanor. In

November 2017, the court imposed the following sentence: 24 months’ probation; 180 days’

incarceration in the Livingston County jail with credit for 3 days and 90 days suspended; 50

hours’ community service; and fines and fees. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his

sentence the next day, which the trial court denied on December 4, 2017. ¶3 On appeal, defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of either offense: driving with a suspended license or obstructing a peace

officer. We disagree and affirm the convictions.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In May 2016, the State charged defendant with two counts: driving on a

suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d) (West 2016)), a Class 4 felony, and obstructing a

peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016)), a Class A misdemeanor. After defendant

waived his jury trial right, the matter proceeded to a bench trial in October 2016.

¶6 The State called Detective Markus Armstrong as its lone witness. Armstrong

testified he previously held the position of patrol officer and worked in that capacity in April

2016. Armstrong stated he worked routine patrol in Pontiac, Illinois, on April 13, 2016, at 7:20

p.m. when he observed a black 2000 Buick Regal traveling ahead of him at a high rate of speed.

While pursuing the speeding vehicle, Armstrong called the Livingston County Emergency

Services and Disaster Agency (LivCom) to run the license plates. Armstrong learned the vehicle

belonged to defendant and defendant’s license and the license plates were suspended. When the

vehicle pulled into a driveway, the driver exited the vehicle. Exiting his marked patrol car about

15 feet away, Armstrong recognized the defendant as the driver. Armstrong called defendant by

name and defendant ran behind the house. Armstrong radioed for backup, informing other

officers defendant had just run from him and providing them with his direction of flight, but

neither Armstrong nor other officers were able to locate defendant.

¶7 Armstrong explained he recognized defendant and knew his name from about a

dozen prior interactions with him professionally and personally in the community. Armstrong

further testified his patrol car video captured much of his pursuit of defendant’s vehicle. The

-2- video showed defendant’s car, the black 2000 Buick Regal, but the video did not show the

driver. The video was admitted as defendant’s exhibit No. 1. Armstrong testified he forwarded

information about the incident to the state’s attorney’s office and it filed charges against

defendant.

¶8 Defendant presented an alibi defense. He confirmed his driver’s license was

suspended. Likewise, he confirmed he owned the vehicle depicted in the police video dated April

13, 2016. However, he denied driving the vehicle that day. Defendant testified he was in

Kankakee that day at his girlfriend’s mother’s house. He stated he and his girlfriend, Kaylee

Dittmer, went to Kankakee to visit her mother and have their children stay with her while

defendant served 20 days in the Livingston County jail. Defendant testified he spent three days in

Kankakee and returned on April 19, 2016, when he turned himself in at 7 p.m. Defendant

acknowledged he previously interacted with Detective Armstrong, explaining he often saw him

at Wal-Mart and the two would sometimes talk.

¶9 Defendant testified four or five other people had access to his car because he left

it unlocked with the keys in the glove compartment. He stated his brother drives his car and the

two share similar shape and size, although defendant said he was taller than his brother.

Defendant testified when he returned from Kankakee and realized his car was missing, he asked

his friends about it, but none knew where his car was. Defendant did not contact the police when

he returned because he “figured it was going to show up” or “somebody was playing a joke or

something.” He testified he finally learned what happened to his car when he received notice

through the mail that his car had been impounded.

¶ 10 Kaylee Dittmer testified that on April 13, 2016, she and defendant were at her

mother’s fiancé’s house in Kankakee, Illinois. She testified she drove defendant there and back

-3- in her car. She said the two left on April 11, 2016, and returned on April 14, 2016, at 5 p.m.

Dittmer testified no one else was in the vehicle with her and defendant. She stated her and

defendant’s children stayed with her grandmother while she and defendant traveled to Kankakee

for a few days. Dittmer explained she and defendant went to Kankakee for a birthday party for

her mom’s fiancé’s niece and to visit Dittmer’s mother. Dittmer testified she was sure the

birthday party occurred on April 12, 2016, and she was “positive” it fell on a weekend “because

that’s when my mom was actually off was on the weekend.” Dittmer gave conflicting statements

about whether she previously told police about defendant’s alibi or provided them with other

corroborating witnesses. Dittmer’s testimony concluded defendant’s presentation of evidence.

¶ 11 In closing, the State reiterated how Detective Armstrong positively identified

defendant driving on April 13, 2016, and defendant fled from him, making him unable to further

investigate the incident. The State argued Armstrong provided a strong identification of the

defendant because of the time of day, his unobstructed view of defendant, and his prior

community interactions with defendant. Finally, the State argued neither defendant’s nor

Dittmer’s testimony was credible evidence. The State, for example, noted that Dittmer was

adamant the birthday party occurred on April 12, 2016, and she was equally insistent that it fell

on a weekend. However, the calendar showed April 12, 2016, was a Tuesday.

¶ 12 Defense counsel, on the other hand, argued Detective Armstrong misidentified

defendant as the driver because he expected to see the vehicle’s owner as the driver. Counsel

questioned whether Armstrong actually had a good view of the driver since it was dusk and the

driver wore a hat. Counsel posited that another person drove defendant’s car that day, since

defendant testified he allowed at least four or five other people to drive his vehicle. Similarly,

counsel explained defendant did not inquire into his car’s whereabouts because he assumed a

-4- friend had it. He finally argued defendant’s and Dittmer’s testimony established defendant could

not have been the driver because they were in Kankakee, Illinois.

¶ 13 The court found “the State met its burden of proof” and found the defendant

guilty as charged. The court explained its decision on the record, concluding “Detective

Armstrong was very clear and credible in his testimony,” describing how he saw defendant

driving and fleeing from him on April 13, 2016. Indeed, the court stated, “I certainly thought that

Detective Armstrong was very credible” and “not the least bit hesitant about his identification of

the Defendant.” The court noted the video showed it was bright enough for Armstrong to easily

recognize the driver when he exited the vehicle. Ultimately, the court credited Armstrong’s

“testimony firsthand having seen Defendant driving, verifying that he is on a suspended license

and then *** fleeing from the vehicle.”

¶ 14 The court next addressed defendant’s and Dittmer’s alibi testimony, finding it not

credible. The court observed, “[T]he problem is that they didn’t have their stories straight with

each other. And if they are going to get up here and concoct a story they need to make sure that

their stories are consistent.” For instance, the court noted the two gave different dates and

reasons for visiting Kankakee—defendant saying they went there to spend time with their kids

before he went to jail, and Dittmer saying they went there alone for a birthday party while the

kids stayed with her grandmother. The court concluded: “I honestly don’t believe, I don’t believe

[defendant] or Miss Dittmer because their stories are not consistent with each other.” After

rendering the guilty verdicts, the court ordered a presentence investigation report and continued

the matter for sentencing.

¶ 15 Following several delays, the court held a sentencing hearing in November 2017

and sentenced defendant to 24 months’ probation, 180 days’ incarceration in the Livingston

-5- County jail with credit for 3 days and 90 days suspended, 50 hours’ community service, and

fines and fees. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, but the court denied the

motion.

¶ 16 This appealed followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 Defendant challenges his convictions for driving while suspended and obstructing

a peace officer, arguing the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We

disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 19 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States

Constitution requires that a person may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he was

charged.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278, 818 N.E.2d 304, 307 (2004) (quoting

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). When a defendant appeals his convictions, arguing the

State failed to satisfy this burden of proof, a reviewing court will not retry the defendant but asks

“ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”

(Emphasis in original.) Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)). Testimony from one credible eyewitness can provide proof beyond a

reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541, 708 N.E.2d 365,

369 (1999). Specifically, when a conviction rests “on eyewitness testimony, a reviewing court

must decide whether, in light of the record, a fact finder could reasonably accept the testimony as

true beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280. But in applying this standard,

-6- we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we defer to the fact

finder’s credibility determinations. See Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 542.

¶ 20 A. Driving With a Suspended License

¶ 21 In order to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving with a

suspended license, the State had to establish two elements: (1) defendant drove a motor vehicle

on Illinois roads (2) while his driver’s license or privileges had been suspended. People v.

Jackson, 2013 IL 113986, ¶ 16, 983 N.E.2d 1027. Defendant concedes the second element and

contests only the first—he drove a car on a Pontiac, Illinois thoroughfare. Specifically, defendant

contends Detective Armstrong’s uncorroborated testimony proved insufficient to secure a

conviction, especially since police never apprehended the driver, and he and his girlfriend

testified they were in Kankakee when the offense occurred.

¶ 22 As defendant’s argument implies, the court’s guilty verdict rested, at least partly,

on Detective Armstrong’s testimony that he observed defendant driving a car in Pontiac, Illinois,

on April 13, 2016. Armstrong testified he saw a speeding black 2000 Buick Regal; as he gave

pursuit, he confirmed defendant owned the vehicle; and he observed the driver exit the vehicle.

Armstrong testified he recognized the driver to be defendant. He stated he had an unobstructed

view of defendant exiting the car and as defendant exited, he looked at Detective Armstrong.

When Detective Armstrong called to defendant by his first name, he fled. Detective Armstrong

explained he previously interacted with defendant in the community at least a dozen times and

knew his name. Moreover, a video confirmed Armstrong pursued a black 2000 Buick Regal and

defendant testified the vehicle depicted in the video was, in fact, his car.

¶ 23 The trial court found “Detective Armstrong was very clear and credible in his

testimony.” It observed “Detective Armstrong was very certain who he saw.” Ultimately, the

-7- court credited Armstrong’s testimony and his version of events. We defer to that determination

because judging witness credibility lies within the fact finder’s purview as it hears the testimony

firsthand and watches the witness testify. See Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350-51, 860 N.E.2d

240, 245 (2006) (“A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court

regarding credibility,” because “it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of

*** witnesses.”). More importantly, though, we will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of

Detective Armstrong’s credibility because a fact finder “could reasonably accept [his] testimony

as true beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.

¶ 24 In the same vein, the trial court rejected defendant’s and Dittmer’s inconsistent

testimony as not credible because the two provided divergent stories about when and why they

were in Kankakee. While defendant and Dittmer agreed they were in Kankakee on April 13,

2016, they disagreed on just about everything else. Defendant stated he had already been in

Kankakee three days by April 13, 2016, and he stayed there until April 19, 2016, when he had to

return to report to the Livingston County jail. Defendant’s reason for going to Kankakee was

twofold: one, taking his children to stay with Dittmer’s mother while he served 20 days in jail;

and, two, spending time with his children while visiting Dittmer’s mother. Dittmer, on the other

hand, testified she and defendant traveled to Kankakee alone, without children, on April 11,

2016, and they returned on April 14, 2016 at 5 p.m. She testified she remembered the exact date

and time they returned because that was when she had to pick up the children from her

grandmother. Dittmer’s reason for her and defendant’s trip to Kankakee was a birthday party for

her mother’s fiancé’s niece. Although there were other inconsistent and less than credible details

from defendant’s and Dittmer’s testimony, we need not meticulously detail them here. We can

conclude the court reasonably rejected defendant’s and Dittmer’s testimony when it said: “I just

-8- don’t think that the story about being in Kankakee is that credible.” We defer to the trial court’s

decision to reject defendant’s and Dittmer’s alibi testimony. See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.

Consequently, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we can say a rational

fact finder could find the crime’s contested essential element—defendant driving a car on Illinois

roads—proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278.

¶ 25 B. Obstructing a Peace Officer

¶ 26 To prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of obstructing a peace

officer the State had to show defendant knew Detective Armstrong was a police officer and he

knowingly thwarted Armstrong from performing an authorized act within his official capacity,

i.e., detaining defendant for driving on a suspended license. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016); see

also People v. Jones, 245 Ill. App. 3d 302, 307, 613 N.E.2d 354, 357 (1993) (instructing flight

from a police officer, after being given a lawful directive to do otherwise, is a form of resisting

or obstructing a police officer). Much of the above evidence supports this conviction.

Specifically, Detective Armstrong testified he followed defendant’s speeding vehicle, he verified

the vehicle belonged to defendant who had a suspended license, and he verified the vehicle had

suspended license plates. That information allowed Armstrong to detain defendant. See 625

ILCS 5/3-701(a)(1), 6-303(a), 7-402 (West 2016). Armstrong also testified he was wearing his

uniform and driving a marked squad car, but defendant ran away when he yelled out his first

name. Detective Armstrong stated he previously interacted with defendant and defendant

confirmed he knew Armstrong to be a police officer. As noted above, the trial court found

Detective Armstrong’s testimony credible and based the convictions upon it. See Smith, 185 Ill.

2d at 541 (“The testimony of a single witness, if it is positive and the witness credible, is

sufficient to convict.”). Because Detective Armstrong provided credible eyewitness testimony

-9- that defendant knew he was a police officer yet evaded him while Armstrong was performing an

authorized act in his official capacity, stopping the defendant for having a suspended driver’s

license and license plates, the State met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of obstructing a peace officer. The defendant’s on-foot flight from a police

officer under the facts of this case was an act of obstruction sufficient to warrant conviction. See

People v. Holdman, 73 Ill. 2d 213, 222, 383 N.E.2d 155, 159 (1978).

¶ 27 Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and deferring to

the trial court’s credibility determinations, we hold the evidence reasonably supports findings of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the offenses of driving with a suspended license and

obstructing a peace officer. See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278. Based on the above evidence, a

rational fact finder could have found the State proved all essential elements of the charged

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. See Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541.

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

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