Filed 2/6/25 P. v. Bass CA4/2
See dissenting opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082349
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB21000434)
QUINN SHINDA BASS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill,
Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Brad Poore and Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Vincent P.
1 LaPietra and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent. A jury found defendant and appellant Quinn S. Bass guilty on one count of
resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code,1 § 69) and one count of resisting arrest (§ 148,
subd. (a)). He argues the trial court erred by denying, without review of documents, his
pretrial motion for discovery of the personnel files of the arresting officers under Pitchess
v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We disagree and affirm defendant’s
convictions in all respects.
FACTS
Bass was tried on offenses arising from two separate events, one in 2019, the other
in 2021. Only the offenses from 2019 are relevant to this appeal. Bass’s motion did not
set forth any summary of the facts surrounding the circumstances of his arrest. The
prosecution did provide a summary of the facts in its opposition to defendant’s motion for
pretrial discovery, which we summarize below.2
According to the prosecution, on March 29, 2019, two San Bernardino County
deputy sheriffs were on patrol together in an unmarked vehicle. They stopped a car they
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts were taken from a report prepared by one of the deputies at the scene of defendant’s arrest.{CT 230-231}
2 suspected of window tint and license plate violations.3 Bass was driving that car, with his
wife in the front passenger seat.
When the deputies turned on their emergency lights to pull the car over, it instead
sped up, then turned “abruptly” into a parking lot and parked. The deputies stopped
behind it. When the deputies approached the car, one on each side, the encounter was
immediately contentious. Bass failed to comply with the deputies’ instructions and,
instead, began reaching around the car, locking the doors on his side of the car, and
telling his wife to lock the doors on her side. When Bass reached towards the glove box,
the deputy on the passenger’s side opened the door and physically prevented him from
doing so.
Bass eventually opened his door and stepped out, but he did not comply with
instructions to face away from the deputy and place his hands behind his back. With
some difficulty, the deputies got control over Bass’s hands and placed him in handcuffs.
Even after he was handcuffed, however, he continued to try to pull away and fight the
deputies. As the deputies tried to put Bass in the back of their patrol car, Bass and one of
the deputies fell; and the deputy suffered a dislocated shoulder. One of the deputies used
pepper spray, in addition to physical force, to attempt to “gain compliance.”4
3 The facts asserted in the People’s opposition to Bass’s Pitchess motion also stated the deputies saw the car “executing an illegal turn in front of them.” At trial, the deputies testified to only the suspected window tint and license plate violations as the basis for the traffic stop. The discrepancy does not matter to our analysis. 4 The facts provided by the People in their opposition did not come by way of declaration or affidavit. Thus, this motion contained no declaration or affidavit that set forth the facts of the alleged detention and arrest.
3 In April 2019, the People filed a felony complaint against Bass, charging him with
one count of resisting an executive officer (§ 69). In August 2019, Bass, representing
himself, filed the Pitchess motion at issue here. Bass sought discovery of relevant
materials from the personnel files of the deputies who arrested him.5
The trial court denied Bass’s motion. The court noted that no police report was
attached to the motion, so it was “only aware” of the “summary” description provided by
the parties. It found Bass had not articulated a “plausible factual scenario” that was an
“alternative to what the police have said has happened.” The court stated Bass was
required to show something “different . . . from just a flat-out denial” and found he had
not met that standard.
The charges against Bass were later amended. He was tried on two counts of
resisting an executive officer (§ 69), allegedly committed on March 29, 2019 (counts 4,
5); as well as two additional counts of the same offense (counts 1 and 3), allegedly
committed on January 29, 2021; and one count of battery on a peace officer (§ 243, subd.
(c)(2), count 2) on the latter date. The jury acquitted Bass of counts 1 through 3, as well
as an alleged enhancement of count 4 for personally inflicting great bodily injury.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b).) The jury found Bass guilty of count 4, but, on count 5, found him
guilty of the lesser offense of resisting arrest. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court
5 The motion also requested documents from the personnel file of the San Bernardino County Sheriff. On appeal, Bass has not challenged that part of the denial of his motion.
4 sentenced Bass to two years of formal probation, with conditions that included 270 days
in county jail, eligible to be served on the weekend or on work release.
DISCUSSION
In order “[t]o initiate discovery [of information in the personnel files of police
officers], [a] defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing ‘good cause
for the discovery,’ first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending
litigation, and second by ‘stating upon reasonable belief’ that the police agency has the
records or information at issue.”6 (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011,
1019, italics added, quoting Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).). Specifically, “[w]hat the
defendant must present is a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is
plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.” (Id. at p. 1025.)
“An affidavit is a written declaration under oath, made without notice to the
adverse party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2003). “An affidavit to be used before any court,
judge, or officer of this state may be taken before any officer authorized to administer
oaths.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2012). Defendant’s motion does not contain an affidavit
taken before a person authorized to administer oaths. Although section 1043 (Pitchess
statute) referenced above refers to affidavits, California law provides that matters that
require affidavits may also be “supported, evidenced, established, or proved” by a
declaration which is signed by the declarant and “states the date and place of execution
. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5).
6 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
5 Thus, in order to make the preliminary showing necessary to require the trial court
to conduct an in camera hearing, a defendant must submit a declaration or affidavit
demonstrating good cause for the discovery. Where defendant’s purported factual
scenario does not contain such declaration or affidavit, it is legally incompetent to prove
anything and cannot establish good cause for the discovery requested. (Warrick v.
Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 [The defendant’s motion must be supported
“by affidavits showing ‘good cause for the discovery . . . .’ ”])
“Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 542, 548.) But where a
“Pitchess ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de novo.” (Ibid.) The
defendant’s purported declaration in this case is legally invalid. A valid declaration must
state that it is certified or declared by the defendant to be true under penalty of perjury
and must be signed by the defendant setting forth the date and place of its execution.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5). Defendant’s motion does meet these requirements.
Defendant’s motion does not contain a separate affidavit or declaration.
Defendant’s motion consists of one document which, in pertinent part, contains a notice
of motion; a purported “DECLARATION OF PETITIONER/COUNSEL”{CT 161}; a
recitation of article I sections 1, 8, 16, 19 of the California Constitution; a one-paragraph
statement of relevant facts; a one-paragraph memorandum of points and authorities; an
argument section; a conclusion; and a prayer.
In the declaration section, there is no reference to defendant’s statement being true
and correct under penalty of perjury. In the conclusion section, it states, “I declare under
6 the penalty of perjury the foregoing to be true and correct.”{CT 169} At that point, there
is no signature to correspond with that statement. In the prayer section, it says, “I pray
the Court honors Petitioner’s unalienable rights, protected by the Constitution of
California of 1849 and the organic U. S. Constitution.”{CT 169} Thereafter, it is dated
August 3, 2019, and signed “Q. Bass UCC 1-308 W.O.P. Without United States/ Without
Recourse/ Sui Juris.”{CT 169} A review of the motion reveals that it contains no valid
declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5 [declaration must state “the date and place of
execution . . . .”) There is unquestionably no place of execution stated anywhere in the
document.7
Here, the People argue that the declaration was insufficient to make the showing
that defendant is entitled to an in camera hearing. We agree. Without a legally sufficient
declaration, the defendant cannot establish, and has not established, good cause for the
discovery requested. “[P]olice personnel records are confidential even vis-à-vis the
prosecution, and therefore ‘prosecutors, as well as defendants, must comply with the
Pitchess procedures if they seek information from confidential personnel records.’ ”
(Serrano v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 759, 772-773.)
7 Further, it is not entirely clear whether the defendant has placed a lawful signature on his motion. A signature includes any mark or sign placed on a writing with the intent to execute or authenticate it. (Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.(1971) 4 Cal. 3d 319, 327) “The signature indicates the intent of the signing party to be bound by the document.” (Ibid.) According to defendant’s motion, his name is Quinn Shinda Bass. He signed the motion, “Q. Bass UCC 1-308 W.O.P. Without United States/ Without Recourse/ Sui Juris.” Although, we discern no relevance of the Uniform Commercial Code in this context, defendant appears to be limiting his intent to be bound by the document by his reference to his signature being “W.O.P.,” “[w]ithout recourse,” and “[w]ithout United States.”
7 Although the trial court’s ruling was based on the substantive insufficiency of the
affidavit rather than the legal infirmity we describe, “[w]e may affirm [a court’s] ruling if
it is correct on any theory, even if the trial court’s reasoning was incorrect.”8 (People v.
Hall (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 946, 952.) Defendant’s failure to comply with section 1043
renders defendant’s purported declaration legally incompetent and, thus, insufficient to
establish the requisite showing required to compel the court to conduct an in camera
review of the police personnel records. Defendant’s failure to comply with section
1043’s requirements is more than just a procedural irregularity. Defendant’s motion
simply does not contain what the legislature requires for a party to obtain confidential
police records.
Further, to the extent the defendant was requesting complaints of excessive force,9
the trial court was correct in denying the motion as defendant failed to attach a copy of
the police report as required for such motions where there is a claim of excessive force.
(§ 1046; see County of L.A. v. Superior Court) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1605, 1610
[Failure to use the procedures set forth in the Evidence Code for discovery of police
officer records supports the determination that defendant is not entitled to the items
requested.])
8 As we discuss hereafter, we also agree with the trial court’s determination that defendant’s motion was substantively insufficient.
9 Defendant’s motion references excessive force on multiple occasions. For example, in defendant’s reply brief in the trial court, defendant says that he and his wife were forced out of the car by pepper spray and experienced “excessive twisting of right wrist.”{CT 271}
8 Apart from the legal and procedural irregularities we describe, we find the factual
scenario presented by the defendant insufficient to establish good cause for the discovery
requested. “What the defendant must present is a specific factual scenario of officer
misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.” (Warrick v.
Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at. p. 1025.)
Under the section of defendant’s motion entitled “DECLARATION OF
PETITIONER/COUNSEL,” defendant writes:{10}
“The Petitioner’s unalienable rights; protected by, the organic United States
Constitution of 1849 . . . were violated by SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPUTIES. SGT. CRAIG, KELLY #B5842, AND DEP. REVELES #C9640,
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR on March 29, 2019 on or around 5pm.
a. SAN BERNARDINO POLICE DEPT., RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR WERE
CONDUCTING A SMASH/GANG SWEEP THAT SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY SHERIFF DEPUTIES, RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR took part in;
furthermore,{CT 161}
b. Agents made contact with NO PROBABLE CAUSE (No emergency, No injured
party, No signed warrant by a judge specifying what person(s) and/or property to be
searched, and/or seized.”
The next reference to facts falls under a section labeled “II. STATEMENT OF
RELEVANT FACTS.” In that section, the motion states, “Petitioner Bass, Quinn D.B.A.
10 Defendant’s motion and reply are found at pages 158-169 and 269-272, respectively, of the Clerk’s transcript.
9 QUINN S. BASS (Hereafter “Bass, Quinn) was arrested by San Bernardino County
Sheriff Deputies for Felony PC 69 Resisting Arrest with no initial charge and/or probable
cause (no injured party, no emergency, no signed warrant issued from a judge) on
March 29, 2019.”11
In the “Argument” section, defendant makes the following statement:
“In this case, the Deputies have put forth one version of what happened, a version
that would support probable cause. The petitioner contends that something different
happened. In the petitioner’s scenario, there was no emergency, no injured party, and no
warrant signed by a judge specifying the specific place to be searched and/or property
and person to be seized; furthermore, probable cause would not have been established by
the Deputies.” Defendant goes on to argue that “[e]vidence of complaints against the
Deputies of falsifying probable cause or facts can be used to impeach the officer’s
credibility.”{CT 166-167}
In Defendant’s reply brief, he adds the following:
“Take further Notice that at no point did the DEPUTIES make contact while
private automobile was moving. Private Automobile was stationary, and at no point was
unmarked car flashing emergency lights during contact. DEPUTIES forced my wife and
I out of the car at gunpoint; furthermore, being injured by DEP. Reveles by pepper spray
and excessive twisting of right wrist. Along with being injured a third time by an
11 This language is repeated again immediately under this paragraph in a section entitled “MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY DISCOVERY (PITCHESS/BRADY).”
10 unnamed Deputy, after being falsely detained with no probable cause. . . . Before being
booked . . . I was admitted in Arrowhead Regional Hospital with a diagnosis of Sprained
Right wrist and Pepper Sprayed eyes.”{CT 271-272}
Later, defendant writes: “[m]y wife and I were parked in our private automobile.
How is that not explaining what we were doing at the time of contact and how is that not
adequate in supporting my own actions?”12
The purported factual scenario does not meet the standards required to compel an
evidentiary hearing even under the relatively relaxed standards used to determine good
cause to compel Pitchess discovery. (See Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 1016). “To determine whether the defendant has established good cause for in-
chambers review of an officer’s personnel records, the trial court looks to whether the
defendant has established the materiality of the requested information to the pending
litigation. The court does that through the following inquiry: Has the defense shown a
logical connection between the charges and the proposed defense? Is the defense request
for Pitchess discovery factually specific and tailored to support its claim of officer
misconduct? Will the requested Pitchess discovery support the proposed defense, or is it
likely to lead to information that would support the proposed defense? Under what
theory would the requested information be admissible at trial?” (Id. at pp. 1026-1027)
12 The reply brief suffers from the same procedural irregularities as the original motion. It is legally incompetent under Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.15 and fails to comply with section 1043 to the extent it seeks complaints of excessive force.
11 The defendant’s factual showing is insufficient because it is incomplete and he fails to
“present a factual account of the scope of the alleged police misconduct, and does not
explain his own actions in a manner that adequately supports his defense.” (People v.
Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1317; see People v. Sanderson (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341.){Fourth Dist., Div. Two}
Defendant’s purported factual scenario is wholly inadequate. Defendant does not
articulate factually what it is that the officers did and what he was doing near the time of
the arrest.13 Defendant says, “the Deputies have put forth one version of what happened,
a version that would support probable cause.”{CT 166} However, defendant does not
clearly inform us in his motion of his view of the officers’ actions. Nor does he provide
the officers’ version of the events. Defendant then says, “The petitioner contends that
something different happened. In the petitioner’s scenario, there was no emergency, no
injured party, and no warrant signed by a judge specifying the specific place to be
searched and/or property and person to be seized; furthermore, probable cause would not
have been established by the Deputies.”{CT 166-167} These conclusory statements are
of no assistance in informing the court of defendant’s plausible factual scenario.
Defendant goes on to say “that at no point did the DEPUTIES make contact while
private automobile was moving. Private Automobile was stationary, and at no point was
13 It is the defendant who has the burden of setting forth a plausible specific factual scenario of the alleged police conduct. Therefore, we look to the factual scenario set forth by the defendant, not the officers, to determine if defendant’s factual scenario is plausible. Although we may utilize the police reports in determining the plausibility of defendant’s factual scenario, we look to defendant to explain his alternative version of the facts creating the need for the discovery.
12 unmarked car flashing emergency lights during contact.”{CT 271} Defendant does not
indicate whose private vehicle he is referring to or whether or not he was even in it.
Defendant speaks of the private vehicle in the third person.
Later, defendant writes: “[m]y wife and I were parked in our private automobile.
How is that not explaining what we were doing at the time of contact and how is that not
adequate in supporting my own actions?”{CT 272} Again, defendant’s vague references
do not clearly set forth a specific factual scenario.
As explained in Thompson, Sanderson, and Warrick, defendant’s motion must be
factually specific and tailored to support the proposed defense. Defendant does not
describe how long he had been at the location of the detention. Nor does he state whether
he had been driving and stopped immediately before the officers approached his vehicle.
Defendant does not explain whether or not the officers asked him to exit his vehicle.
Further, defendant does not explain whether he complied or refused to comply with the
officers’ directions. Defendant does not explain his own actions in a manner that
supports his defense. Defendant’s failure to clearly set forth the officers’ actions and his
own actions makes it impossible for us to know whether defendant has a plausible
alternative version of events.
We recognize that the factual scenario can be based on a denial of the official
version of events. “That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case,
may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.” (Warrick v. Superior
Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1025.) However, a denial will not always suffice to
meet the defendant’s burden. (People v. Thompson, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317;
13 see People v. Sanderson, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1340-1341.) If a simple denial were
always sufficient, the specific factual scenario requirement would be of no effect. Every
defendant would be entitled to discovery by simply denying the allegations in the police
reports. Here, defendant does not state what is in the official police reports, let alone
deny those alleged facts.
Finally, defendant seeks the confidential personnel records of Deputy Clotworthy
and Sgt. Smith in his motion;14 however, defendant does not allege what each officer
purportedly did. “[A] showing of good cause must be based on a discovery request
which is tailored to the specific officer misconduct that is alleged.” (California Highway
Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021.) Each officer’s records are
confidential. “The Penal Code provisions designate peace officer personnel records as
confidential, while the Evidence Code sections provide the specific procedures which
must be followed to obtain discovery of peace officer personnel records.” (Id. at
p. 1019). If defendant is alleging that a particular officer fabricated a police report, he
needs to say so and point to the particular officer in question. Defendant cannot obtain
the confidential records of an officer without some plausible showing of misconduct by
that officer. Defendant fails to comply with this requirement. We see no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Pitchess motion. The trial court did
not exercise “its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
14 In the body of the motion, defendant also references Deputy Reveles.
14 resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (See People v. Rodriguez (1999)
20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
15 [People v. Bass, E082349]
RAPHAEL, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court correctly
denied Quinn S. Bass’s pretrial motion for discovery under Pitchess v. Superior Court
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
I agree with the majority that Bass’s motion was procedurally irregular in several
ways. A Pitchess motion must include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the
discovery or disclosure sought.” (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) Lacking the benefit
of counsel, Bass did not file a separate affidavit along with his motion, only a single
document entitled a “Notice and Notice of Motion for Preliminary Discovery
(Pitchess/Brady),” a section of which is designated “Declaration of Petitioner/Counsel.”
The document is signed by Bass, and declares “under the penalty of perjury the foregoing
to be true and correct,” but in the “Conclusion” paragraph rather than immediately before
the signature. His reply brief, entitled “Notice and Declaration of Affidavit of Rebuttal
Against County’s Opposition for Preliminary Discovery (Pitchess/Brady),” is also signed
“under the penalty of perjury,” although again the signature is separate from the quoted
language. Bass appended to his signatures as “Q. Bass” some extra verbiage that may
suggest he is an adherent of the “sovereign citizen” movement. And although the motion
and reply both indicate an address in San Bernardino, California, it is a P.O. box rather
than a place of execution.
1 I disagree, however, that these irregularities are fatal to Bass’s Pitchess motion.1
It is certainly best to follow the practice of most attorneys and make the supporting
affidavit a separate document, attached to the Pitchess motion rather than incorporated
into it. But the statute requires that a Pitchess motion “include” supporting affidavits, not
that they take any particular form. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).) In the same vein,
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 2015.5 does not require the declaration under penalty
of perjury to appear at the end of the document, although the form suggested in the
section contemplates that this is the ordinary placement of the declaration, and it is no
doubt the better practice.” (People v. Pierce (1967) 66 Cal.2d 53, 59.) It also is clear
that the extra verbiage Bass appended to his signature would not shield him from a
perjury prosecution, as courts have consistently rejected such “sovereign citizen”
arguments. So that verbiage should not invalidate his signature for purposes of this
motion. Because the People did not object in the trial court that Bass’s declaration failed
to state where it was executed, which would have allowed Bass to cure that defect, I
would deem the point waived. (See People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1966) 240
Cal.App.2d 895, 896, fn. 2 [declaration in support of bond forfeiture motion lacked date
and place of execution, rendering them “clearly insufficient” under Code of Civil
1 I agree with the majority that, to the extent Bass requested discovery of complaints of excessive force, the motion was properly denied because he failed to include a copy of the police report. (Evid. Code, § 1046.) That requirement does not apply, however, to the apparent focus of the motion, which was any instances of dishonest conduct (“ . . . fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, illegal search and seizure, false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing false police reports, false and misleading internal reports including but not limited to false overtime or medical reports . . .”) 2 Procedure Section 2015.5, but “no objection on that ground was made in the trial court
and . . . it could easily have been cured,” so court of appeal “deem[ed] the point
waived.”]; accord Guardianship of Stephen G. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1422 [“‘An
appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings . . .
where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some
appropriate method,’”], quoting 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 311, p.
321.)
Under our Supreme Court’s precedent, I also disagree with the majority’s finding
that Bass presented a factual scenario insufficient to establish good cause for discovery of
evidence of dishonest behavior in the arresting officer’s personnel files.
“Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both “‘materiality’”
to the subject matter of the pending litigation and “a reasonable belief” that the agency
has the type of information sought.’” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011,
1016; Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) “A showing of good cause is measured by
‘relatively relaxed standards’ that serve to ‘insure the production’ for trial court review of
‘all potentially relevant documents.’” Warrick, supra, at p. 1016.) Thus, the defendant
“need demonstrate only ‘a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending
charge’ and describe with some specificity ‘how the discovery being sought would
support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.’”
(People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 182 (Gaines).) The defendant’s factual
showing, “depending on the circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the
3 facts asserted in the police report.” (Warrick, at pp. 1024-1025.) The defendant’s factual
scenario must be “plausible” in the sense the asserted officer misconduct “might or could
have occurred.” (Id. at p. 1026.) The question is not whether the defendant’s account is
credible or believable, but only whether it is “both internally consistent and supports the
defense proposed to the charges.” (Ibid.; see Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th
63, 74 [characterizing required Pitchess showing as “minimal”].) The showing required
for a Pitchess motion need not be based on “personal knowledge” of facts, as it is often
from a lawyer simply articulating a scenario where the information could be used at trial.
(City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 85-86.)
Bass’s Pitchess motion is not drafted with the clarity that a good lawyer would
bring. Plainly enough, however, he articulated not just a flat denial but a specific factual
scenario that contradicted the officers’ version of events. According to Bass, he was
parked, not driving, before the officers contacted him, so the deputies were lying about
observing traffic violations and had no other justification for detaining him. The deputies
then forced Bass and his wife out of their car, rather than respect their decision not to roll
down their windows for a conversation. (See People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032,
1050 (Flores) [in the absence of reasonable suspicion by police the defendant was doing
something illegal, the defendant “had the right to decline further interaction with the
officers and . . . the officers had no authority to compel him to do otherwise”].)
To be sure, Bass was incorrect to phrase his argument as implicating the deputies’
lack of “probable cause,” rather than reasonable suspicion. (See Flores, supra, 15
4 Cal.5th at p. 1041 [discussing reasonable suspicion standard for investigative
detentions].) And Bass could conceivably have provided more detail about exactly who
did what, when, and to whom, as the majority opinion faults him for not doing. (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 13.) But an illegal traffic stop allegation is not complicated. In my view,
the point Bass tried to articulate was discernible, and it does not take much detail to
understand its merit as a predicate for Pitchess review. There is nothing internally
inconsistent or otherwise implausible about the version of the facts Bass described. (See
Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1023.) And at this stage, the issue was not whether
Bass’s version of events is persuasive or credible or probable, but only whether it “might
or could have occurred.” (Id. at p. 1026; Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 182 [“a
defendant is entitled to discover relevant information under Pitchess even in the absence
of any judicial determination that the potential defense is credible or persuasive”].)
Further, if accepted by the trier of fact, Bass’s version of events would support a
valid defense to the charged offense. The prosecution alleged Bass violated Penal Code
section 69 by using force or violence to resist a peace officer “in the performance of his
duty”—as distinguished from an attempt to deter the officer from performing a duty in
the future—so an element of the offense is that the officer was “acting lawfully at the
time of the offense.” (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 241 (Smith).) The same
element is required to establish a violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1),
the lesser offense Bass was found guilty of committing as to count 5. (See Smith, at p.
242.) “[A]n officer is not lawfully performing her duties when she detains an individual
5 without reasonable suspicion or arrests an individual without probable cause.’” (Garcia
v. Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 803, 819.)
Of course, whether the arresting officers were acting lawfully is not an element of
every charge that could apply to Bass’s actions as alleged by the prosecution. (E.g.,
People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 153 [defendant who used unreasonable
force in resisting officers’ improper or excessive use of force could be convicted of
simple assault].) What matters here is whether Bass’s account would support a defense
to resisting an executive officer in violation of Penal Code section 69. It would.
I would therefore find the trial court erred by denying Bass’s Pitchess motion
without conducting an in camera hearing to determine whether there was any
discoverable information about dishonest conduct in the arresting deputies’ personnel
files. I would conditionally reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court to conduct
that in camera hearing and then to proceed as appropriate depending on whether
discoverable information was found.
RAPHAEL J.