2025 IL App (4th) 241516-U
NOS. 4-24-1516, 4-24-1517, 4-24-1518, 4-24-1519 cons.
NOTICE IN THE APPELLATE COURT FILED This Order was filed under August 19, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is OF ILLINOIS Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). FOURTH DISTRICT Court, IL
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Henry County ROBERT F. BARNES, ) Nos. 24CM83 Defendant-Appellant. ) 24CF89 ) 24CF140 ) 24CF141 ) ) Honorable ) Terence M. Patton, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court (1) did not err when it used conditional language to inform defendant he was extended-term eligible, (2) sufficiently informed defendant of the sentencing consequences prior to his admission into drug court, and (3) did not impose an excessive sentence.
¶2 In July 2024, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine (720
ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2024)) in two different cases and to possession of a stolen vehicle (625
ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2024)). Pursuant to his plea agreement, defendant was admitted into
the Henry County drug court program. In September 2024, following a hearing, defendant was
dismissed from the program. In November 2024, he was sentenced to eight concurrent years’
imprisonment for the aforementioned offenses. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court
committed plain error by failing to properly admonish him pursuant to section 5-8-2(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(b) (West 2024)) and section 25(b) of the
Drug Court Treatment Act (Act) (730 ILCS 166/25(b) (West 2024)). Additionally, he argues the
court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In Henry County case No. 24-CF-89, defendant was charged with possession of
methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2024)) for knowingly possessing less than five
grams of methamphetamine and driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a)
(West 2024)) on March 26, 2024. In Henry County case No. 24-CF-140, he was charged with
possession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2024)) for knowingly possessing
less than five grams of methamphetamine on May 7, 2024. In Henry County case No. 24-CF-
141, he was charged with possession of a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2024))
for possessing, on May 3, 2024, a 2012 Chevrolet Cruze, knowing it to have been stolen. In
Henry County case No. 24-CM-83, he was charged with two counts of battery (720 ILCS 5/12-
3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2024)) for punching Francis Sturm.
¶5 In July 2024, defendant pleaded guilty to (1) possession of methamphetamine as
charged in case No. 24-CF-89, (2) possession of methamphetamine as charged in case No.
24-CF-140, (3) possession of a stolen vehicle as charged in case No. 24-CF-141, and (4) two
counts of battery as charged in case No. 24-CM-83 in exchange for being accepted into the
Henry County drug court program. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court admonished
defendant he was eligible for a prison sentence for possessing methamphetamine in case No.
24-CF-89 “for a period of two to five years, up to ten years if you’re extended-term eligible.”
Regarding his plea for possessing methamphetamine in case No. 24-CF-140, the court
admonished defendant he was subject to the “same penalties” as in case No. 24-CF-89.
-2- Regarding his plea to possessing a stolen vehicle in case No. 24-CF-141, the court admonished
defendant he was eligible for a prison sentence of “three to seven years, up to 14 years if you’re
extended-term eligible.” Lastly, regarding his plea to battery in case No. 24-CM-83, the court
admonished defendant it was “punishable by up to 364 days in the county jail.” The court asked
defendant if he understood what he was “charged with and what the potential penalties are?”
Defendant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.”
¶6 The State provided a factual basis for the plea agreement, and the trial court found
defendant’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. The court also stated defendant
understood the charges and the “potential penalties.”
¶7 The record shows defendant signed a waiver of jury trial and plea of guilty. He
subsequently signed a consent to participate in the drug court program. Just above defendant’s
printed and signed name, the consent document states in bold, all-capital letters
“[DEFENDANT] UNDERSTAND[S] THAT THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM MAY BE AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR [HIM] TO AVOID CONVICTION, JAIL AND/OR PRISON.”
¶8 The trial court asked defendant if he had reviewed the consent document and had
any questions pertaining to it. Defendant replied “I read the mail pretty good. I’m ready, yeah.”
The court further stated defendant did not “have to stay in [drug court], but there certainly would
be other consequences if [he] fail[ed] to do so.” The court admitted defendant into the drug court
program and commented that drug court would require significant effort on defendant’s part to
successfully complete. Defendant subsequently stated: “No. I appreciate it. Prison’s [sic] easy for
me. I’m doing [drug court] because it’s not going to be easy. It’s what I need to do.”
¶9 On July 16, 2024, defendant appeared for his first drug court appearance, wherein
he admitted to smoking cannabis. The trial court expressed appreciation for defendant’s honesty
-3- and admonished him that cannabis use would not be permitted in drug court going forward.
¶ 10 On July 23, 2024, defendant appeared in drug court, wherein the trial court stated
he appeared to be “a little more stable.” Defendant agreed and stated he had missed an
Alcoholics Anonymous meeting the previous day. The court instructed defendant to focus on
organization and scheduling to avoid missing any further meetings.
¶ 11 On July 30, 2024, defendant failed to appear for drug court, and a warrant for his
arrest was issued.
¶ 12 On September 24, 2024, defendant appeared in drug court. The trial court
informed defendant the State would be filing a petition to revoke his participation in drug court.
The court issued defendant a sanction for his first failed drug test and remanded him to jail until
the hearing on the State’s petition to revoke.
¶ 13 On September 25, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s 24-month
drug court program participation, alleging defendant violated the terms by (1) testing positive for
methamphetamine on July 24, 2024, (2) failing to report for a scheduled drug screening on July
27, 2024, (3) failing to attend drug court on July 30, 2024, (4) failing to report to Bridgeway for
treatment four times a week as required since July 30, 2024, and (5) failing to provide at least
three support group meeting verifications per week as required since July 30, 2024.
¶ 14 On September 26, 2024, a hearing on the State’s petition occurred. Defendant
informed the trial court he intended to admit all of the allegations. The court stated it wanted to
“go over what [defendant was] charged with and what the potential penalties were, what [he] was
originally convicted of, make sure [he] understand[s] those.” The court informed defendant he
was subject to “two to five years, up to ten years if you’re extended-term eligible” for case No.
24-CF-89. Regarding case No. 24-CF-140, the court stated he was subject to the “same exact
-4- penalties that I just read to you in regards to [case No.] 24[-]CF[-]89.” Defendant stated he
understood. Regarding case No. 24-CF-141, the court informed defendant he was subject to
“three to seven years, up to 14 years if you’re extended-term eligible.” Regarding case No.
24-CM-83, the court informed defendant he was subject to 364 days in the county jail. The court
then asked defendant if he understood “what the original charges were and what the potential
penalties” were. Defendant said, “I do, Your Honor.” The court accepted defendant’s admission
as knowing and voluntary.
¶ 15 The trial court then turned to the issue of whether defendant would be permitted
to continue participating in drug court or be dismissed from it. Defendant testified on his own
behalf. He testified he would do “anything” to remain in drug court. He stated he was a drug
addict who has had a drug problem his entire life. He stated he had relapsed and then “panicked.”
He stated his relapse “ruined everything” and that he had become homeless.
¶ 16 Amberleigh Underwood, a drug court officer, testified on behalf of the State and
stated defendant told her she “would know when [defendant] was done [with drug court
participation] because he wouldn’t show up anymore.” No further evidence was presented.
¶ 17 The trial court subsequently dismissed defendant from the drug court program and
ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).
¶ 18 A sentencing hearing occurred on November 19, 2024. The PSI was admitted into
evidence without any notable additions or corrections. The PSI showed numerous juvenile
offenses. Defendant’s adult criminal record revealed numerous traffic and misdemeanor
offenses, many of which were drug-related . Defendant also had numerous felony convictions,
including, but not limited to, aggravated battery to a peace officer and obstruction of justice in
2006, for which he received probation. His probation was subsequently revoked, and he was
-5- sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In 2006, he was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
three years’ imprisonment. In 2011, he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. In 2013, he was convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. In 2018, he was convicted of
aggravated fleeing or eluding police and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In 2018, he was
also convicted of possessing a stolen vehicle and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. In 2020,
he was convicted of burglary and received probation, from which he was unsuccessfully
discharged. In 2022, he was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and aggravated fleeing
and eluding and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
¶ 19 No evidence in mitigation was offered. However, defendant made an unsworn
statement. He stated he struggled with addiction his entire life and, after he failed his first drug
test while in drug court, he “panicked.” He said he had spent “12 years” of his life in prison and
believed using drugs “doesn’t help [him]. It makes [him] worse.” He said there was no reason he
failed to attend Bridgeway because he lived “two blocks” away from it. He said he had a “good
job.” He reiterated prison would not help him. He noted his grandmother was dying and that
“really [was] hitting [him] hard.”
¶ 20 The trial court stated it had considered the nature and circumstances of the
offenses, the PSI, the statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation, any relevant nonstatutory
factors, defendant’s unsworn statement, the arguments from the parties, the cost of incarceration,
and the rehabilitative potential of defendant. The court noted, as a mitigating factor to his felony
convictions, defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another.
The court stated defendant had “a long criminal history,” which included violence. The court
stated defendant’s history did not support the factor that the circumstances were unlikely to recur
-6- “because they keep recurring over and over and over again.” The court found defendant’s
character and attitude indicated he was likely to commit another crime, he had failed to get his
drug problem under control despite multiple chances, he was not likely to comply with
probation, his prior juvenile delinquency and criminal history were aggravating factors, his
rehabilitative potential was “low,” and probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses
and be inconsistent with the ends of justice.
¶ 21 The trial court merged the battery convictions in case No. 24-CM-83 and
sentenced defendant to time served. Regarding the convictions for (1) possession of
methamphetamine in case No. 24-CF-89, (2) possession of methamphetamine in case No.
24-CF-140, and (3) possession of a stolen vehicle in case No. 24-CF-141, the court sentenced
defendant to three concurrent eight-year prison terms.
¶ 22 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing his sentence was excessive given
the facts and circumstances in his life at the time he had been charged with the offenses. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion.
¶ 23 This appeal followed.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 On appeal, defendant argues the sentencing court committed plain error when it
failed to properly admonish him pursuant to section 5-8-2(b) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(b)
(West 2024)) and section 25(b) of the Act (730 ILCS 166/25(b) (West 2024)) before imposing
sentence. Alternatively, he argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve these issues
on appeal. Lastly, he argues his sentence was excessive because the court failed to consider his
rehabilitative potential and mitigating evidence, such as his drug addiction. We address each
claim in turn.
-7- ¶ 26 A. Insufficient Admonishment Claims
¶ 27 Defendant concedes his first two claims are forfeited because they were not
preserved in his motion to reconsider his sentence. He asks that we review them under the plain-
error doctrine. Where a defendant forfeits a sentencing claim, “we may review this claim of error
only if [the] defendant has established plain error.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010).
To establish plain error, “a defendant must first show that a clear or obvious error occurred.” Id.
“In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show either that (1) the evidence at the
sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the
defendant of a fair sentencing hearing.” Id. “The first step of plain-error review is determining
whether any error occurred.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010).
¶ 28 1. Admonishment Pursuant to the Code Claim
¶ 29 Defendant’s first contention is the sentencing court committed plain error when it
failed to properly admonish him he was eligible for an extended-term sentence. He cites section
5-8-2(b) of the Code regarding extended-term sentencing, which states:
“If the conviction was by plea, it shall appear on the record that the
plea was entered with the defendant’s knowledge that a sentence
under this Section was a possibility. If it does not so appear on the
record, the defendant shall not be subject to such a sentence unless
he is first given an opportunity to withdraw his plea without
prejudice.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(b) (West 2024).
Defendant notes the court used conditional language when discussing his extended-term
eligibility, which, he claims, did not satisfy the requirements of section 5-8-2(b) of the Code. He
cites People v. Taylor, 368 Ill. App. 3d 703 (2006), for the proposition that when a sentencing
-8- court uses conditional extended-term admonishments, a defendant is left to speculate as to
whether an extended-term sentence is possible and the requirements of section 5-8-2(b) are, thus,
not satisfied.
¶ 30 In Taylor, the defendant pleaded guilty to two felonies, for which the trial court
admonished him the first felony was punishable by two to five years in prison and “ ‘if extended
term applies, it’s 2 to 10 years.’ ” Id. at 704. For the second felony, the court admonished the
defendant, “ ‘If extended term applies, the term is instead of 1 to 3 years in prison, it’s 1 to 6
years in prison.’ ” Id. The defendant was sentenced to probation, which was later revoked, and
the court sentenced defendant to concurrent extended-term sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Id. at 706. The appellate court, applying People v. Eisenberg, 109 Ill. App. 3d 98 (1982), found
the court’s admonishments failed to inform the defendant he was eligible for extended-term
sentencing, noting the court “merely stated that, if [the defendant] were eligible, certain penalties
could follow.” (Emphasis in original.) Taylor, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 708. The appellate court
concluded the court’s “conditional, tentative admonishment leaves a defendant to speculate
whether an extended-term sentence is indeed possible in his case. Therefore, it does not establish
that section 5-8-2(b) of the Code has been satisfied.” Id. The appellate court went on to note the
record reinforced the presumption the defendant did not know an extended-term sentence was
possible, noting the trial court and the parties at the defendant’s guilty plea hearing “expressed
uncertainty about [the] defendant’s prior convictions.” Id. At the defendant’s resentencing, the
court and parties still “apparently did not realize” the defendant had a qualifying conviction for
extended-term eligibility pursuant to section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Code (730 ILCS 5-5-3.2(b)(1)
(West 2004)). Taylor, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 708. Additionally, the defendant’s postplea counsel had
“ ‘attempted to explain’ ” extended-term eligibility to the defendant after he had pleaded guilty.
-9- Id. The court concluded, “[T]he record creates doubt that, when defendant pleaded guilty,
anyone realized that he was eligible for extended-term sentencing.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at
708-09.
¶ 31 The dissent in Taylor disagreed with the majority’s conclusion the trial court’s
sentencing admonishments failed to satisfy the requirements of section 5-8-2(b) of the Code. Id.
at 710-12 (Kapala, J., dissenting in part). The dissent noted:
“Eisenberg does not address what statement by a trial court
sufficiently informs a defendant of the possibility that he could
receive an extended-term sentence. Unlike the case at bar, in
Eisenberg there was no indication in the record the court informed
the defendant of the possibility of an extended-term sentence.” Id.
at 710 (Kapala, J., dissenting in part).
The dissent further stated:
“The majority concludes the trial court judge’s statement to
defendant that ‘[i]f extended term applies, it’s 2 to 10 years’ was
too tentative to demonstrate that [the] defendant had knowledge
that an extended-term sentence was a possibility. I disagree.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘possibility’ as, “An event that
may or may not happen.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1185 (7th ed.
1999). Accordingly, section 5-8-2(b) required only that the record
reflect that [the] defendant knew that an extended-term sentence
may or may not occur. When the trial court judge informed [the]
defendant of the consequences of extended-term sentencing, she
- 10 - alerted [the] defendant to the fact that a sentence of 2 to 10 years’
imprisonment may or may not happen. I do not believe that using
the term ‘if’ before ‘extended term’ negates the defendant’s
knowledge of the possibility of extended-term sentencing. In fact,
by using the term ‘if,’ the trial court specifically indicated that
extended-term sentencing may or may not apply and, thus,
suggested that it was a possibility for [the] defendant.” Id. at 711
(Kapala, J., dissenting in part).
¶ 32 In the instant case, defendant is requesting this court to construe section 5-8-2(b)
as the majority did in Taylor. However, we agree with the dissent in Taylor. See, e.g., People v.
Taylor, 2022 IL App (4th) 210614-U, ¶ 35 (where this court—in a factually distinguishable
case—had previously agreed with the dissent in Taylor). “The primary objective of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.” People v. Clark,
2019 IL 122891, ¶ 18. “The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the
statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. ¶ 20. “Issues requiring statutory interpretation
are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Evans v. Cook County State’s Attorney, 2021 IL
125513, ¶ 27.
¶ 33 The pertinent phrase from section 5-8-2(b) is “it shall appear on the record that
the plea was entered with the defendant’s knowledge that a sentence under this Section was a
possibility.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(b) (West 2024). Thus, the critical question is whether the trial
court’s admonishments, which used conditional language, were sufficient to inform defendant an
extended-term sentence was a possibility.
¶ 34 As the dissent in Taylor noted, “possibility” refers to something that may or may
- 11 - not happen. Taylor, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 711 (Kapala, J., dissenting in part); see Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (showing this remains a definition of possibility); see also People v.
Hill, 409 Ill. App. 3d 451, 454 (2011) (“The ordinary and popularly understood meaning of a
word may be determined by utilizing the dictionary definition.”). Here, when the trial court
informed defendant of the possible penalties, it informed him of the extended-term sentences by
saying, “if you’re extended-term eligible.” The court’s mere use of “if” did not remove the
specter of the possibility that defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence.
¶ 35 There are finite sets of instantiations where a defendant can be admonished as it
relates to extended-term sentence eligibility. In one set, the court makes no mention of extended-
term sentences regardless of whether a defendant is extended-term eligible, and as such, the court
has failed to inform a defendant of the possibility of such a sentence. For example, this appeared
to be the case in Eisenberg, upon which the majority in Taylor relied. In the other set, the court
makes mention of extended-term sentencing, whether correct or not, and the defendant, for better
or for worse, i.e., whether it would be error not, is now privy to its possibility. This case falls
within this latter set. This is not to say a court’s mere mention of extended-term sentencing
automatically entails a defendant is subject to such sentencing in all cases. The clearest example
would involve a court mentioning extended-term sentencing and explicitly telling a defendant
they would not be subject to such potential penalties. However, that is not the case here.
¶ 36 The trial court’s use of “if” in this case did not remove the possibility defendant
was subject to an extended-term sentence. “If’ as a conjunction means “in the event that” or “on
condition that.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/if#dictionary-entry-2 (last visited
July 24, 2025). “If,” thus, connotates something that may happen. See, e.g., Golden v. Puccinelli,
2016 IL App (1st) 150921, ¶ 43 (Gordon, J., dissenting in part) (defining “if” as something that
- 12 - may happen). Therefore, by the very nature of using “if,” the court created a possibility. When
the court used “if,” it was an indicative conditional statement about a possible set of future
sentencing consequences.
¶ 37 While it remains best practice for trial courts and parties to make matters, such as
sentencing, explicitly clear as early in the proceedings as possible, the court’s use of conditional
language here did not obviate the fact defendant had been informed of the possibility he was
subject to an extended-term sentence. We find the record sufficiently demonstrates defendant
knew or should have known he was subject to an extended-term sentence and, thus, section 5-8-
2(b) of the Code was satisfied. Accordingly, defendant has not shown an error occurred, and
without error, there can be no plain error. Defendant’s alternative claim, i.e., counsel was
ineffective for failing to preserve this issue, fails for the same reason. See People v. Hensley,
2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47 (“Similarly, the failure of a defendant to show that error
occurred at all defeats both an ineffective assistance claim and a claim of error under either
prong of the plain error doctrine.”).
¶ 38 2. Admonishment Pursuant to the Act Claim
¶ 39 Defendant next contends the trial court failed to comply with section 25(b) of the
Act by not informing him that if he failed to meet the conditions of the drug court program, he
could be sentenced for the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Section 25(b) states:
“The judge shall inform the defendant that if the defendant fails to
meet the conditions of the drug court program, eligibility to
participate in the program may be revoked and the defendant may
be sentenced or the prosecution continued as provided in the
[Code] for the crime charged.” 730 ILCS 166/25(b) (West 2024).
- 13 - ¶ 40 The State argues section 25(b) should be given a directory reading rather than a
mandatory reading. Based on our review of the record, we find a mandatory/directory distinction
is not necessary because the record shows defendant was both informed and knew his failure to
meet the conditions of drug court could result in him being incarcerated.
¶ 41 The record shows the trial court only explicitly informed defendant of “other
consequences” for failing to meet the conditions of the drug court program. The consent
document defendant signed to enter drug court explicitly admonished defendant that
incarceration was an alternative consequence. The court specifically asked defendant about this
document and whether he understood it. Defendant stated he read it “pretty good” and
understood it. Section 25(b) does not direct how or what words must be used for a court to
inform a defendant of the consequences of failing to meet the conditions of drug court. Again,
we reiterate it is best practice for courts and parties to be explicitly clear as early in the relevant
proceedings as possible of a defendant’s potential consequences. The record here demonstrates
defendant was informed of other consequences, specifically, incarceration, as an alternative to
drug court. Additionally, defendant volunteered that prison was “easy” for him, but participating
in drug court would not be, which gives further credence he was well aware of what failing to
participate in or successfully complete drug court would entail. Therefore, we find the court’s
admonishments satisfied section 25(b). Accordingly, defendant has failed to show error occurred,
and without error, there can be no plain error. Because he has failed to show error, he cannot,
alternatively, show ineffective assistance of counsel. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47.
¶ 42 B. Excessive Sentence Claims
¶ 43 Lastly, defendant argues his sentence was excessive because there was substantial
mitigating evidence the sentencing court failed to consider. He notes the court described his
- 14 - rehabilitative potential as “low” and “small” and referenced his previous rehabilitative efforts
were unsuccessful, leaving punishment as the alternative. He contends this shows the court failed
to consider his rehabilitative potential. He also maintains the court failed to consider the highly
mitigating evidence his drug addiction played in his criminal conduct.
¶ 44 “The legislature sets forth by statute the range of permissible sentences for each
class of criminal offense.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). A reviewing court affords
great deference to a trial court’s sentencing judgment because, “having observed the defendant
and the proceedings, [it] is in a far better position to consider such factors as the defendant’s
credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, and habits than a
reviewing court, which must rely on a ‘cold’ record.” People v. Little, 2011 IL App (4th)
090787, ¶ 24. A sentence that falls within the applicable statutory limits is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36. “A sentence within statutory
limits will not be deemed excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion unless it is ‘greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense.’ ” People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20 (quoting Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54).
¶ 45 Because defendant was only sentenced to prison for the felony offenses for which
he pleaded guilty, we focus exclusively on those convictions. Defendant pleaded guilty to
possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine in two distinct cases, both Class 3
felonies. See 720 ILCS 646/60(b)(1) (West 2024). He also pleaded guilty to possession of a
stolen vehicle, a Class 2 felony. See 625 ILCS 5/4-103(b) (West 2024). Pursuant to the Code,
each possession of methamphetamine conviction subjected defendant to a prison term of 2 to 5
years, with an extended-term sentencing range of 5 to 10 years. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a)
(West 2024). For possession of a stolen vehicle, defendant was subject to a prison term of 3 to 7
- 15 - years, with an extended-term range of 7 to 14 years. Id. § 5-4.5-35(a). The trial court found
defendant was extended-term eligible and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment for all
three convictions, to be served concurrently. See id. § 5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(a). Because defendant’s
sentence was within the permissible range, we begin with the presumption the sentence was
proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.
¶ 46 To rebut this presumption, defendant’s first contention is the trial court’s
description of his rehabilitative potential as “low” and “small” and reference to his previous
rehabilitative efforts as unsuccessful showed the court failed to consider his rehabilitative
potential.
¶ 47 The trial court is not required to recite each factor it considers when sentencing a
defendant. People v. McDonald, 322 Ill. App. 3d 244, 251 (2001). Where mitigating evidence is
before the court, it is presumed the court considered it. Id. Additionally, “that presumption will
not be overcome without explicit evidence from the record that the *** court did not consider
mitigating factors.” People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158 (2010).
¶ 48 The fact that the sentencing court described defendant’s rehabilitative potential as
low demonstrates, in contrast to defendant’s argument, the court considered his rehabilitative
potential, found the lack of it aggravating, and concluded punishment was necessary. Both,
punishment and rehabilitative potential are relevant considerations at sentencing. People v.
Ferguson, 2021 IL App (3d) 200041, ¶ 12. Given defendant’s lengthy criminal history, which
has included numerous prison sentences and failed probation sentences, we find the court’s
diminished view of defendant’s rehabilitative potential reasonable. Accordingly, we find the
court appropriately considered defendant’s rehabilitative potential before imposing sentence.
¶ 49 Defendant also contends the trial court failed to consider the highly mitigating
- 16 - evidence his drug addiction played in his criminal conduct. We disagree.
¶ 50 First, the Code does not identify drug addiction as a factor in mitigation or
aggravation, and “the [sentencing] court is not required to view drug addiction as a mitigating
factor.” People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105. However, for the sake of
argument, even if we were to consider drug addiction as a nonstatutory mitigating factor in this
case, the mere fact a mitigating factor exists does not outweigh the various aggravating factors
the trial court noted in its decision. A court is not required to afford greater weight to mitigating
factors than to the severity of the offense. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010); see
People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002) (noting the seriousness of the offense is the
most important sentencing factor). Nor does the presence of mitigating factors require a
minimum sentence. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55. Ultimately, the court was
in a better position to observe defendant’s conduct and weigh the need for a harsher sentence.
Accordingly, we find defendant’s sentence was not unduly excessive and, thus, not an abuse of
discretion.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
- 17 -