[146]*146Opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
We reaffirm the requirement that trial counsel’s request for a pretrial lineup must be timely (see Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625-626 [114 Cal.Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681]), and conclude that, under the circumstances in this case, defendant’s motion was late.
Defendant Craig Baines and his codefendant Michael Jones (not a party to this appeal) were charged with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; further statutory references are to this code) with use of a firearm (§ 12022.5). Following his conviction by a jury, defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of seven years. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was improperly denied the right to a pretrial lineup; (2) he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct; (3) his sentence was erroneously enhanced by dual consideration of his use and possession of a firearm; and (4) he is entitled to credit for time served in county jail prior to his imprisonment.
The incident in question occurred in Los Angeles on December 30, 1978. After attending a party, victims Wilson and Pickens walked to their parked car where they encountered two men later identified by them as defendant and his codefendant. Defendant pointed a gun at the victims and either defendant or Jones told Wilson to hand over his money and jewelry. After receiving various items from Wilson, Jones then confronted Pickens and reached into his pocket. Pickens gave Jones his watch and $5. The robbers then departed, and Wilson and Pickens observed them entering what appeared to be a green Maverick automobile. Wilson stopped a passing police car, reported the robbery, and the victims then followed the officers in their own car in pursuit of a green Mercury automobile (similar in appearance to a Maverick) which was observed to be moving rapidly down the street. The red light and siren of the police car were activated and the Mercury ran a stop sign. During the chase, the officer observed one of the occupants of the Mercury throw a dark oblong object from the car.
The Mercury eventually stopped, and its five occupants were ordered from the car. Jones was identified as the driver and defendant was riding in the front passenger seat. Two females and another male were passengers in the back seat of the car. Wilson and Pickens confronted the occupants of the Mercury and identified both defendant and Jones as the robbers. Wilson recognized as his own the black leather coat [147]*147which Jones was wearing and a chain and ring which were taken from the female occupants. A loaded gun was later found in the area of the robbers’ escape route.
At trial, the female passengers each testified that items of the victims’ property were thrown into the back seat by one or both of the co-defendants after the officers began their pursuit, and the victims again identified codefendants as the robbers. Jones did not testify. Defendant, however, took the stand and denied any participation in the robbery or that he threw any objects into the back seat of the car, claiming that he was simply accompanying Jones and his friends as they drove home from a party.
1. Right to Pretrial Lineup
The sequence and timing of pretrial procedures is significant in our disposition of defendant’s assertion of prejudice in the denial of his motion for pretrial lineup. The robbery occurred on December 30, 1978; on January 4, 1979, the public defender was appointed to represent defendant; on January 18, private counsel was engaged to represent defendant after the public defender declared a conflict of interest, and the preliminary examination was set for January 30; on that date, following a hearing, both defendants were held to answer the complaint, and the arraignment was scheduled for February 13, 1979.
On February 13, the information was filed, new private counsel was appointed to represent defendant, and an arraignment was held; trial was set for March 30, 1979, and a pretrial hearing was scheduled for March 15 for the purpose of hearing any pretrial motions; on March 15, defendant moved for a pretrial lineup; the People objected to the motion, and after a hearing on March 21 the trial court denied defendant’s motion as untimely. The trial court observed: “As I understand this, the date of this [proposed lineup] would be approximately 90 days after the date of the incident and 60 days after his [defendant’s] preliminary hearing. That is the problem .... [¶] We’re talking about timeliness. And it’s not necessarily timeliness in respect to the trial date. That’s a coincidence.” Defendant asserts error.
We have held that “due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate. The right to a lineup arises, however, only when eyewitness identification is [148]*148shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to resolve.” (Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, italics added and fn. omitted.) We further explained in Evans that the trial court has broad discretion to deny an untimely motion for a lineup, concluding that “Such motion should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable. We note that motions which are not made until shortly before trial should, unless good cause is clearly demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such delay.” (P. 626, italics added.)
The People apparently concede that defendant made a sufficient factual showing to justify a pretrial lineup. As defendant observed in his moving papers, the offense occurred late at night, the victims had been drinking and were initially confused as to which defendant held the gun, and several other cars were leaving the party at the time of the crime, enhancing the possibility of a mistaken identification of the robbers’ car or its occupants. The People contend, however, that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion as untimely.
Defendant excuses his delay by reliance on a local rule of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Criminal Division, which states: “At the time of arraignment and plea, in addition to the setting of the trial date, a pretrial conference hearing date shall be set in every case within 30 days. All pretrial motions shall be noticed for the pretrial conference date.” In the present case, counsel’s motion for pretrial lineup was filed in compliance with the foregoing rule.
Defendant fails to explain, however, why his motion was not made to a magistrate prior to his arraignment on February 13, 1979. In Evans, we specifically noted that a motion for pretrial lineup should be presented to the “trial judge or magistrate” and “should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable.” (11 Cal.3d at p. 626, italics added; see also People v. Vallez (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 46, 55-56 [143 Cal.Rptr. 914].) The value of a pretrial lineup is substantially diminished once a preliminary examination has been conducted and a direct confrontation between a defendant and his accusers has occurred.
In the present case, defendant was arrested on December 30, 1978; the preliminary examination was held on January 30, 1979, and the [149]
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[146]*146Opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
We reaffirm the requirement that trial counsel’s request for a pretrial lineup must be timely (see Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625-626 [114 Cal.Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681]), and conclude that, under the circumstances in this case, defendant’s motion was late.
Defendant Craig Baines and his codefendant Michael Jones (not a party to this appeal) were charged with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; further statutory references are to this code) with use of a firearm (§ 12022.5). Following his conviction by a jury, defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of seven years. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was improperly denied the right to a pretrial lineup; (2) he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct; (3) his sentence was erroneously enhanced by dual consideration of his use and possession of a firearm; and (4) he is entitled to credit for time served in county jail prior to his imprisonment.
The incident in question occurred in Los Angeles on December 30, 1978. After attending a party, victims Wilson and Pickens walked to their parked car where they encountered two men later identified by them as defendant and his codefendant. Defendant pointed a gun at the victims and either defendant or Jones told Wilson to hand over his money and jewelry. After receiving various items from Wilson, Jones then confronted Pickens and reached into his pocket. Pickens gave Jones his watch and $5. The robbers then departed, and Wilson and Pickens observed them entering what appeared to be a green Maverick automobile. Wilson stopped a passing police car, reported the robbery, and the victims then followed the officers in their own car in pursuit of a green Mercury automobile (similar in appearance to a Maverick) which was observed to be moving rapidly down the street. The red light and siren of the police car were activated and the Mercury ran a stop sign. During the chase, the officer observed one of the occupants of the Mercury throw a dark oblong object from the car.
The Mercury eventually stopped, and its five occupants were ordered from the car. Jones was identified as the driver and defendant was riding in the front passenger seat. Two females and another male were passengers in the back seat of the car. Wilson and Pickens confronted the occupants of the Mercury and identified both defendant and Jones as the robbers. Wilson recognized as his own the black leather coat [147]*147which Jones was wearing and a chain and ring which were taken from the female occupants. A loaded gun was later found in the area of the robbers’ escape route.
At trial, the female passengers each testified that items of the victims’ property were thrown into the back seat by one or both of the co-defendants after the officers began their pursuit, and the victims again identified codefendants as the robbers. Jones did not testify. Defendant, however, took the stand and denied any participation in the robbery or that he threw any objects into the back seat of the car, claiming that he was simply accompanying Jones and his friends as they drove home from a party.
1. Right to Pretrial Lineup
The sequence and timing of pretrial procedures is significant in our disposition of defendant’s assertion of prejudice in the denial of his motion for pretrial lineup. The robbery occurred on December 30, 1978; on January 4, 1979, the public defender was appointed to represent defendant; on January 18, private counsel was engaged to represent defendant after the public defender declared a conflict of interest, and the preliminary examination was set for January 30; on that date, following a hearing, both defendants were held to answer the complaint, and the arraignment was scheduled for February 13, 1979.
On February 13, the information was filed, new private counsel was appointed to represent defendant, and an arraignment was held; trial was set for March 30, 1979, and a pretrial hearing was scheduled for March 15 for the purpose of hearing any pretrial motions; on March 15, defendant moved for a pretrial lineup; the People objected to the motion, and after a hearing on March 21 the trial court denied defendant’s motion as untimely. The trial court observed: “As I understand this, the date of this [proposed lineup] would be approximately 90 days after the date of the incident and 60 days after his [defendant’s] preliminary hearing. That is the problem .... [¶] We’re talking about timeliness. And it’s not necessarily timeliness in respect to the trial date. That’s a coincidence.” Defendant asserts error.
We have held that “due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate. The right to a lineup arises, however, only when eyewitness identification is [148]*148shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to resolve.” (Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, italics added and fn. omitted.) We further explained in Evans that the trial court has broad discretion to deny an untimely motion for a lineup, concluding that “Such motion should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable. We note that motions which are not made until shortly before trial should, unless good cause is clearly demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such delay.” (P. 626, italics added.)
The People apparently concede that defendant made a sufficient factual showing to justify a pretrial lineup. As defendant observed in his moving papers, the offense occurred late at night, the victims had been drinking and were initially confused as to which defendant held the gun, and several other cars were leaving the party at the time of the crime, enhancing the possibility of a mistaken identification of the robbers’ car or its occupants. The People contend, however, that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion as untimely.
Defendant excuses his delay by reliance on a local rule of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Criminal Division, which states: “At the time of arraignment and plea, in addition to the setting of the trial date, a pretrial conference hearing date shall be set in every case within 30 days. All pretrial motions shall be noticed for the pretrial conference date.” In the present case, counsel’s motion for pretrial lineup was filed in compliance with the foregoing rule.
Defendant fails to explain, however, why his motion was not made to a magistrate prior to his arraignment on February 13, 1979. In Evans, we specifically noted that a motion for pretrial lineup should be presented to the “trial judge or magistrate” and “should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable.” (11 Cal.3d at p. 626, italics added; see also People v. Vallez (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 46, 55-56 [143 Cal.Rptr. 914].) The value of a pretrial lineup is substantially diminished once a preliminary examination has been conducted and a direct confrontation between a defendant and his accusers has occurred.
In the present case, defendant was arrested on December 30, 1978; the preliminary examination was held on January 30, 1979, and the [149]*149arraignment occurred on February 13. Defendant was represented throughout by counsel, albeit by different ones. He does not claim that they were inadequate, but no justification is offered for his failure to seek, in the municipal court, a prompt lineup. Moreover, although defendant acquired new private counsel to represent him at the arraignment, we cannot assume that any prejudicial gap in legal representation occurred prior to that time. Section 987.1 provides, “Counsel at the preliminary examination shall continue to represent a defendant who has been ordered to stand trial until the date set for his arraignment in superior court unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause.”
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion as untimely.
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during defendant’s cross-examination. The record discloses the following colloquy:
“Q: When you were arrested you gave your name as Banks, didn’t you?
“A: No. I gave my name as Craig Baines.
“Q: Not Craig Banks?”
“A: No.”
The prosecutor made no further attempt to prove his accusation, thereby leaving the jury with an unproven suggestion that defendant may have used a false name. Defendant neither objected to the interrogation nor requested any appropriate admonition. Such an objection or admonition would have cured any harm and, accordingly, defendant must be deemed to have waived the asserted misconduct. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) The prosecutor’s reference was brief and limited. “Any harmful effect of the prosecutor’s conduct could be obviated or cured by an appropriate admonition.” (People v. Chojnacky (1973) 8 Cal.3d 759, 765 [106 Cal. Rptr. 106, 505 P.2d 530].)
[150]*1503. Improper Calculation of Sentence
Although the trial court orally sentenced defendant to six years in prison, the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects a seven-year sentence. The error appears to be a clerical one and the People have agreed that “The oral pronouncement ... imposed a term of four years for robbery plus a two-year enhancement for use of a firearm, for a total of six years .... The abstract 'and minute order reflecting a seven-year term are therefore in error and should be corrected.”
4. Precommitment Jailtime Credits
Defendant claims he is entitled to certain credits against his state prison sentence for time spent in county jail after judgment but before transfer to state prison. We may assume that the Department of Corrections properly will calculate these credits upon defendant’s appropriate request therefor.
The judgment is modified to reflect that defendant is sentenced to an aggregate term of six years in state prison. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Newman, J., and Schauer, J.,
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council