2026 IL App (1st) 232350 No. 1-23-2350 Opinion filed March 27, 2026
FIFTH DIVISION
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No.16 CR 0807001 ) JOHN E. ARNOLD, ) The Honorable ) Michael Joseph Kane, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. )
JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant John E. Arnold, age 67, was found guilty by a jury of the first degree
murders of his fellow senior-community residents, David Bosseler and Kruka Ajemba.
Bosseler, who was 74 years old, was stabbed 32 times and disemboweled, while Ajemba, who
apparently came to Bosseler’s aid, was stabbed three times. Rejecting an insanity defense, the
jury found defendant guilty but mentally ill, and the trial court sentenced him to natural life in
prison, a sentence which was statutorily required due to the death of two victims. 730 ILCS No. 1-23-2350
5/5-8-1(a)(c) (West 2022) (“the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life
imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the
age of 18, and *** (ii) is found guilty of murdering more than one victim”).
¶2 On this direct appeal, defendant claims (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to give
certain jury instructions and (2) that a natural life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him
because of his mental illness. With respect to the jury instructions, defendant claims that the
trial court refused to give (1) a Lynch instruction (People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 199-200
(1984)) with respect to victim Bosseler and (2) self-defense and second-degree murder
instructions with respect to victim Ajemba, although they were provided with respect to victim
Bosseler. Infra ¶¶ 31-33 (explanation of a Lynch instruction). Regarding the sentencing issue,
defendant alleges the court failed to consider his mental illness when, after a hearing, the trial
court found, among other things, that “even if the law weren’t what the law is, the mitigating
circumstances that I’ve been provided with or that were provided during the course of the trial
were not terribly persuasive.” For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The evidence at trial established, and no one disputes on appeal, that defendant and the
victims were neighbors who lived in a senior community. Defendant lived on the first floor,
while Bosseler and Ajemba lived in a two-bedroom apartment on the sixth floor.
¶5 Surveillance video showed defendant walking down the sixth-floor hallway with a
chair toward Bosseler’s apartment a few minutes before 7 a.m. on April 24, 2016, the day of
the murders. At 7 a.m., defendant reached the end of the hallway, sat in a chair in front of
Bosseler’s apartment, and waited. At 7:41 a.m., Bosseler opened his front door, and defendant
ran into Bosseler’s home. At 7:46 p.m., defendant exited Bosseler’s home and walked back to
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his own unit. Just a few minutes later, at 7:50 a.m., defendant went back to Bosseler’s sixth-
floor unit to remove the chair that he had brought earlier.
¶6 At trial, there was little issue regarding who the perpetrator was or how the victims had
died. Bosseler was found, lying on his bed, disemboweled, with multiple stab wounds. Ajemba
was found against the inside of the second bedroom door, holding the door shut, with puncture
wounds to her left side. The medical examiner found that Bosseler, who was 68 inches and 260
pounds, had 32 stab wounds, while Ajemba, who was 63 inches and 147 pounds, had 3 stab
wounds. The primary issue at trial was defendant’s mental state and motive. In a videotaped
statement, defendant claimed, among other things, to have acted out of self-defense.
¶7 Police recorded two interviews with defendant: the first, on April 25, 2016, lasted
approximately three hours; the second, on April 26, lasted approximately eight minutes. During
the first interview, defendant changed his account and sometimes gave contradictory answers.
In essence, defendant stated that he was friends with Bosseler and that, when defendant’s car
broke down, defendant gave Bosseler $50 to drive defendant to get his car fixed. Defendant
left his identification card (ID) in Bosseler’s car, but Bosseler would not give it back.
Defendant claimed that Bosseler was moving and was mad that defendant would not buy
Bosseler’s furniture. Defendant said he called the police, and he claimed that Bosseler would
not open the door when the police came. Defendant eventually admitted that he had waited
outside of Bosseler’s apartment on the morning of the murder. Defendant claimed that Bosseler
had hit or assaulted him on prior occasions. Defendant alleged, at one point, that Bosseler had
pulled him into the apartment on the day in question and reached for a knife. Defendant stated
that he told Bosseler he wanted his ID back, the two argued, Bosseler hit him, and defendant
hit back to defend himself. At one point, defendant said he did not see Ajemba in the apartment,
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and at another point, he said he hit her with a screwdriver when she tried to help Bosseler. At
one point, he admitted stabbing Bosseler.
¶8 During the first interview, defendant admitted, among other things, to having thrown
out his shoes because they had blood on them. Police testified that, from a nearby dumpster,
they retrieved a bag containing a pair of gym shoes with blood that was later tested and matched
Bosseler’s DNA. A jacket with blood was retrieved from defendant’s apartment and also
matched Bosseler’s DNA. A detective testified to retrieving defendant’s ID from Bosseler’s
car.
¶9 During the second interview, defendant claimed, among other things, that he killed
Bosseler by accident. Defendant went up there to scare Bosseler. Bosseler called defendant an
asshole and reached for a knife; defendant also had a knife, which he had brought from his
own home. When Ajemba tried to help Bosseler and attacked defendant, defendant stabbed her
to get her off of himself.
¶ 10 A detective testified that, prior to the second videotaped interview, defendant told the
detective that he killed Bosseler, that he could not believe that he had killed anyone, and that
he killed Ajemba because she was defending Bosseler.
¶ 11 The defense called two witnesses: Dawn Joyce, who had met defendant at church, and
Dr. Erick Neu, a forensic psychologist who had examined defendant before trial and found him
sane at the time of the offense. Joyce testified that she had met defendant in 2012 or 2013 and
that defendant regularly attended church until April 2016. However, in early 2016, she noticed
that his behavior changed, that he was not thinking clearly, and that he was slipping. In her
opinion, he was not capable of making decisions or distinguishing right from wrong.
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¶ 12 Dr. Neu testified. that based on his examination of defendant’s medical records, his
evaluation of defendant, and an interview with defendant’s nephew, his “primary diagnosis”
was schizophrenia, which was acutely symptomatic at the time of the murders. His “secondary
diagnosis” was “substance abuse” involving heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. Dr. Neu found that
defendant’s drug use greatly exacerbated his symptoms. As to defendant’s sanity, Dr. Neu
found him legally sane at the time of the offense. While defendant’s symptoms impaired his
judgment, defendant knew right from wrong.
¶ 13 After listening to closing arguments and jury instruction, the jury found defendant
guilty but mentally ill of the two murders. Defendant filed a motion to declare unconstitutional
as applied to him the statutory section that required the imposition of natural life due to the
murder of two victims. After the State’s written memo and a hearing on this issue, the trial
court denied defendant’s motion, stating:
“There is no case specifically on point with regards to a finding of guilty but
mentally ill, but there is People v. Robinson [2021 IL App (1st) 192289], which came
out of the 1st District in May of 2021 before we tried this case which is almost on point
because of the nature of the trial where the lawyers submitted to the court as much
material with regards to the defendant’s mental health as this court has heard. Now I’ve
been through a number of records that I had before trial and those confirm that Mr.
Arnold did have a psychiatric issue which I heard about during the course of the trial.
In Robinson, the case had been remanded for resentencing. And in that case, the
counsel argued that the sentencing statute requiring a natural life sentence was
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant under the proportion of penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution. However, Justice Burke referenced the fact that the Illinois
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Supreme Court had dealt with this issue while the case was pending and Justice Burke
went into great detail to explain why that sentencing provision is constitutional. And in
the Supreme Court case [People v.] Coty, [2020 IL 123972,] the court found that the
mandatory life sentence imposed on the intellectually disabled defendant did not violate
the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him. The Legislature had the power to
prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and the power necessarily includes the
authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences restricted the
judiciary’s discretion with regards to sentences. In that case, the court acknowledged
that the record, as in this case, demonstrated a long-term struggle with behavioral
problems, complying with rules, et cetera.
And so, while there was no finding of guilty but mentally ill in that case, in
mitigation there were numerous documents and medical records submitted to the
sentencing judge and the [reviewing court] found that in spite of that evidence that the
sentencing provision was constitutional.
And for that reason, this court agrees with Robinson and Coty and finds that the
argument is misplaced under these circumstances, and the statutory provision is
constitutional.”
¶ 14 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation,
including that defendant had no prior felony convictions. After listening to evidence, the
defendant’s remarks and argument, the trial court found: “It does appear to me that this crime,
at least as to the gentleman, was premeditated.” The trial court further found:
“[E]ven if the law weren’t what the law is, the mitigating circumstances that I’ve been
provided or that were provided during the course of the trial were not terribly
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persuasive. I mean, there was no evidence to suggest he was insane at the time of the
crime. There was an opinion that he had some mental issues. But, you know, half the
county jail is populated by people who have some kind of mental issues. I mean, the
actions in this case defy explanation with regards to a motive as far as I’m concerned.
And these two people died for no reason. I mean, no reason whatsoever.”
The trial court then imposed the statutorily required sentence of natural life. Defense counsel
immediately made a motion to reconsider sentence, which, as the trial court described, was
“two paragraphs with regards to the constitutionality of the imprisonment under the sentencing
statute.” Neither party wanted argument on the motion, and the trial court denied it. This appeal
followed.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 I. Jury Instructions
¶ 17 On this appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to provide three
requested instructions, namely, self-defense and second degree murder instructions regarding
Ajemba, and a Lynch instruction regarding Bosseler’s allegedly violent prior behavior toward
defendant.
¶ 18 A. Standard of Review
¶ 19 In defendant’s opening brief, he argued that the question of whether a defendant had
presented sufficient evidence to justify giving a particular instruction was a question of law,
which this court should review de novo. In support, he cited the Illinois Supreme Court cases
of People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 19, and People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 157
(1990). In response, the State argued that, in the subsequent case of People v. McDonald, 2016
IL 118882, ¶¶ 27-30, 39-41, the supreme court had analyzed both Washington and Everette in
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depth and found that these cases had not, in fact, applied de novo review to this issue. The
McDonald court found that a litigant who cited these cases as supporting de novo review had
misread them. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42
¶ 20 The McDonald court concluded: “when the trial court, after reviewing all the evidence,
determines that there is insufficient evidence to justify the giving of a jury instruction, the
proper standard of review of that decision is abuse of discretion.” McDonald, 2016 IL 118882,
¶ 42. Similarly, in the more recent case of People v. Sloan, 2024 IL 129676, ¶ 15, the supreme
court cited McDonald with approval and held: “We review a trial court’s decision denying a
jury instruction request for an abuse of discretion.” Thus, the abuse-of-discretion standard of
review is firmly established in our supreme court’s precedent. 1
¶ 21 When determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that would
lessen the offense, the trial court must consider whether there is “some evidence” in the record
that, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime charged. People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL
123525, ¶ 72; McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 25; see Sloan, 2024 IL 129676, ¶ 15. When
applying this familiar “some evidence” standard, the trial court should not weigh the evidence
or judge its credibility. Sloan, 2024 IL 129676, ¶ 15; Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 72;
McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 25.
¶ 22 When a trial court determines that there was insufficient evidence to justify the giving
of an instruction, our standard of review, as noted above, is abuse of discretion. Sloan, 2024
1 In his reply brief, defendant acknowledged that, while the decision of whether to give a particular instruction is left to the discretion of the trial judge, the issue of whether an instruction conveyed the applicable law is subject to de novo review. However, on this appeal, defendant does not call upon us to determine the correctness of an instruction, but rather asks us to find that the trial court erred by refusing to provide certain instructions. Thus, the parties now appear to be in agreement that our standard of review is abuse of discretion, and our reading of recent supreme court cases confirms that they are correct. E.g., Sloan, 2024 IL 129676, ¶ 15 8 No. 1-23-2350
IL 129676, ¶ 15; Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 72; McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42. An abuse
of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful or so unreasonable
that no reasonable person would agree with it. Sloan, 2024 IL 129676, ¶ 15. The question is
not whether we would have made the same decision in the first instance, but whether the trial
court’s decision was unreasonable. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 32.
¶ 23 B. Second Degree Murder and Self-Defense Instructions
¶ 24 Defendant argues that his recorded statements supported giving second-degree murder
and self-defense instructions regarding Ajemba. In rejecting this request, the trial court found
“there is nothing on this woman, nothing.”
¶ 25 To obtain a jury instruction on self-defense, a defendant must establish some evidence
of six factors: (1) force was threatened against the defendant, (2) the defendant was not the
aggressor, (3) the danger of harm was imminent, (4) the threatened force was unlawful, (5) the
defendant actually and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use of the force
applied, and (6) the defendant’s beliefs were objectively reasonable. People v. Jones, 2025 IL
App (1st) 230771, ¶ 89 (citing Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 35). If the State negates any
one of the self-defense elements, the defendant’s claim of self-defense fails. Jones, 2025 IL
App (1st) 230771, ¶ 89 (citing People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 128 (1995)).
¶ 26 Second-degree murder is distinguishable from self-defense only in terms of the sixth
factor, namely, the nature of defendant’s belief at the time of the killing. People v. Rodriguez,
336 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2002). After the State has first proved first degree murder, a defendant
who claims this form of second-degree murder must show the first five factors of the
affirmative defense of self-defense (listed above) by a preponderance of the evidence. People
v. Castellano, 2015 IL App (1st) 133874, ¶ 149.
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¶ 27 If the evidence supports giving a self-defense instruction, the trial court must give an
instruction on second degree murder as a mandatory counterpart. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882,
¶ 27. This is because, the sixth factor, “[t]he question of whether the defendant’s subjective
belief” in the need for force “was reasonable or unreasonable is for the jury to decide.”
McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 28.
¶ 28 The fourth factor asks whether the threatened force was unlawful. With respect to the
fourth factor, defendant cites in support section 7-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code),
which provides in full:
“A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against
such other’s imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force
which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony.” 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West
2022).
Applying the words of the above-quoted statute to the facts of this case, Ajemba would have
been “justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily
harm” if she “reasonably believe[d] that such force [was] necessary to prevent imminent death
or great bodily harm to [herself] or another.” 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2022). Thus, even if the
force she used had been deadly, her use of force would have been lawful, as an attempt to
prevent Bosseler’s imminent death. Since defendant failed to present some evidence that her
use of force was unlawful, he was not entitled to either a second-degree murder or self-defense
instruction. We certainly cannot find on this record that the trial court abused its discretion in
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concluding that defendant failed to present some evidence that Ajemba’s use of force was
unlawful. Thus, the trial court’s refusal to give both a second-degree murder instruction and a
self-defense instruction regarding Ajemba was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, and as
such, is not grounds for reversal.
¶ 29 Defendant’s primary argument is that, since the trial court gave these instructions with
respect to the first victim, it should have also given them with respect to the second victim.
However, just because a trial court chose, as was its discretion, to provide an instruction
regarding one charge or victim does not mean that the same instruction is then required for
another victim or charge, upon pain of reversal. As a result, we do not find this argument
persuasive, and we find no reason to reverse on this basis.
¶ 30 C. Lynch Instruction
¶ 31 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court refused to give a requested Lynch
instruction.
¶ 32 In Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 199-200, our supreme court held that evidence of a victim’s
aggressive and violent character could be used, in two situations, to support a defendant’s
theory of self-defense. These two specified situations are, first, to demonstrate that defendant’s
knowledge of the victim’s violent tendencies affected the defendant’s perception of and
reaction to the victim’s behavior, and second, to support a defendant’s version of the facts
where there were conflicting accounts of what happened. People v. Simon, 2011 IL App (1st)
091197, ¶ 70 (discussing Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 199-200).
¶ 33 However, both these situations still require “reasonably reliable evidence of a violent
character,” such as, for example, multiple convictions for battery. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 201;
People v. Ciavirelli, 262 Ill. App. 3d 966, 971 (1994) (pursuant to Lynch, “the evidence must
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be reliable”). While a prior altercation or arrest, without a conviction, may reflect a violent
character, Lynch and its progeny require proof that the victim actually committed the alleged
violent acts. People v. Figueroa, 381 Ill. App. 3d 828, 846 (2008); People v. Cook, 352 Ill.
App. 3d 108, 128 (2004) (although Lynch does not require a conviction, there still must be
proof that the victim performed the alleged acts). Also, a trial court does not abuse its discretion
in denying such evidence if it “would create a series of ‘mini-trials’ on those incidents whose
relevancy would be, at best, tenuous and tangential, diverting the jurors’ attention away from
the events in the present case.” Ciavirelli, 262 Ill. App. 2d at 973.
¶ 34 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.12X (approved Oct. 17, 2014)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.12X), which is based on Lynch, provides in full:
“In this case, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the proposition that the
defendant was not justified in using the force which he used. You have [(heard
testimony) (received evidence)] of ___’s [(prior conviction of a violent crime) (prior
acts of violence) (reputation for violence)]. It is for you to determine whether ___ [(was
convicted) (committed those acts) (had this reputation)]. If you determine that ___
[(was convicted) (committed those acts) (had this reputation)] you may consider that
evidence in deciding whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not justified in using the force which he used.”
¶ 35 At trial, defendant sought a Lynch instruction based on his own recorded statement that
Bosseler hit him a few days prior to the murder. 2 On appeal, defendant also notes that he had
2 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel argued that “there is evidence that—there is evidence that he said that Bosseler had hit him previously a week before, beaten him up, so that would be a prior act of violence.” Counsel did not bring up any other acts or statements when asking for the Lynch instruction. 12 No. 1-23-2350
further alleged in his recorded statement that Bosseler had hit him on other occasions. The
committee note to the instruction cites Lynch and states: “Give this instruction only when
evidence of the victim’s prior conviction for a crime of violence has been admitted pursuant to
[Lynch].” (Emphasis omitted.) IPI Criminal No. 3.12X, Committee Note. In the case at bar,
the trial court denied the requested instruction on the basis that there was no prior conviction.
¶ 36 On appeal, the State acknowledges this was an incorrect basis for the denial. The State’s
brief concedes: “defendant is correct that a prior altercation or arrest, without a conviction, can
be adequate proof of violent character.” Despite the committee note, the instruction itself
permits evidence of not only convictions but also acts of violence. In addition, Illinois Rule of
Evidence 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides: “In criminal homicide or battery cases when
the accused raises the theory of self-defense and there is conflicting evidence as to whether the
alleged victim was the aggressor, proof may also be made of specific instances of the alleged
victim’s prior violent conduct.”
¶ 37 However, this court may affirm on any basis found in the record, whether or not the
trial court relied on that basis or whether the trial court’s reasoning was correct. People v.
Williams, 2019 IL App (3d) 160132, ¶ 15; People v. Begay, 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 35.
In the case at bar, defendant’s terse assertions that he was hit or assaulted by Bosseler provide
no context or detail, such as when, where, or how, from which a trial court or a reviewing court
could assess their reliability. Thus, we can find no abuse of discretion here in denying a Lynch
¶ 38 II. Sentencing
¶ 39 Defendant argues that his statutorily required sentence of natural life for murdering two
victims violates our state’s proportionate penalties clause as applied to him, due to his mental
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illness. Section 5-8-1(a)(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) provides that “the court
shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time
of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 18, and *** (ii) is found guilty of
murdering more than one victim.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(c)(ii) (West 2022).
¶ 40 Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the statute has the
burden of clearly establishing the alleged invalidity. People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. In
addition, a court must construe the statute so as to uphold its constitutionality, if reasonably
possible. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. Constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. De novo review means that we perform the same
analysis that a circuit court would and that we owe no deference to the trial court’s decision.
People v. Avdic, 2023 IL App (1st) 210848, ¶ 25.
¶ 41 The proportionate penalties clause in our state constitution provides: “All penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. However, our
supreme court has “repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the power to prescribe
penalties for defined offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe
mandatory sentences, even if such sentences restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing
sentences.” Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 24. Our supreme court has affirmed in other cases the
application of statutorily mandated natural life sentences. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 31
(discussing a prior case).
¶ 42 In Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 46, our supreme court found that a mandatory natural life
sentence imposed upon an intellectually disabled adult was constitutional as applied to him.
The court made this finding under both the proportionate penalties clause of our constitution
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and the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Coty,
2020 IL 123972, ¶¶ 44-45. In reaching this finding, the court considered three factors:
(1) culpability, (2) future dangerousness, and (3) rehabilitative potential. Coty, 2020 IL
123972, ¶ 32; People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 74 (“[i]n Coty, we identified three important
considerations in a proportionate penalties clause analysis”). Although the trial court here did
not use these terms, it made findings with respect to all three factors. With respect to
culpability, the trial court found no motive or excuse, in that the refusal or failure of the victim
to return defendant’s identification card was so completely out of proportion to the crime
committed. With respect to future dangerousness, the trial court noted that the crime was
premeditated. The video established that defendant waited patiently for almost an hour outside
the victim’s door. With respect to rehabilitative potential, the trial court found that, although
defendant certainly had mental issues, he was sane at the time of the offense. As noted above,
Dr. Neu found him legally sane at the time of the offense. Thus, it was a sane man who
committed this particularly repulsive offense, where one of the victims was disemboweled on
his own bed. Although we exercise de novo review, we can find no error here requiring
reversal. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 79 (diminished impulse control resulting from a mental
deficiency may render a defendant a threat to the community, thereby requiring a greater prison
sentence to protect the public).
¶ 43 On appeal, defendant argues, first, that his life-long struggle with mental illness
demonstrates a diminished culpability and, second, that unlike the intellectual disabilities
present in Coty, defendant has a greater capacity for rehabilitation since defendant’s conditions
are treatable. Defendant argues that his behavior can and does improve with medication. The
State notes that the expert witness testified that defendant’s mental health issues were “greatly
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exacerbate[d]” by defendant’s well-documented substance abuse, which included cocaine and
heroin. See People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶ 100 (an “intractable” drug
addiction may be considered an aggravating factor at sentencing).
¶ 44 Unfortunately for defendant, his first point undercuts his second point. Coty, 2023 IL
127273, ¶ 77 (a life-long disability is a two-edged sword, in that it may diminish culpability
while increasing the probability of future dangerousness). Although he argues his conditions
are treatable, he concedes they have been a life-long issue, thereby minimizing the likelihood
of rehabilitation. In his brief, defendant notes that one of his childhood friends told the
presentence investigator that, when defendant was on his prescribed psychiatric medications,
defendant was “one of the best dudes ever.” However, in the next line, the same friend stated
that, when defendant was off his medications, he was a “terror.” In addition, defendant’s drug
abuse further reduced the likely success of rehabilitation. Given his age, his life-long
conditions appear to be “permanent fixtures of his character.” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 97;
Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 42 (“his age make[s] him less likely to be rehabilitated”). Thus, we
do not find persuasive defendant’s arguments that his mental health issues made his sentence
disproportionate as applied to him.
¶ 45 CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to provide certain
requested instructions or in the trial court’s imposition of a statutorily required sentence.
¶ 47 Affirmed.
16 No. 1-23-2350
People v. Arnold, 2026 IL App (1st) 232350
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-CR- 0807001; the Hon. Michael Joseph Kane, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Arianne Stein, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, Brian A. Levitsky, and Lisanne P. Pugliese, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.