2020 IL App (2d) 190475 No. 2-19-0475 Opinion filed November 30, 2020
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 95-CF-2075 ) WILLIAM E. AMOR, ) Honorable ) Robert A. Miller, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Zenoff and Hudson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, William E. Amor, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for a
certificate of innocence under section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-702
(West 2016)). We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On September 10, 1995, Marianne Miceli died of carbon monoxide intoxication from
inhaling smoke and soot during a fire in her apartment. Defendant and his wife, Tina, who was
also Miceli’s daughter, lived in Miceli’s apartment but had gone out for the evening shortly before
the fire started. Defendant was questioned about the matter several times in the next several weeks. 2020 IL App (2d) 190475
He denied having any information about the fire or any knowledge regarding any life insurance
that Miceli had. Gradually, his story began to change, as he remembered spilling some vodka and
possibly leaving a lit cigarette in a nearby ashtray. Immediately upon his release from a two-week
stint in jail on a traffic warrant, detectives extensively questioned defendant again. During this
questioning, detectives allowed a process server to serve defendant with Tina’s petition for
divorce. They also told defendant that Tina believed that he started the fire and was responsible
for her mother’s death. Eventually, defendant put his head on the table and said that the fire was
his fault. Defendant stated that he had knocked a lit cigarette onto a pile of newspapers onto which
he had previously spilled some vodka; he heard it sizzle and saw it smolder. He deliberately left
the pile to smolder while he and Tina left to go to the movies. Defendant gave audiotaped
statements to both the police and an assistant state’s attorney. He eventually said that he had
intentionally knocked a lit cigarette onto vodka-sodden newspapers because he wanted to get
Miceli’s insurance proceeds due to the apartment’s unbearable living arrangements.
¶4 The State charged defendant with one count of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)
(West 1994)) and one count of aggravated arson (id. § 20-1.1(a)(1)). The court denied defendant’s
motion to suppress statements and quash his arrest. A jury subsequently found him guilty of both
counts. We affirmed defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder, specifically finding, among
other things, that (1) the trial court’s determination that defendant’s inculpatory statements were
voluntary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) defendant was proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Amor, No. 2-97-1189 (1999) (unpublished order
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 1
1 This court reversed defendant’s conviction of and sentence for aggravated arson, pursuant
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¶5 Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). The petition raised issues of ineffective assistance by
both trial and appellate counsels. The court dismissed the petition at the second stage, and we
affirmed the dismissal. See People v. Amor, No. 2-01-0962 (2002) (unpublished order pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶6 Defendant then filed a successive petition for postconviction relief in 2015, raising an issue
of actual innocence. This petition proceeded to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, after which the
trial court held:
“In the instant case there was evidence of motive and intent: consider, for example,
the need for money to obtain a new residence and start a new life; knowledge of at least
some insurance; and the disabling of the fire detector. There was also evidence of
consciousness of guilt: consider, for example, defendant’s lies about insurance, denial of
drinking, denials concerning Tina and the lighter fluid, and the evolution of his statements
generally. But all that being said, there can be no question that the lynchpin of the State’s
case at trial was the defendant’s confession, which the State and Defense experts today
agree is scientifically impossible. Whatever the reasons for the Defendant’s scientifically
impossible confession, the new evidence places the evidence presented at trial in a different
light and undercuts this Court’s confidence in the factual correctness of the guilty verdict.”
The court then vacated defendant’s conviction and continued the matter for further proceedings.
¶7 The case proceeded to a bench trial. While most of the testimony was identical to that at
the first trial, there was new testimony regarding the fire’s cause and origin. Defendant presented
to the “one act, one crime” doctrine.
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three experts on that issue. One opined that a smoldering cigarette left in a recliner caused the fire.
Another testified that a smoldering cigarette was unlikely to have ignited the fire and believed that
investigators should have classified the fire as “undetermined.” The third also opined that the fire’s
cause classification should have been “undetermined.” All three experts agreed—defendant could
not have started the fire in the manner described in his confession. The State presented further
expert testimony that the fire’s point of origin was near where defendant had confessed to starting
the fire. However, the expert concluded that the cause of the fire was open flame ignition by human
hands. This testimony indicates an intentionally set fire—not an accidentally set fire.
¶8 The trial court found defendant not guilty on all charges. In its extensive written order, the
trial court addressed the issue of defendant’s confession:
“But there are also the defendant’s statements over time to Officers Cross, Gurrerri,
Carlson, Cunningham and [Assistant State’s Attorney] Nigohosian. The defendant’s
version of events evolved over time: starting with outright denials; moving to suggestions
of accident; and ultimately ending with an admission to setting the fire for insurance
proceeds. The problem with the defendant’s ultimate admission, of course, is that he
confesses to a scenario that both defense and state experts agree is scientifically impossible.
Clearly the defendant’s vodka soaked newspaper/cigarette story, believed by the
investigating officers and fire experts who testified in 1997, cannot serve as a basis for a
finding of guilt with the advances in modern fire science knowledge. That having been
said, it must nevertheless be determined [sic] the import of defendant’s confession that he
started the fire, notwithstanding that he admitted doing so in an impossible manner.”
¶9 Defendant then filed a petition for a Certificate of Innocence under section 2-702 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2016)), seeking a certificate of innocence along
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with the expungement and impounding of his criminal records. The State filed a motion to dismiss
the petition, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for a certificate
of innocence. To obtain a certificate of innocence under section 2-702, a defendant must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of
Illinois and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of
the sentence; (2) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or
information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the petitioner was found not guilty at
the new trial or the petitioner was not retried and the indictment or information dismissed; (3) he
is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information or his acts or omissions
charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the
State; and (4) the petitioner did not by his own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his
conviction. Id. § 2-702(g); People v. Dumas, 2013 IL App (2d) 120561, ¶ 15. Generally, granting
a certificate of innocence is within the sound discretion of the court. Dumas, 2013 IL App (2d)
120561, ¶ 17.
¶ 12 In dismissing defendant’s petition, the trial court ruled as follows:
THE COURT: All right. I’ve considered the filings of the parties. I’ve considered
the applicable case and statutory law and the relevant portions of the Illinois Criminal
Code. I have reviewed the exhibits that were provided, and I have taken a look at the file
in so much as—I’ve looked at Judge Brennan’s decision regarding the bench trial that
occurred.
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Certainly there are issues in this case that are somewhat unique. For example,
having the defendant served with divorce papers during the course of a homicide
interrogation isn’t something I’ve ever seen before, heard of, read about, or even seen on
fictional TV. Yet, that was considered by the appellate court, and the appellate court took
a look at the defendant’s education, the fact that he was provided with sustenance and,
otherwise, apparently, treated fairly, according to the appellate court, and they found that
his statements to the police were freely and voluntarily given.
I agree with the defendants [sic] that it’s an unreliable confession, but that doesn’t
seem to equate with the defendant involuntarily providing a confession, so I’m not ruling
on the first three paragraphs of the defendant’s burden.
I am taking a look at whether or not the petition[er] did or did not by [his own]
conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his conviction, and I believe that the defendant
did act in such a manner voluntarily to bring about his or her own conviction. I’m only
focusing on that. It appears the defendant did give a statement—gave a statement to the
police. It wasn’t the effect—wasn’t the product of any physical abuse or such verbal
conduct or sleep deprivation or any other type of interrogation tactic that would bring about
an involuntary confession.
Although it certainly has issues, as the appellate court noted, I can’t find anything
about the confession, despite [its] unreliability, that would make it the product of either
illegal police conduct or some other activity that would cause the statement to be something
other than a voluntary statement; and, therefore, I do find that the defendant brought about
his conviction through his own conduct; and, therefore, I’m granting the State’s motion to
dismiss.
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Sorry, sir.”
¶ 13 Defendant first argues that we must review de novo instead of reviewing the trial court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. According to defendant, because the trial court’s dismissal of
his petition “was based on an erroneous interpretation of the statute and the legal determination
that [defendant’s] confession barred him from relief,” we must review de novo the dismissal. See,
e.g., People v. Fields, 2011 IL App (1st) 100169, ¶ 18. According to defendant, the trial court
misinterpreted the certificate of innocence statute and committed legal error by determining that,
“because a movant gave a confession deemed ‘voluntary’ for Fifth Amendment purposes[,] he is
not entitled to a certificate of innocence.”
¶ 14 We disagree. Our review of the trial court’s ruling does not show either legal
misinterpretation or improper legal conclusion. The trial court did not rule that the statute requires,
in all cases, that a voluntary confession prohibits the issuance of a certificate of innocence. Instead,
the court looked at “whether or not the petition[er] did or did not by [his own] conduct voluntarily
cause or bring about his conviction, and I believe that the defendant did act in such a manner
voluntarily to bring about his or her own conviction.” The trial court did not show any
misunderstanding of the statute and tailored its decision per the statutory requirements. We will
still review its decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
¶ 15 Defendant next argues that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g) (West 2016).
However, this element of the cause of action for a certificate of innocence is not at issue before us.
The trial court specifically stated, “I’m not ruling on the first three paragraphs of the defendant’s
burden.” These paragraphs included the element of defendant’s innocence. Defendant asserts that
the trial court “likely ignored this issue in making its ruling because the record could not be clearer
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that Amor has proven his innocence by more than a preponderance of the evidence.” Such
speculation is unnecessary; what is abundantly clear is that the only basis upon which the trial
court dismissed defendant’s petition was that defendant brought about his conviction by his
conduct. The trial court did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law on the “innocence”
element, nor did it make any ruling on it that was detrimental to defendant’s cause. If anything, we
will assume—in the absence of such findings, conclusions, and rulings—that defendant did prove
those other elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶ 16 Defendant then argues that the trial court erred in determining that defendant voluntarily
brought about his conviction. “ ‘[B]efore the petitioner can be said to have caused or brought about
his prosecution *** he must have acted or failed to act in such a way as to mislead the authorities
into thinking he had committed an offense.’ ” Dumas, 2013 IL App (2d) 120561, ¶ 18 (quoting
Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1993), citing 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) (1988)).
“[T]here must be either an affirmative act or an omission by the petitioner that misleads the
authorities as to his culpability.” Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285. Betts suggests that “[t]he clearest example
would be the defendant who either falsely confesses to a crime or intentionally withholds
exculpatory evidence—in common parlance, one who ‘takes the fall’ for someone else.” Id. It then
quotes from United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) for additional
examples of such acts or omissions, including an attempt to flee, a false confession, 2 the removal
of evidence, an attempt to induce a witness or an expert to give false testimony or a false opinion,
and an attempt to suppress such testimony or opinion.
2 Inexplicably, defendant omits this example when citing this very same passage in Betts.
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¶ 17 Defendant notes that the trial court’s determination that he voluntarily brought about his
conviction was based on his giving a statement to the police admitting his culpability for the crime.
Relying on the cases of People v. Simon, 2017 IL App (1st) 152173, and People v. Glenn, 2018 IL
App (1st) 161331, defendant then makes the following bold assertion:
“This is wrong as a matter of law, as every Illinois court who [sic] has considered this issue
has held. A confession, regardless of whether it is ever suppressed, and even in
circumstances where a defendant goes on to plead guilty after proper and constitutional
admonishments by the court, is not enough to demonstrate that a petitioner voluntarily
brought about his own conviction.”
¶ 18 This assertion is patently false, and the cases upon which defendant relies do not in any
way support such a broad assertion. In Simon, the defendant alleged that he was either duped or
coerced by attorneys to provide a filmed confession and eventually pleaded guilty to charges of
murder and voluntary manslaughter in the attorneys’ attempt to get the man already convicted of
the murders (and facing execution) out of prison. After the defendant’s convictions were
subsequently vacated, he sought a certificate of innocence. The trial court denied the defendant’s
petition because he did not establish that he did not voluntarily cause his conviction and that his
claim did not involve any allegations of misconduct on behalf of the State. Simon, 2017 IL App
(1st) 152173, ¶ 21. The appellate court vacated the denial and remanded the cause for further
proceedings because (1) the trial court erroneously relied on inadmissible evidence, outside the
evidentiary record, in denying the petition (id. ¶ 23) and (2) the appellate court disagreed with the
trial court’s determination that, because the State was not involved in the wrongdoing that led to
the defendant’s wrongful incarceration, the defendant could not obtain relief in the court of claims
(id. ¶ 28). The court held:
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“Notably, we are not making any determination regarding the merits of petitioner’s
petition, and our ruling does not mean that, after conducting the hearing, the court cannot
deny the certificate of innocence for the reason that petitioner failed to establish that he
caused his own conviction based on admissible, probative evidence.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 19 In Glenn, the defendant pleaded guilty to narcotics charges fraudulently brought by the
police. The defendant was later pardoned by Governor Pat Quinn, although the governor did not
expressly find the defendant’s innocence as the pardon’s basis. Glenn, 2018 IL App (1st) 161331,
¶ 10. The trial court vacated the convictions and the guilty pleas and ordered the defendant’s
criminal record expunged. The trial court subsequently denied the defendant’s petition for a
certificate of innocence because she was sentenced to probation, not a term of imprisonment. Id.
¶ 11. The appellate court disagreed and interpreted the section 2-702 requirement that the petitioner
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment to include petitioners sentenced to probation; accordingly,
on appeal, the trial court’s judgment was reversed, and the cause was remanded with directions to
grant the certificate of innocence. Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 20 Contrary to defendant’s claim, neither of those cases stands for the proposition that “[a]
confession, ***, is not enough to demonstrate that a petitioner voluntarily brought about his own
conviction.” Simon explicitly held that its ruling “does not mean that, after conducting the hearing,
the court cannot deny the certificate of innocence for the reason that petitioner failed to establish
that he caused his own conviction based on admissible, probative evidence.” Glenn did not involve
the issue of a confession or the defendant voluntarily causing or bringing about her conviction by
her conduct. Defendant’s presentation of, and reliance on, these cases for the claim that he makes
is not well-taken.
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¶ 21 Defendant spends much time on anecdotal circuit court rulings in other certificate-of-
innocence cases. First, we note that trial court decisions are not binding precedent. See People v.
Mann, 397 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769 (2010). Further, these cases are sui generis; just because some
other defendant’s confession was held not to have brought about his conviction does not influence
us here. We decide cases on their unique facts and circumstances.
¶ 22 Defendant next argues that using a fifth-amendment-voluntariness standard is improper in
determining whether a defendant voluntarily caused or brought about his conviction. According to
defendant, a finding that one did not voluntarily contribute to one’s conviction “does not require a
legal finding that a confession should be excluded or suppressed.”
¶ 23 Defendant again cites Dumas and Betts and their list of possible acts or omissions that
could mislead the authorities as to a defendant’s culpability, again failing to include, let alone
address, these cases’ listing of a false confession as such a possible act. Defendant even accuses
the State of “blatantly” misrepresenting the holding in Betts and “conveniently” stopping short of
providing a full quotation from the case. However, it is defendant who misreads and misrepresents
Betts. Betts makes two separate references to false confessions in its list: first, the “clearest
example,” which it refers to as taking the fall for someone, and, second, within its quote from
Keegan, which is not modified or explained as anything beyond “a false confession.” See Betts,
10 F.3d at 1285. Contrary to defendant’s argument, Betts does not bar relief only “for the
wrongfully convicted who intentionally take the fall for another to mislead authorities.”
¶ 24 We agree with defendant that prior rulings on a statement’s voluntariness are not
dispositive and of res judicata effect. However, this argument is a straw man; there is no indication
that the trial court viewed the prior rulings regarding defendant’s confession as dispositive or as
res judicata. The trial court’s ruling acknowledged our holding on defendant’s direct appeal that
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the trial court’s finding that defendant made voluntary inculpatory statements was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. However, the court did not just assert this as the basis for
dismissing defendant’s petition. The court detailed its own investigation, stating that it considered
the filings, statutory and case law, exhibits, and the decision rendered after defendant’s retrial. The
court acknowledged the “unique” issues in this case, including the serving of divorce papers during
the questioning and the later-determined unreliability of the confession. Even considering these
issues, the court concluded:
“I can’t find anything about the confession *** that would make it the product of either
illegal police conduct or some other activity that would cause the statement to be something
other than a voluntary statement; and, therefore, I do find that the defendant brought about
his conviction through his own conduct; and, therefore, I’m granting the State’s motion to
dismiss.”
“A court abuses its discretion only if it acts arbitrarily, without the employment of conscientious
judgment, exceeds the bounds of reason and ignores recognized principles of law; or if no
reasonable person would take the position adopted by the court.” Payne v. Hall, 2013 IL App (1st)
113519, ¶ 12. This trial court did not surrender its discretion; it exercised its discretion after
investigating the facts and law, and it made a decision. This decision was not an abuse of discretion.
We find no error here.
¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
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No. 2-19-0475
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 95-CF- 2075; the Hon. Robert A. Miller, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jon Loevy, Tara Thompson, and Lauren Myerscough-Mueller, of for The Exoneration Project at the University of Chicago Law Appellant: School, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne for Hoffman and Steven J. Lupa, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of Appellee: counsel), for the People.
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