FILED | L E D 1 CLERK of COURT CLERK OF couRT 2 2021IJUL 202~ JUL f15 5 AHII= r, : 15 3 SUPERJOR COURT SUPERKBR COURT UF GU&M¢é@< OF GUAMA:---t_ 4 IN THE THE SUPERIOR SUPERIOR COURT COURT OF OF GUAM GUAM 5
6 PEOPLE OF GUAM GUAM Criminal Case No. CM0363-22 GPD GPD Report Report No. No. 21-26405 21-26405 7 vs.
8 UGOCHUKWU E. AKOMA, DECISION DECISION AND AND ORDER 9 (Motion (Motion to to Dismiss) Dismiss) Defendant. 10
11 11 This matter came before matter came before the the Honorable Honorable Alberto Alberto E. E. Tolentino Tolentino on on April April 15, 15, 2024, 2024, upon upon 12 12 Defendant Ugochukwu E. E. Akoma's Aroma's oral oral motion motion to to dismiss dismiss this case case with with prejudice. prejudice. At At the the hearing, 13 Attorney Joaquin Joaquin C. Arriola, Arriola, Jr. Jr. appeared appeared on behalf of of Defendant, Defendant, and Assistant Assistant Attorney General 14
15 15 Randall Winston B. Randall Winston B. Albright Albright appeared appearedon onbehalf behalfofofthe thePeople PeopleofofGuam Guam("People"). ("People"). Having Having duly duly
16 16 considered the oral arguments, considered the subsequentwritten arguments, subsequent writtenbriefings, briefings, and and the the applicable applicable law, law, the Court Court 17 DENIES DENIES Defendant's Defendant's Motion. 18 BACKGROUND 19 19 Defendant, a medical doctor, stands accusedof stands accused oftwo two counts countsof of Fourth FourthDegree Degree Criminal Sexual 20 Conduct (as aa Misdemeanor). Conduct (as Misdemeanor). Mag. Comal. Compl. (Oct. 20, 20, 2022). 2022). Defendant's Defendant's jury jury trial trial began on April April 21
22 8, 2024, 2024, and andconcluded concludedon onApril April 15, 15,2024, 2024,with withthe thedeclaration declarationof ofaamistrial. mistrial. As explained in more
23 detail in in the Court's Court's April April19, 19,2024, 2024, Decision Decisionand and Order, the trial was plagued with with evidentiary issues,
24 which ultimately ultimately led led to to the the exclusion exclusion of of much of the People's evidence. much of evidence. Defendant Defendant eventually eventually 25 requested, and the the Court granted, granted, a mistrial. mistrial. See See generally generally Dec. & Order Order (Apr. (Apr. 19, 19, 2024). 26
28 Page 1 of9 11 Upon the Upon the Court's Court's grant ofmistrial, grant of mistrial,Defendant Defendant informed informedthe the Court Courtthat that he he intended intended to make make
2 an oral oral motion to dismiss dismiss the the case case with with prejudice. The Court prejudice. The Court heard heard Defendant's Defendant's oral oral motion for
3 dismissal dismissal later that that same same day. day. At Atoral oralarguments, arguments, Defendant Defendant made made two core core arguments: arguments: aa retrial retrial 4 violate double would violate double jeopardy, jeopardy, and and rescheduling rescheduling this this trial trial would would lead to to a violation ofhis violation of his statutory statutory 5 right to to a speedy speedytrial. trial. Min. Entry Entry at at2:15:04 2:15:04PM PM(Mot. (Mot. Hr'g, Apr. 15, 15, 2024). The The People People argued argued in in 6 response that response that double double jeopardy to these jeopardy does not apply to these facts and that there is still time time on on the the speedy 7
8 trial "clock" retrial. Id. at 22:28:05 "clock" for aa retrial. 128 PM. At At the the conclusion the hearing, the Court took the conclusion of the the
9 matter under matter advisement.Id. underadvisement. Id at 2:55:05 2:55:05 PM. TheCourt PM. The Courtalso also gave gaveparties parties leave leave to tosubmit submit written written
10 10 briefing by the the end endof thefollowing of the following day. Id. at day. Id at 2:52:15 2:52:15 PM. Both Bothparties See Mot. parties did so. See Mot. Dismiss Dismiss 11 11 (Apr. 16, 2024), (Apr. 16, 2024); Opp. Mot. Dismiss (Apr. 16, 16, 2024). 12 12 DISCUSSION 13 13 1. Double Double Jeopardv DoesNot Jeopardy Does Not Bar Bar Defendant's Defendant's Retrial Retrial 14 14 The general rule rule is is that that when when a mistrial is is granted granted upon upon the request of the the defendant, double 15 15
16 16 jeopardy does not bar bar a retrial. retrial. People v. Pablo, Pablo, 2016 2016 Guam Guam 29 29 1] 25, Oregon v, ,i 25; v. Kennedy, Kennedy, 456 U.S.
17 17 667 (1982). This Thisisisbecause because"a "amotion motionby bythe thedefendant defendant is is deemed deemed to to be be aa deliberate election election on on his
18 18 part to forgo his part to his valued valued right right to have his guilt have his guilt or or innocence innocence determined by the determined by the first first trier of fact.99" trier of 19 19 United United States States v. v. Scott, Scott, 437 U.S. U.S. 82, 82, 93 93 (1978). (1978). However, However, both the Guam Guam Supreme Court and and the 20 U.S. Supreme have recognized a "narrow exception" Supreme Court have exception" to tothis this rule rule in inthe the circumstance circumstance where 21 "the "the mistrial mistrial arose arose from from prosecutorial prosecutorial or or judicial judicialactions actions done done in inorder orderto to goad goad the the defendant defendant into 22 requesting requesting aa mistrial." mistrial." Id Id.Defendant Defendantargues arguesthat thathe he was was "goaded" "goaded"into intorequesting requesting aa mistrial mistrial here here by 23
24 the People's "lack the People's "lackofofpreparation preparationand and inability inabilitytotomeet meetbasic basicevidentiary evidentiaryburdens, burdens, and and repeated repeated
25 motions to reconsider motions to reconsider basic basicevidentiary evidentiaryrulings." rulings." Mot. Dismiss Dismiss at at 6, 6; see see generally generally Dec. & Order Order 26 (Apr. (Apr. 19, 19, 2024) 2024) (summarizing (summarizing the the evidentiary issues). 27
28 Page 2 of9 Page 1 1 The burden of of proof proof on a "goading" claim belongs "goading" claim belongs to to the defendant defendant and and is is a difficult standard
2 to meet. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 1123, 1130 Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 1996) (the standard standard is is "extremely
3 v. August, 375 P.3d 140, exahing"); People v. exacting"), 140, 144 144 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016) ("a heavy burden"); burden"), People .: 4 v. v. Dawson, Ct. App. 1986) Dawson, 397 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Mich. Ct. 1986) (a "near impossible burden"), burden"); see also also 5 Kennedy, at 688 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688 (Steve (Stevens, fs, J., J., concurring) concurring) ("It is almost inconceivable that a defendant 6 prosecutor's deliberate could prove that the prosecutor's deliberate misconduct misconduct was was motivated motivated by by an intent to provoke a 7
8 mistrial."). Thus, "in mistrial."). Thus, "in practice, practice, the Kennedy standard standard isis rarely rarelymet. ...Nationwide, met.... Nationwide, such such cases cases are are
9 few and far between." between." United United States States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 955, 962 962 (9th (9th Cir. Cir. 2012).
10 10 "whether the The key inquiry is "whether the conduct conduct giving giving rise rise to to the the mistrial mistrial in this case was intended 11 11 to provoke a mistrial." Pablo, Pablo, 2016 2016 Guam Guam 29 29126 1126 (emphasis (emphasis in in original). original). A defendant must show 12 12 that the prosecutor had the specific "intent the trial," "intent to terminate the trial," not not an "intent "intent to to prevail prevail at at trial by 13 13 impermissible means." United States v. v. Oseni, Oseni, 996 F.3d 183, 188 (7th (7th Cir. Cir. 1993). 1993). If "prosecutorial 14 misconduct-regardless misconduct-regardless ofofits its character-is character-isnot notintentionally intentionallydesigned designedtotoprovoke provoke the the defendant defendant into 15
16 for aa mistrial, moving for mistrial, then reprosecution prosecution isis not not balTed." barred." State v. v. Brear, Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 298 (N.M.
17 1996). Thus, "gross negligence Thus, negligence by the the prosecutor, prosecutor, or or even even intentional intentional conduct conduct that that seriously seriously
18 prejudices the defense, defense,isisinsufficient." insufficient." United United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. States v. Cir. 2017), 2017); see see 19 19 Dawson, 397 N.W.2d at 283 283 ("Negligent 'gross' or ("Negligent error, 'gross' or otherwise, otherwise, may may properly properly lead lead to to aa mistrial, 20 but in the absence of of willfulness should should not not rise rise to to the level level of ofaa constitutional constitutional bar bar on retrials."). 21 The Court must consider the "objective of the trial to "objective facts and circumstances" of to determine the 22 "existence or nonexistence nonexistence of intent" intent" to to provoke provoke a mistrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. mistrial. Kennedy, U.S. at at 675. Here, the 675. Here, 23
24 Court is not persuaded that that the the People's evidentiary errors were made with the specific specific purpose of of
25 goading Defendant Defendant into requesting a mistrial. As As Defendant Defendanthimself himselfnotes notes: 26 In retrospect, what is clear is that the the assigned prosecutor was foisted into this case 27 at the last last minute. minute. Witnesses Witnesses were not not prepared, prepared, exhibits were reviewed and exhibits were and
28 Page 3 of of9 1 updated lltbth hour. And most updated and lists were haphazardly filed at the 11 most important important to the mistrial, the actual actual exhibits exhibits were were not not reviewed reviewed with the corresponding witnesses to 2 2 prepare prepare toto meet the foundational admissibility under the Guam foundational requirements of admissibility 3 Rules of of Evidence. The exhibits were disorganized with some not timely lodged disorganized with with the Court Court raising further further authenticity authenticity and and chain chain of ofcustody custodyissues issues. 4
5 Mot. Dismiss Dismiss at 4. Clearly, Clearly, the the People People made madeerrors errors in in their their preparation preparation for for this trial, but these appear this trial,
6 to be errors errors of of negligence. negligence.
7 The Court first notes notes that that the the People have extensively contested all the evidentiary rulings in People have 8 question, brought question, brought and argued several motions for for reconsideration reconsideration of those rulings, rulings, requested a 9 mistrial themselves mistrial themselves on on account account of of one ruling, ruling, and even suggested suggested that they would attempt attempt an an 10 10 interlocutory appeal. The People appeal. The People also also resisted Defendant's oral motion Defendant's oral motion for for mistrial, and even now, 11 11 they continue to argue the admissibility of the admissibility of the the evidence. evidence. See Opp. Mot. Dismiss Dismiss at 5-6. 5-6. While their 12 12
13 13 legal arguments themselves have not been (and not been (and are are still still not) well well taken taken by by the the Court, Court, this this posture
14 14 suggests the People genuinely believe in their positions. This in positions. This in Mm tum suggests suggests that the People did
15 15 not deliberately err in order to provoke provoke aa mistrial, as they do not believe they they erred erred at at all. 16 16 While the People's People's subjective subjective views views obviously obviously are are not not dispositive, dispositive, there is is little little other other 17 17 evidence before evidence before the Court relevant to to Defendant's The Court Defendant's claim. The Court finds finds nothing in the nothing in the record record that 18 18 explicitly demonstrates demonstrates the the People's People's specific intent to to cause cause aa mistrial. mistrial. Defendant Defendant has not argued 19 19
20 that specific intent can be inferred from any particular evidentiary error, nor does the Court find that
21 any particular error error inherently inherentlydemonstrates demonstrates such such an intent. Cf Cf State State v. v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693,
22 702 (Mo. 2007) ("the fact of the prosecutor's prosecutor's misconduct misconduct alone does not prove his intent to prevent 23 an acquittal acquittal ... ... his his misconduct misconduct may may just just as well be attributed to poor attributed to poorjudgment."). judgment."). And And the specific 24 kinds of kinds of er r or her errors e-wit ness list here-witness listissues, issues, t he thefafailure ilur e t otoprpresent esent ororiginal igina l copies, copies, difficult ies difficulties 25 establishing establishing aa proper proper chain-of-custody chain-of-custodyfor forphysical physicalevidence, evidence,etc.-are etc.-are not not the the kind kind of oferrors errors that that 26
28 Page 4 of of9 1 can only occur through calculated efforts. Errors Errors like these can also occur because because of of disorganization disorganization
2 or unpreparedness unpreparedness before before trial-in trial-in other otherwords, words, as as aa result result of negligence. 3 Defendant's primary Defendant's primary theory theory appears appears to to be that he was provoked into requesting requesting aa mistrial by 4 the cumulative effect of the evidentiary evidentiary errors. errors. See Mot. Dismiss at 6 ("A mistrial mistrial was the only 5 consequence of foreseeable consequence of the Government's Government's repeated repeated errors."). errors."). However, However, this this argument argument is is difficult 6 to square to r e with aa sta standardd that requires equir es a showing showing of of intentional conduct conduct on the pa part of of tthe 7
8 prosecution. The prosecution. The mere mere fact fact that that the the People People committed committed several several errors errors does not not itself itself prove they
9 intended to err, or that they they intended these errors errors to to provoke provoke a mistrial. mistrial. And And ifif the the errors errors are are all all
10 10 unintentional, multiple unintentional, multiple errors errors do do not create create a bar to to rreprosecution. prosecution. See, See, e.g., United United States v. 11 11 McCallum, McCallum, 721 F.3d 706, 711 711 (D.C. (D.C. Cir. Cir. 2013) 2013) ("Because ("Because the prosecutor's several violations were 12 12 unintentional, unintentional, however, however, retrial retrial of of McCallum McCallum is is not barred barred by the the Double Double Jeopardy Jeopardy Clause."), Clause."); 13 13 Commonwealth v. Johnson, Johnson, 231 A.3d A.3d 807, 807, 817-19 817-19 (Penn. 2020). 14 14 Defendant Defendant also also analogizes analogizes the the evidentiary evidentiary errors errors in in this this case case to the crucial crucial error in People v, v. 15 15
16 16 Charfauros, Crum. Charfauros, Case No. CM0387-17. Crim. Case CM0387-17. However,, the However he Courtt finds finds t he er r or in error in tthat ha t ca se case
17 17 distinguishable. In Charfauros, a mistrial was declared, and dismissal with prejudice was granted, distinguishable.
18 because the prosecutor elicited testimony from a witness on a highly prejudicial and fundamentally 19 19 irrelevant topic. See Dec. & 17, 2019). Order at 2 (Dec. 17, & Order 2019). Critically, this evidence was elicited only 20 the Judge after the Judge had made made a finding on the record that the the evidence evidence could not be elicited, and after the 21 Judge had issued Judge issued "repeated "repeated warnings reamingstotothe theprosecution" prosecution"against against doing doing so.so.Id.Id atat 6.6. When the 22 prosecutor elicited the testimony anyway, the Judge found that he had acted "intentionally and with 23
24 of goading the purpose of goading defense defense counsel counsel to to object object to tothe thetestimony." testimony." Id. Id
25 By contrast, the evidentiary contrast, the evidentiary errors errors in in this this case case were were made upon evidence that that was was clearly clearly 26 relevant, arguably probative, and and not not unfairly unfairly prejudicial prejudicial to toDefendant. Defendant. The People did not introduce 27 waring, nor the evidence over the Court's warning, norwould wouldthe theCourt Court have have excluded excluded or or stricken stricken the evidence 28 Page 5 of of99 1 had it been been introduced properly. properly. Instead, Instead, the evidence evidence was excluded or stricken because the methods excluded or
2 the People chose to attempt to introduce the evidence were contrary to the Guam Rules of Evidence.
3 The Court does not mean mean to to suggest suggest that that the People's People's errors errors in this case were not not serious, serious; indeed, 4 they were so serious that they required required a mistrial. But unlike the error mistrial. But error in the Charfauros case, the 5 errors in this case do not demonstrate intentional conduct. errors conduct. Instead, Instead, they they demonstrate demonstrate negligence. 6 And while prosecutorial negligence negligence is is condemnable, condemnable, itit does does not not suffice suffice to sustain a "goading" "goading" claim. 7
8 Under Under these circumstances, circumstances, double double jeopardy jeopardy does does not not bar bar aa retrial.
9 Defendant's Due 2. Defendant's Due Process Process Rights Rights Were Were Not Not Violated Violated
10 10 In line with the prior argument, Defendant Defendant also casts the People's actions as People's actions as a violation of his violation of 11 11 "due process right to competent prosecution." Mot. Mot. Dismiss Dismiss at at 6. 6. Defendant Defendantasserts asserts that that the the Court Court 12 12 has the inherent supervisory authority authority to to dismiss dismiss an an indictment indictment upon upon prosecutorial impropriety. Id. prosecutorial impropriety. Id 13 13 He argues the Court should exercise this authority here because 14 14 [the People's] basic basic violation violation of of the the Court's Court's orders orders concerning concerning organization organization ofof 15 15 exhibits, and lodging the same with the court as ordered lodging the same with the court ordered by by the Court - factored into 16 16 the ultimate mistrial. mistrial. The The Government Government as a whole whole should be deterred from this type of malfeasance when bringing bringing criminal criminal defendants defendants to to trial trial in Guam. Guam. This This matter matter 17 17 should be dismissed as a stern stem statement from the Court that thethe Government Government must 18 18 do better.
19 19 Id. Id at at 7. 20 While the Court Court understands understands Defendant's frustration with the outcome of frustration with of the the first first trial, trial, 21 "dismissal of of an indictment indictment with with prejudice prejudice necessarily necessarily implicates implicates separation-of-powers separation-of-powers principles," 22 and is therefore "impermissible "impermissible absent absent a clear basis in fact United States v. fact and law for doing so." United 23
24 Bundy, Bundy, 968 F.3d 1019, 1019, 1031 1031 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, Cir. 2020). Thus, "for "for prosecutorial prosecutorial misconduct misconduct to to support support the
25 super visor y exercise supervisory of dismissal exer cise of dismissa l as a s aa sanction, nct ion, the t he misconduct must be bot misconduct must bothh fla gr flagrant aand nd
26 prejudicial." People v. v. Lujan, Lujan, 1998 1998 Guam 28 1] ~ 19, 19; see see United States v. v. Jacobs, Jacobs, 855 F.2d F.2d 652, 652,655 27 (9th Cir. 1988) ("absent flagrant and prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, this court will find that 28 Page 6 of of9 1 court's dismissal the district court's dismissal of of an an indictment indictment is is an an abuse abuse of of its itsdiscretion."). discretion."). By By contrast, contrast, "negligent, "negligent,
2 or even grossly negligent" negligent" behavior behavior does does not not amount amount to flagrant misconduct. misconduct. United United States v. v. Kearns, Kearns,
3 1993); Bundy, 968 F.3d at 1038 (flagrant 5 F.3d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1993), (flagrant misconduct misconduct does not include 4 "accidental or merely negligent" errors). errors). Here, Here, the the Court Court has found that the People's People's errors errors were 5 negligent, not not deliberate. Since Since negligent negligenterrors errors do do not not rise rise to the level of of "flagrant misconduct," the 6 sanction of of dismissal with prejudice prejudice on on this this basis basis is unavailable. 7
8 Necessarily Violate Defendant's Statutorv 3. Retrial Would Not Necessarilv Statutory Speedv Speedy Trial Right
9 Defendant Defendant argues argues that any retrial that any retrial would would violate violate Guam's Guam's Speedy Speedy Trial Trial Act, Act, 88 GCA GCA §§ 80.60, 80.60,
10 10 because there is already already "no time left on the speedy trial clock to to bring bring [him] [him] to to trial trial again." again." Mot. 11 11 Dismiss at 8 (Apr. (Apr. 16, 16, 2024). 2024). Because Defendant Defendant was was not not in in custody custody at the time of of his arraignment, 12 12 his speedy trial his speedy clock began trial clock began with with sixty sixty (60) (60) days on it. days on GCA §§ 80.60(a)(3). it. 88 GCA 80.60(a)(3). Defendant Defendant asserted his asserted his 13 13 right to a speedy trial on January 30, 2024. 2024. Defendant Defendant calculates that this this required required him to be brought 14 14 trial by to trial by April April 1, 1, 2024, 2024, although although in infact facthis trialdid histrial didnot notbegin beginuntil untilApril April8,8,2024. 2024.Id Id at at 8. 8. Therefore, Therefore, 15 15
16 16 Defendant reasons there Defendant reasons zero (0) are zero there are (0) days days left on his his speedy speedy trial trial clock, clock, so so any any retrial retrial would would
17 17 automatically violate his statutory speedy trial right.
18 18 It is undeniable that more than sixty days elapsed between between January January 30, 30, 2024, and April 8, 8, 19 19 2024. 2024. Under Under88GCA GCA§§80.60, 80.60, "if "ifaa defendant defendant isis not not brought brought to to trial trial within within the the time time prescribed prescribed and and 20 no good good cause is shown, the trial court must must dismiss dismiss the the indictment." indictment." People v. Flores, 2009 Guam v. Flores, 21 'if 23; Ungacta 22 1123, Ungacta v. v. Superior Court, Court, 2013 Guam 29 'if 9.9. Thus, the question is whether there was 29 1] 22
good cause for the delay, delay; this is typically found where the delay delay was was caused caused by, and/or and/or was for the 23
24 'ii 26; benefit of, the defendant. Id 1[ 26, see see Flores, 'if 40 (good Flores, 2009 Guam 22 1140 (good cause found where trial trial
25 delay was due to to appointment appointment of defendant's new new attorney); attorney), Quinata rata v. v. Superior Superior Court, Court, 2010 Guam
26 8 'if1137 (good cause 37 (good causefound foundtotoexclude excludetime time spent spent resolving resolving defendant's defendant's motion to dismiss). 27
28 Page 7 of9 of 1 Here, although jury trial although jury trial began on April 8, 8, 2024, 2024, it was originally scheduled scheduled for March 25,
2 2024, i.e., within 2024, i.e., withinthe the60-day 60-daylimit limitimposed imposedby GCA§§80.60(a)(3). by88GCA The two-week 80.60(a)(3). The two-week delay delay from from March March 3 25 to to April 8 8 occurred at atthe therequest requestof ofDefendant's Defendant'scounsel. counsel.Min. Min.Entry Entry(Feb. (Feb.20, 20,2024). 2024). The The two- 4 week delay was was therefore caused caused by Defendant and and was was for for Defendant's benefit, and it is therefore 5 excludable excludable for good good cause. cause. See See Ungacta, Ungacta, 2013 Guam 29126. 2013 Guam 29 1] 26. Thus, Thus, on on the the date dateDefendant's Defendant's first 6 trial began, trial began, aa total total of of fifty-four fifty-four (54) (54) days days had had elapsed elapsed from Defendant's speedy trial clock, speedy trial clock, leaving 7
8 six (6) 6) days days remaining. remaining.
9 The Court notes The Court under18 that under notes that 18USCA USCA §§ 3161(e) of the 3161(e) of the federal federal Speedy Trial Act, Speedy Trial Act, the the
10 10 declaration of a mistrial mistrial resets resets the thespeedy speedytrial trialclock. clock. See United United States v.v. Kington, 875 F.2d 1091, 1091, 11 1107 (5th Cir. 1107 (5th Cir. 1989), 1989); Unitea'States United States v.v. Porchay, Porchay, 651 930, 937 651 F.3d 930, 937n.5 n.5(8th (8thCir. Cir.2011). 2011). Several Several states states 12 have similar rules. See, e.g., rules. See, e.g., Cal. Cal. Penal Code §§ 1382(a)(2), Penal Code 1382(a)(2); Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3402(±); Stat. Ann. 22-3402(f), Colo. Colo. Rev. 13 Stat. Arm. §§ 18-1-405(6)(e). Stat. Ann. 18-1-405( e). Other Otherstates stateshold holdthat thatthe the statutory statutory speedy speedy trial trial right right has has been satisfied been satisfied 14 14 where the trial began within the statutory timeframe, regardless statutory timeframe, regardlessof of how how the the trial trial ends, ends; accordingly, 15 15
16 16 there there iS is no no corresponding corresponding "speedy trial trial clock" clock"governing governingthe theretrial, retrial,but butrather ratheraareasonableness reasonableness
17 17 analysis. analysis. See, See, e.g., e.g., People v. v. Dixon, Dixon, 410 N.E.2d 252, 255 255 (Ill. Ct. Ct. App. 1980), 1980); Bryant Bryantv.v. State, State, 746 746 18 So.2d 853, 853, 867 867 (Miss. (Miss. Ct. Ct. App. 1998). 1998). InInGuam, Guam,however, however,there thereisisno nosimilar similarstatute, statute, and and there there 19 appears to be appears to be no Guam Guam Supreme Court precedent Supreme Court precedent on on the the intersection intersection of of speedy speedy trial trial rights rights and and 20 mistrials. mistrials. Therefore, Therefore, six six(6) (6)days daysremain remain on on the the speedy trial clock for retrial. speedy trial 21 21 // II 22 // II 23 24 // II
25 // II 26 // II 27
28 Page 8 of9 1 CONCLUSION
22 Based on the the above above analysis, analysis, the the Court Court DENIES DENIES Defendant's Motion. The The Court Court further further 3 3 orders that the the Pre-Trial Pre-Trial Conference Conferencebe bescheduled scheduled for forJuly July16, 16, 2024, 2024, at at 8:45 8 :45 a.m. 4 ORDEREDthis SO ORDERED this §i.gL 1 JUL ll 2024 l 5 202% 5 5 6 6
8 8 C I
HONORABLE HONORABLE ALBERTO ALBERTO E. E. TOLENTINO 9 9 Judge, Superior Superior Court of Guam 10 10 11 11
12 12 13 13 14 14
15 15 SERVIICE S~RVDCIEVIA VHAE-EWAHL rE-MAHIL 16 16 acknowledge that II acknowledge that an an electronic electronic copyofoi the copy the original original was was e-mailed e-mailed to: to: 17 17 ,16 I, 4.-riglq ,fa II rr ;vf '1 18 18 nate~ '7//-Y/1Tlme 1/2W/ Date:1brktrime: l/;f4,J,-. 19 19 I7I4.uf (k/du, littti.f (M/w 624 .a...-< Deputy Deputy Clerk, Clerk, Superior Superior Court Court of of Guam Guam 220
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