People v. 2017 Lexus RX 350

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 5-25-0295
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250295-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/26/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0295 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE ex rel. THOMAS A. HAINE, ) Appeal from the State’s Attorney of Madison County, ) Circuit Court of ) Madison County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 24-MX-732 ) 2017 LEXUS RX 350, TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ) THOUSAND DOLLARS ($250,000) UNITED ) STATES CURRENCY, and FOUR HUNDRED ) DOLLARS ($400) UNITED STATES CURRENCY, ) ) Defendants ) Honorable ) Neil T. Schroeder, (Xiaolin Zheng and Kezhong Xie, Claimants-Appellants). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Sholar concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The circuit court erred in dismissing the forfeiture action without entering a final order disposing of the seized property. On appeal, the State concedes that the circuit court retained in rem jurisdiction after dismissal and was required to direct the disposition of the property. The parties only dispute whether the circuit court was required to return the property to the claimants. Because the record does not establish that the claimants were entitled to immediate return of the property as a matter of law, we reverse the dismissal to the extent it failed to dispose of the seized property and remand for entry of a final disposition order consistent with Illinois forfeiture law and in rem jurisdictional principles.

¶2 The claimants, Xiaolin Zheng and Kezhong Xie, appeal the order of the circuit court of

Madison County granting the State’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture action without directing the

1 disposition of the property. On appeal, the claimants argue that the circuit court erred by dismissing

the forfeiture action without ordering the disposition of the property and failing to return the seized

property to them. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 We limit our recitation to the facts necessary for the disposition of this appeal. On June 25,

2024, the Illinois State Police (ISP) conducted a traffic stop on Interstate 70 in Madison County

involving claimants Xiaolin Zheng and Kezhong Xie. During the stop, officers located

approximately $250,000 in U.S. currency concealed beneath the carpeted center console area of a

2017 Lexus RX 350, along with an additional $400 on Zheng’s person. The Lexus and all seized

currency were taken into evidence and held by the Metropolitan Enforcement Group of Southern

Illinois (MEGSI).

¶5 On June 27, 2024, the Madison County State’s Attorney filed felony money laundering

charges against Zheng and Xie. In addition, on July 3, 2024, the State filed a verified complaint

for forfeiture under Madison County case No. 24-MX-732 pursuant to section 29B-5 of the

Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/29B-5 (West 2022)), seeking forfeiture of the Lexus,

the $250,000 in U.S. currency, and the $400 in U.S. currency. The verified forfeiture complaint

alleged that the seized property constituted proceeds of money laundering or was used to facilitate

money laundering offenses. The circuit court, on the same date, entered a probable-cause finding

under section 29B-9(e) (id. § 29B-9(e)).

¶6 On July 30, 2024, the claimants filed a claim/answer asserting lawful ownership of the

property. Their filing asserted a possessory and ownership interest in the seized money and vehicle

and alleged that the money was obtained from family and acquaintances for the purpose of opening

a restaurant in the Midwest. Additionally, on that same date, the claimants filed a motion to excuse

2 verification of the claim/answer. On August 7, 2024, the claimants filed a verification to their

claim/answer, and the matter was set for further proceedings.

¶7 During the preliminary stages of the forfeiture action, multiple pleadings were filed,

including claimants’ motions for substitution of judge. On October 2, 2024, the State filed a motion

to strike the claimants’ claim/answer asserting that they have failed to “provide sufficient facts or

legal basis to substantiate their claim of ownership” in addition to challenging whether the claim

satisfies the statutory pleading requirements. The circuit court set the motion to strike for a

November 1, 2024, hearing and scheduling conference. On October 15, 2024, the claimants filed

a written response. Before any ruling on the motion to strike, the claimants filed a motion to

dismiss the forfeiture action and to return the property on October 25, 2024, and later amended the

motion on October 30. On October 31, 2024, the State filed a motion to stay the forfeiture

proceedings under section 29B-13(12) of the Code (id. § 29B-13(12)), asserting that the underlying

criminal case should proceed first. The record indicates that both parties agreed to stay the

forfeiture proceedings while related criminal matters proceeded.

¶8 Thereafter, on March 10, 2025—nine months after the seizure—Callaway County,

Missouri, issued criminal arrest warrants charging both Zheng and Xie with felony “stealing by

deceit” relating to the same $250,000. Missouri authorities advised ISP and Madison County

prosecutors that they sought the seized currency for evidentiary use in the Missouri criminal case.

We note that no separate claim or turnover order was filed in the forfeiture action by Missouri

authorities, nor a motion requesting an “innocent owner hearing” under section 29B-14 by the

alleged true owners of the currency in Missouri. See id. § 29B-14.

¶9 On March 20, 2025, the State dismissed the criminal felony money laundering charges.

The following day, March 21, 2025, the State filed a motion to dismiss the forfeiture case, and the

3 matter proceeded to a hearing. The circuit court noted that on March 6, 2025, claimants’ counsel

had filed a motion for return of the property. The parties agreed that the State’s motion to dismiss

should be addressed first. The claimants’ counsel objected to the proposed dismissal order because

it did not direct the disposition of the property, arguing that the forfeiture statute required the court

to direct the disposition of the seized property and citing federal forfeiture authority. Counsel

emphasized that while the State had authority to dismiss its own action, the court retained an

independent obligation to direct the disposition of the property.

¶ 10 The central issue at the hearing concerned whether, after dismissal, the circuit court was

statutorily required to determine ownership or otherwise direct disposition of the seized property.

The claimants argued that “there must be directions from you as to the res” and that a forfeiture

court retains jurisdiction until it orders where the property must go.

¶ 11 The State argued that the money constituted evidence in Missouri and that, because it was

no longer pursuing forfeiture, the circuit court had no further role. The State explained it was not

pursuing forfeiture and intended that the currency “should go to Missouri where [the claimants]

have warrants pending” and where it would be used “as evidence in that matter.” The State also

argued that the statutory return provisions apply only following adjudication on the merits, not

voluntary dismissal.

¶ 12 The circuit court repeatedly expressed the view that, upon signing the dismissal order, “this

Court’s jurisdiction ends with what happens to the car and the money.” The circuit court stated:

“I don’t think I have jurisdiction over the res once this case is dismissed. And it simply

becomes something sitting in a vault at the Illinois State Police. And what happens to it at

that point, not my concern. If it ends up in civil court because people want to file lawsuits,

so be it.”

4 ¶ 13 The claimants’ counsel strongly disputed the court’s view that dismissal ended its authority

over the property. Counsel emphasized that they had filed a verified claim asserting an interest in

the seized property and that no other person or entity had appeared to assert a competing claim.

Counsel argued that the forfeiture statute required the court to resolve the claims before it and that

“one of the parties has said we don’t want it anymore,” leaving the claimants “the only ones left.”

Counsel maintained that, under the Code, once a verified claim is filed, “there’s a process that you

have to go through,” and that the court was therefore required to determine the proper disposition

of the property.

¶ 14 The record reflects that the circuit court rejected claimants’ position. The judge

characterized the result urged by claimants—automatic return of the property upon the State’s

voluntary dismissal—as an “absurd result.” The court reasoned that the forfeiture statute did not

require the State to proceed to a merits hearing simply because a claim had been filed. The court

further expressed that dismissal ended the forfeiture court’s role, stating that “once this forfeiture

action is dismissed, this Court’s jurisdiction ends.”

¶ 15 The circuit court also rejected claimants’ argument that section 29B‑13(10) required return

of the property because the State “failed to meet its burden.” The court explained that the statutory

burden‑shifting scheme applies only after a hearing or trial at which the State presents its

case‑in‑chief. Because “there’s been no hearing, and there’s been no trial,” the court concluded

that the provisions in section 29B‑13(9) and (10) concerning the State’s burden did not apply. The

court emphasized that it was making no determination regarding ownership or whether the State

had met—or failed to meet—any substantive burden, because the forfeiture action was being

dismissed at the pleadings stage.

5 ¶ 16 Ultimately, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss without directing any

disposition of the property. The written dismissal order did not address the Lexus, the $250,000,

or the $400, and simply closed the case. As a result, the seized property remained in ISP/MEGSI

custody with no judicial directive governing its lawful disposition. The claimants filed a timely

notice of appeal.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, two issues are presented: (1) whether the circuit court erred by dismissing the

forfeiture action without entering a final order directing the disposition of the seized property and

(2) whether the circuit court erred in refusing to return the property to the claimants upon dismissal

of the forfeiture action. Notably, the State expressly concedes that the circuit court retained in rem

jurisdiction over the property and should have directed its disposition. Because both issues involve

questions of statutory interpretation and in rem jurisdiction, our review is de novo. See Marque

Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 160756, ¶ 31

(questions relating to circuit court’s jurisdiction and interpretation of a statute present questions of

law subject to de novo review).

¶ 19 As an initial matter, the State, during oral argument, suggested for the first time that the

voluntary dismissal order may not have been final and appealable. Although the issue was not

raised in the briefs, this court has an independent duty to consider issues of jurisdiction, regardless

of whether either party has raised them. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). In Kahle v.

John Deere Co., 104 Ill. 2d 302 (1984), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant may

appeal from a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal order because, although dismissed without prejudice,

such an order conclusively terminates the pending action and may prejudice the opposing party,

leaving no mechanism for later review in the trial court. Id. at 305-07. The same reasoning applies

6 here: the order dismissing the State’s forfeiture complaint ended the action in its entirety, resolved

all claims then before the court, and rendered all pending motions—including the State’s motion

to strike and the claimants’ motion to dismiss and return property—moot, leaving nothing

remaining that would alter finality. Whether the dismissal should have been accompanied by a

judicial disposition of the property presents a pure legal question that can be reviewed only on

direct appeal. Accordingly, the March 21, 2025, dismissal order is final and appealable under

Kahle, and we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

¶ 20 Article 29B of the Code authorizes forfeiture of property connected to money laundering

offenses. 720 ILCS 5/29B-5 (West 2022). Property is subject to forfeiture if it constitutes or is

derived from proceeds of money laundering or if it is used or intended to be used to commit or

facilitate such conduct. Id. § 29B-5(1)-(2).

¶ 21 Under section 29B-13, a judicial in rem forfeiture proceeding is initiated by filing a verified

complaint, which must be served on all known or reasonably identifiable persons claiming an

interest in the property. Id. § 29B-13(1), (3). Once the court enters a probable-cause finding under

section 29B-9(e), the statute directs that the circuit court “shall order the property subject to the

applicable forfeiture Act held until the conclusion of any forfeiture proceeding.” Id. § 29B-9(e).

¶ 22 A. Failure to Enter a Final Disposition Order

¶ 23 The claimants first argue that the circuit court erred by dismissing the forfeiture action

without issuing an order directing the disposition of the seized Lexus and currency. They assert

that once the State invoked the court’s in rem jurisdiction by filing a verified complaint and the

court entered a probable-cause order under section 29B-9(e), the court acquired jurisdiction over

the property and could not lose that jurisdiction until it entered an order specifying the property’s

lawful disposition. The claimants rely on People v. Keys, 324 Ill. App. 3d 630, 635 (2001), and a

7 line of federal in rem decisions holding that a court’s in rem jurisdiction persists until the court

affirmatively disposes of the property.

¶ 24 The State, on appeal, expressly concedes that the circuit court retained in rem jurisdiction

over the property even after the State voluntarily dismissed its complaint. The State acknowledges,

in its brief, that “the circuit court never lost in rem jurisdiction over the property and that the court’s

jurisdiction remains, regardless of the property’s present location.” The State further concedes that

dismissal alone did not extinguish the court’s jurisdiction and that the court was required to issue

a disposition order. The State only disputes whether the circuit court was required to return the

property to the claimants.

¶ 25 When the State filed its verified forfeiture complaint and the circuit court entered a

probable-cause order under section 29B-9(e) of the Code, the circuit court acquired in rem

jurisdiction over the seized Lexus and currency. People ex rel. Alvarez v. $59,914 United States

Currency, 2022 IL 126927, ¶ 20 (circuit court had in rem jurisdiction over currency based upon

the State’s seizure and filing of a forfeiture action). Section 29B-9(e) provides that, upon a finding

of probable cause, the circuit court shall order the property held until the conclusion of the

forfeiture proceeding. 720 ILCS 5/29B-9(e) (West 2022). Although article 29B does not define

“conclusion,” the structure of article 29B reflects that proceedings conclude only when the circuit

court enters a judicial determination directing the disposition of the property. See id.

§§ 29B-13(10), 29B-25(a). Nothing in article 29B authorizes voluntary dismissal alone to resolve

the status of property already placed within the circuit court’s in rem jurisdiction.

¶ 26 Illinois authority likewise recognizes that once a court acquires in rem jurisdiction over

property, that jurisdiction continues until the court affirmatively relinquishes control over or

disposes of the property. In People v. Keys, 324 Ill. App. 3d 630 (2001), the appellate court

8 explained that courts are “rightfully jealous of their jurisdiction,” and once jurisdiction attaches, it

is not surrendered “until [the court] ha[s] expressly done so.” Id. at 635. Keys further held that

unilateral acts by law enforcement or the state’s attorney cannot divest the court of jurisdiction

over seized property. Id. at 635-36 (“The State’s Attorney does not have the power to oust the

circuit court of jurisdiction once that jurisdiction has been assumed.”). Although Keys addressed

competing claims to seized assets, its reasoning remains applicable: when property is seized

pursuant to judicial process, the court’s control persists until it enters an order directing lawful

disposition. Id. at 636-37.

¶ 27 The Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in People ex rel. Alvarez v. $59,914

United States Currency, 2022 IL 126927. There, the court held that in rem jurisdiction attaches

when the State seizes property and initiates forfeiture proceedings, and that once jurisdiction

attaches, subsequent defects in notice or procedure do not divest the court of authority over the

res. Id. ¶¶ 18-23. The court further explained that such defects render any resulting order voidable,

rather than void, precisely because jurisdiction over the property already attached. Id. ¶¶ 20-23.

Thus, Alvarez confirms that once a court acquires in rem jurisdiction over the res, that jurisdiction

is not defeated by subsequent procedural irregularities. Likewise, Keys recognized that property

comes within the circuit court’s power upon seizure pursuant to judicial process and that, once

jurisdiction has been assumed, it is not surrendered until the court expressly relinquishes it. Keys,

324 Ill. App. 3d at 636-37. Accordingly, the question is not whether the State’s voluntary dismissal

terminated the forfeiture claim; it plainly did. Rather, the question is whether dismissal of the

forfeiture pleadings, standing alone, also terminated the circuit court’s in rem authority over

property that remained in its custody—still physically secured in an ISP vault—because no order

directing its disposition had been entered. Under Alvarez and Keys, it did not. Absent a judicial

9 disposition, transfer order, or other affirmative relinquishment of control over the property,

dismissal of the complaint did not, itself, extinguish the circuit court’s in rem jurisdiction.

¶ 28 Federal authority is consistent with this framework. The United States Supreme Court has

long held that “the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise

that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” Penn General Casualty Co. v. Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935). Likewise, Republic National Bank of

Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80 (1992), reaffirmed that once a court acquires in rem

jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is not defeated by subsequent transfer of the res or by loss of physical

possession. Id. at 87-88. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has similarly recognized that when state

law vests custody of seized property in the circuit court, neither law enforcement nor a prosecuting

authority may unilaterally interfere with or circumvent that court’s in rem jurisdiction; disposition

must occur through the court exercising that jurisdiction. United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C–

20 Van, 924 F.2d 120, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1991). Together, these authorities support the same

principle discussed above: once in rem jurisdiction attaches, it remains unless and until the court

affirmatively relinquishes it.

¶ 29 As noted above, the State concedes on appeal that the circuit court retained in rem

jurisdiction after dismissal, and that a disposition order was required. Although not binding on this

court, the concession is consistent with article 29B and controlling principles of in rem jurisdiction;

thus, we accept the State’s concession. Our acceptance of the State’s position does not rest upon

the concession alone; rather, the continuing nature of in rem jurisdiction under Illinois law

provides an independent basis for this conclusion.

¶ 30 Applying these principles, the circuit court erred by concluding that dismissal of the

forfeiture complaint terminated its authority over the property. Upon the filing of a forfeiture action

10 and entry of the section 29B-9(e) probable-cause order, the court obtained continuing control over

the Lexus and currency until it issued an order disposing of the res. The dismissal order entered

here contained no such directive. Instead, the court expressly stated that the property was “not [its]

concern” after dismissal and would remain “in a vault” with the Illinois State Police. That

reasoning contravenes article 29B, Keys, and Alvarez, and the dismissal order must be reversed.

¶ 31 We note an additional basis supporting our conclusion that the circuit court retained in rem

jurisdiction and requiring reversal of the circuit court’s dismissal order. Although not raised by

either party, the circuit court erred when it failed to address the State’s motion to strike the

claimants’ verified claim prior to granting dismissal of the forfeiture action. Our conclusion is

reinforced by the statutory structure of article 29B, as recently examined in People ex rel. Raoul

v. $699,982 in United States Currency, 2026 IL App (3d) 230139. In Raoul, the appellate court

reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of a forfeiture action, holding that even though the parties

had agreed to address a motion to dismiss before the State’s challenge to the verified claim under

section 29B-13(5) and (6), the court erred by granting dismissal without first resolving that

challenge. Id. ¶¶ 32-37, 42. As Raoul explains, section 29B-13(5) provides that “ ‘[o]nly an owner

of or interest holder in the property’ ” may answer the State’s complaint and participate as a

claimant in an in rem forfeiture proceeding. Id. ¶ 33 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/29B-13(5) (West 2022)).

Further it provides that, upon the State’s motion, “ ‘the court shall first hold a hearing, in which a

claimant shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has a lawful, legitimate

ownership interest in the property and that it was obtained through a lawful source.’ ” Id. (quoting

720 ILCS 5/29B-13(5) (West 2022)). Thus, once the State triggers section 29B-13(5), the circuit

court must decide that threshold ownership and claim-sufficiency issue before entering dispositive

relief and cannot circumvent the statutory sequence. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 37, 42. Moreover, Raoul makes

11 clear that although parties may agree to sequence motions in a particular order, such agreements

do not relieve the court of its independent obligation to decide the section 29B-13(5) issue first.

Id. ¶¶ 34-37. Although Raoul did not arise from a voluntary dismissal, its reasoning applies with

equal force because the filing of a verified claim coupled with the State’s motion challenging the

verified claim under section 29B-13(5) imposes a statutory obligation that is not extinguished

merely because the State later elects to abandon the forfeiture complaint. Once the State invokes

section 29B-13(5), the circuit court must determine whether any lawful claimants exist—both to

assess who may participate in the proceedings and argue motions before the court, and to identify

the proper disposition of the property should dismissal be granted.

¶ 32 The same structural defect occurred here. At the March 21, 2025, hearing, the circuit court

acknowledged there were outstanding motions, but the parties agreed to proceed on the motion to

dismiss first. During arguments related to the motion to dismiss, the circuit court noted that the

State had filed a motion to strike the claimants’ verified claim, and the circuit court expressly

stated on the record that it had set that motion “for a hearing” but that “we never got past

[subsection] 5” because the parties agreed to stay the forfeiture case pending the related criminal

charges. The circuit court further acknowledged that it had “never determined that [the claimants]

made a valid claim” and that section 29B-13(9) and (10) did not apply because “there’s been no

hearing, and there’s been no trial.” As in Raoul, these statements by the circuit court confirm that

the statutory prerequisites governing who may appear as a claimant remained unresolved at the

time the court granted dismissal. See id. ¶¶ 32-33.

¶ 33 Nothing in Raoul suggests that this statutory obligation depends on which party seeks

dismissal; the error lies in granting dispositive relief while the unresolved section 29B-13(5)

challenge remained pending. Under Raoul, the circuit court here was required to first address the

12 State’s motion to strike the verified claim before proceeding to any dispositive relief. Id. ¶¶ 32-33,

37, 42. Because the circuit court “never got past [subsection] 5,” the statutory sequence required

for concluding a forfeiture proceeding had not been completed. Accordingly, the forfeiture action

had not reached a “conclusion” within the meaning of section 29B-9(e) at the time of dismissal.

Thus, the circuit court retained in rem jurisdiction over the res and erred in dismissing the

forfeiture action without entering a lawful disposition order.

¶ 34 Because the circuit court dismissed the forfeiture action without resolving the status of the

seized property as required under article 29B, reversal is necessary. On remand, the circuit court

must exercise its continuing in rem jurisdiction, adjudicate any outstanding threshold matters

under section 29B-13, and enter a lawful disposition order consistent with article 29B’s statutory

framework.

¶ 35 B. Whether Claimants Were Entitled to Return

¶ 36 The claimants next argue that the circuit court was required to return the seized property

immediately upon voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture complaint. They rely primarily on section

29B-13(10) of the Code, which provides that if the State “does not meet its burden to show that

the property is subject to forfeiture, the court shall order the interest in the property returned or

conveyed to the claimant ***.” 720 ILCS 5/29B-13(10) (West 2022). They argue that dismissal

should be treated as a failure of proof and that, because no competing claim was filed, return was

mandatory.

¶ 37 We do not read article 29B so broadly. Section 29B-13 establishes a structured, sequential

adjudicative framework. First, a claimant must file a verified claim satisfying statutory

requirements. Id. § 29B-13(5), (6). The court must then resolve any challenges to the sufficiency

of that claim. Only after a legally sufficient and adjudicated claim is recognized does the statute

13 contemplate an evidentiary hearing at which the State must “meet its burden” by proving that the

property is subject to forfeiture. Id. § 29B-13(9), (10). Section 29B-13(10) applies only when the

State fails to meet its burden at such a hearing. Nothing in article 29B treats voluntary dismissal

before adjudication as equivalent to an adverse finding on the merits.

¶ 38 Here, the State filed a motion to strike the verified claim challenging its factual and legal

sufficiency under section 29B‑13, and the circuit court never ruled on that motion. As a result, the

court never determined whether the claimants’ filing met the statutory requirements necessary to

trigger the burden‑shifting and mandatory‑return provisions of section 29B‑13(10). As discussed

above, section 29B‑13(5) through (10) operates in a required sequence, and the court cannot reach

the merits‑related provisions of section 29B‑13(9) and (10) until any threshold challenge to the

verified claim has been resolved. See Raoul, 2026 IL App (3d) 230139, ¶¶ 32-33, 37. Because the

State invoked section 29B‑13(5) here and the court “never got past [subsection] 5,” the proceeding

never advanced to the stage at which the State could be said to have failed to meet its burden; thus,

section 29B‑13(10) was never triggered.

¶ 39 Further, article 29B expressly recognizes that property may continue to be lawfully held

for evidentiary purposes independent of an active forfeiture proceeding. Section 29B-25(d)

authorizes retention of property “needed for evidentiary purposes,” and section 29B-19 tolls

statutory deadlines while property is held as evidence. 720 ILCS 5/29B-25(d), 29B-19 (West 2022)

(“If property is seized for evidence and for forfeiture, the time periods for instituting judicial and

non-judicial forfeiture proceedings shall not begin until the property is no longer necessary for

evidence.”). Nothing in article 29B limits evidentiary retention to Illinois prosecutions. The record

indicates that Missouri authorities sought the currency for use in criminal proceedings arising from

the same events. Because the circuit court erroneously believed it lost jurisdiction upon dismissal,

14 it never considered whether evidentiary retention or transfer was authorized. We express no view

as to whether Missouri’s criminal proceedings may independently justify continued evidentiary

retention or transfer under principles of comity or custodial coordination; such questions remain

for the circuit court to address on remand in the first instance.

¶ 40 Illinois precedent confirms that section 29B-13(10) cannot be read to mandate automatic

return upon voluntary dismissal. In Keys, the appellate court rejected interpretations that would

allow disposition of seized property outside the judicial process mandated by statute, underscoring

that custody remains with the court until it orders otherwise. Keys, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 635-37. The

Illinois Supreme Court has likewise instructed that statutes must be construed as a whole and not

in a manner that collapses distinct procedural safeguards. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12.

Reading section 29B-13(10) to mandate immediate return upon voluntary dismissal would nullify

the statute’s sequential structure and improperly treat dismissal as a merits adjudication.

¶ 41 Federal forfeiture authority is consistent with this interpretation. The Sixth Circuit has

explained that even when a forfeiture action is voluntarily dismissed, the district court “retains the

authority to make an appropriate disposition of the property,” because a federal court may continue

to resolve collateral issues after dismissal. United States v. $515,060.42 in United States Currency,

152 F.3d 491, 501 n.9 (6th Cir. 1998). Thus, dismissal does not itself terminate judicial control

over the res or require the immediate return of the res to the claimant.

¶ 42 Accordingly, because the sufficiency of the verified claim was never adjudicated, no

evidentiary hearing occurred, and no judicial determination regarding forfeiture was made, section

29B-13(10) was not triggered. Additionally, the mere act of voluntary dismissal does not constitute

the “conclusion” of a forfeiture proceedings within the meaning of section 29B-9(e), as the

statutory framework conditions that conclusion upon a judicial determination resolving the

15 disposition of the res. Thus, although the circuit court erred in dismissing the forfeiture action

without entering a disposition order, the claimants were not automatically entitled to immediate

return of the property as a matter of law. The proper remedy is reversal of the dismissal order and

remand for the circuit court to exercise its continuing in rem jurisdiction and conduct the necessary

proceedings to determine the lawful disposition of the seized property under article 29B, as set for

below.

¶ 43 For these reasons, we reverse the dismissal order to the extent it failed to dispose of the

seized property and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the circuit court shall exercise its

continuing in rem jurisdiction and, if necessary, resolve the threshold matters left pending at

dismissal—including the sufficiency of any verified claim under section 29B‑13—and conduct the

proceedings required under article 29B to determine the lawful disposition of the Lexus and

currency. We also acknowledge that circumstances involving the res may have evolved since

dismissal, including the fact—known to the circuit court at the time—that Missouri authorities

sought the seized currency for use in a pending criminal prosecution. We express no view on the

legal effect on any such developments. On remand, the circuit court may consider these and any

other post-dismissal developments in the first instance, as appropriate under Illinois law and

principles of comity, in determining the proper disposition of the res.

¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the reasons stated, we reverse and remand the judgment of the Madison County circuit

court.

¶ 46 Reversed and remanded with directions.