The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY December 4, 2025
2025COA92
No. 25CA1724, People in the Interest of N.G. — Health and Welfare — Behavioral Health — Involuntary Commitment of a Person with a Substance Use Disorder
A division of the court of appeals applies section 27-81-112,
C.R.S. 2025, for the first time in a published opinion to affirm a
court order authorizing an involuntary commitment to the Colorado
Department of Human Services, Behavioral Health Administration,
for an incapacitating substance use disorder. This statute serves as
an important tool in assisting those who meet the statutory criteria
for involuntary commitment. In applying the statute, our
discussion of the evidence that supports commitment is instructive. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA92
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1724 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH2036 Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of N.G.,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur
Prior Opinion Announced November 13, 2025, WITHDRAWN
Opinion Previously Announced as “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)” on November 13, 2025, is now Designated for Publication
Miko Brown, City Attorney, Kathleen Bell, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, N.G., appeals a magistrate’s order committing her
to the custody of the Colorado Department of Human Services,
Behavioral Health Administration (BHA), under section 27-81-112,
C.R.S. 2025. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In early August 2025, N.G. was intoxicated and fell from a
bus, injuring her face. She was taken to an emergency room, where
her son learned that her liver was in “complete failure” and that she
“need[ed] to be committed.” Days later, N.G. was referred to
Centennial Peaks Hospital (the hospital). Because she would not go
voluntarily, N.G.’s son filed an application for emergency
commitment under section 27-81-111, C.R.S. 2025. In the
application, N.G.’s son alleged that his mother is a chronic alcohol
abuser who engages in behavior that places her at significant risk of
harm, has a history of injurious accidents while intoxicated, and
lacks stable housing. Based on the application for emergency
commitment, N.G. was placed at the hospital under the care and
treatment of Dr. Roderick O’Brien, among others.
¶3 On August 13, 2025, the People petitioned a magistrate under
section 27-81-112 to authorize the involuntary commitment of N.G.
1 to the custody of the BHA to receive substance use treatment. The
People included with their petition a physician’s certificate for
involuntary commitment, completed by Dr. O’Brien, and an
application for involuntary commitment, completed by N.G.’s son.
The magistrate appointed counsel for N.G. and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
¶4 At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. O’Brien, N.G.’s son, Shiloh
Kirby (an Involuntary Commitment Program coordinator and trainer
at the BHA), and N.G. testified. Dr. O’Brien testified without
objection as an expert in the field of addiction medicine. He
summarized N.G.’s “long history” of alcohol use and explained how
she met the diagnostic criteria for substance use disorder. N.G.’s
son described how his mother’s drinking has affected her ability to
care for herself and his concern that without treatment she will die.
Kirby, who testified as an expert in the field of involuntary
commitment coordination without objection, explained that N.G.
had been administered the American Society of Addiction Medicine
(ASAM) Criteria assessment. Kirby then explained that, based on
N.G.’s assessment results, the recommended placement was a
clinically managed residential treatment program. N.G. admitted to
2 having a problem with alcohol but said she did not believe inpatient
treatment was appropriate. Instead, she testified that outpatient
treatment would be a better fit for her “mentally” given her severe
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
¶5 The magistrate granted the petition, finding that the testimony
provided by Dr. O’Brien, N.G.’s son, and Kirby was “essentially
uncontroverted” and “credible” and N.G.’s testimony, to the extent
N.G. disagreed with the others’ testimony or her testimony was
contradicted by these witnesses, was not credible. The magistrate
found by clear and convincing evidence that N.G. is a person with a
substance use disorder who is incapacitated by substances and has
refused voluntary treatment. Accordingly, the magistrate entered
an order involuntarily committing N.G. to the BHA’s custody for
ninety days of substance use treatment.
II. Discussion
¶6 N.G. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
order. In particular, she contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the magistrate’s finding that she is
incapacitated by substances. We disagree.
3 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the record de novo, viewing it as a whole and in the light
most favorable to the People, to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of
Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. Likewise, we review de novo the
court’s conclusions of law, but we defer to its findings of fact if
supported by the record. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603,
613 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 131
(Colo. App. 2011). “The district court, as fact finder, ‘has discretion
to determine the credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency,
probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from it.’” People in Interest of R.C., 2019
COA 99M, ¶ 7 (quoting People in Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d
958, 962 (Colo. App. 2007)).
¶8 Section 27-81-112(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a court
may commit a person to the custody of the BHA if the person has a
substance use disorder and is incapacitated by substances. Before
entering a commitment order, the court must find that grounds for
involuntary commitment have been established by clear and
4 convincing evidence. § 27-81-112(5). Evidence is clear and
convincing when it “persuades the trier of fact that the truth of the
contention is ‘highly probable.’” People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127,
1136 (Colo. 1980) (quoting Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 800 (Colo.
1979)).
B. Incapacitated by Substances
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The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY December 4, 2025
2025COA92
No. 25CA1724, People in the Interest of N.G. — Health and Welfare — Behavioral Health — Involuntary Commitment of a Person with a Substance Use Disorder
A division of the court of appeals applies section 27-81-112,
C.R.S. 2025, for the first time in a published opinion to affirm a
court order authorizing an involuntary commitment to the Colorado
Department of Human Services, Behavioral Health Administration,
for an incapacitating substance use disorder. This statute serves as
an important tool in assisting those who meet the statutory criteria
for involuntary commitment. In applying the statute, our
discussion of the evidence that supports commitment is instructive. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA92
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1724 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH2036 Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of N.G.,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur
Prior Opinion Announced November 13, 2025, WITHDRAWN
Opinion Previously Announced as “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)” on November 13, 2025, is now Designated for Publication
Miko Brown, City Attorney, Kathleen Bell, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, N.G., appeals a magistrate’s order committing her
to the custody of the Colorado Department of Human Services,
Behavioral Health Administration (BHA), under section 27-81-112,
C.R.S. 2025. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In early August 2025, N.G. was intoxicated and fell from a
bus, injuring her face. She was taken to an emergency room, where
her son learned that her liver was in “complete failure” and that she
“need[ed] to be committed.” Days later, N.G. was referred to
Centennial Peaks Hospital (the hospital). Because she would not go
voluntarily, N.G.’s son filed an application for emergency
commitment under section 27-81-111, C.R.S. 2025. In the
application, N.G.’s son alleged that his mother is a chronic alcohol
abuser who engages in behavior that places her at significant risk of
harm, has a history of injurious accidents while intoxicated, and
lacks stable housing. Based on the application for emergency
commitment, N.G. was placed at the hospital under the care and
treatment of Dr. Roderick O’Brien, among others.
¶3 On August 13, 2025, the People petitioned a magistrate under
section 27-81-112 to authorize the involuntary commitment of N.G.
1 to the custody of the BHA to receive substance use treatment. The
People included with their petition a physician’s certificate for
involuntary commitment, completed by Dr. O’Brien, and an
application for involuntary commitment, completed by N.G.’s son.
The magistrate appointed counsel for N.G. and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
¶4 At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. O’Brien, N.G.’s son, Shiloh
Kirby (an Involuntary Commitment Program coordinator and trainer
at the BHA), and N.G. testified. Dr. O’Brien testified without
objection as an expert in the field of addiction medicine. He
summarized N.G.’s “long history” of alcohol use and explained how
she met the diagnostic criteria for substance use disorder. N.G.’s
son described how his mother’s drinking has affected her ability to
care for herself and his concern that without treatment she will die.
Kirby, who testified as an expert in the field of involuntary
commitment coordination without objection, explained that N.G.
had been administered the American Society of Addiction Medicine
(ASAM) Criteria assessment. Kirby then explained that, based on
N.G.’s assessment results, the recommended placement was a
clinically managed residential treatment program. N.G. admitted to
2 having a problem with alcohol but said she did not believe inpatient
treatment was appropriate. Instead, she testified that outpatient
treatment would be a better fit for her “mentally” given her severe
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
¶5 The magistrate granted the petition, finding that the testimony
provided by Dr. O’Brien, N.G.’s son, and Kirby was “essentially
uncontroverted” and “credible” and N.G.’s testimony, to the extent
N.G. disagreed with the others’ testimony or her testimony was
contradicted by these witnesses, was not credible. The magistrate
found by clear and convincing evidence that N.G. is a person with a
substance use disorder who is incapacitated by substances and has
refused voluntary treatment. Accordingly, the magistrate entered
an order involuntarily committing N.G. to the BHA’s custody for
ninety days of substance use treatment.
II. Discussion
¶6 N.G. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
order. In particular, she contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the magistrate’s finding that she is
incapacitated by substances. We disagree.
3 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the record de novo, viewing it as a whole and in the light
most favorable to the People, to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of
Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. Likewise, we review de novo the
court’s conclusions of law, but we defer to its findings of fact if
supported by the record. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603,
613 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 131
(Colo. App. 2011). “The district court, as fact finder, ‘has discretion
to determine the credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency,
probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from it.’” People in Interest of R.C., 2019
COA 99M, ¶ 7 (quoting People in Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d
958, 962 (Colo. App. 2007)).
¶8 Section 27-81-112(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a court
may commit a person to the custody of the BHA if the person has a
substance use disorder and is incapacitated by substances. Before
entering a commitment order, the court must find that grounds for
involuntary commitment have been established by clear and
4 convincing evidence. § 27-81-112(5). Evidence is clear and
convincing when it “persuades the trier of fact that the truth of the
contention is ‘highly probable.’” People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127,
1136 (Colo. 1980) (quoting Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 800 (Colo.
1979)).
B. Incapacitated by Substances
¶9 As relevant here, “incapacitated by substances” means that a
person, because of alcohol use,
is unconscious, has his or her judgment otherwise so impaired that he or she is incapable of realizing and making a rational decision with respect to his or her need for treatment, is unable to take care of his or her basic personal needs or safety, or lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate rational decisions about himself or herself.
§ 27-81-102(9), (9.4), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 10 The magistrate found that (1) N.G.’s “judgment [is] so impaired
that she is incapable of realizing and making a rational decision
with respect to her need for treatment,” and (2) she is “unable to
take care of her basic personal needs and safety.” The record before
us supports these findings.
5 ¶ 11 Dr. O’Brien opined that N.G. cannot make “reasonable and
informed decisions about her health care” due to “years of heavy
alcohol use,” which has resulted in metabolic and physical injuries.
For example, Dr. O’Brien explained that based on recent lab tests,
N.G. is in “end-stage liver failure.” And he described two recent
incidents that occurred when N.G. was intoxicated. The first was a
fall that resulted in injuries to her facial bones and required
surgery. However, because “her liver function was too dangerously
impaired by her alcoholism,” she was “not able to receive [the]
surgery that should . . . have been done.” The second was the fall
getting off the bus that resulted in “pretty severe injuries” to her
face, which were still visible at the hearing.
¶ 12 Dr. O’Brien explained that these injuries caused N.G. “to be in
a state where she is chronically impaired, and is not able to
reasonably make good judgment,” “good decisions,” or “reasonable
and informed decisions about her health care.” He testified that
she “demonstrates a huge lack of understanding, and lack of
insight,” about her alcoholism. Dr. O’Brien also testified that N.G.
has “anosognosia,” which is “a blind spot about her own illness,”
meaning “she doesn’t recognize the severity of her alcoholism” and
6 cannot “process and recognize that the consequences of failing to
treat [her illness are] likely to be lethal.”
¶ 13 Kirby testified that N.G. has “limited insight into the severity of
how alcohol use has impacted [her] medical and psychiatric
conditions” and that outpatient treatment would not be an
appropriate placement for her, despite N.G.’s preference for it, given
her ASAM assessment results. Further, Kirby explained that N.G.
“has had multiple attempts at” engaging in “that level of [outpatient]
care and also multiple failures,” and therefore “a higher level of care
is really needed.”
¶ 14 Concerning N.G.’s ability to take care of her own basic
personal needs or safety, Dr. O’Brien opined that N.G. is unable to
take care of her personal safety. N.G.’s son testified that his
mother’s drinking has affected her ability to obtain and maintain
employment and housing. He explained that, when she drinks, she
“neglect[s] all of her responsibilities, financially, medically, [and]
personally. Her entire life just gets consumed by alcohol, so she
takes care of nothing but drinking.” And Dr. O’Brien, N.G.’s son,
and Kirby each testified regarding their concern that if N.G. did not
receive the recommended inpatient treatment, “she would die.”
7 ¶ 15 This evidence, when viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the People, is more than sufficient to support the
magistrate’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that N.G. is
incapacitated by substances.
¶ 16 N.G. asserts that she is not incapacitated by substances
because she readily admits that she has a problem with alcohol and
plans to continue treatment on an outpatient basis because the
inpatient environment triggers her severe PTSD. While we
commend N.G. for her recognition that she has a problem with
alcohol, we are unpersuaded by her argument.
¶ 17 The magistrate found, with record support, that N.G.’s PTSD is
“not a contraindication for the recommended level of treatment.”
Indeed, Dr. O’Brien testified that her treatment providers
considered her PTSD diagnosis “very seriously” and were “aware of
the potential barrier in having PTSD as a co-occurring illness, and
that the setting for residential could potentially cause re-
traumatization.” But he also testified that, “empirically,” N.G. is
doing “quite well” in the inpatient setting — she has expressed “a lot
of appreciation and gratitude” about the relationships she has
formed with other patients and has been getting “adequate sleep,”
8 and the staff has not observed “any complications of PTSD.”
Additionally, Kirby testified that, while N.G.’s assessments “indicate
an underlying diagnosis of PTSD,” there is “no indication” that her
PTSD has “impact[ed] her state of mind” or “would impact her
ability to participate in [inpatient] treatment at this time.”
¶ 18 The magistrate expressly weighed this expert testimony
against N.G.’s testimony “that she’s able to take care of herself, she
thinks she’s functioning just fine, and that outpatient treatment
would meet her needs.” Noting that it was “sensitive to [N.G.]’s
concerns about residential or inpatient level of care and her PTSD,”
the magistrate found N.G.’s “testimony to not be entirely credible, in
light of the more credible testimony from Dr. O’Brien and Ms.
Kirby.” Because the record supports the magistrate’s
determination, we will not disturb it, and to the extent N.G. asks us
to second-guess witness credibility or draw different inferences from
the testimony, we decline to do so. See R.C., ¶ 7.
III. Disposition
¶ 19 The order authorizing involuntary commitment pursuant to
section 27-81-112 is affirmed.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.