Peo in Interest of Harris

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 26CA0407
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

26CA0407 Peo in Interest of Harris 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0407 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH830 Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Lincoln Harris,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Hawthorne*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 14, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Hayley Swestka, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Respondent, Lincoln Harris, appeals a magistrate’s order

authorizing his certification for long-term mental health treatment

at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (the hospital). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In March 2025, Harris was admitted to the hospital for

restoration treatment after being found incompetent to proceed in a

criminal case. Less than two weeks later, the criminal court

dismissed Harris’s charges, which prompted the hospital to request

a seventy-two-hour mental health hold. The hospital then

petitioned for short-term mental health treatment.

¶3 After extending the short-term certification, the hospital

petitioned for long-term mental health treatment, alleging that

Harris was gravely disabled. In February 2026, a magistrate held a

hearing, at which Dr. Zachary Wickline (one of Harris’s treating

physicians) and Harris testified. After hearing the evidence, the

magistrate found that Harris was gravely disabled and granted the

request for long-term certification.

1 II. Long-Term Certification

¶4 Harris asserts that there was insufficient evidence to establish

that he was gravely disabled, and the magistrate therefore erred by

authorizing the long-term certification. We are not persuaded.

¶5 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we

must affirm if the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the People, is sufficient to support the order. People in

Interest of R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. As the fact finder, the

magistrate determines the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight

of the evidence, along with the inferences and conclusions to be

drawn from it. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. We

must defer to the magistrate’s factual findings if they have record

support, but we review the magistrate’s legal conclusions de novo.

R.K.L., ¶ 13.

¶6 To authorize long-term certification for mental health

treatment, the magistrate must find that the patient has a mental

health disorder and, as a result of that disorder, is gravely disabled

or a danger to themselves or others. § 27-65-110(1)(a), C.R.S.

2025. Gravely disabled means that, because of a mental health

disorder, a person is incapable of making informed decisions about

2 or providing for their essential needs without significant supervision

and assistance from other people. § 27-65-102(17), C.R.S. 2025;

see also People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 1980) (noting

that a person is gravely disabled if they cannot “take care of basic

personal needs,” such as “food, shelter, clothing, and medical

care”).

¶7 The magistrate determined that the evidence presented at the

hearing established that Harris was gravely disabled as defined by

section 27-65-102(17). In reaching this decision, the court pointed

to the following evidence in the record:

• Harris indicated that he wanted to “discharge to

homelessness” and stated that he was “okay living on the

side of the road” and “get[ting] food from the kindness of

strangers.”

• Harris had an “addiction to substances” and would

“likely engage in those addictions” if released, “which will

place him in many risky sexual situations.”

• Although Harris currently engaged in some safe hygiene

practices, he was in a “highly structured setting” at the

3 hospital and even then “require[d] some prompting from

others.”

• Harris did not have a well-defined plan “on where he

would go” if released and did not “know how to get

medications” if he ran out.

Ultimately, the magistrate concluded that Harris “could not make

informed decisions for himself without assistance,” which would

likely lead him “back to an inpatient setting within days or weeks.”

¶8 The record supports the magistrate’s findings. Dr. Wickline

testified that Harris had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, which

caused him to be highly impulsive, led to pleasure seeking

behaviors, and frequently got him into dangerous situations. The

doctor noted that Harris’s schizophrenia impaired his judgment and

that Harris would often fluctuate between good judgment and

impulsive behavior. Dr. Wickline said that, during hospitalization,

Harris had been (1) involved in multiple physical altercations and

(2) engaged in hypersexual behaviors, such as inserting his fingers

into his rectum and flinging blood and feces onto the walls or at

staff.

4 ¶9 Dr. Wickline opined that, because of his schizophrenia, Harris

was gravely disabled. In support of his opinion, the doctor pointed

to Harris’s repeated statements that he would prefer discharging to

homelessness, lack of a realistic plan for obtaining food or shelter,

and addiction to methamphetamine. Dr. Wickline believed that,

without structured support, Harris could not obtain medications,

medical care, or follow-up treatment, and he would therefore be at

substantial risk of physical harm, worsening medical issues, and

psychiatric decompensation.

¶ 10 Still, Dr. Wickline acknowledged that Harris’s condition had

improved significantly during his stay at the hospital, especially

after he was prescribed clozapine. For example, the doctor noted

that Harris’s hypersexual behavior, hallucinations, and delusions

had become less frequent and that Harris had gradually been

moved to progressively lower-acuity units within the hospital.

However, Dr. Wickline opined that, because of Harris’s impaired

judgment, he was unlikely to continue his medication if released

from the hospital and noted that he would be vulnerable to a rapid

psychiatric deterioration as a result.

5 ¶ 11 For his part, Harris testified that, if released, he would stay at

a homeless shelter or attempt to return to his tribe in Wyoming. He

also said that he would continue taking his medications in the

community. But he refused to apply for public benefits and said

that he would obtain food, shelter, and medication from churches

or “people around.” And he insisted that he could meet his basic

needs by way of “self-motivation.”

¶ 12 On appeal, Harris asserts that there was insufficient evidence

that he was gravely disabled because the evidence showed that

(1) his symptoms had improved; (2) he voluntarily took his

prescribed medications; (3) he had some insight into his mental

illness and the need for medication; (4) he could maintain his basic

personal needs in the hospital; and (5) he expressed “viable

post-discharge” options. We disagree with this assertion for two

reasons.

¶ 13 First, Harris relies, in part, on his own testimony to support

this argument, but, to the extent that Harris’s testimony conflicted

with Dr. Wickline’s, the magistrate did not find Harris’s testimony

credible. Because we must defer to the magistrate’s credibility

determinations, Harris’s conflicting testimony does not help his

6 argument. See People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 38

(rejecting the respondent’s argument because “[t]he probate court

credited the treating psychiatrist’s testimony and did not credit

Ramsey’s testimony”).

¶ 14 Second, the evidence was sufficient for the magistrate to

determine that Harris was gravely disabled based on Dr. Wickline’s

testimony that, because of his mental health disorder, Harris could

not make informed decisions about or provide for his essential

needs without significant supervision and assistance from others.

See id. at ¶ 37 (noting that “[a] finding that a respondent is gravely

disabled may be shown by expert medical opinion”). Although some

evidence supports Harris’s position, the magistrate considered this

evidence and weighed it against the evidence supporting a finding

that Harris was gravely disabled. Because we may not reweigh the

evidence to reach a different result, we reject Harris’s argument.

See R.C., ¶ 7; see also People in Interest of N.G., 2025 COA 92, ¶ 18

(noting that an appellate court may “draw different inferences from

the testimony”).

¶ 15 Therefore, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to

the People, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish

7 that Harris was gravely disabled as defined in section 27-65-

102(17). See R.K.L., ¶¶ 13, 27 (concluding that the evidence was

sufficient where the respondent “was not able to make a good

assessment of what was a realistic way to provide for himself”); see

also Ramsey, ¶ 35 (evidence showed that the respondent was

homeless and could not communicate her medical concerns).

¶ 16 Finally, Harris asserts that the evidence did not establish that

he was a danger to himself or others. But the magistrate did not

find that he was a danger to himself or others, so we do not address

this argument. See § 27-65-110(1)(a) (requiring a showing of grave

disability or dangerousness); see also Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor

Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (“Generally, we

presume the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’ marks distinctive

categories.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 17 The order is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.