The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY September 11, 2025
2025COA78
No. 25CA0282, People in Interest of O.J.R. — Family Law — Dependency and Neglect — Interstate Compact on Placement of Children — Revised Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
In this dependency and neglect case, a division of the court of
appeals addresses two novel issues. First, the division determines
that the Revised Interstate Compact on Placement of Children is not
currently in effect in Colorado. Second, the division concludes that
the existing Interstate Compact on Placement of Children does not
apply when a court grants custody of a child to an out-of-state
parent. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA78
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0282 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30654 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of O.J.R., a Child,
and Concerning P.A.R.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Fox and Taubman*, JJ., concur
Announced September 11, 2025
Michiko Ando Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Samantha Metsger, Guardian Ad Litem
Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, P.A.R. (father)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment adjudicating O.J.R. (the child)
dependent or neglected and entering the initial disposition. The
resolution of this dispute requires us to determine two novel issues.
First, we must address whether the Revised Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children (Revised ICPC) is currently in effect in
Colorado. We conclude that it isn’t. Second, we consider whether
the provisions of the current Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children (ICPC)1 apply when a court grants custody of a child to an
out-of-state parent. We conclude that they do not.
¶2 We therefore determine that the juvenile court erred by
applying the provisions of the Revised ICPC to this case because
they are not yet effective or binding. Nonetheless, the error was
harmless because the requirements of the current ICPC do not
apply when a court grants custody of a child to an out-of-state
parent. And, because father’s remaining appellate claims do not
warrant reversal, we affirm the judgment.
1 As explained more fully in Part II.B infra, the ICPC governs the
interstate “placement” of children and corresponding provision of services to children involved in dependency and neglect cases.
1 I. Background
¶3 In July 2024, the Denver Department of Human Services filed
a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the then-eight-
year-old child. The Department alleged that a few days earlier, the
police responded after a third party found the child “actively
bleeding” with cuts on his face. The child reported that his father
had punched him and hit him with a belt, causing injuries to his
face and legs. The child was transported to the hospital by
ambulance. His facial injuries required stitches.
¶4 In the petition, the Department noted that the child’s mother
had never lived in Colorado and was not in the home when the
child’s injuries occurred. However, both parents had a history of
child welfare referrals.
¶5 Mother and father had also been engaged in lengthy and
contentious custody proceedings regarding the child in New York.
In February 2023, the New York court granted primary custody of
the child to father, with mother granted parenting time during
summer, winter, and spring breaks. In May 2024, father registered
the New York custody order in Colorado and obtained a temporary
order limiting mother’s parenting time to supervised visits in
2 Colorado.2 The Colorado domestic relations court subsequently
certified the ongoing custody proceedings into this dependency and
neglect case.
¶6 Initially, the juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of
the child to the Department, and he was placed in foster care.
Within two weeks, mother requested that the child be placed with
her. Shortly after that, the foster parents requested removal of the
child from their home within thirty days.
2 At the initial shelter hearing, the juvenile court found that it had
temporary emergency jurisdiction based on the allegations in the petition. See § 14-13-204(1), C.R.S. 2025 (providing that a court has jurisdiction if it is “necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse”). However, the court noted that it was necessary to determine if Colorado had ongoing jurisdiction over the case. At the next hearing, the juvenile court informed the parties that it had spoken to the New York domestic relations judge. The New York judge told the court that she had issued an order “waiving” New York’s jurisdiction in December 2023 because by that point, the child had been living in Colorado for at least six months and Colorado was a “more appropriate jurisdiction.” Neither party contests these statements or the juvenile court’s continuing exercise of jurisdiction. Given this record, we are satisfied that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify the New York orders and hear this case pursuant to section 14-13-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (permitting a Colorado court to modify child-custody orders from another state if that state determines it no longer has continuing exclusive jurisdiction or that Colorado would be a more convenient forum).
3 ¶7 In August 2024, the juvenile court held a contested placement
hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court found that a home
study for mother was not required under the “ICPC modifications,”
which, as explained below, we construe as a reference to the
Revised ICPC. The court then granted mother’s request for
temporary legal and physical custody of the child. After the
hearing, the child was returned to mother’s home in New York.
¶8 Approximately one month later, father requested that his
counsel withdraw so he could represent himself. The juvenile court
granted the request. Around the same time, mother entered into a
deferred adjudication, admitting that the child had received
improper care through no fault of her own. Father denied the
petition and requested an adjudicatory hearing.
¶9 In November 2024, the juvenile court held a contested
adjudicatory hearing concerning only father. Father appeared and
represented himself. The court found that the child was dependent
or neglected. The court later held a dispositional hearing and
adopted a treatment plan for father.
¶ 10 Father appeals the juvenile court’s decisions granting custody
of the child to mother in New York, adjudicating the child
4 dependent or neglected, and adopting the initial treatment plan for
him.
II. Order Granting Mother Custody
¶ 11 Father first contends that the juvenile court erred by
misapplying the ICPC and granting custody of the child to mother
before an ICPC home study had been completed. Specifically, he
argues that the court improperly applied the Revised ICPC because
it was not in effect when the placement hearing occurred. He also
argues that under the current version of the ICPC, a home study
was required before the court could grant custody of the child to
mother in New York.
¶ 12 We agree that the juvenile court improperly applied the
Revised ICPC. Nonetheless, we conclude the error was harmless
because the current ICPC does not apply when a court grants
custody3 of a child to an out-of-state parent.
3 Our conclusion is not limited to cases in which a court grants
“legal custody,” as defined by section 19-1-103(94)(a), C.R.S. 2025, to a parent. Rather, the term “custody,” as used in this opinion, includes an award of either legal or physical custody to a parent. Thus, even when a court grants legal custody of a child to a department of human services but “places” the child with an out-of- state parent, the ICPC does not apply.
5 A. Standard of Review
¶ 13 Whether the juvenile court properly applied the ICPC is a
question of law that we review de novo. See People in Interest of
I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 6. We also review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. People in Interest of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28,
¶ 24.
¶ 14 When interpreting statutes, we seek to discern and effectuate
the legislature’s intent. Id. In doing so, we apply words and
phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings, and we
consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Id. If the statutory
language is unambiguous, we apply it as written, and we need not
resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. In construing a
statute, we must respect the legislature’s choice of language and
refrain from adding words to the statute or subtracting from it. Id.
at ¶ 25.
B. The Revised ICPC is Not Currently Effective in Colorado
¶ 15 The ICPC is an interstate agreement approved by all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See
I.J.O., ¶ 9. The purpose of the ICPC is to facilitate interstate
6 cooperation and coordination in the placement of, and provision of
services to, children being placed by one state’s child protective
services agency in another state. Id.
¶ 16 Colorado enacted the ICPC in 1975, and it was codified at
sections 24-60-1801 to -1803, C.R.S. 1975. See Ch. 224, sec. 1,
§§ 24-60-1801 to -1803, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 844-49. The
original language of the ICPC remained codified in sections 24-60-
1801 to -1803 until August 2024, when Colorado became the
eighteenth state to enact the Revised ICPC.4 In doing so, the
legislature included language that will have the effect of repealing
and reenacting, with amendments, part 18 of article 60 of title
24. See Ch. 248, sec. 2, §§ 24-60-1801 to -1804, 2024 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1628-51.
¶ 17 However, the legislation specifically provides that the Revised
ICPC is not immediately effective:
The [Revised ICPC] shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than 35 states. The effective date shall be the later of July 1, 2007, or upon enactment of the compact into
4 The Revised ICPC was drafted by the American Public Human
Services Association (APHSA) in 2006. See APHSA, History of the ICPC, https://perma.cc/39WY-3S2B.
7 law by the 35th state. Thereafter it shall become effective and binding as to any other member state upon enactment of the compact into law by that state.
§ 24-60-1802, art. XIV(B), C.R.S. 2025. Section 24-60-1804, C.R.S.
2025, reiterates, “Section 2 of Senate Bill 24-125, enacted in 2024,
will take effect on the date the [Revised ICPC] is enacted into law in
the thirty-fifth compact state.” To date, only eighteen states have
adopted the Revised ICPC. See APHSA, Revised ICPC,
https://perma.cc/FZN4-9RZA. Consequently, although the
language of the Revised ICPC presently appears in sections 24-60-
1801 to -1804 of Colorado’s current revised statutes, the Revised
ICPC is not yet in effect or binding.
¶ 18 Thus, we conclude that the language of the prior version of the
ICPC, sections 24-6-1801 to -1803, C.R.S. 2023, remains in effect.
This conclusion is consistent with the plain language of section 24-
60-1804. And, to the extent this language permits any ambiguity,
the legislative history of H.B. 25-1086 reveals that the intent of
section 24-60-1804 was to “clarif[y] that the existing [ICPC] remains
in effect until the updated version is enacted by 35 states.” Legis.
Council of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, Fiscal Note on H.B. 25-1086, at
8 1 (Jan. 30, 2025); see Ch. 60, sec. 1, § 24-60-1804, 2025 Colo.
Sess. Laws 251.
¶ 19 In sum, the Revised ICPC will not take effect in Colorado until
it has been enacted into law by thirty-five states. Unless and until
that happens, juvenile courts in Colorado must apply the language
of sections 24-60-1801 to -1803, C.R.S. 2023, when addressing the
interstate placement of children.
C. The ICPC Does Not Apply to Orders Granting Custody to Out- of-State Parents
¶ 20 No reported Colorado case has determined whether the
provisions of the ICPC apply when custody of a child is granted to
an out-of-state parent. Courts from other states have reached
different conclusions in resolving this issue. Compare Kurtis A.
Kemper, Construction and Application of Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children, 5 A.L.R. 6th 193, § 6 (2005) (discussing
cases holding that the ICPC applies to out-of-state placement with a
natural parent), and Green v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 864 A.2d 921,
926-27 (Del. 2004) (concluding that the ICPC should be read to
encompass placement of a child with a noncustodial parent), with
Kemper, § 7 (discussing cases holding that the ICPC does not apply
9 to such placements), and In re Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 182 (N.H.
2008) (concluding that the ICPC was intended only to govern
placements of children in substitute arrangements for parental
care, which does not include returning a child to a natural parent).
We now address the issue and conclude that the ICPC does not
apply when a court grants custody of a child to a parent.
¶ 21 The ICPC governs the “interstate placement of children.” § 24-
60-1802, art. I, C.R.S. 2023. Thus, the definition of “placement” is
central to discerning the ICPC’s reach. The ICPC defines
“[p]lacement” as “the arrangement for the care of a child in a family
free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution.”
§ 24-60-1802, art. II(d), C.R.S. 2023. This language, on its own, is
somewhat unclear, particularly “family free” home, which is not
defined by the ICPC. See In re R.S., 215 A.3d 392, 404 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2019) (acknowledging that the definition of “family free”
is not clear), aff’d, 235 A.3d 914 (Md. 2020); In re C.B., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 294, 299 (Ct. App. 2010) (stating that “family free home” is
not a term of art, and its meaning is by no means clear on its
face). But see Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 182 (“Although the term ‘family
free’ home is not defined, in context it refers to a home that
10 provides care for a child similar to that which a family would
provide, but that, unlike a boarding home, charges no fee for this
care.”).
¶ 22 But the ICPC provides additional guidance through provisions
that address conditions for placement. Specifically, article III of the
ICPC provides as follows:
(a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of the children therein.
(b) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state.
§ 24-60-1802, art. III(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2023 (emphasis added). And,
although the ICPC does not define “foster care” or “adoption,” the
plain meaning of those terms does not include an award of custody
to a parent.
11 ¶ 23 This conclusion is consistent with Colorado’s statutory
definition of “[f]oster care.” The Children’s Code defines “foster
care” as
the placement of a child or youth into the legal custody or legal authority of a county department of human or social services for physical placement of the child or youth in a kinship care placement; supervised independent living placement, as defined in section 19-7-302[, C.R.S. 2025]; or certified or licensed facility, or the physical placement of a juvenile committed to the custody of the state department of human services into a community placement.
§ 19-1-103(66), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 24 Thus, “placement in foster care” does not include placement
with parents. See R.S., 215 A.3d at 405 (referring to Maryland’s
statutory definition of “foster care” in concluding that the ICPC’s
definition of “placement” does not encompass a child’s out-of-state
placement with a parent); see also In re Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1, 7-8
(Conn. 2012) (“Children in the care of their own parents are not in
‘foster care’ in any ordinary sense of that phrase, and parents are
not required to adopt their own children.”).
¶ 25 Moreover, to the extent that the ICPC placement provisions
create any ambiguity, the original drafter’s notes, supplied by the
12 Council of State Governments, “reinforce the notion that the [ICPC]
does not apply to parental placements.” McComb v. Wambaugh,
934 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1991). These notes explain that the
ICPC “exempts certain close relatives . . . in order to protect the
social and legal rights of the family and because it is recognized
that regulation is desirable only in the absence of adequate family
control or in order to forestall conditions which might produce an
absence of such control.” Id. (citation omitted). The purpose of this
exemption is to limit the state’s unnecessary intrusion into family
life. Id. (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977)). This deference is at its zenith when the proposed custody
award is to a parent. See id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982)); see also Alexis O., 959 A.2d at 183.
¶ 26 In sum, we conclude that the plain language of section 24-60-
1802, C.R.S. 2023, limits the applicability of the ICPC to cases in
which children are placed for foster care or adoption. In other
words, it applies to substitutes for parental care that are not
implicated when custody of a child is granted to a parent.
¶ 27 We acknowledge that our interpretation of the ICPC conflicts
with “Regulation 3” promulgated by the Association of
13 Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children (AAICPC) and adopted in Colorado through Department of
Human Services Rule 7.307.1, 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-4. The
AAICPC’s Regulation 3 states in pertinent part that compliance with
the ICPC is required for “[p]lacements with parents and relatives
when a parent or relative is not making the placement.” AAICPC,
Regulation 3(2)(a)(3) (effective Oct. 1, 2011),
https://perma.cc/82ME-QNBV. Likewise, we acknowledge that our
interpretation of the ICPC conflicts with the Colorado Department of
Human Services’ rules implementing ICPC Regulations 3, which
provide that the ICPC procedures “shall be initiated for children
who are considered for placement out-of-state for . . . [h]omes of
parents.” Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.307.31(B), 12 Code Colo.
Regs. 2509-4. However, in light of our conclusion that the relevant
text of the ICPC unambiguously confines its application to
placements of children in foster care or as preliminaries to
adoption, both ICPC Regulation 3(2)(a) and Department of Human
Services Rule 7.307.31(B), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-4, are
inconsistent with the enabling legislation and, therefore, cannot be
given effect. See B.C.B., ¶ 27 (“In conducting our statutory
14 analysis, we may consider an administrative agency’s interpretation
of the statute, but we are not bound by this interpretation, and we
will not defer to it if it conflicts with the statute’s plain language.”);
see also D.L. v. S.B., 201 N.E.3d 771, 777 (N.Y. 2022) (concluding
that ICPC Regulation 3 cannot be given effect because it is
inconsistent with the language of the ICPC); R.S., 215 A.3d at 406-
07 (concluding that Regulation 3 is invalid to the extent it purports
to expand application of the ICPC to out-of-state placements with a
parent).
¶ 28 Moreover, our conclusion does not excuse Colorado juvenile
courts and departments of human services from ensuring that
children are safe when placed with out-of-state parents. Rather,
when making any placement or custody decision, a juvenile court
must consider the overriding purpose of the Children’s Code, which
is to protect a child’s safety and welfare by providing procedures to
serve the child’s best interests. See L.G. v. People in Interest of K.G.,
890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). And a juvenile court’s paramount
concern in a dependency and neglect case must be to protect a
child from any further harm as the result of abuse or neglect. Id.
15 ¶ 29 More specifically, before an adjudication has been entered and
after notice to the parents, a juvenile court may hold a hearing and
enter temporary orders for the custody and protection of a child so
long as such orders are in the child’s best interests. See § 19-1-
104(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025. And, after an adjudication has been
entered, a juvenile court “may place the child in the legal custody of
one or both parents . . . , with or without protective supervision,
under such conditions as the court deems necessary and
appropriate.” § 19-3-508(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 30 Based on the foregoing, we join those states holding that the
ICPC does not apply when a court grants custody of a child to an
out-of-state parent. See D.L., 201 N.E.3d at 775 (the clear language
of the ICPC limits its applicability to cases of placement for foster
care or adoption, which do not include custody with out-of-state
parents); R.S., 215 A.3d at 396 (the ICPC does not apply to the out-
of-state placement of a child with a biological parent); In Interest of
C.R.-A.A., 521 S.W.3d 893, 903 (Tex. App. 2017) (The plain
language of the ICPC shows “it is inapplicable to an interstate
placement of a child with a parent.”); In re S.R.C.-Q., 367 P.3d 1276,
1282 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he ICPC applies only to out-of-state
16 placements of children with foster care or as a preliminary to a
possible adoption, not to out-of-state placements with a parent.”); In
re D.B., 43 N.E.3d 599, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[T]he statute
quite plainly provides that it applies only to placement in foster care
or a preadoptive home. A biological parent is neither of these.”);
Emoni W., 48 A.3d at 7-8 (“[T]he ordinary meaning of the [ICPC’s
language] does not encompass placement with a noncustodial
parent.”); C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302 (An “out-of-state placement
with a parent is never subject to the ICPC.”); Alexis O., 959 A.2d at
182 (The language of the ICPC shows that it “does not apply to care
for a child by his or her natural parent.”).
D. Application to the Current Case
¶ 31 We now turn to the juvenile court’s ruling. Recall that the
court expressly applied the “ICPC modifications.” Specifically, it
found that an ICPC home study was unnecessary because mother
qualified as a “non-custodial parent.” But the language about non-
custodial parents appears only in article III of the Revised ICPC, not
the current ICPC. Compare § 24-60-1802, art. III(B)(5), C.R.S.
2025, with § 24-60-1802, art. III, C.R.S. 2023. Thus, when read in
context, it is clear that the juvenile court was referring to and
17 applying the Revised ICPC when it found that an ICPC home study
was not required before granting temporary physical and legal
custody of the child to mother in New York. In doing so, the court
erroneously relied on the language of the Revised ICPC because that
language is not yet effective.5 See §§ 24-60-1802, art.
XIV(B), -1804, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 32 Nonetheless, as explained above, the provisions of the ICPC
were not triggered when the juvenile court granted custody of the
child to mother in New York. See § 24-60-1802, arts. II(d), III(a)-(b),
C.R.S. 2023. Thus, we discern no reversible error in the court’s
finding that an ICPC home study was unnecessary before granting
custody to mother.
¶ 33 Moreover, consistent with its general obligations under the
Children’s Code, the record indicates that the Department had
taken steps to ensure that granting mother custody was safe for the
child. See § 19-3-508(1)(a). Specifically, the Department flew a
5 We recognize that at various times throughout the proceedings,
the parties argued that the juvenile court was required to relinquish jurisdiction upon granting custody to mother. However, these arguments were based on the provisions of the Revised ICPC. We need not address these arguments in light of our conclusion that the Revised ICPC is not yet effective.
18 caseworker to New York to visit mother’s home prior to the
placement hearing. After inspecting mother’s home and meeting
with everyone who lived there, the caseworker had no safety
concerns. Another caseworker testified that she had been in
contact with the New York Department of Social Services and that a
New York casework supervisor had agreed to conduct courtesy
home visits if the court granted custody to mother. The Colorado
caseworker stated that if the child was placed with mother in New
York, she planned to conduct weekly phone calls with the child and
could fly to New York to do face-to-face visits when necessary.
¶ 34 Additionally, before granting temporary custody to mother, the
juvenile court considered the child’s safety, as evidenced by its
entry of several protective orders. Specifically, the court ordered
that mother refrain from any use of corporal punishment, abstain
from excessive use of alcohol or drugs around the child, and ensure
that the child have no contact with mother’s ex-boyfriend. The
court also noted that the Department would be required to continue
working with the New York Department of Human Services “in
regards [sic] to making sure that [the child] is safe.”
19 ¶ 35 Accordingly, the court’s erroneous application of the Revised
ICPC was harmless because the court had the authority to grant
custody of the child to mother in New York and because it entered
temporary orders to ensure that the custody arrangement was safe
and in the child’s best interests. See § 19-1-104(3)(a).
III. Child Hearsay
¶ 36 Father next contends that at the adjudicatory hearing, the
juvenile court erred by eliciting and considering the child’s out-of-
court statements that constituted inadmissible hearsay. However,
father concedes that he did not preserve this claim for appeal.
Indeed, he did not object when the court directed a witness — the
child’s discharge nurse — to review her notes for any statements
the child made to other medical professionals about the cause of his
injuries and to summarize those statements for the court.
¶ 37 Nevertheless, father urges us to review his appellate claim to
avoid a miscarriage of justice, specifically arguing that there was a
“power imbalance between [the judge] directly questioning a witness
. . . and a pro se litigant’s ability to object to such questioning.”
But the miscarriage of justice exception is a high bar and narrow in
scope, applying only to limited situations in which an error by the
20 juvenile court — not otherwise properly preserved for appeal —
results in a grossly unfair outcome for the parent. See People in
Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶¶ 23-24; see also People in Interest
of A.E., 914 P.2d 534, 539 (Colo. App. 1996). Father’s arguments
do not establish that the court’s adjudicatory judgment created
such a result.
¶ 38 Moreover, even if the court had excluded the child’s
statements, its finding that the child was dependent or neglected
was supported by the remaining evidence. Specifically, father’s own
testimony — that he did not know where his son was when the
third party found him, or how his injuries occurred — supported
the court’s findings that the child lacked proper parental care
through father’s actions or omissions, see § 19-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S.
2025, and that the child had run away from home or was beyond
father’s control, see § 19-3-102(1)(f). And section 19-3-102 requires
proof of only one of its provisions to support an adjudication. See
People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29, aff’d sub nom.,
People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31.
21 ¶ 39 Based on the foregoing, we discern no miscarriage of justice
and therefore decline to address father’s hearsay objection asserted
for the first time on appeal.
IV. Treatment Plan
¶ 40 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by not
approving an appropriate treatment plan at the initial dispositional
hearing. We are not persuaded.
¶ 41 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child
legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the
problems that required intervention into the family. People in
Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 11. Thus, an appropriate
treatment plan is one that is approved by the court, relates to the
child’s needs, and is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit
to provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable
time. § 19-1-103(12); K.B., ¶ 13. A juvenile court must measure
the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its likelihood of success
in reuniting the family, which is assessed based on the facts
existing at the time the court approves the plan. People in Interest
of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005).
22 ¶ 42 Here, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing at which
father appeared and represented himself. Prior to that hearing, the
Department filed a proposed treatment plan, which required father
to address his use of corporal punishment and physical discipline,
demonstrate that he could meet the child’s needs, and cooperate
with the Department. The guardian ad litem (GAL) requested
specific amendments to the proposed treatment plan. After
discussing the proposed plan with father, the court adopted it.
¶ 43 Father does not argue that the treatment plan was generally
inappropriate because it was not reasonably calculated to render
him fit to provide adequate parenting to the child within a
reasonable time or because it did not relate to the child’s needs.
See K.B., ¶ 13. Rather, he makes three more narrow arguments,
which we address and reject.
¶ 44 First, we disagree with father’s contention that the juvenile
court did not clarify whether it intended to adopt the modifications
suggested by the GAL. At the beginning of the hearing, the
Department noted that the GAL had suggested some amendments
to the treatment plan, and the Department specifically requested
that the court adopt the “treatment plan with the amendments.”
23 The GAL then explained the three proposed amendments: (1) that
an action step be added to require father to engage in parenting
education that focuses on safe discipline practices; (2) that an
action step be added to require father to refrain from telling secrets
or whispering to the child during parenting time; and (3) that an
objective be added to require father to address his mental health
issues.
¶ 45 After discussing the suggested amendments with father, the
court stated that it was “going to adopt the treatment plan as
recommend[ed].” Thus, the record indicates that the juvenile court
did, in fact, adopt the GAL’s proposed amendments as part of
father’s treatment plan. And, consistent with the juvenile court’s
order, the caseworker’s subsequent court report and treatment plan
update expressly included the amendments.
¶ 46 Next, we reject father’s argument that the treatment plan was
inappropriate because it included duplicative services. Although
father stated he had already completed online, self-paced parenting
classes, the juvenile court explained that those classes were not
sufficient because nobody monitored father’s progress and level of
engagement. Thus, the court concluded that it was appropriate to
24 require father to engage in a parenting program that had
professionals who could provide updates on father’s engagement.
We discern no error in this ruling.
¶ 47 Last, we reject father’s argument that the juvenile court
“improperly engaged in burden shifting” by requiring him to obtain
a referral for family therapy. Although we agree with father that the
Department is generally obligated to provide referrals for services
required by a treatment plan, see § 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, we
disagree with his interpretation of the court’s orders regarding
family therapy. At the dispositional hearing, father stated that he
believed “group therapy” with the child could be helpful, but he did
not request that it be added to the treatment plan. In response, the
court stated that if father would “like to get [his] provider to
recommend someone, that’s absolutely appropriate” and that the
parties could “take [father’s] lead” in terms of family therapy. But
the court did not say that family therapy would be required as part
of father’s treatment plan. Thus, the court did not require father to
obtain a referral for a service required by his treatment plan, and
we discern no “improper burden shifting” in the court’s order
adopting the plan.
25 ¶ 48 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile
court’s order adopting father’s initial treatment plan.
V. Disposition
¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.