25CA1846 Peo in Interest of JV 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1846 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV216 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.V., a Child,
and Concerning B.A.F.S. and W.V.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE DUNN J. Jones and Fox, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Michael J. Valentine, Deputy County Attorney, Sylvia Geiger, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant B.A.F.S.
Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant W.V. ¶1 W.V. (father) and B.A.F.S. (mother) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with J.V. (the
child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In March 2022, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services (the Department) received a report that mother was using
illicit substances. Following an investigation, the Department
removed the child from mother’s care and filed a petition in
dependency or neglect. At that time, the Department couldn’t find
father, but it soon located him in Florida. Both parents made no-
fault admissions to the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated
the child dependent or neglected.
¶3 After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adopted
treatment plans for the parents. Both plans required the parents to
provide protective parenting, participate in family time, demonstrate
financial stability, abstain from criminal activity, and remain in
contact with the Department. Mother’s treatment plan also
required her to address her substance abuse and mental health
issues.
1 ¶4 More than two years later, the Department planned to return
the child to mother’s care with an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) between the parents. In anticipation of that
goal, the Department completed an “address check” and discovered
that mother had been arrested a few months earlier and had an
active protection order, which she was violating; as a result, the
Department moved to restrict mother’s parenting time to supervised
visits. Over the next six months, mother’s participation waned and
father didn’t make the necessary arrangements for the child to live
with him in either Florida or Colorado.
¶5 In June 2025, the Department moved to terminate the
parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary
hearing in August 2025. After hearing the evidence, the court
terminated the parent-child legal relationships between the parents
and the child.
II. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)
¶6 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by requiring an
ICPC home study before placing the child in his care in Florida. In
the alternative, he maintains that the Department failed to make
2 reasonable efforts to rectify the ICPC denial. We aren’t persuaded
by either argument.
¶7 We review de novo whether the juvenile court properly applied
the ICPC. People in Interest of O.J.R., 2025 COA 78, ¶ 13. Whether
a department satisfied its obligation to make reasonable efforts is a
mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022
COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error
and review de novo its legal determination. Id.
¶8 The ICPC is an interstate agreement that facilitates the
placement and provision of services to children being placed by one
state’s child protective services agency in a home in another state.
People in Interest of I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 9. Under the ICPC, a
“sending state” must notify a “receiving state” of its intent to send a
child into the receiving state, and the receiving state typically
completes a home study before accepting the child for placement in
its state. § 24-60-1802, art. III(b), (d), C.R.S. 2023; see also O.J.R.,
¶ 19 (noting that, even though the General Assembly enacted a
revised version of the ICPC in 2024, the 2023 version remains in
effect until thirty-five states pass the revised version).
3 ¶9 In April 2023, the Department notified child protective services
in Florida of its intent to place the child with father. The Florida
authorities initiated a home study and requested information from
father, including fingerprints from anyone living in his home, but
father didn’t follow through, so Florida denied placement. In
February 2024, the Department sent a second request; this time, a
paternal great-uncle who was staying in the home refused to submit
to fingerprinting, and placement was again denied. At the
termination hearing, father’s expert explained that the great-uncle
wouldn’t provide his fingerprints because, in his Haitian culture,
there were “certain beliefs about government.” And though father
reported to the caseworker that he was going to look for his own
apartment in Florida so that he could restart the ICPC process, he
never obtained different housing in Florida.
¶ 10 A few weeks before the termination hearing, father filed a
motion, asserting, among other things, that the ICPC doesn’t apply
to the placement of children with an out-of-state parent. In
support, father directed the juvenile court’s attention to decisions
from other jurisdictions that have decided that the ICPC doesn’t
apply to parents. See, e.g., D.L. v. S.B., 201 N.E.3d 771, 777 (N.Y.
4 2022). Notably, Florida, the state involved in this case, isn’t one of
those jurisdictions. See Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Benway, 745 So.
2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
¶ 11 During the pendency of the case, no Colorado appellate court
had yet decided whether the ICPC applies to placement with a
parent. See I.J.O., ¶ 11. However, shortly after the juvenile court
ordered termination, a division of this court announced O.J.R.,
which joined those jurisdictions that have determined that the ICPC
doesn’t apply to placement with parents. O.J.R., ¶ 30.
¶ 12 Father now asks us to apply O.J.R., conclude that the juvenile
court erred by requiring him to complete the ICPC process, and
reverse the termination judgment. In response, the Department
and guardian ad litem assert that we shouldn’t apply O.J.R.
because (1) the case doesn’t apply retroactively, see People in
Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 607 (Colo. 1982) (describing the
test for retroactive application of new case law); or (2) father waived
his appellate argument by participating in the ICPC process, see
People in Interest of T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 26 (noting that a party
may waive an appellate argument by not making a timely request
for relief).
5 ¶ 13 We need not decide these points because, even if O.J.R.
applies, we still discern no error. Notably, although the O.J.R.
division determined that an ICPC home study isn’t required before a
court places a child in another state, nothing in the opinion
suggests that a department is prohibited from initiating an ICPC
home study. To the contrary, the division specifically noted that its
“conclusion d[id] not excuse Colorado juvenile courts and
departments of human services from ensuring that children are safe
when placed with out-of-state parents.” O.J.R., ¶ 28. And one way
in which a court and department may ensure a child’s safety when
placing a child out-of-state is through an ICPC home study.
¶ 14 This case is also distinguishable from O.J.R. because the
record in that case established that the authorities in New York
agreed to supervise the child’s placement in that state without an
ICPC home study. See id. at ¶ 33. But here, we see nothing in the
record to suggest that the Florida authorities would have done the
same, especially considering that Florida courts have determined
that the ICPC does apply to placement with parents. See Benway,
745 So. 2d at 439.
6 ¶ 15 Having determined that the juvenile court didn’t err by
applying the ICPC, we now turn to father’s assertion that the
Department failed “to make reasonable efforts to help [him] rectify
the problems so that a home study [could] be passed.” See I.J.O.,
¶ 17. To that end, father maintains that the Department (1) should
have spoken with the paternal great-uncle or (2) provided resources
for housing and employment in Colorado. But we aren’t convinced
that the caseworker was required to speak with the great-uncle,
and even if she was, we can’t see how doing so would have changed
the outcome of the ICPC home study, given the circumstances
described above. And father doesn’t explain how the provision of
resources in Colorado would have assisted him with passing the
home study in Florida.
III. Equal Protection
¶ 16 Father contends that he was deprived of equal protection
under the United States and Colorado Constitutions because the
Department treated him differently from mother based on gender.
We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 17 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its
7 jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. “Although the Colorado Constitution does not contain an
identical provision, the due process clause of the Colorado
Constitution implies a similar guarantee.” People v. Castillo, 2022
COA 20, ¶ 17. “We review equal protection claims de novo.”
Howard v. People, 2020 CO 15, ¶ 11.
¶ 18 An equal protection violation occurs when the government
arbitrarily treats a group of people differently from other people who
are similarly situated. Salazar v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2022
COA 13, ¶ 34. Classifications based on gender are subject to
intermediate scrutiny, which requires a showing that the
classification furthers a sufficiently important governmental
interest. People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 25 n.7.
¶ 19 Father hasn’t established that he and mother were treated
differently because of gender. He maintains that, while the
Department provided mother with “years of treatment, support, and
a managed transition of the child back to her care,” he received
“relatively little” in comparison. But he doesn’t explain how this
differential treatment had anything to do with gender. Indeed, if the
parents’ roles were reversed (i.e., if father was the custodial parent
8 and mother supported return to his care), it seems that the
Department would have provided father with the same attention
that it provided mother. In other words, to the extent the
Department treated the parents differently, nothing in the record
suggests that it did so because of gender.1
IV. Constitutional Right to Travel
¶ 20 Father argues that the juvenile court and the Department
violated his constitutional right to travel. We disagree.
¶ 21 A citizen has a constitutional right to travel between states,
which includes the right to resettle, find a new job, and start a new
life. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005).
Generally, a rule that operates to chill a parent’s exercise of the
right to travel, absent a sufficient state interest to do so, is as
impermissible as one that bans exercise of the right altogether. Id.
We review an alleged violation of a constitutional right de novo. See
People v. Janis, 2018 CO 89, ¶ 14.
¶ 22 Father asserts that he was “coerced” into moving to Colorado
in violation of his constitutional right to travel. But the record
1 At oral argument, father agreed that the analysis ends if the
record doesn’t demonstrate different treatment based on gender.
9 belies this assertion. We see nothing in the record — and father
hasn’t directed us to anything — establishing that the juvenile
court or the Department required him to move to Colorado. Rather,
the record clearly shows that father volunteered, on his own, to
move to Colorado to improve his chances of reuniting with the child.
To be sure, promptly relocating to Colorado may have helped father
to succeed in this case. But he could have also completed an ICPC
home study in Florida. He did neither.
¶ 23 Because the record doesn’t establish that the juvenile court or
the Department required father to move to Colorado or attempted to
chill his right to remain in Florida, we discern no error. See
Heninger v. Charnes, 613 P.2d 884, 887 (Colo. 1980) (concluding
that the appellant’s license revocation didn’t burden his
constitutional right to travel because he was “neither locked into
nor fenced out of the state of Colorado”).
V. Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 24 The parents maintain that the juvenile court erred by
terminating their parental rights. We disagree.
10 A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 25 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 26 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶ 27 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,
and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions
drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People
in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We
therefore can’t reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for
11 that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA
133, ¶ 29.
B. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 28 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 29 To determine fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile
court must consider whether a county department of human
services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and
reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),
C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of
diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the
department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides
services consistent with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 30 The juvenile court should consider whether the services
provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,
People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of
12 My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. In doing so, the court may
consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in services. See
People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
2. Father
¶ 31 Father argues that the Department didn’t (1) establish “quality
contacts” with him; (2) make timely and “culturally responsive”
ICPC referrals; or (3) engage in diligent searches for relatives. We
aren’t persuaded.
¶ 32 First, father asserts that the caseworker needed to make
“quality contacts” with him each month, as described in the
Department’s own regulations. But these regulations don’t mention
anything about “quality contacts.” Rather, the relevant regulation
requires only that a caseworker make “monthly engagement” with a
parent living out of state through “telephone calls, letters, or
electronic communication.” Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.204(B)(3),
12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-3. And the record shows that the
caseworker did just that. In any event, section 19-3-208 (not the
Department’s own regulations) guides our review, and nothing in
that statute requires the caseworker to do anything more to satisfy
the reasonable efforts requirement.
13 ¶ 33 Next, father contends that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because (1) both ICPC home studies were delayed
by several months, and (2) the ICPC home studies weren’t
“culturally responsive.” As to the first point, father doesn’t explain
how any delay could have impacted the outcome of the case,
considering that he never complied with the ICPC process and
eventually abandoned that process. As to the second issue, father
doesn’t specifically explain how the process wasn’t culturally
responsive or what the Department needed to do to correct it. Nor
does he direct us to any legal authority that would require the
Department to make such efforts to satisfy the reasonable efforts
standard.
¶ 34 Finally, father maintains that the Department didn’t engage in
diligent searches for relatives. Specifically, he submits that the
Department failed to follow up with the three individuals that he
had suggested as possible placement options. But the record shows
that the Department ran background checks on all three people
father suggested: One person didn’t pass the background check,
another person lived with father, and the third person said that she
could be a “support” but not a placement. Considering that all
14 three people weren’t appropriate placement options, we aren’t
convinced that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts.
¶ 35 Ultimately, father suggests that the juvenile court had no
reason to reject his expert’s testimony on these three issues. But it
isn’t our role to second-guess the court’s witness credibility
determinations. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 627-28 (Colo.
2005); Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 2020 CO 66, ¶ 75 n.14
(holding that a court doesn’t have to accept even unrebutted expert
testimony); Scott v. People, 444 P.2d 388, 393 (Colo. 1968) (noting
that a fact finder isn’t required to accept expert testimony). And if
the record supports the court’s findings, as they do here, we can’t
substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S.,
¶ 29.
3. Mother
¶ 36 Mother contends that the Department didn’t provide her with
family time throughout the case. We discern no reversible error.
¶ 37 To satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, a department
must provide “[f]amily time services for parents with children or
youth in out-of-home placement.” § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Family time
services must be provided “as determined necessary and
15 appropriate by individual case plans.” § 19-3-208(2)(a), (b).
Because the juvenile court must make decisions about family time,
it can’t delegate its authority to do so to other parties, such as a
department. See People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71
(Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 38 To begin, mother contends that the Department didn’t provide
her with family time for two weeks at the very beginning of the case
or expand her family time quickly enough. However, the record is
undisputed that, until the end of December 2024, the Department
provided increasing amounts of family time (in which she ultimately
had the child in her care for two weeks at a time), along with
decreasing levels of supervision, resulting in the child’s near return
home to mother. We aren’t convinced that a short delay at the
beginning of the case could have had any impact on her ability to
reunite with the child. Likewise, considering that mother had
extensive family time, we can’t see how any delays in changes to the
supervision levels resulted in a lack of reasonable efforts.
¶ 39 The heart of mother’s argument, however, is that after the
juvenile court restricted her family time at the end of December
2024, the Department failed to provide her with family time as
16 ordered by the court. In short, the record shows that the
Department moved to restrict mother’s family time to supervised
community visits, which mother agreed to, but the Department
didn’t offer her a supervised community visit until shortly before the
termination hearing. While the record supports her factual
assertion, we discern no reversible error.
¶ 40 After the juvenile court restricted mother’s family time, the
Department offered her virtual visits until it could arrange for
someone to supervise community visits. The Department initially
believed that one of its family time providers could supervise visits,
but the Department later reported that the provider wasn’t able to
do so. The Department reached out to mother in hopes of finding a
relative or other appropriate support to supervise the community
visits. Mother provided the name of a relative, but that person
didn’t pass a background check.
¶ 41 At a hearing in February 2025, mother’s counsel requested
supervised visits at the Department until community visits could be
arranged. In doing so, counsel emphasized that her request wasn’t
an agreement to a new restriction; rather, she just wanted to “get
[mother and the child] in a room together.” Notably, the
17 Department never asked to restrict mother’s family time thereafter,
and the Department didn’t offer a supervised community visit until
the foster parents agreed to supervise one in August 2025.
¶ 42 Mother maintains that the Department needed to do more to
make sure the community visits happened or, alternatively, request
that the juvenile court restrict her family time. Because the
Department didn’t do either, mother asserts that we should reverse
the judgment. We decline to do so because, although the
Department’s actions were imperfect, given mother’s disengagement
with her treatment plan, we aren’t convinced that these
shortcomings justify reversal. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court
may disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial
rights of the parties.”); see also People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA
79, ¶ 27 (noting that the lack of visitation might be harmless in
light of a parent’s “noncompliance with other parts of [the]
treatment plan”).
¶ 43 As noted, the Department continued to provide mother with
family time after the restriction. But mother didn’t consistently
attend that family time. And when the Department finally offered
her a community visit, she didn’t show up for that visit. Taking all
18 this together, we can’t say that the Department did not make
reasonable efforts by failing to provide community visits when it
was providing in-person visits that mother wasn’t attending.
C. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness
¶ 44 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that he
hadn’t successfully complied with his treatment plan and was unfit.
We disagree.
¶ 45 It is the parent’s obligation to ensure compliance with and the
success of a treatment plan. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d
257, 260 (Colo. App. 2007). Although absolute compliance with a
treatment plan isn’t required, even substantial compliance may not
be sufficient to correct or improve the parent’s conduct or condition,
or to render the parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d
905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 46 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the
parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).
Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent
provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet
the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.
19 People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A
parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally
“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs
and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”
People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). But
if the evidence doesn’t support a finding that a parent is unfit, the
child’s “need for permanency alone [isn’t] sufficient to terminate”
the parent-child legal relationship. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 60.
¶ 47 First, father contends that he complied with all the
components in his treatment plan. The juvenile court found that,
although father had “checked the boxes on some of the treatment
plan,” he hadn’t successfully complied with the plan such that he
was fit. That finding is not without record support. Among other
things, the evidence established that father
• never demonstrated to the Department that he had safe,
stable, and suitable housing for the child in Florida;
• violated the safety plan during an unsupervised visit by
allowing mother to attend one of his visits when she
wasn’t authorized to do so;
20 • didn’t fully disclose the people who would be in the home
with him and the child during one of his visits to
Colorado, and those unknown people were aggressive
with the caseworker and were smoking marijuana in the
home during the visit;
• had only limited face-to-face contact with the child, such
that they hadn’t developed a significant parent-child
relationship;
• didn’t have a job or housing lined up if he decided to
move to Colorado;
• claimed he had plenty of money (enough to purchase new
cars for himself and his father) but provided minimal
financial support to his child throughout the case; and
• had gaps in his treatment plan and had not
demonstrated that he could meet the child’s needs,
according to the caseworker.
¶ 48 Though we might have weighed the evidence differently had it
been our call, it’s not. And because there is record support for the
court’s finding that that father didn’t fully comply with the plan’s
21 components, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
¶ 49 Second, father argues that the Department didn’t establish
that he was an unfit parent. Rather, he claims that the juvenile
court terminated his parental rights based on the child’s need for
permanency alone, which isn’t permissible. See id. But as
described above, father didn’t fully comply with his treatment plan.
See D.P., 181 P.3d at 408. The court also relied on father’s
unwillingness to comply with the ICPC process, “get his own place,”
or make the necessary arrangements to provide a stable home for
the child in Colorado. Taken together, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to establish that father was “unable or
unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care.” § 19-3-604(2).
Because the evidence satisfies the statutory criteria for unfitness,
we can’t reweigh evidence or substitute our judgment to reach a
different result. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
D. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 50 Both parents assert that the juvenile court erred by finding
that they couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. We
disagree.
22 ¶ 51 In determining whether the parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, a juvenile court may consider whether any change
has occurred during the case, the parent’s social history, and the
chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.
People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).
The determination of a reasonable period is fact specific and varies
from case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. But a reasonable time isn’t an
indefinite time, and it must be determined by considering the
child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. A.J.,
143 P.3d at 1152. And when, as in this case, a child is under six
years old, the court must also consider the expedited permanency
planning provisions, which require that the child be placed in a
permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-
102(1.6), 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 52 As for father, the juvenile court rejected his assertion that he
could become fit within a reasonable time, finding that, “[i]n three
and half years, he’s done almost nothing . . . to get his son back.”
For example, the court noted that father could have complied with
the ICPC process or ensured that he had his own place so he could
pass the ICPC home study. Considering the length of time that the
23 child had already been out of the home, the court concluded that
waiting any longer for father to become a fit parent wasn’t in the
child’s best interests.
¶ 53 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. As
previously described, father didn’t comply with the ICPC process in
Florida, and two different ICPC home studies were denied. Father
told the caseworker that he would look for an apartment in Florida
so that he could pass an ICPC home study, but he never did. And
after the child was removed from mother’s care in December 2024,
father claimed that he would move to Colorado so that he could be
the child’s custodial parent. More than eight months passed since
father said he would move, and he hadn’t made any progress
toward completing that task. Father testified that he’d given notice
to his employer in Florida and would move in the next few weeks
but admitted that he hadn’t made any arrangements for
employment or housing. In the caseworker’s opinion, extending the
case wasn’t in the child’s best interests, considering that father had
had multiple “opportunities” over a nearly four-year period but had
been unwilling to take advantage of them.
24 ¶ 54 On appeal, father asserts that he could become fit within a
reasonable time because he only needed about ninety days to move
to Colorado and get established. But the juvenile court rejected this
same argument for the reasons described above. And because the
record supports the court’s findings, we can’t substitute our
¶ 55 As for mother, the juvenile court determined that she couldn’t
become fit within a reasonable time, noting that, although she was
“doing well in treatment” until December 2024, her compliance
“completely [fell] off [for] almost a year.” During 2025, mother last
saw the child in May, “stood up the child [for] the last two visits,”
and didn’t participate in any substance abuse and mental health
treatment.
¶ 56 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. As already
described in detail above, the record indicates that mother was
substantially complying with the main components of her treatment
plan and was exercising increasing family time until the child was
in her care for two full weeks at a time. But the Department
discovered that mother had an undisclosed criminal case and
protection order (which she was violating by having contact with the
25 restrained person). After that, the record shows that mother
minimally attended family time, stopped engaging in substance
abuse and mental health treatment, and tested positive for illicit
substances. The caseworker acknowledged that, when mother was
“focused” and “working hard, she d[id] great,” but that “only
happen[ed] for a certain period of time” before she would regress.
Thus, the caseworker opined that, at that point, extending the case
any longer would “do more harm than good” for the child.
¶ 57 Mother now contends that she could become fit within a
reasonable time, considering her success during most of the case.
But the juvenile court considered evidence supporting mother’s
compliance during the first part of the case, weighed it against
contrary evidence of her compliance during the latter part of the
case and the needs of the child, and determined that mother
couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. Despite mother’s
success in the first part of the case, considering that she hadn’t
participated in family time or services for almost eight months at
the time of the termination hearing, we discern no error in the
court’s decision. See People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132,
26 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (even “increased compliance” over the
course of a case may not justify additional time).
¶ 58 Mother also argues that she could have become fit within a
reasonable time if the Department had provided her services in a
timely manner after December 2024. As for family time services, we
rejected this argument in Part V.B.2 above. And as for other
services, mother hasn’t established that the Department’s lack of
efforts, rather than her unwillingness to participate, delayed new
referrals after December 2024. See A.V., ¶ 12.
E. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 59 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. Specifically,
she asserts that an APR to the maternal great-grandmother was a
less drastic alternative to termination. We discern no reversible
error.
¶ 60 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must
27 give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
¶ 61 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order
termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 62 To aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less
drastic alternative to termination, the department must evaluate a
reasonable number of people the parents identify as placement
options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App.
2004). But the department isn’t obligated to “independently identify
and evaluate other possible placement alternatives.” People in
Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 63 In addressing whether there was a relative who could be a
placement for purposes of a less drastic alternative, the juvenile
court found:
28 • Mother wasn’t “forthcoming” about her relatives and that
she didn’t give the Department much information until
three years into the case.
• The maternal great-grandmother “had no idea that the
child was in foster care” and hadn’t seen the child in a
“long time.”
• The maternal great-grandmother didn’t “speak any
English,” mother “refused to tell the caseworker what
language [great-grandmother] spoke,” and the caseworker
couldn’t get an interpreter as a result.
Based on this information, the court found that the Department
“looked at all the relatives” and didn’t identify anyone who was an
appropriate placement option.
¶ 64 The juvenile court then determined that there wasn’t a less
drastic alternative to termination, and that termination and
adoption were in the child’s best interests. Specifically, the court
found that an APR was “absolutely not appropriate given [the
child’s] age and the length of time he’[d] been in out of home
placement and foster care.”
29 ¶ 65 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The
caseworker testified that the Department did a diligent search for
relatives, but the search didn’t locate the great-grandmother. The
caseworker said that she found out about the great-grandmother
when mother disclosed her as a possible placement in March 2025.
The caseworker completed a background check and didn’t find
anything that would disqualify the great-grandmother as a
placement. Mother told the caseworker that the great-grandmother
would need an interpreter if she wanted to speak to her, but mother
wouldn’t tell the caseworker what language she spoke so that the
caseworker could provide an interpreter. Instead, mother said that
she would interpret, but the caseworker didn’t believe that was
appropriate.
¶ 66 In part because of these delays, the caseworker didn’t meet
with the great-grandmother until August 2025. The caseworker
said that communication with the great-grandmother was “a bit
rough” and that she could only communicate with a great-uncle,
who also lived in the home. The caseworker noted that it didn’t
appear that the great-grandmother had seen the child since he was
30 removed from mother’s care and that she hadn’t come forward
because mother didn’t tell her that the child was in foster care.
¶ 67 The caseworker opined that placing the child with the great-
grandmother wouldn’t be in his best interests. Specifically, the
caseworker testified that “putting him in a home where he [didn’t]
know the language[,] [didn’t] know the people, and . . . [had] never
built a relationship with [them] . . . would be very hard on him, and
very detrimental.”
¶ 68 Despite this record, mother asserts that the juvenile court
erred for two reasons, both of which we reject.
¶ 69 First, mother asserts that the Department should have known
about the great-grandmother sooner because she mentioned her in
a meeting in April 2022. But mother doesn’t direct us to anything
in the record showing that she identified the great-grandmother as
a placement option before March 2025. And because the
Department isn’t obligated to evaluate a relative unless the parent
identifies them as a placement option, we discern no error. See id.
¶ 70 Second, mother contends that the Department violated Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it declined to place the child
with the great-grandmother because she didn’t speak English. But
31 mother didn’t claim Title VI discrimination in the juvenile court.
See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14. And we decline
her request to address this unpreserved argument because she
hasn’t developed an argument in support of that request. See
D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.
¶ 71 Finally, even if the great-grandmother was an appropriate
placement option, we still reject mother’s assertion because the
juvenile court found, and the record shows, that an APR to her
wouldn’t be a less drastic alternative to termination because the
child needed permanency that could only be achieved through an
adoption. See People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30.
VI. Disposition
¶ 72 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE FOX concur.