People in Interest of JCE

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 30, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0660
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0660 Peo in Interest of JCE 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0660 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV30071 Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.C.E., a Child,

and Concerning D.W.E.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Dunn and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Sylvia Geiger, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Counsel for Youth, Brighton, Colorado, for J.C.E.

Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect action, D.W.E. (mother) appeals

the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities for

J.C.E. (the child) to D.E., the child’s adult brother (brother). We

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further

proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect, alleging concerns about mother’s

ability to care for the child. The Department also had concerns

about mother’s ability to provide for the child’s medical and

educational needs.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected and entered a treatment plan for mother. The child

remained with mother at that time.

¶4 About four months later, the child was hospitalized with a

wrist injury. The hospital refused to discharge the child to mother

because hospital staff were concerned about the child’s and

mother’s safety. The Department obtained a verbal removal order

and placed the child with brother where he remained for the

remainder of the case.

1 ¶5 The Department then moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) and filed a proposed APR. Mother opposed

the Department’s proposal and filed her own proposed APR.

¶6 After a contested hearing, the juvenile court adopted and

entered a mostly unaltered version of the Department’s proposed

APR order.

II. Analysis

¶7 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by improperly

delegating decisions concerning parenting time to brother.

Additionally, mother advances several arguments challenging the

Department’s reasonable efforts, her fitness, her treatment plan

compliance, the juvenile court’s restrictions on parenting time, and

the juvenile court’s best interests findings. We address each in

turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair, or based on a misapplication of the law. People in Interest

2 of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 12. As the trier of fact, the juvenile court

assesses the credibility of witnesses and determines the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, People in Interest of

A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010), and when its findings

have record support, we will not disturb them on review, People in

Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10. But we review de novo

whether the court applied the correct legal standard in making its

findings. Id.

B. Delegation of Parenting Time

¶9 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by

improperly delegating decisions concerning her parenting time to

brother. We agree.

1. Relevant Law

¶ 10 The juvenile court is authorized to determine the legal custody

of a child who comes within its jurisdiction, People in Interest of

C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005), and when allocating

parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the

child’s best interests, People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208

(Colo. App. 2011).

3 ¶ 11 Questions about a child’s health and safety, including family

time decisions, are entrusted to the juvenile court’s discretion.

People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006).

Because the court itself must make those decisions, it cannot

delegate family time decisions to a third party. See id.; People in

Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding

that the juvenile court cannot delegate family time decisions to

others); see also In re Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 621 (Colo.

App. 1997) (prohibiting the district court from delegating to the

child’s psychiatrist the decision of when overnight visits can occur).

2. The Juvenile Court Erred by Permitting Brother to Modify Mother’s Family Time

¶ 12 As relevant here, the juvenile court ordered that brother can

“cancel a visit if [brother] determines that it is not [in the child’s]

best interest based on [m]other’s behaviors.” The court further

ordered that “[a]dditional time may be allowed at the discretion of

[brother].”

¶ 13 The Department and the counsel for youth argue that the

court could delegate its authority over parenting time to brother in

this case because “evidence indicates that the parties are able to

4 cooperate.” See In re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 25.

However, the record contradicts the premise that the parties are

willing and able to cooperate on parenting time decisions. The

caseworker testified that communication between mother and

brother “is incredibly strained” and that “[t]hey do not have a good

relationship.” The caseworker also expressed concerns about

mother’s parenting time due to her contentious relationship with

brother. Brother further testified that his relationship with mother

is “never a good one” and that he believed she is “a sorry mother.”

Brother also withheld mother’s court ordered parenting time after a

conflict with mother just a week before the contested hearing.

¶ 14 Therefore, the court erred by delegating to brother the

discretion to deny and expand mother’s parenting time. See Id. at

¶ 25 (“[A] general parenting time order that leaves the specific

parameters of a parent’s time to the parents to work out together”

constitutes an abuse of discretion “if the parents are not able to

cooperate.”). Accordingly, we reverse the parenting time provision

of the APR judgment and remand the case for the juvenile court to

determine parenting time.

5 C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 15 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by entering the

APR judgment because the Department failed to make reasonable

efforts to reunite her with the child. We disagree.

1. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 16 A department of human services has a statutory obligation to

provide reasonable efforts to reunify the family when the juvenile

court enters an APR to a nonparent. People in Interest of A.S.L.,

2022 COA 146, ¶ 20; §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5, 19-3-208(1),

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Services provided in accordance with

section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. See

§ 19-1-103(114). Among the services required by section 19-3-208

are screening, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services; visitation services for parents with

children in out-of-home placement; and placement services

including foster care and emergency shelter. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 17 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,

the court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in

6 Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). But a

department has “discretion to prioritize certain services or

resources to address a family’s most pressing needs in a way that

will assist the family’s overall completion of the treatment plan.”

People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. Whether a

department has made reasonable efforts “must be measured

holistically rather than in isolation with respect to specific

treatment plan objectives.” Id. at ¶ 35.

¶ 18 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

provided to obtain the assistance they need to comply with the

treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

(Colo. App. 2011). The court may therefore consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether

a department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest of E.D.,

2025 COA 11, ¶ 12.

¶ 19 Whether a department has satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to reunify the family is a mixed question of fact

and law. A.S.L., ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings

related to reasonable efforts for clear error but review de novo the

7 court’s legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether

a department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Finding the Department Made Reasonable Efforts

¶ 20 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother. The record supports the

court’s findings.

¶ 21 First, the Department’s obligation to provide reasonable efforts

to mother did not arise until the child was removed from her care

roughly four months before the contested APR hearing. See

§ 19-3-100.5(1) (noting federal law requires the state to “make a

commitment to make ‘reasonable efforts’ to prevent the placement

of abused and neglected children out of the home” (emphasis

added)).

¶ 22 Even so, the record shows it was mother’s unwillingness to

cooperate that prevented her from accessing necessary services.

See E.D., ¶ 12. Mother argues that the Department should have

helped her clean up her home, repair her broken appliances, and

obtain the child’s medical information. However, by the time the

Department was required to provide reasonable efforts, mother

8 refused to speak to the caseworker. The caseworker testified that

this lack of communication impacted the Department’s ability to

help with services.

¶ 23 Mother also argues that the Department failed to help the

child re-enroll and receive services from a program that specializes

in providing support for children and adults with disabilities.

However, the record shows that the program disenrolled the child

after program staff struggled to engage with mother “for a number

of months.” While mother attempted to contact program staff the

month before the child’s disenrollment, the program’s staffing

changes prevented her from re-enrolling the child at that time.

Nevertheless, the Department tried to re-enroll the child as soon as

it learned the child had been disenrolled. At the time of the

contested hearing, the child was on a waiting list to receive services.

¶ 24 Finally, while mother argues generally that the Department

should have provided additional services and referrals, she does not

identify what services or referrals should have been provided.

¶ 25 Given this record, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s

findings that the Department made reasonable efforts.

9 D. Fitness, Treatment Plan Compliance, and Restrictions on Parenting Time

¶ 26 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by granting the

APR judgment to brother because, she asserts, she was a fit parent

and substantially complied with her treatment plan. She further

argues that the court unduly restricted her parenting time.1 We

discern no reversible error.

¶ 27 Although a juvenile court must sometimes find that a parent is

unfit before it may terminate parental rights, see

§ 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), no such finding is required before a court may

allocate parental responsibilities. While parental unfitness “clearly

constitutes a compelling reason not to return a child home,”

parental deficiencies less serious than unfitness can provide a

1 Mother also briefly argues that the juvenile court erred because it

“did not explain how the APR order was in [the child’s] best interests.” In support of this argument mother cites People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278 (Colo. App. 2005). While C.M. does require a department to “establish a compelling reason why it is not in the child’s best interests to return home,” we do not read C.M. as establishing a rule requiring a court to expressly explain how an APR is in the child’s best interests before it may enter an APR judgment. Id. at 1283. Mother cites no other authority, and we are aware of none, that would require such findings.

10 compelling reason to deny the child’s return when considered in

light of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs. C.M., 116 P.3d at 1283. Thus, whether a parent is fit or

unfit is not dispositive of whether an APR is in the child’s best

interests. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208 (APR must be determined in

accordance with the child’s best interests; finding of parental

unfitness not required for a child who has been adjudicated

dependent or neglected).

2. The Juvenile Court Properly Focused on the Child’s Best Interests in Granting an APR

¶ 28 First, mother argues that she was a fit parent. Though not

required, the juvenile court found that mother was unfit at the time

of the APR hearing. While the court did not make any specific

findings about mother’s treatment plan compliance, the court

expressed concerns regarding her physical health and emotional

stability. Given these concerns, the court found the APR was in the

child’s best interests.

¶ 29 As mother asserts, the mental health component of her

treatment plan was held in abeyance and never actually adopted by

11 the court. Despite that, the court noted concerns with mother’s

mental health when finding her unfit.

¶ 30 However, nothing in the record suggests that the juvenile

court afforded undue weight to mother’s mental health concerns.

Rather than focusing on mother’s mental health, the court focused

on her physical well-being and the child’s best interests. The court

also noted its concerns about mother’s ability to put the child’s

needs above her own and found that mother was not “able to make

decisions in [the child’s] best interest and care for him in the

manner that he needs to be cared for.” The court stated that since

the child’s removal from mother’s care, his grades and attendance

at school had improved, and his “negative behaviors ha[d]

significantly decreased because he has had the stability and the . . .

care and affection” he needed from brother “that he wasn’t getting

from [mother].” This conclusion is supported by the record.

¶ 31 Mother next argues that she substantially complied with her

treatment plan. Mother’s treatment plan required her to

(1) successfully work with the Department to complete her

treatment plan goals; (2) maintain safe and stable housing; (3) gain

an understanding of and appropriately meet the child’s physical,

12 emotional, medical, and educational needs; (4) provide protective,

safe, and stable parenting to the child; and (5) connect with

community resources and develop an understanding of the child’s

needs.

¶ 32 The record shows that mother was not in compliance with any

of her treatment plan goals and that there were ongoing safety

concerns about her ability to care for the child.

¶ 33 The caseworker testified that he was not in regular contact

with mother at the time of the contested hearing because mother

refused to speak with him. While mother had consistent housing

throughout the case, the caseworker had concerns that the home

was cluttered, many of the appliances were broken, and there were

several holes in the walls from the child hitting and kicking them.

The caseworker further reported that while in mother’s care, the

child was brought to the emergency room “with a high amount of

frequency” and that it was “clear there was an overuse of the

emergency department to provide care for the child.” At one point,

the hospital refused to release the child into mother’s care because

staff had concerns about mother and the child’s safety, as well as

mother’s ability to care for the child. Additionally, while the child

13 lived with mother during the case, the caseworker never saw an

improvement in the child’s grades or attendance in school.

¶ 34 Most notably, the caseworker testified that he never saw any

progress in any of mother’s treatment plan areas for the entirety of

the case and did not see an improvement in mother’s ability to care

for the child. By contrast, the caseworker testified that after the

child was removed from mother’s home, the caseworker had seen

improvement in several areas and that brother was meeting all the

child’s needs.

¶ 35 Lastly, mother argues that there were no safety concerns

during her parenting time and, therefore, the court unduly

restricted her parenting time which was contrary to the child’s best

interests.

¶ 36 It is true that mother’s parenting time reportedly went well

without any safety concerns for the child. The child also expressed

a desire to spend time with mother. However, the record

contradicts mother’s assertion that the court “incorrectly focused

on its perception of [mother’s] behavior” in determining parenting

time, rather than the child’s safety.

14 ¶ 37 First, the juvenile court expressly found the APR to be in the

child’s best interests. Second, as described above, the Department

presented concerns about mother’s ability to safely care for and

meet the child’s needs throughout the case. Mother herself at times

reportedly stated that she did not feel she was able to meet the

¶ 38 Thus, because the juvenile court’s findings are supported by

the record, we discern no reversible error in the court’s findings

that mother was unfit and failed to comply with her treatment plan.

Likewise, we perceive no error in its ultimate conclusion that an

APR was in the child’s best interests.

III. Disposition

¶ 39 The portion of the APR judgment allowing brother the

discretion to modify mother’s parenting time is reversed, and the

case is remanded to the juvenile court to enter orders consistent

with this opinion. The APR judgment is affirmed in all other

regards.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.