The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY June 4, 2026
2026 COA 47
No. 25CA1563, People in Interest of C.N.T. — Juvenile Court — Dependency and Neglect — Termination of the Parent-Child Legal Relationship — Guardian ad Litem — Standing
In this dependency and neglect appeal, a division of the court
of appeals considers whether a guardian ad litem (GAL) has
standing to file a motion to terminate parental rights. The division
concludes that a GAL has standing because (1) People in Interest of
R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, applies only to the first, or adjudicatory, phase
of a dependency or neglect proceeding and not to the second, or
dispositional, phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding; and (2)
the GAL is acting under their independent statutory charge to
advocate for the child’s best interests.
The division further rejects the parents’ contentions that the
juvenile court erred by (1) terminating their parental rights;
(2) finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and to reunite them with the child; (3) finding that
the father was unfit and that the mother couldn’t become fit within
a reasonable time; and (4) finding there was no less drastic
alternative to termination.
Likewise, the division is unpersuaded by the father’s
additional claims that (1) his treatment plan was inappropriate;
(2) he substantially complied with his treatment plan; and (3) his
counsel provided ineffective assistance.
The division affirms the juvenile court’s judgment. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 47
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1563 Chaffee County District Court No. 23JV30009 Honorable Dayna Vise, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.N.T., a Child,
and Concerning W.C.T. and N.L.D.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Lum, J., concurs J. Jones, J., concurs dubitante
Announced June 4, 2026
Mannina & Associates, Julie Thomerson, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant W.C.T.
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant N.L.D. ¶1 W.C.T. (father) and N.L.D. (mother) appeal the juvenile court’s
judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with
C.N.T. (the child). The parents contend, in part, that under People
in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, ¶ 33, which held that the State is
the exclusive party to prosecute a dependency or neglect
proceeding, the guardian ad litem (GAL) lacked standing to file a
motion to terminate their parental rights. Thus, they argue, the
juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate their
parental rights. We disagree and conclude that R.M.P. doesn’t apply
for two reasons: (1) R.M.P. applies to only the adjudicatory (first)
phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding — and the motion to
terminate was filed in the dispositional (second) phase of the
proceeding — and (2) the GAL was acting under section 19-3-
203(5), C.R.S. 2025, which charges a GAL to represent the child’s
best interests. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2023, the Chaffee County Department of Human
Services received a report that mother had been involved in a
domestic violence incident and that she was too intoxicated to care
for the child. A caseworker responded to the scene and spoke with
1 mother, who explained that father had custody of the child but that
he was currently incarcerated in the county jail. The Department
removed the child and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
¶3 The parents admitted that the child was in an injurious
environment, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child
dependent and neglected. After a dispositional hearing, the court
adopted treatment plans for the parents that required them to
address substance use and domestic violence, improve their
parenting skills, attend family time, and provide a safe and stable
home.
¶4 In February 2025, the GAL moved to terminate the parents’
parental rights; the Department didn’t object. The juvenile court
held an evidentiary hearing in June 2025; the GAL and the
Department participated. After considering the evidence, the court
granted the GAL’s motion and terminated mother’s and father’s
parent-child legal relationships with the child.
II. Standing
¶5 The parents assert that the juvenile court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to terminate their parental rights because the
GAL didn’t have standing to move for termination. We disagree.
2 ¶6 Whether a party has standing is a legal question that we
review de novo. R.M.P., ¶ 18. In R.M.P., ¶ 33, the supreme court
determined that, under the State’s parens patriae authority,1 only
the State has standing to bring an action in dependency or neglect
and to prosecute a petition in dependency or neglect. In doing so,
the supreme court overruled People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d
1032 (Colo. App. 1986), which allowed a juvenile court to maintain
a dependency or neglect case over the department’s request to
dismiss the petition before an adjudicatory hearing had occurred
when the GAL objected to dismissal.
¶7 The parents maintain that, in light of the supreme court’s
holding in R.M.P., a GAL lacks standing to file a motion for
termination and is therefore no longer permitted to do so. We
disagree and conclude that R.M.P. doesn’t lead to the conclusion
that a GAL lacks standing to move for termination.
¶8 To begin, we recognize that in R.M.P. the supreme court used
the word “proceeding” on a few occasions when describing the
1 Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing
to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, [especially] on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (12th ed. 2024). 3 State’s role in prosecuting a dependency or neglect petition. R.M.P.,
¶¶ 4, 24, 33. But we disagree with the parents that these few
references to a “proceeding” evidence the supreme court’s intent to
prohibit a GAL from filing a motion to terminate. There is no doubt
that termination is part of an overall dependency or neglect
proceeding in a general sense. See People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021
CO 38, ¶ 39 n.3 (noting that a motion to terminate parental rights
is “not the start of a second proceeding”). Yet for the reasons set
forth below, we aren’t convinced that the supreme court intended
for R.M.P. to apply so broadly that a GAL could never ask for any
relief during a dependency or neglect proceeding.
¶9 Reading R.M.P. in context, we conclude that the opinion only
applies to the first phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding. A
dependency or neglect proceeding has two phases:
(1) In the first, or adjudicatory, phase, the State, through the
department of human services, files a petition, and the
juvenile court must “determine[] if there are grounds to
adjudicate the child dependent and neglected.” E.O. v.
People in Interest of C.O.A., 854 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo.
1993).
4 (2) If the juvenile court adjudicates a child dependent or
neglected, “the second, or dispositional, phase
commences with the hearing and adoption of a treatment
plan.” Id. During the second phase, the court may
consider a motion to terminate parental rights if the
treatment plan is unsuccessful in rehabilitating the
parent. See § 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 10 In R.M.P., the supreme court noted that the parens patriae
doctrine provides the State with standing to initially intervene in the
familial relationship. R.M.P., ¶ 20. The State exercises this
authority by filing a petition in dependency or neglect, thus
beginning the first phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding.
And because the State is the sole party that can initiate a
dependency or neglect proceeding by filing a petition, it is also the
only entity with standing to prosecute that petition. Id. at ¶ 22. In
R.M.P., the supreme court clarified that, in a dependency or neglect
proceeding, the generic term “prosecute” means to “institute” or to
“pursue” the legal proceeding. Id. at ¶ 3 n.1. Likewise, the State is
the only party that has a “legal interest in determining whether a
child should be adjudicated dependent or neglected.” Id. at ¶ 23.
5 R.M.P. therefore addresses only the State’s authority to (1) initiate a
case and (2) prosecute the petition to its conclusion — a
dependency or neglect adjudication.
¶ 11 While the stare decisis doctrine requires courts to adhere to
earlier judicial decisions from a higher court when the same issue
arises again in litigation, People v. Kembel, 2023 CO 5, ¶ 43, the
precedential value of a decision is strictly limited to the issues that
were actually raised and resolved, see Gomez v. Walker, 2023 COA
79, ¶ 9 (recognizing that a prior appellate decision isn’t controlling
unless it decided the specific issue presently on appeal); Coon v.
Berger, 588 P.2d 386, 387 (Colo. App. 1978) (A “prior opinion is
only [s]tare decisis on the point decided [therein].”). Therefore,
although the supreme court referred to a dependency or neglect
“proceeding” broadly, we conclude that its holding relates to the
6 initiation of a dependency or neglect case only until a child is
adjudicated as dependent or neglected.2
¶ 12 R.M.P. says nothing about whether, after an adjudication is
entered, a GAL can file a motion to terminate. Notably, unlike a
petition in dependency or neglect, which commences the action, a
motion for termination is merely a request for a remedy within the
case. See S.A.G., ¶ 39 n.3 (“[A] motion to terminate parental rights
after a child has been adjudicated dependent and neglected is a
request for a remedy . . . .”). Indeed, the supreme court has
recognized that a GAL has authority to file a motion for termination.
See, e.g., C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, ¶ 24 (“[T]he GAL may file a
motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship.”); A.M. v.
A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 14 (“Failure to comply reasonably with the
treatment plan may provide grounds for the State or the guardian
2 In People in Interest of N.K.S., the majority relied on People in
Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, ¶ 4, to hold that the GAL lacked standing to appeal the denial of a motion to terminate parental rights, whether acting on the State’s behalf or in the GAL’s own right. N.K.S., 2025 COA 100, ¶ 5 (cert. granted Mar. 30, 2026). To the extent that N.K.S. can be read to suggest that a GAL can’t file any motion of substance, such as a motion to terminate parental rights, we disagree with the majority’s holding. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13 (recognizing that one division of the court of appeals isn’t bound by the decisions of another division). 7 ad litem to file a motion to terminate parental rights.” (emphasis
added)); People in Interest of M.N., 950 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. App.
1997) (holding that a GAL may file a motion to terminate parental
rights and that the juvenile court did not err by terminating father’s
parent-child legal relationship with his children on the GAL’s
motion).
¶ 13 Moreover, “the GAL is statutorily obligated to advocate for the
best interests of the child and is expressly authorized to participate
at all steps of the legal proceedings.” C.W.B., ¶ 24. Specifically,
section 19-3-203(5) requires a GAL to “participate further in the
proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the
child.”3 While the statute doesn’t “specify[] the precise method that
should be utilized in performing the role,” People in Interest of
D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 586 (Colo. App. 2003), section (V)(D)(1)(a)(i) of
Chief Justice Directive (CJD) 04-06, Court Appointments Through
3 The General Assembly recently passed House Bill 26-1227, which
was enacted in direct response to People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, to clarify that as a party to the proceedings, the child has legal standing regarding all matters related to the child’s interests and the right to have those interests fully represented by the GAL throughout the proceedings, including appeals. H.B. 1227, 75th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2026). 8 the Office of the Child’s Representative (amended Jan. 2023),
requires a GAL to, at a minimum, “[p]resent independent
information relevant to the child’s best interests at each hearing
through . . . motions . . . and other acceptable means consistent
with the court’s appointment orders and the GAL’s statutory
authority and ethical obligations.” See Off. of State Ct. Adm’r v.
Background Info. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 420, 431 (Colo. 1999) (“The
Chief Justice Directive represents an expression of Judicial Branch
policy, to be given full force and effect in matters of court
administration.”); see also People v. Greer, 2022 CO 5, ¶ 27 (“The
enforceability of CJDs is beyond question.”).
¶ 14 For the reasons explained, R.M.P. doesn’t apply to this matter.
The case had progressed past the adjudicatory phase of the
proceeding. And the GAL was complying with the independent and
“universally acknowledged responsibility of [a GAL] . . . ‘to represent
the best interests’ of children who are involved in litigation.” In re
J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726, 735 (Colo. 2007) (citation omitted).
¶ 15 Accordingly, the GAL had authority to file the motion to
terminate.
9 III. Venue
¶ 16 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to
change venue to Saguache County. Father moved for a change of
venue in the juvenile court but withdrew the motion because “he
did not want to pursue” it. Therefore, father abandoned this
argument, and we decline to address it. See In re Marriage of
Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 23 (“A litigant who abandons an argument
in the trial court likewise abandons it for the purposes of appeal.”).
IV. Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 17 The parents argue that the juvenile court erred by terminating
their parental rights. We aren’t persuaded.
A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 18 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
10 ¶ 19 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves an
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶ 20 The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative
value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s
discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.
2010). We therefore cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S.,
2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.
B. Appropriate Treatment Plan
¶ 21 Father asserts that his treatment plan was inappropriate. We
discern no error.
¶ 22 A treatment plan is appropriate if (1) it is reasonably
calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to
the child within a reasonable time, and (2) it relates to the child’s
11 needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. An appropriate treatment plan
must “address the safety concerns identified during the assessment
of the family.” People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14. We
measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its likelihood of
success in reuniting the family, “which must be assessed in light of
the facts existing at the time of the plan’s approval.” People in
Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 23 While the focus of a plan is to address the child’s needs and
any identified safety concerns, the plan’s requirements must also be
realistic given the existing facts. See People in Interest of B.J.D.,
626 P.2d 727, 730 (Colo. App. 1981). When the requirements of a
treatment plan are not realistic based on the existing facts, “[n]on-
compliance [is] virtually assured and lack of success [is] a foregone
conclusion.” Id.
¶ 24 The juvenile court found that father’s treatment plan was
appropriate because it “adequately addressed the safety concerns
which initiated the Department’s involvement — namely, substance
use and patterns of domestic violence.” The record supports the
court’s finding. For example, father’s treatment plan included a
substance use component that required him to complete a
12 substance use evaluation and follow any recommendations from the
provider, develop a relapse prevention plan, and participate in
random drug tests. Likewise, the treatment plan included a
domestic violence component that required father to complete a
domestic violence evaluation, identify triggers and coping
mechanisms, and learn how domestic violence impacted the child.
¶ 25 Still, father asserts that the treatment plan was inappropriate
because it didn’t consider the various barriers he had to completing
the plan, such as “transportation, employment, location, and ability
to pay for treatment.” He maintains that, because the treatment
plan was unrealistic given these facts, the plan was destined for
failure. Although the evidence shows that there were barriers to
father completing parts of his treatment plan, we aren’t convinced
that those barriers rendered the treatment plan inappropriate.
Rather, as discussed infra Part IV.D below, the Department
attempted to provide father with ways to overcome those barriers.
Had father fully engaged with available services and taken
advantage of the Department’s efforts, he could likely have
successfully completed the treatment plan. We therefore reject
father’s assertion.
13 C. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶ 26 Father also asserts that he substantially complied with his
treatment plan and that the juvenile court therefore erred by
terminating his parental rights. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 27 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), the juvenile court must find
that (1) the parent did not reasonably comply with the treatment
plan, or (2) the treatment plan was not successful. It is a parent’s
obligation to ensure compliance with and the success of a treatment
plan. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 260 (Colo. App.
2007). Although absolute compliance with a treatment plan is not
required, even substantial compliance may not be sufficient to
correct or improve the parent’s conduct or condition or to render
the parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo.
App. 2005).
¶ 28 The juvenile court found that father didn’t reasonably comply
with the treatment plan and that the treatment plan was
unsuccessful. The court also determined that father exhibited the
same problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate
improvement.
14 ¶ 29 In support of its decision, the juvenile court relied on evidence
that father
• sporadically complied with drug tests and recently tested
positive for cocaine;
• attended fewer than half of the scheduled visits over the
few months before the termination hearing and none in
the month before the termination hearing;
• was discharged from his first domestic violence treatment
provider and only recently began treatment with a new
provider;
• hadn’t engaged with his individual therapist for several
months and did not follow through with parenting skills
training; and
• didn’t fully understand the child’s needs or believe the
child needed services.
The caseworker testified to each of these points during the
termination hearing. Therefore, the record supports the court’s
findings.
¶ 30 Still, father asserts that the juvenile court erred because the
evidence established that he “complied with the treatment plan to 15 the best of his ability.” For example, he maintains that the evidence
shows that he had employment and stable housing, engaged in
monitored sobriety, participated in individual and group therapy
and domestic violence treatment, and attended family time. To be
sure, the evidence presented at the termination hearing established
that father participated, to some extent, in these services. But the
court weighed father’s participation in the treatment plan against
other evidence of his lack of participation, and it determined that
evidence of his lack of participation in certain critical areas, as
described above, outweighed the evidence of his participation in
those services that he identifies on appeal. See In re Marriage of
Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed
unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).
What’s more, the court determined that, despite father’s
participation, the treatment plan was unsuccessful because it didn’t
render him fit. See E.S.V. v. People in Interest of C.E.M., 2016 CO
40, ¶ 20 (“[E]ven substantial compliance may not result in a
successful plan that renders the parent fit.”).
¶ 31 In sum, because the record supports the juvenile court’s
findings, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our
16 judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. We
therefore decline to disturb the judgment.
D. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 32 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.
¶ 33 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the
juvenile court must consider whether the county department of
human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),
C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of
diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the
department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides
appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-
103(114).
¶ 34 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the
department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and
individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;
(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and
(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should
consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support
17 the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d
911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the
circumstances and accounting for all services and resources
provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire
treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,
¶ 33.
¶ 35 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to
comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,
1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the juvenile court may consider a
parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining
whether the department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest
of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
¶ 36 The juvenile court determined that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with
the child but that the parents didn’t use the resources provided by
the Department to become fit. The record supports the court’s
findings. As father acknowledges, the Department provided him
with numerous services, including sobriety monitoring, individual
and group therapy, the Child First program, the Circle of Security
program, and parenting classes. The record also shows that the
18 Department provided transportation to visits, and it offered to pay
for rent and car repairs. As for mother, the record shows that the
Department provided her with sobriety monitoring, therapy, family
time services, parenting classes, a domestic violence program, and
housing resources.
¶ 37 Despite this record, the parents assert, for various reasons,
that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We address
and reject those arguments below.
¶ 38 Father makes three general arguments: The Department failed
to (1) assist him with barriers; (2) focus on reunification; and
(3) expand parenting time. Under each of these general arguments,
he presents numerous specific contentions.
¶ 39 He first asserts that the Department failed to assist him with
barriers related to transportation, his distance from the offered
services, conflicts with his employment schedule, and his inability
to afford services. But the record shows that the Department
offered to assist in these areas. For example, the Department
offered to pay for car repairs if father provided an estimate and
description of what needed to be fixed, but the caseworker said that
father did not take advantage of that offer. Likewise, the
19 caseworker said that, although the Department could not pay for
father’s domestic violence treatment because it didn’t have a
contract with his provider, the Department offered to pay for
father’s rent so that he could “save that money and use that to pay
for domestic violence treatment.” The Department also transported
the child to and from father’s home for visits. As for father’s work
schedule, the caseworker said the Department offered to change the
visitation schedule to accommodate father’s work, but even when it
switched visits to his day off, father still did not attend family time.
¶ 40 Therefore, although the Department didn’t do everything
father wanted, considering the totality of the circumstances, we
can’t say that the juvenile court erred by finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts. Notably, father hasn’t
directed us to anything in section 19-3-208 that the Department
failed to provide. For example, section 19-3-208(2)(d)(I) states that
the Department must provide transportation to services only if
“other appropriate transportation is not available.” Apart from
noting that his vehicle may have needed repairs at some point,
father doesn’t assert that he lacked transportation for most of the
case. And although the Department is required to provide some
20 services if funds are available, such as drug and alcohol treatment
services, nothing in section 19-3-208 specifically requires the
Department to pay for domestic violence treatment.
¶ 41 Second, father contends that the Department failed to focus
on reunification because it didn’t involve his fiancee in the case,
only sought permanency with the foster parents, failed to observe
father’s interactions with the child, and did not provide services in
Saguache County. Again, father hasn’t directed us to anything in
section 19-3-208 requiring the Department to make these efforts.
As for father’s assertion that the Department failed to provide
services in Saguache County, the caseworker testified that, if a
parent moves to another county, the Department might reach out to
its counterpart in the other county for provider recommendations in
that county. The caseworker said that she could have done so in
this case, but father never requested it.
¶ 42 Finally, father asserts that the Department failed to expand
family time. Section 19-3-208(2)(b) only requires that the
Department provide family time services “as determined necessary
and appropriate by individual case plans.” Said another way, to
satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, the Department must
21 provide family time as ordered by the juvenile court. Father doesn’t
assert that the Department withheld any of his court-ordered family
time. The record therefore shows that the Department satisfied its
burden under section 19-3-208, and we aren’t convinced that it had
any duty to exercise its discretion to expand family time, especially
considering that father wasn’t addressing the identified concerns in
this case.
¶ 43 Mother also asserts that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it didn’t provide her with a full domestic
violence evaluation. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 44 The domestic violence cycle component of mother’s treatment
plan required her to schedule an intake with a confidential provider
to “learn about domestic violence dynamics in a group or individual
setting.” The evidence shows that mother engaged in individual
therapy, but because she was absent for most of the case, she had
not yet begun addressing domestic violence. The caseworker said
that she had also talked with mother’s therapist about referring her
to a domestic violence survivors’ group called Seeking Safety, and
the therapist agreed that it would be appropriate for mother.
However, the therapist expressed concern that mother might be
22 overwhelmed by all the services and recommended it as a
“substitute group,” rather than an “additional therapeutic
intervention.”
¶ 45 Therefore, the record shows that the Department provided
mother with the appropriate services to support her treatment
plan — namely, individual and group therapy. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d
at 915. Contrary to mother’s argument, her treatment plan didn’t
require a comprehensive domestic violence evaluation, and
therefore the Department didn’t have an obligation to provide her
one to meet its reasonable efforts requirement, especially
considering that mother didn’t object to the plan’s domestic violence
component and never asked the Department for a referral for such
an evaluation. At any rate, mother doesn’t explain how she could
have become a fit parent in a reasonable time even if the
Department had referred her for a comprehensive domestic violence
evaluation, given that she only actively participated in the case for
the final four months. We therefore reject her argument.
E. Fitness
¶ 46 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that he
was unfit, while mother argues that the court erred by finding that
23 she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. We aren’t
persuaded.
¶ 47 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the
parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).
Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent
provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet
the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.
People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A
parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally
“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs
and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”
People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 48 In determining whether the parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, a juvenile court may consider whether any change
has occurred during the case, the parent’s social history, and the
chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.
D.L.C., 70 P.3d at 588-89. The determination of a reasonable
period is fact specific and varies from case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25.
But a reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be
24 determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. A.J., 143 P.3d at 1152.
¶ 49 The juvenile court found that father was unfit based, in large
part, on the same evidence it relied on to determine that he did not
successfully comply with his treatment plan as we described, supra
Part IV.C. See D.P., 181 P.3d at 408. And as already set forth
above, the record supports those findings.
¶ 50 Yet father asserts, for the following reasons, that the juvenile
court erred.
• Father contends that the court erred by finding him unfit
under section 19-3-604(2)(e) because he didn’t have a
“substance abuse addiction.” But subsection (2)(e)
doesn’t require proof of an “addiction.” Rather, it merely
allows a court to “consider” evidence of “[e]xcessive use”
of “controlled substances” that “affects the [parent’s]
ability to care and provide for the child.” Given that
father only sporadically complied with testing and tested
positive for a controlled substance, the record supports
the court’s finding.
25 • Father asserts that he didn’t “lack accountability” and
instead that the evidence showed he “supported the
child’s services” and “demonstrated safe parenting.” But
the caseworker testified to the contrary, and it was within
the juvenile court’s purview to weigh this evidence. See
A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
• Father asserts that the court “erroneously relied on
expert testimony” when it considered the caseworker’s
opinions about whether he was fit. But we decline to
address this argument because father didn’t object to the
caseworker’s expert testimony in the juvenile court. See
People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14.
¶ 51 Father also asserts, in a single sentence, that the juvenile
court erred by finding that he couldn’t become fit within a
reasonable time. Because father failed to develop this argument, we
don’t address it. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531
(Colo. App. 2004) (appellate courts don’t address arguments that
fail to “identify any supporting facts, make specific arguments, or
set forth specific authorities to support the contention”).
26 ¶ 52 We now turn to mother’s assertion that the juvenile court
erred by finding that she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable
time. The court determined that mother couldn’t become fit within
a reasonable time because, although she had recently made
progress, her engagement came too late, especially considering that
this case was an expedited permanency planning (EPP) case. See
§ 19-1-102(1.6), C.R.S. 2025 (noting that the EPP provisions require
a court to ensure that a child under six years old is placed in a
permanent home as “expeditiously as possible”). The record
supports the court’s finding. The evidence established that mother
left Colorado early in the case without providing the Department
with a way to contact her. She didn’t return to start working on her
treatment plan until about four months before the termination
hearing. The caseworker opined that mother was unlikely to
become fit in a reasonable time because mother couldn’t address
the child’s “specific needs” given her “current challenges.”
¶ 53 Mother asserts that she could become fit in a reasonable time
because she had made “substantial progress by the time of the
termination hearing.” There is no doubt that the evidence showed
that mother engaged in the treatment plan during the short time
27 that she was involved in the case. But we must nevertheless reject
her assertion because it would require us to reweigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we
cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29; see also People in Interest of V.W., 958
P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that even “increased
compliance” over the course of a case may not justify more time).
F. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 54 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.
¶ 55 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
¶ 56 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order
28 termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must
affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the
record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.
¶ 57 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination. In reaching its decision, the court noted
that (1) the child needed the permanency and stability that only
termination and adoption could provide, see People in Interest of
Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 30; and (2) the foster parents wanted to
adopt and did not want to participate in an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR), see S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 920. The record
supports the court’s findings. Specifically, the caseworker testified
that termination and adoption were in the child’s best interest
because she “need[ed] security and permanency” that couldn’t be
achieved through an APR. She also testified that the child was
doing well in her current foster home, the foster parents wanted to
adopt her, and they didn’t believe that an APR would be in the
child’s best interests.
¶ 58 Father doesn’t challenge the juvenile court’s findings, nor does
he attack any of the evidence on which the court relied. Instead, he
maintains that we should reverse the termination judgment
29 because the Department failed to make intensive, ongoing efforts to
identify placement options with relatives. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 59 To aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less
drastic alternative to termination, the department must evaluate a
reasonable number of the people identified by the parents as
placement options. D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532. But the department
isn’t obligated to “independently identify and evaluate other possible
placement alternatives.” People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211,
215 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 60 The caseworker testified that the Department investigated all
the relatives the parents had identified as potential placement
options, but none of those individuals could serve as a placement.
See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532. In addition, the Department conducted
a diligent search for relatives but couldn’t identify any other
options. See Z.P., 167 P.3d at 215. And father failed to identify any
other relatives who were available for placement (and willing to
accept an APR) but were not investigated by the Department. For
these reasons, we discern no error.
30 V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 61 Father contends that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance. We discern no basis for a remand.
¶ 62 Under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in
dependency or neglect cases, the parent must establish that
(1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) the parent was
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance — that is, a
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the outcome would have been different. See A.R. v. D.R.,
2020 CO 10, ¶ 60. “If the parent fails to establish either prong of
this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168,
¶ 26.
¶ 63 An appellate court must remand for an evidentiary hearing if a
parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and compelling to
constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A.R., ¶ 63. If the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity,
however, the appellate court may summarily deny the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Id.
31 ¶ 64 First, father asserts that his attorney provided ineffective
assistance by failing to “object to improper venue.” But father
cannot establish deficient performance because his attorney, in
fact, moved to change venue under section 19-3-201(2), C.R.S.
2025, and only withdrew the motion at father’s request. But even if
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a
change of venue under section 19-3-201(2), father hasn’t
sufficiently alleged prejudice because a party can only request a
change of venue under that section if the department filed the case
in “a county other than that of the child’s residence.” And father
doesn’t specifically allege that the child’s residence was in any
county other than Chaffee County.4
¶ 65 Second, father contends that his attorney provided ineffective
assistance by calling an expert witness who recommended a post-
adoption contract because a post-adoption contract was “in direct
opposition to [his] interests.” Even if counsel performed deficiently
4 In its answer brief, the Department responds to the allegation that
father’s counsel should have moved to change venue “earlier in the case.” But father didn’t allege that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a change of venue sooner. We therefore don’t address that issue. 32 in this regard, father hasn’t sufficiently alleged prejudice. He
asserts that he was prejudiced because the juvenile court “expressly
relied on his expert’s post-adoption contract recommendation.”
Indeed, the court noted father’s expert’s testimony when finding
that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. But we
aren’t convinced that, but for the expert’s testimony, the outcome of
the case would have been different. As discussed, supra Part IV.F,
father didn’t propose any less drastic alternatives to termination,
and nothing in the record suggests that a less drastic alternative
existed. In other words, the expert’s testimony had no impact on
the court’s finding that there was no less drastic alternative to
termination. As a result, father’s claim fails.
¶ 66 Finally, father argues, “to the extent [that an] issue is raised
concerning counsel’s failure to ensure the reasonable efforts
hearing was completed,” his attorney provided ineffective
assistance. Father’s counsel moved for a finding of lack of
reasonable efforts in November 2024, and the juvenile court held an
evidentiary hearing in December 2024, which was eventually
continued until April 2025 when father’s counsel asked the court to
hold the motion “in abeyance” because “the issues in the motion
33 [were] going to be the same issues that [were] going to be litigated in
the termination trial.” Although father doesn’t specifically say so,
he presumably argues that, if we were to conclude that if his
counsel had waived his reasonable efforts argument by failing to
pursue resolution of his motion, then his attorney provided
ineffective assistance. Because we haven’t done so, we need not
address father’s argument further.
¶ 67 In sum, we conclude that father hasn’t raised sufficiently
specific and compelling allegations to create a prima facie showing
of ineffective assistance of counsel. See A.R., ¶ 63; see also People
v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 914 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that a
claim that is too speculative will not satisfy the prejudice prong).
Thus, we decline to disturb the termination judgment.
VI. Disposition
¶ 68 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LUM concurs.
JUDGE J. JONES concurs dubitante.
34 JUDGE J. JONES, concurring dubitante.
¶ 69 The majority holds that a guardian ad litem (GAL) may file and
prosecute a motion to terminate parental rights. In so holding, it
reads the language of People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34 — in
which the Colorado Supreme Court held that only the State may file
and prosecute a dependency or neglect petition — as applying only
to that initial phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding. I’m not
so sure. But because the majority’s conclusion is plausible and I’m
not able to conclude with sufficient certainty that the majority is
wrong, I concur in the result.1 Nevertheless, I think it appropriate
to explain why I believe R.M.P. casts doubt on the majority’s
conclusion. I begin, though, twenty-eight years before R.M.P.
¶ 70 In People in Interest of M.N., 950 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. App.
1997), a division of this court held that a GAL may file a motion to
1 “Dubitante” is a Latin word meaning “[d]oubting.” Black’s Law Dictionary 630 (12th ed. 2024). A dubitante opinion can serve a variety of purposes. One such purpose is to express a judge’s doubts about a majority’s holding — albeit doubts that don’t, in the judge’s mind, justify a dissent. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 355-58 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante) (concurring because “I cannot be confident that my colleagues are wrong”); see also People v. Carter, 2021 COA 29, ¶ 60 n.1 (J. Jones, J., concurring dubitante) (describing the different reasons for a dubitante opinion).
35 terminate parental rights. At least two times since, the supreme
court has — in dictum — cited M.N. with apparent approval.
¶ 71 In A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, the court held that foster parents
who are allowed to intervene in a dependency or neglect proceeding
“may participate fully in [a] termination hearing without limitation.”
Id. at ¶ 1. In reviewing the statutory procedures in a dependency or
neglect proceeding, the court said that a parent’s “[f]ailure to
comply reasonably with [a] treatment plan may provide grounds for
the State or the guardian ad litem to file a motion to terminate
parental rights.” Id. at ¶ 14 (first citing § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.
2012; and then citing M.N., 950 P.2d at 676); see also id. at ¶ 5 n.2
(“The guardian ad litem is authorized to file a motion to terminate
parental rights.” (citing M.N., 950 P.2d at 676)).
¶ 72 Five years later, in C.W.B. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, the court held
that foster parents who had intervened in a dependency or neglect
proceeding didn’t have standing to appeal a juvenile court’s order
denying a termination motion. Id. at ¶ 2. In the course of
“examining the relative duties and rights of the several parties to a
dependency and neglect case,” id. at ¶ 21, it observed that “the GAL
may file a motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship,”
36 id. at ¶ 24 (first citing M.N., 950 P.2d at 676; and then citing A.M.,
¶ 14).
¶ 73 But then, seven years later, the court decided R.M.P., holding
that “the State, in its role as parens patriae, is the sole party that
may prosecute dependency and neglect proceedings.” R.M.P., ¶ 4.
The more specific issue in the case was whether a “counsel for
youth,” § 19-3-203(2), C.R.S. 2025, can prosecute a dependency or
neglect petition. The court held that such counsel can’t and, for
good measure, said that “[n]othing in the Children’s Code” gives any
“non-state party” — which would include a GAL — authority to do
so either. R.M.P., ¶ 24.
¶ 74 The majority in this case holds that the supreme court’s
rationale in R.M.P. is limited to the “first phase of a dependency and
neglect proceeding” — the adjudicatory phase. Supra ¶¶ 9-10. Put
another way, the majority concludes that M.N. remains good law
after R.M.P. As I said above, the majority plausibly explains why,
notwithstanding R.M.P., a GAL can file and prosecute a termination
motion. But the following aspects of R.M.P. give me pause:
• As the majority recognizes, the court in R.M.P repeatedly
used the word “proceeding” when speaking about the
37 State’s “sole” authority. Though the majority says the
court could only have been referencing the first phase of
a proceeding, the supreme court previously, in People in
Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, took pains to emphasize
that the “proceeding” in this context is the whole of a
dependency or neglect case: A motion to terminate is a
remedy within the proceeding, “not the start of a second
proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 39 n.3. Given this history, to
conclude that the court in R.M.P. meant only a phase of a
proceeding when using the term “proceeding” requires
assuming that the court overlooked what it previously
said in S.A.G.
• The court’s holding in R.M.P. rested on the State’s
authority as parens patriae. R.M.P., ¶¶ 4, 19-20, 23. The
State continues to exercise that authority throughout the
case and is the only party with such authority. A GAL
“represents” the “child’s best interests,” id. at ¶ 2; see
§ 19-3-203(5), C.R.S. 2025, but a GAL doesn’t stand in a
parent’s shoes, see In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726, 734-35
(Colo. 2007).
38 • The court in R.M.P. said that “to allow a child (or another
non-state party, such as a family member or foster
parent) to prosecute dependency and neglect actions
risks transforming the government’s parens patriae
authority to protect children into a weaponized family
court system.” R.M.P., ¶ 24. Along the same lines, the
court said that “[a]llowing a child (or any non-state party)
to override the State’s determination that a petition [in
dependency or neglect] should be dismissed would be
analogous to allowing the victim of a crime to prevent the
district attorney from dismissing a criminal case.” Id. at
¶ 30. Though the court was speaking about a petition in
dependency or neglect, it is difficult to see why the same
concerns wouldn’t apply to the State’s determination not
to move to terminate parental rights.
• The court in R.M.P. spoke about the State’s authority to
“prosecute a dependency and neglect petition” but also
said it was using the term “prosecute” “to mean to
‘institute’ or to ‘pursue’ the legal proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 3 &
39 n.1 (emphasis added). Again, in S.A.G., ¶ 39 n.3, the
court said that the “proceeding” is the whole of the case.
• Section 19-3-203(5) provides that a GAL “shall . . .
participate further in the proceedings to the degree
necessary to adequately represent the child.”2 And yet
the court in R.M.P. held what it held, apparently of the
view that this provision doesn’t give a GAL, who may be
appointed before or after a petition in dependency or
neglect is filed, see § 19-3-205(1), authority to file or
prosecute a petition.
¶ 75 To my mind, all this could be read as broadly applying beyond
the context of filing a petition in dependency or neglect. And I’m
not alone in taking this view. In People in Interest of N.K.S., 2025
COA 100, ¶ 9 (cert. granted Mar. 30, 2026), a division of this court
applied the rationale and broad language of R.M.P. to hold that a
2 In People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, the supreme court
said, “[U]nlike a guardian ad litem, who represents the child’s best interests, a counsel for youth represents the child in the same manner as an attorney directly representing a client.” Id. at ¶ 2 (citing § 19-2-203(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025). So it appears the court reads “child” in the sentence from section 19-2-203(5) that I quote above as “child’s best interests,” a reasonable construction given the statutory context.
40 GAL lacks standing to appeal the denial of a motion to terminate
parental rights when the State has elected not to appeal.3
¶ 76 All that said, the supreme court hasn’t overruled M.N.; indeed,
it has cited it with approval at least twice, most recently in 2018.
But in light of the uncertainty R.M.P. has engendered, I would urge
the supreme court to clarify the reach of R.M.P. Perhaps it will do
so in N.K.S. But that case involves a different issue than this one
and may be resolvable based on the language in section 19-3-203(5)
giving a GAL the right to “appeal matters to the court of appeals or
the supreme court.” This case, however, squarely presents the
issue whether a GAL may file and prosecute a motion to terminate
parental rights.
3 I also note that section 19-3-602(1.5)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025, provides
that a “motion for termination must . . . [i]nclude a statement indicating what continuing inquiries the county department of human or social services has made in determining whether the child who is the subject of the termination proceeding is an Indian child.” It would seem that only a department would be likely to have that information, indicating that perhaps only a department may file such a motion. But I may be assuming too much.