People ex rel. Sloan v. New York State Board of Parole

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People ex rel. Sloan v. New York State Board of Parole

88 A.D.2d 666, 450 N.Y.S.2d 512, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16909

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 24, 1982

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 88 A.D.2d 666 (People ex rel. Sloan v. New York State Board of Parole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People ex rel. Sloan v. New York State Board of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 666, 450 N.Y.S.2d 512, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16909 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).

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Opinion

— In a habeas corpus proceeding, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Dachenhausen, J.), dated December 9, 1981, which sustained the writ of habeas corpus, vacated and dismissed the parole violation detainer warrant, annulled the declaration of delinquency and directed that petitioner be released from custody, unless he was subject to another commitment or warrant. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is dismissed and the detainer warrant and declaration of delinquency are reinstated. If the petitioner has been released, he is directed to surrender himself to the Superintendent of the Ossining Correctional Facility. Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing on parole revocation charges on August 13,1981. On October 2,1981 counsel for the petitioner filed a notice of appearance with the Division of Parole and on October 19, 1981 counsel was advised that a final revocation hearing was scheduled for November 9, 1981, within the statutorily prescribed 90-day period (see Executive Law, § 259-i, subd 3, par [f], cl [i]). On October 30, 1981, because of a scheduling conflict, petitioner’s attorney requested an adjournment of the final hearing from November 9, 1981 to November 18, 1981, a date beyond the 90-day period. In response to counsel’s request for a postponement, the Division of Parole rescheduled the final hearing to November 30, 1981, the first available date, and properly charged the delay to the petitioner. (See 9 NYCRR 8005.17 [c] [3].) Thus, the record indicates that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy hearing. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Kitt v Dalsheim, 67 AD2d 934; People ex rel. Miranda v Dalsheim, 70 AD2d 941.) Gibbons, J. P., Weinstein, O’Connor and Boyers, JJ., concur.

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— In a habeas corpus proceeding, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Dachenhausen, J.), dated December 9, 1981, which sustained the writ of habeas corpus, vacated and dismissed the parole violation detainer warrant, annulled the declaration of delinquency and directed that petitioner be released from custody, unless he was subject to another commitment or warrant. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is dismissed and the detainer warrant and declaration of delinquency are reinstated. If the petitioner has been released, he is directed to surrender himself to the Superintendent of the Ossining Correctional Facility. Petitioner waived a preliminary hearing on parole revocation charges on August 13,1981. On October 2,1981 counsel for the petitioner filed a notice of appearance with the Division of Parole and on October 19, 1981 counsel was advised that a final revocation hearing was scheduled for November 9, 1981, within the statutorily prescribed 90-day period (see Executive Law, § 259-i, subd 3, par [f], cl [i]). On October 30, 1981, because of a scheduling conflict, petitioner’s attorney requested an adjournment of the final hearing from November 9, 1981 to November 18, 1981, a date beyond the 90-day period. In response to counsel’s request for a postponement, the Division of Parole rescheduled the final hearing to November 30, 1981, the first available date, and properly charged the delay to the petitioner. (See 9 NYCRR 8005.17 [c] [3].) Thus, the record indicates that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy hearing. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Kitt v Dalsheim, 67 AD2d 934; People ex rel. Miranda v Dalsheim, 70 AD2d 941.) Gibbons, J. P., Weinstein, O’Connor and Boyers, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

88 A.D.2d 666, 450 N.Y.S.2d 512, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16909, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-sloan-v-new-york-state-board-of-parole-nyappdiv-1982.

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