People ex rel. Powers v. Kalbfleisch

25 A.D. 432, 49 N.Y.S. 546
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedFebruary 15, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 25 A.D. 432 (People ex rel. Powers v. Kalbfleisch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Powers v. Kalbfleisch, 25 A.D. 432, 49 N.Y.S. 546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1898).

Opinion

Adams, J.:

The only matter litigated before the referee was that of overvaluation, and consequently the sole question for this court to determine is, whether the learned referee was justified by the facts appearing upon the hearing before him in reducing the relator’s assessment to the extent directed, by the judgment appealed from.

[434]*434As preliminary to a discussion of this question it may be assumed that every presumption in the case is in favor of the correctness- of the assessment; and that the relator, in assailing the judgment of the assessors as to the-value of his property, must establish affirmatively that such judgment was erroneous. (People ex rel. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574.)

Having this rule in mind, it becomes of- the utmost importance to determine to what extent these presumptions have been overcome, and with this end in view we proceed to an examination of the case. .

The premises upon which the Powers Block stands are, probably, as desirable for business purposes as any in the city of Rochester. They were purchased by the relator in different parcels between the years 1860 and 1870, and the total cost thereof was the sum of $234,000. The building itself, which is ten stories in height, constructed of iron, stone-and' brick, and said to be tire-proof, is designed for commercial purposes, the ground floor being occupied by a bank, shops and stores, and the remainder of the building by offices. The structure is really the union of four separate buildings which were erected at intervals, covering a period of live or six years, and finally reconstructed and united so as to form one large building, harmonious in its external appearance, and most conve-' niently arranged for the purposes for which it is occupied. Its total cost, which was considerably augmented by reason of the removal of completed work in order to replace the same with new and different work and thereby obtain proper architectural results, was, as the relator' testified, $825,000. So' that the original cost of the entire property was, in round numbers, $1,060,000; and this fact would at first blush seem to fully justify and confirm the valuation placed upon it by the defendants.

The actual cost of a piece of property is often a fact of great potency in determining its real worth; but it is by no means the only one, and in this particular instance it would prove of little value as a guide, for the reason that the lot upon which the building stands has nearly doubled in its market value- since it was purchased by the relator, while the building itself, which was erected at. a period when the materials of which it was constructed cost very much, more than the same materials would cost at the present time, [435]*435is obviously worth, much less than it was when it was first built. This being the case, it is apparent that some other and more satisfactory rule of valuation should, if possible, be employed.

At the time the assessment in question was levied the statutes of this State provided a method by which the valuation of real and personal property should be ascertained for the purposes of taxation, which Avas by estimating it at its full and true value, as the same would be appraised in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor (2 R. S. [Banks’ 9th ed.] 1685, § 17); and this we think will prove the most satisfactory rule for our guidance in the present instance. It is to be observed, then, that the primary requisite of this rule is that the defendants are to assess the relator’s property at “ its full and true value,” and such value can best be determined, as we think, by ascertaining its debt-paying quality. This, however, is something which is often impossible of ascertainment with any degree of certainty, by reason of the difficulty which attends any attempt to formulate a rule which will accommodate itself to all cases. If a man possesses a piece of property which has a fixed and certain market value, it is much less difficult to determine Avhat that property is worth in the payment of a debt than Av'ould be the case if its value were fluctuating and uncertain ; and unfortunately the relator’s property belongs to the latter class. It cannot be said to have any market value, for the reason that there is no other property like it in the city, and consequently none has ever been put upon the market. Persons familiar with the value of real estate in that locality could, as was done upon the hearing before the referee, express their opinion as to its real value, but such evidence is, at the best, but the mere expression of an opinion which is not altogether satisfactory, and which in this case was especially confusing, inasmuch as the valuation thus stated ranged all the Avay from $600,000 to $1,000,000. Eliminating, therefore, all consideration of the market value of the property in question, we find that there remain íavo other methods of ascertaining its true and full value, and these are the ones which, as we understand it, were, adopted by'the learned referee. ' They are, first, its earning capacity as an investment, and, second, the probable and natural cost of its reproduction.

It is urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that too much prominence was given, upon the hearing at the Special Term, [436]*436to the first of the two methods just mentioned; but we are inclined to think that the net income of a building constructed for commercial purposes and as an investment is an important element in deter-, mining its assessable value. For, as was said in an analogous case, “ a thing to be worth its cost must be able to pay out of the profits from its use and enjoyment an income bearing some relation to the interest due' from an investment or loan of a sum of money equal to such cost and over and above the loss by wear or waste.” (People ex rel. Ogdensburgh & L. C. R. R. Co. v. Pond, 13 Abb. N. C. 1.)

. To illustrate, no one would ever think of purchasing the Powers Block ” for any other reason than because it was a revenue-producing investment, and consequently its net income must necessarily bear a ratio to, and determine, its true value. The relator testified that the • average net annual income derived from his building for the past fifteen years was $21,348.64, which when capitalized would be equivalent to less than three per cent upon $800,000. The correctness of this statement is, however, challenged by the defendants, and it is claimed that the relator, in order to reduce the net income of the property, has charged certain items to the expense account thereof which do not properly belong there. To meet this evidence, therefore, two expert witnesses were called, one of whom, Mr. Bower, made a thorough examination of the relator’s books and vouchers for the year 1895, and stated as the result of such examination that, he found the net income for. that year to be $26,017.35. To reach this result, however, he disallowed the sum of $3,500, which the relator was compelled to pay as his share of the cost of paving West Main street, which we think was quite as much an expense as any other tax; but even with this item thrown out, the income for the ■ year 1895, as estimated' by this witness, would yield but a trifle: over three per cent.upon a capital of $800,000. The' other expert: made the net income for 1895 a little more than Mr. Bower’s estimate, but not enough more to appreciably increase its percentage.

It is apparent, therefore, that as a source of revenue the relator's-property during the year 1895, when it is not denied that it was.

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Bluebook (online)
25 A.D. 432, 49 N.Y.S. 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-powers-v-kalbfleisch-nyappdiv-1898.