People Ex Rel. Department of Public Works v. Nyrin

256 Cal. App. 2d 288, 63 Cal. Rptr. 905, 1967 Cal. App. LEXIS 1854
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 22, 1967
DocketCiv. 29864
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 256 Cal. App. 2d 288 (People Ex Rel. Department of Public Works v. Nyrin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People Ex Rel. Department of Public Works v. Nyrin, 256 Cal. App. 2d 288, 63 Cal. Rptr. 905, 1967 Cal. App. LEXIS 1854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).

Opinion

*291 MOSS,

J.—The People appeal from a judgment in condemnation awarding the sum of $183,000 for property taken from defendants for freeway purposes. The jury awarded $63,000 for the property taken and $120,000 for severance damages. Only the award of severance damages is in controversy on this appeal.

Appellant sought to condemn lots 18, 19 and 20 of Tract 14798, which were referred to in the complaint and are referred to in this opinion as Parcel 7. Parcel 7 was part of an entire block consisting of lots 15 through 28. Lots 15, 16 and 17 were occupied by the Bradford Medical Building and on May 4, 1962, were owned in fee by Dolores D. Kaye, one of the defendants and respondents herein. On May 4, 1962, appellant purchased the Bradford Medical Building for the same freeway for which this action was brought. Summons in this action was issued on August 17, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the “date of condition’’). On that date lots 18 through 28 were owned in fee by respondents Nyrin and U.L.C. Corporation. Lots 25 through 28 and a portion of lot 24 were occupied by the Bella Vista Community Hospital. The lots between the hospital and the medical building, lots 18 through 23 and a portion of lot 24, were used for parking for both the hospital and the medical building. The route of the proposed freeway across the property is shown on the diagram. *

The trial court ruled, after receiving evidence on the subject, that Parcel 7 was not an entire parcel, as contended by appellant, but part of a larger parcel consisting of lots 18 through 28. The court also ruled that on the date of condition the hospital had the number of parking spaces required by the applicable zoning ordinance. The effect of this ruling, according to appellant, was to permit the experts and the jury to include, in determining severance damages, the loss to the hospital of some parking spaces on Parcel 7 which, prior to the purchase of the medical building by appellant on May 4, 1962, appellant contends, had been reserved for the exclusive use of the medical building. After the trial court ruled that Parcel 7 was part of a larger parcel appellant moved the court for a determination that, in view of this ruling, appellant had no authority to acquire the excess portion of Parcel 7 because such excess was not needed for the improvement and had been included in the take under the authority of section 104.1 of *292 the Streets and Highways Code. 1 The trial court denied appellant’s motion and offer of proof made in connection therewith.

Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in making each of these rulings.

The Ruling that Parcel 7 was Part of a Larger Parcel

Severance damages accrue only where the property sought to be condemned is part of a larger parcel. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1248.) California courts have established three prerequisites to a finding that a single parcel exists: unity of ownership, unity of use and, ordinarily, contiguity. (See County of Santa Clara v. Curtner, 245 Cal.App.2d 730, 736 [54 Cal.Rptr. 257]; People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Dickinson, 230 Cal.App.2d 932, 934 [41 Cal.Rptr. 427]; and authorities cited therein.) Appellant contends that the unities of ownership and use were not shown to exist as to Parcel 7 and lots 21 through 28. What constitutes a single parcel of land in the contemplation of section 1248 is essentially a question of law (City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lbr. & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392 [153 P. 705]) but may involve issues of fact. (Stipe v. United States (10th Cir. 1964) 337 F.2d 818; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 14.31, p. 715.) While the evidence is basically not in conflict as to the ownership and use of the property, it is to some extent susceptible of two interpretations. Insofar as the evidence is subject to opposing inferences, it must upon a review thereof, be regarded in the light most favorable to the ruling of the trial court. (Mah See v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421, 426 [213 P. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123] ; City of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal.App.2d 261, 270-271 [311 P.2d 135].)

In 1956 lots 18 through 28 were owned by Bella Vista Investment Company and lots 15, 16 and 17 were owned by Herman Kaye, the husband of Dolores D. Kaye, and Bertram Harris. On January 10, 1956, Kaye and Harris entered into a 50-year lease of lots 18, 19 and 20 (Parcel 7) as lessees “for the operation of a parking lot” at a rental of three dollars per year. The major consideration given by the lessees for this lease was their agreement to build a medical building on lots *293 15, 16 and 17 to help the hospital, which was then in operation. The lessor and lessees agreed that the leased property would be used for joint parking for the hospital and the medical building. The medical building was completed in 1958. Herman Kaye was the manager of the medical building from the time it was built until it was sold to appellant on May 4, 1962. Construction of the medical building was financed in part by a loan from John Hancock Life Insurance Co. which was secured by a deed of trust on lots 15, 16 and 17 and an assignment of the lessees’ interest in the 50-year parking lot lease on lots 18, 19 and 20. Through a series of conveyances not material to the issues before us, Dolores D. Kaye, the wife of Herman Kaye, acquired fee title to the medical building in the summer of 1960.

Prior thereto, Herman Kaye had purchased the interests of his partners in the medical building and to secure the purchase money obligation had executed a deed of trust in favor of Milton Greene, trustee for the selling partners, covering lots 15, 16 and 17 and the lessees’ interest in the 50-year parking lot lease in lots 18, 19 and 20. On February 2, 1960 the owners of lots 18 through 28 leased all of these lots to AMA Corporation, as lessee “for the purpose of conducting therein a Hospital, and for no other purpose” for a term of 10 years. Mr. Kaye was the president of the lessee corporation and became the president and operating manager of the hospital. On October 1, 1960, AMA Corporation leased lots 18, 19 and 20 to Dolores D. Kaye, as lessee for a term of 10 years, to be used by her “in connection with her enjoyment and use of the Bradford Medical Building.” In 1960 and 1961 Messrs. Kaye and Harris and their successors in interest in lots 15, 16 and 17 executed quit claim deeds to Dolores D. Kaye for the purpose of clearing those lots of the 50-year parking lot lease. When appellant purchased the medical building on May 4, 1962, all liens against lots 15, 16 and 17 were paid. Since payment of a debt extinguishes the security therefor, (Civ. Code, § 1473; Singleton v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 127 Cal. App. 635 [16 P.2d 293] ; 34 Cal.Jur.2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, § 356, p.

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Bluebook (online)
256 Cal. App. 2d 288, 63 Cal. Rptr. 905, 1967 Cal. App. LEXIS 1854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-department-of-public-works-v-nyrin-calctapp-1967.