People Ex Rel. Cutmore v. Harding

164 N.E. 827, 333 Ill. 384
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 3, 1929
DocketNo. 19405. Writ denied.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 164 N.E. 827 (People Ex Rel. Cutmore v. Harding) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People Ex Rel. Cutmore v. Harding, 164 N.E. 827, 333 Ill. 384 (Ill. 1929).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

On December 7, 1928, on motion of Harry S. Cut-more, leave was granted him to file a petition for mandamus against George P. Harding, couqty treasurer of Cook county. The petition was filed and a summons was issued returnable on December 12. The respondent demurred to the petition, briefs were filed and the cause was submitted on December 17 for decision. We announced our decision denying the writ on December 19, but since the business of the term had not permitted the preparation of an opinion, it was announced that one would be filed later setting forth the reasons for our decision. The reasons will now be stated.

All the allegations of fact in the petition are admitted by the demurrer, and they show that the State Tax Commission on July 10, 1928, ordered a re-assessment of all the real property in Cook county assessed in 1927, and that such re-assessment, when made, should be substituted for the original quadrennial assessment made in 1927 for the year 1928, and thereafter until the next general quadrennial assessment. On August 2, 1928, the tax commission amended the rules for the equalization and assessment of property by the addition of a rule designated as rule 14, which was applicable only to counties having a population of more than 500,000 and provided an elaborate system and procedure for the taxation of real estate in such counties. This rule required a permanent public record to be kept and maintained, in which should be recorded the elements or basis of valuation and the things taken into consideration by the local assessment officers in determining the full fair cash value of each town or city lot or parcel of land and each improvement thereon, and the adoption by the local assessment officers of a uniform standard unit of value for “determining the full fair cash value of all town and city lots and parcels of land, which shall be known and designated as the standard unit foot, and which shall be a strip of land a foot wide and 125 feet deep, or such other standard depth as the local assessment officers shall adopt.” The local assessment officers were required to determine the full fair cash value of the strip of land in the middle of each block extending one foot along the street frontage and at right angles to the street, to a depth of 125 feet or such standard depth as the local assessment officers should have adopted, and the value so determined should be the standard unit-foot value to be considered, among other things, in determining the value of each lot or parcel of land in such block fronting on such street. The local assessment officers were also required to cause to be marked on unit-value maps the standard unit value so established for each block of frontage on each street represented on each of such maps. The rule provided in detail the method of determining the value of each lot or parcel of land by the use of such standard unit-foot values recorded on such maps, taking into consideration, also, further elements mentioned in the rule affecting the value of any lot or parcel of land; and also required the local assessment officers to cause to be made a schedule classifying various types of buildings or structures by their use and construction, and to cause buildings and other improvements on each lot or parcel of land to be measured, described and classified as to use and construction, such measurements, description and classification to be entered upon the permanent record of each lot or parcel. The rule contained other requirements which we do not regard as necessary to be set out at length, since those which have been stated are sufficient to indicate the character of the rule and the extent of the changes made in the manner of making the assessment.

On September 4, 1928, the board of assessors of Cook county, in a letter addressed to the county board in regard to the plan for the accomplishment of the work of re-assessment in accordance with the order of the tax commission and to the cost of it, stated that the method to be employed in making the assessment under the rules of the commission called for an entirely different organization and plan of procedure from that theretofore followed or financed by the county board and for authority from the board to employ and pay necessary help. A detailed description of the work to be done was attached to the letter, together with estimated expenditure proposed, from which it appeared that the amount required was $809,375. The county board appropriated this amount, and clerks and deputies of the board of assessors were appointed and employed in the work of making such re-assessment. Among those so appointed and employed from November 1 to November 15 were the following persons at the daily rate specified: Harry S. Cutmore, clerk, director of valuation operations, $75; Clayton J. Young, clerk, publicity specialist, $20; Henry C. Hagedorn, clerk, superintendent of land valuations, $50; Ralph A. Olcott, clerk, assistant superintendent land valuations, $35; Wendell F. Simmons, clerk, supervisor land valuations, $50; Elden D. Pollock, clerk, supervisor land valuation actuary, $50; F. D. Waddell, land valuation actuary, $35 ; Henry G. Hulbuert, land valuation actuary, $35; Harry P. Moran, superintendent of building appraisal, $50; C. D. Faxon, expert building appraiser, $50; George W. Cutmore, expert building appraiser, $35; W. V. O’Malley, building valuation expert, $35 5 W. J. Rammer, supervisor of building measurers, $25 ; B. K. Suttle, supervisor of building measurers, $25. Payrolls were made out and certified by the tax commission to the county board for the compensation of the persons above named for the period stated and were approved by the finance committee of the board and by the board ordered paid. Warrants for their payment were drawn by the comptroller and presented to the respondent, but he refused to countersign and pay them, for the reason that compensation in excess of $10 a day was not authorized by law.

The Revenue act of 1898 provided for the election of a board of assessors in counties containing 250,000 or more inhabitants, whose duty should be to assess all property in the county, and by section 3 authorized such board “to employ a chief clerk, who shall have charge of the office of such board, and such other clerical help as may be necessary, subject to the approval of the board of review as to the number thereof, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the board, and who shall take and subscribe an oath of office that he will honestly and faithfully perform all duties of such office under the direction of said board, and he shall have power to administer all oaths authorized by law to be administered by assessors, and the compensation of such clerk shall be fixed by such board, subject to the approval of the board of review, not to exceed $10 per day, for each working day.” By section 6, as amended, the board of assessors is given power to appoint as many suitable persons as in its judgment are necessary to act as deputies, subject to the approval of the board of review as to the number and time of service of such deputies, to assist them in making the assessment, who shall perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the board of assessors, hold their office during the will of the board of assessors and receive such compensation as shall be determined by the board, not exceeding $7 per day.

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Bluebook (online)
164 N.E. 827, 333 Ill. 384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-cutmore-v-harding-ill-1929.