People ex rel Burke v. 2016 Land Rover Range Rover

2026 IL App (1st) 250312-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-0312
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 250312-U No. 1-25-0312 Order filed March 11, 2026 Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE ex rel. EILEEN O’NEILL BURKE, ) Appeal from the State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 23 COFO 2576 ) 2016 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER, ) ) Defendant ) Honorable ) John M. Allegretti, (Gewone Ross, Claimant-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Martin and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed where claimant-appellant failed to present an adequate record for review.

¶2 In this civil asset forfeiture case, claimant Gewone Ross appeals from an order, entered

after a bench trial, adjudging his claimed property, a 2016 Land Rover Range Rover, to be forfeited

pursuant to sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/36-1, 36-2

(West 2022)). On appeal, Ross contends that the State failed to establish that he “knew or No. 1-25-0312

committed a crime in the vehicle” such that it was subject to forfeiture, and that the court erred by

failing “to follow the law of innocent owner.” Because Ross has not provided an adequate record

for review, we affirm.

¶3 The record on appeal consists of one volume of the common law record and does not

contain a report of proceedings or an acceptable substitute under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323

(eff. Jul. 1, 2017).

¶4 On December 20, 2023, the State filed a complaint initiating forfeiture proceedings against

the subject vehicle under sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Code. The State alleged that, on November

13, 2023, Oak Forest police officers observed the vehicle with an expired temporary Indiana

registration and curbed it. As an officer approached the vehicle on foot, the driver of the vehicle

executed a U-turn and fled at a high rate of speed. The officers pursued the vehicle, which was

traveling more than 21 miles per hour over the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. After the

driver of the vehicle ran three red lights, the officers discontinued their pursuit. On November 22,

2023, Chicago police located the vehicle in Chicago. Oak Forest police seized the vehicle on

November 30, 2023.

¶5 The State claimed that the vehicle was subject to seizure because it had been used during

the commission of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1

(West 2022)). The State identified Ross and a lienholder bank as having right, title, or interest in

the vehicle.

¶6 The lienholder bank filed an appearance and an answer asserting, as an affirmative defense,

that it was an innocent owner. Ross also filed an appearance and an answer. In the answer, Ross

denied the factual allegations in the complaint describing the vehicle fleeing the police.

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¶7 On September 25, 2024, the trial court entered an order adjudging the vehicle forfeited in

accordance with sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Code, subject to the rights of the lienholder bank.

The order recited that all parties had been served and notified, but that “no appearance, no answer

or other pleading [had] been filed.” The order did not specify who was present in court.

¶8 On September 26, 2024, Ross filed a motion to vacate. He alleged that the vehicle was

adjudged forfeited “because the judge said I was late.” Ross requested a new court date so that he

could continue the process of recovering his vehicle.

¶9 On October 7, 2024, the trial court entered a case management order, noting that the bank’s

attorney and Ross were “on Zoom,” and setting a case management conference for 1:30 p.m. on

October 21, 2024. The order did not explicitly grant the motion to vacate.

¶ 10 On October 21, 2024, the trial court entered another order adjudging the vehicle forfeited

in accordance with sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Code, subject to the rights of the lienholder bank.

The court hand-wrote on the order, “Defaulted @ 2:20 pm claimant not on Zoom [lienholder

bank’s attorney] on Zoom.” The court also noted this was the second time it had entered a default

judgment, with the first having been on September 25, 2024, when Ross “was late to court.”

¶ 11 On October 22, 2024, Ross filed a motion to vacate the default judgment and asking the

court to continue his case. Ultimately, the court set the case for trial on January 28, 2025 without

stating the motion to vacate had been granted.

¶ 12 On January 22, 2025, Ross filed a motion titled “Innocent owner.” He asserted that he was

seeking return of the vehicle because he “did not know or have any knowledge that the crime was

going to happen or was likely to happen.”

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¶ 13 Following a bench trial on January 28, 2025, the trial court entered a written order

adjudging the vehicle forfeited in accordance with sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the Code, subject to

the bank’s lien, and terminating Ross’s right, title, and/or interest in the vehicle. The order noted

that Ross “withdrew his Motion for Innocent Owner and proceeded to trial on Zoom asserting the

affirmative defense of Innocent Owner.” The court found the testimony of an Oak Forest police

officer to be credible, and the testimony provided by Ross to be inconsistent and not credible. The

court stated that it also considered the exhibits received in evidence and the arguments of counsel.

The court determined that the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle

was used in the commission of a criminal offense as stated in the complaint, that the vehicle was

subject to forfeiture, and that Ross knew or should have known that the vehicle was used in the

commission of the criminal offense stated in the complaint. Finally, the court found that Ross “did

not establish the affirmative defense of Innocent Owner.”

¶ 14 On February 6, 2025, Ross filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the court

misunderstood him or “heard the case wrong during trial.” Ross insisted he had no knowledge of

the crime and that, when he discovered the vehicle was not where he had left it, he intended to

report it stolen. He argued that the court’s conclusion that he knew about the vehicle being driven

“doesn’t make sense.”

¶ 15 On February 10, 2025, the trial court entered a written order denying Ross’s motion to

reconsider. The court observed that Ross presented no newly discovered evidence or changes in

the law and had failed to show any error.

¶ 16 Ross filed a timely notice of appeal on February 19, 2025.

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¶ 17 Although the State has not filed a response brief, we may proceed under the principles set

forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976),

and have ordered the appeal taken on Ross’s brief and the record alone.

¶ 18 On appeal, Ross contends that the court erred by failing “to follow the law of innocent

owner.” More specifically, he argues that the State failed to provide evidence that he “knew or

committed a crime in the vehicle.” Ross questions whether the State showed he consented to

criminal use of the vehicle and asks whether the vehicle was adjudged forfeited solely on “the

crime and allegations.”

¶ 19 In his statement of facts, Ross relates that, at trial, he testified that he parked the vehicle at

his grandmother’s house and then left town for a few days. When he returned, the vehicle was

gone. Thinking it had been stolen, he called the police to report the theft. During the call, he learned

the vehicle had been involved in a crime, towed from a different location, and impounded.

According to Ross, the Assistant State’s Attorney asked him at trial how he intended to report the

vehicle stolen if he did not know about the crimes that were committed in it. This did not make

sense to Ross, who insisted that he was an innocent owner and had no knowledge of the crimes.

At the end of the trial, according to Ross, the court “basically said [it] didn’t believe what [Ross]

was saying during the trial about reporting the car stolen and *** not having knowledge of the

crime.”

¶ 20 Ross asserts that the court misunderstood him at trial and did not let him explain in detail

why he intended to report the vehicle stolen. He further alleges that, at the hearing on his motion

to reconsider, he explained to the court how it “was wrong.” Ross concludes that the court “did

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not go off facts of the case” but, instead, “went off if [it] believed me or not” despite his insisting

numerous times that he was an innocent owner.

¶ 21 As an initial matter, the record does not show that Ross served his notice of appeal on the

opposing party, the State, as the “proof of service” section of his notice of appeal states only that

he sent the notice to the lienholder bank and no notice of filing has been filed with this court.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides that the party filing the notice of

appeal “shall, within 7 days, file a notice of filing with the reviewing court and serve the notice of

appeal upon every other party and upon any other person or officer entitled by law to notice. Proof

of service *** shall be filed with the notice.” Id.

¶ 22 If the appellant fails to serve a copy of the notice of appeal on an opposing party, this court

is not deprived of jurisdiction, as the filing of the notice of appeal is the “only jurisdictional step”

in appealing from a circuit court decision. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Zwolinski, 2013 IL App (1st)

120612, ¶ 14. We will not dismiss an appeal for failure to serve the opposing party with a copy of

the notice of appeal if there was no evidence of prejudice to the party. Id. A party is not prejudiced

by the failure to serve a copy of the notice of appeal if the party could file appellate briefs and

argue orally. Id. However, “failure to serve a copy of the notice of appeal on parties who may be

adversely affected by the appellate court’s decision may result in dismissal of the appeal.”

(Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 23 Here, there is no indication that Ross properly served the State with a copy of the notice of

appeal in compliance with Rule 303(c), as he did not provide proof of service as required. See

Zwolinski, 2013 IL App (1st) 120612, ¶ 17. Our records indicate that the State has not filed an

appearance and has not filed an appellate brief.

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¶ 24 Nevertheless, regardless of whether the State was prejudiced by Ross’s failure to serve it

with a copy of the notice of appeal, other issues preclude this court from resolving the appeal on

the merits.

¶ 25 At the outset, Ross has failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct.

1, 2020), which provides mandatory procedural rules that govern the content of appellate briefs.

¶ 26 Ross’s brief fails to comply with several of the requirements of Rule 341(h), most notably,

Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which requires that an appellant’s brief contain reasoned

argument supported by citations to the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. We are

entitled, as a reviewing court, to have the issues on appeal clearly defined, pertinent authority cited,

and a cohesive legal argument presented. Lewis v. Heartland Food Corp., 2014 IL App (1st)

123303, ¶ 5. An appellant’s pro se status does not relieve him of the obligation to comply with

Rule 341. Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 7. “Arguments that do

not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected by this

court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43.

¶ 27 Ross’s brief consists primarily of a recitation of facts and repeated assertions that the court

erred in not finding he was an innocent owner where the State failed to provide evidence showing

he knew or should have known the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime. The brief does

not contain reasoned bases for its contentions, any citations to the record, or citations to pertinent

authority. The only authorities Ross cites in his brief are two sections of the civil forfeiture

statute—section 36-1, which defines what property is subject to forfeiture, and section 36-2.7,

which sets forth the procedure for requesting and conducting an innocent owner hearing (see 720

ILCS 5/36-1, 36-2.7 (West 2022))—and a general citation to United States v. One 1987 Mercedes

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560 SEL, 919 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1990), a case where the government was found to have presented

sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to seize the appellant’s assets.

¶ 28 Arguments that are not supported by citations to authority fail to meet the requirements of

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted. Vilardo v. Barrington Community

School District 220, 406 Ill. App. 3d 713, 720 (2010). Similarly, where a party fails to provide

cohesive legal arguments or reasoned bases for his or her contentions, they are forfeited. Lewis v.

Heartland Food Corp., 2014 IL App (1st) 123303, ¶ 6.

¶ 29 To the extent that Ross’s contentions on appeal could be found to have survived procedural

default, our review is impeded by the inadequacy of the record.

¶ 30 As noted, Ross has not included in the record on appeal any transcripts of proceedings or

any acceptable substitutes, such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts pursuant to

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Our supreme court has long held that, in order

to support a claim of error on appeal, the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete

record, and that any doubts arising from an incomplete record must be resolved against the

appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)). Absent transcripts or acceptable

substitutes, it is presumed that the trial court acted in conformity with the law. Doe v. Parrillo,

2021 IL 126577, ¶ 71.

¶ 31 In this appeal, Ross contends that the State failed to prove that he knew or had reason to

know that the vehicle was involved in the commission of a crime. He also argues that the court

erred in making a decision not based on facts, but, rather, based on “if [it] believed [Ross] or not.”

Ross has provided no records that would allow us to conduct meaningful review of these matters.

Without a record of the forfeiture proceedings, we cannot know what evidence and argument the

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trial court heard and cannot evaluate what explanations the court may have given for its decision.

See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391 (“From the very nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of

review must have before it the record to review in order to determine whether there was the error

claimed by the appellant.”). We can find no support in the record for Ross’s contentions and,

therefore, cannot determine whether any error occurred. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pavlovich,

2019 IL App (1st) 172859, ¶ 20 (where the appellant provided a “meager record” and no transcript

of proceedings, this court assumed that the trial court’s actions conformed with the law).

¶ 32 In summary, Ross has failed to provide reasoned bases for his contentions, citations to the

record, and citations to pertinent authorities. In addition, absent an adequate record, we cannot find

that the trial court erred.

¶ 33 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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