People Ex Rel. Buffalo & State Line Railroad v. Barker

48 N.Y. 70
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 5, 1871
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 48 N.Y. 70 (People Ex Rel. Buffalo & State Line Railroad v. Barker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People Ex Rel. Buffalo & State Line Railroad v. Barker, 48 N.Y. 70 (N.Y. 1871).

Opinion

Hunt, C.

Two principal points are urged by the appellants’ counsel, upon which it is insisted that the judgments in question should be reversed. These are: 1. That the assessors adopted an erroneous principle in ascertaining the value of the relator’s lands within their district; 2. That the assessment should have been made as for non-resident lands, and not against the relator personally as for resident lands. These points are elaborated into several branches, and I will consider such of them as seem to be important.

In the town of Hamburgh the real estate of the relator was assessed at $225,000. The vice-president of the road gave evidence tending to show that it was worth only $68,667; and it is insisted that his evidence was controlling, and that a judgment should have been given in accordance with it. Again, it. is insisted that the value of the land and its superstructure simply, without reference to its connections at either end, or its general profit, should determine the amount of the assessment.

*74 A reference to the statutory provisions on the subject of the assessment and taxation of real estate is necessary to a proper understanding of this subject.

It is provided, in general terms, that “ all lands and all personal estate within this State, whether owned by individuals or corporations, shall be liable to taxation, subject to the exemptions hereafter specified.” (1 R. S., 387, § 1.) The exemptions do not relate to anything here in question. “ Every person shall be assessed in the town or ward where he resides when the assessment is made, for all lands then owned by him within such town or ward, and occupied by him, or wholly unoccupied.” (Id., 389, § 1.) “The real estate of all incorporated companies liable to taxation shall be assessed in the town or ward in which the same shall lie, in the same manner as the real estate of individuals.” (Id., § 6.) These statutes are intended to provide that all real and personal estate within this State, with a few exceptions not necessary to be considered, shall be liable to taxation.

As to the manner in which the assessment shall be made, many directions are given. It is provided that “ all real and personal estate shall be estimated by the assessors at its j ust and full value, as they would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.” (Id. 393, § 17, Laws 1851, ch. 176.) This rule is to be followed in all assessments, “ except where the assessors shall be specifically required, by law, to observe a different rule.” (Id.) A provision is made for the re-examination of those cases where a party deems himself aggrieved by the assessment, to wit, “ they shall hear and examine all complaints in relation to such assessment as shall be brought before them.” (Laws 1851, supra.) These complaints are to be determined in accordance “ with section 15 of title 2.” The original section fifteen here referred to, with sixteen and seventeen, and the amendments of the same by the act of 1851, are important to be understood. Section fifteen, as it originally stood, enacted that any person whose real and personal estate was taxed, might present an affidavit to the assessors to the effect that the real *75 or personal estate owned by him did not exceed in value a certain sum to be named, and it was made the duty of the assessors to assess the same at the sum named and no more. (Rev. Stat. as amended.) Section sixteen contained the same authority as to trustees. In section seventeen it was declared that all real and personal estate, the value of which shall not have been so specified by affidavit, shall be estimated at its full value, as the assessors would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor. (Id.) Under this statute it was the evident duty of the assessors to value the property at the sum specified in the affidavit, although their own judgment may have been entirely different, or although they may have been satisfied that the statements were dishonestly made. A different rule was established by the act of 1851 (chapter 176, page 332). It was there enacted that the sections 15, 16, 22, 23, 21. 25 and 26 should be repealed, and that section 17 should be amended so as to read as follows: All real and personal estate liable to taxation shall be estimated and assessed by the assessors at its full and true value, as they would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.” The other sections declared to be repealed with the substitutes, are equally significant. By section twenty-two, thus repealed, it was declared that at their meeting for review, if a person had not previously made an affidavit, he might then make it, and the assessors should reduce the assessment to the sum specified in the affidavits. Section twenty-three authorized the proof to be made by other means than the affidavit of the party. Section twenty-six gave the form of the certificate to be made by the assessors, to the effect that they had assessed the real estate according to their best information, and that, with the exception of those cases in which the value had been sworn to by the owner, they had estimated the value at the sum at which they would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor. A similar statement was contained in it in respect to personal estate. This was all changed by the law of 1851. The certificate then stated that they had set down all the real estate according to their best *76 information, and that, with the exception of those cases in which the value had been changed by reason of the proof produced, they had estimated the value at the sum at which they would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.

Assessors are citizens chosen from their respective towns, who, in theory of law and in fact, have personal knowledge of the value of the real estate in their towns. In the first instance they form their own judgment of the value of each piece of real estate and place it in the third column of their assessment roll. This judgment they form from the best information in their power, derived from their own knowledge and experience, and from such communications as they may confide in. According to the system in force before 1851, this judgment gave way, absolutely, to the affidavit of the owner. His statement of value was conclusive, and it was the duty of the assessors to adopt it, whatever their own judgment might be. According to the law of 1851 this affidavit was evidence before them, and to be considered by them with the other means of information in their power, and, upon the whole, their own judgment was to be formed of the value. If this proof or any other evidence before them changed the value of the real estate,” they accepted such change and gave the statement. If it changed it to the extent claimed by the owner, or if only to a modified extent, the value was stated accordingly. It was the evident intention of the legislature to abolish the rule that the affidavit of the owner should be conclusive evidence of value. There is no rule left except the judgment of the assessors upon the whole case, the affidavit included. The statute of 1858 (chapter 536, page 122) adopted and confirmed the rule of the statute of 1851 in this respect.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Railway Co. v. Harris
168 Misc. 685 (New York Supreme Court, 1938)
Zeigenmeyer v. Goetz Lime & Cement Co.
88 S.W. 139 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1905)
Mercantile Nat. Bank v. . Mayor, Etc., of N.Y.
64 N.E. 756 (New York Court of Appeals, 1902)
People ex rel. Rendrock Powder Co. v. Feitner
41 A.D. 544 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1899)
People ex rel. Trowbridge v. McNamara
18 A.D. 17 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1897)
People Ex Rel. D., L. W.R.R. Co. v. . Clapp
46 N.E. 842 (New York Court of Appeals, 1897)
People ex rel. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad v. Clapp
152 N.Y. 490 (New York Court of Appeals, 1897)
People Ex Rel. Equitable Gas Light Co. v. Barker
39 N.E. 13 (New York Court of Appeals, 1894)
People ex rel. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad v. Zoeller
15 N.Y.S. 684 (New York Supreme Court, 1891)
People Ex Rel. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dolan
126 N.Y. 166 (New York Court of Appeals, 1891)
People ex rel. Fitchburg Railroad
17 N.Y. St. Rep. 980 (New York Supreme Court, 1888)
People ex rel. Fitchburgh Railroad v. Assessor
2 N.Y.S. 240 (New York Supreme Court, 1888)
People ex rel. Boston, Hoosac Tunnel & Western Railroad v. Wilder
3 N.Y. St. Rep. 159 (New York Supreme Court, 1886)
State Board of Assessors v. Central Railroad
4 A. 578 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1886)
People ex rel. Wallkill Valley Railroad v. Keator
43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 592 (New York Supreme Court, 1885)
Heenan v. New York, West Shore & Buffalo Railway Co.
1 How. Pr. (n.s.) 53 (New York County Courts, 1884)
People ex rel. Walkill Valley Railroad v. Keator
67 How. Pr. 277 (New York Supreme Court, 1884)
People ex rel. Ogdensburgh & L. C. R. R. Co. v. Pond
13 Abb. N. Cas. 1 (New York Supreme Court, 1882)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 N.Y. 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-buffalo-state-line-railroad-v-barker-ny-1871.