People ex rel. Becker v. Miner

46 Ill. 384
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1868
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 46 Ill. 384 (People ex rel. Becker v. Miner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Becker v. Miner, 46 Ill. 384 (Ill. 1868).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Breese

delivered the opinion of the Court:

On the sixth of March, 1867, the General Assembly of this State passed an act entitled, “An act for the relief of the citizens of the American Bottom in St. Clair county,” by the first section of which it was provided, that the' State tax raised in townships one and two, north of ranges nine and ten, west of the third principal meridian, in St. Clair county, should be appropriated for the term of fire years, to assist in paying for building, improving and repairing levees and embankments, built, and to be built, by the American Bottom Board of Improvement, chartered by an act of the same General Assembly, approved February 10, 1853, to prevent the lands in the American Bottom, in those townships, from being overflowed by the high waters of the Mississippi river.

The second section required the county clerk of St. Clair county to give to the treasurer of this company, so soon as practicable after the return of the books each year, including 1866, should be made to him by the assessor, a certificate of the amount of the State tax to be collected from those townships, and transmit a similar one to the auditor of publir accounts; on presentation of this certificate to the county col lector, he was required, after the deduction of legal abate ments and commissions, and upon filing a bond, to pay ovei to the company treasurer the balance of the amount so certified, and the auditor was authorized to give the collector credit for the amount of this certificate upon a settlement with him for taxes due the State. Sess. Laws 1867, p. 152.

On the eighteenth of June, 1867, the county clerk of St. Clair county issued to the treasurer of this company the required certificate, by which it appeared the State taxes in those townships, for 1866, amounted to the sum of twelve thousand nine hundred and forty-six dollars and eleven cents, which the treasurer, on that day, duly presented to Charles Becker, then sheriff and ex offiaio collector of St. Clair' county, and demanded payment thereof. The collector paid on the certificate about eight thousand dollars, and on a settlement with the auditor, on the 25th of July thereafter, that officer-refused to allow the collector a credit for the amount of the certificate with the proper abatements and commissions, he insisting, that the company was only entitled to the sum of five thousand, three hundred and sixteen 27-100 dollars. On this refusal, the collector obtained an alternative mandamus against the auditor, to show cause why he did not allow the credit for the full amount of the certificate, and on failure, that a peremptory mandamus issue, commanding him to give the credit as claimed.

The auditor, in his return to the writ, admits he had received from the county clerk of St. Clair county, a certificate, similar in all respects to that issued to the treasurer of the company, and by him presented to the collector, the relator herein. The auditor also admits, that the relator made a demand for a credit for the amount of this certificate on his settlement for the taxes collected, and that he refused the credit, alleging as reasons for his refusal: 1st. That the act of 1867 was unconstitutional. 2d. That if it was not so, the Legislature had no power to divert from the payment of the State debt, the amount of the two mill tax, so called. 3d. That a portion of these taxes had been appropriated to the maintenance of a system of common schools, and the act should be construed to mean only such taxes as were not otherwise appropriated. 4th, That the legislature has no power to grant away taxes not imposed at the time of the grant, the amount not being known at the time of the enactment of the law.

Unnecessarily, as we think, the relator demurred to the return, when the return itself is nothing more than a demurrer to the writ. No fact is controverted by the return, and no question raised, other than questions of law.

The Attorhey General, on behalf of the Auditor, in arguing tlie first objection made to the claim of the relator, admits the general assembly has the right to appropriate money to any object, and for any purpose, with few exceptions, but he questions their right to appropriate taxes yet to be raised upon or within certain districts of country for a term of years, for any propose whatever. He refers, in this connection, to section 26 of article 3 of the constitution, by which it is declared that “Ho money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and an accurate statement of the receipts and expenditures of the public moneys shall be attached to, and published with the laws, at the rising of each session of the general assembly.”

From this, he infers, that the legislature can exercise no control over the money of the State, until it is actually in the treasury ; that they have no power to stop it i/n trcmsitu. He argues, also, that the legislature has no right to receive any thing but money in payment of taxes, and have no power to say to the citizens of certain districts of country, .if you will make certain roads, ditches and embankments, such works will be received in lieu of the taxes assessed against you; and from this the inference is drawn that the taxes imposed upon those citizens cannot be employed by the legislature in erecting such structures, or be diverted, for that purpose, from the State treasury. This is a specious, as well as a strong argument, against the power exercised in passing this law, but we think not conclusive. The argument is more against the policy of such legislation than against the power; for when it is admitted the legislature may appropriate money for almost any conceivable purpose, the manner in which it' shall be done becomes a different question, and that is settled by the section of the constitution cited. When the money collected for taxes is placed in the treasury, it can be drawn therefrom but in consequence of appropriations made by law ; and the same is true, if the money is in the hands of the collector, not paid into the treasury. It cannot be drawn from hiih but in the same mode. Suppose the legislature should empower the collector of St. Clair, or of any other county, instead of paying the public money in his hands to the State treasurer, he should go with it into the money market and purchase our State indebtedness, for-which, being surrendered by him to the proper State authority, he should have a credit on his collections. Can it be said such a law would be against the constitution? What clause does it violate? However much we might deprecate such legislation, and condemn its policy, the power of the legislature to give such authority must be admitted; at any rate, such a law would not be so clearly and palpably in the face of the constitution, as to justify this court in declaring it null and void. Wherein does the law under consideration differ in principle from the one supposed ? .In both cases the taxing power is carried out, for the taxes are actually collected of the tax payers. When collected, they have become the money of the State; the amount is certain and known, and it is appropriated by an act of the legislature for a purpose which is admitted to be within the constitutional competency of the legislature, and an accurate and definite statement of the receipt and expenditure, can be attached to, and published, with the laws.

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Bluebook (online)
46 Ill. 384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-becker-v-miner-ill-1868.