People Ex Rel. Attorney General v. Curry

62 P. 516, 130 Cal. 82, 1900 Cal. LEXIS 793
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 18, 1900
DocketS.F. No. 2442.
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 62 P. 516 (People Ex Rel. Attorney General v. Curry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People Ex Rel. Attorney General v. Curry, 62 P. 516, 130 Cal. 82, 1900 Cal. LEXIS 793 (Cal. 1900).

Opinions

VAN DYKE, J.

This is an action brought to restrain the defendant, as secretary of state, from certifying to the county clerks of the several counties of the state the proposed senate constitutional amendment No. 22, adopted at the regular session of the legislature, March 18, 1899. A general demurrer was filed to the complaint, which was sustained by the court below, and, the plaintiff declining to amend, judgment was entered for the defendant; and this appeal is taken from said judgment.

It is alleged in the complaint that, in addition to the duties prescribed in the constitution of the state of California, it is by law made the duty of the secretary of state to certify all proposed amendments to the constitution to the county clerk of each county, and the clerk of each county thereafter to include the same in the preparation, arrangement, and printing of ballots, and the performance of other acts, as provided by law, for the purpose of submitting the same to the qualified electors of the state for the popular vote. That the performance of such duties by the secretary of state involves and makes *87 necessary the expenditure of large sums of money, payable from the funds in the hands of the treasurer of said state, derived from taxation; and that at the' thirty-third regular session of the legislature, commencing January 2, 1899, and on March 18, 1899, there was duly and legally adopted, two-thirds of all the members elected to each house of the legislature voting in favor thereof, a joint resolution proposing to the people of the state of California an amendment to the constitution, by amending sections 1, 2, 3, 4,10,12, 14,16,17,18, 21-, 23, and 24, of article VI thereof relating to the judiciary and, establishing courts of appeal, which said joint resolution is known as senate constitutional amendment lío. 22, a copy of which is attached to the complaint and made a part thereof. The complaint further states that at the extraordinary session of the legislature of the state of California, commencing on the twenty-ninth day of January, 1900, and on the tenth day of February, there was duly and regularly adopted, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of said houses of the legislature voting in favor thereof, a joint resolution proposing to the people of this state an amendment to the constitution of said state, by amending article VI thereof relating to the judiciary and establishing courts of appeal, which said joint resolution is known as senate constitutional amendment lío. 1, a copy of which is attached to the complaint and made part thereof. It is further alleged that said senate constitutional amendment No. 1, adopted by the legislature at its extraordinary session, was intended to, and does in fact, supersede and render null and. void senate constitutional amendment lío. 22, adopted by the legislature at its thirty-third regular session, to wit, on March 18, 1899. That, notwithstanding such fact, the said defendant, as secretary of state, proposes and intends, unless restrained, to certify to each of the county clerks of the several counties of the state the proposed constitutional amendment designated as senate constitutional amendment lío. 22, and that the carrying out of such threatened acts by defendant will take from the funds of the state of California, and from the respective counties thereof, derived from the taxation of the people and of the tax bearers, money without any authority of law and for an unlaw *88 ful purpose. Wherefore, it is prayed that the said defendant, the secretary of state, he restrained and enjoined from in anywise certifying to the county clerks of the respective counties the proposed said senate constitutional amendment Ho. 22, or from the preparation, arrangement, printing, or distribution of any ballots, or the performance of any act whatever, for submission to the qualified electors for popular vote, of the said proposed constitutional amendment.

In the brief of the attorney general, on behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the defendant, as secretary of state, should not certify constitutional amendment Ho. 22, adopted at the regular session in 1899, but that he should certify senate constitutional amendment Ho. 1, adopted by the legislature at its extraordinary session in February, 1900. This contention is based upon the claim that the legislature in extraordinary session has the power to propose to the qualified electors of the state amendments to the constitution, even though the question of proposing amendments was not mentioned or specified in the proclamation of the governor convening the said legislature. It is conceded by the attorney general that the governor’s proclamation omitted entirely' to mention the subject of proposing constitutional amendments; and it is also conceded to be the duty of the defendant to certify proposed amendments to the constitution to the county clerks, but the question to be determined is, which of the proposed amendments to the judiciary article should be certified; appellant contends, as already stated, that the one proposed at the extra session should be certified, and not the one proposed at the regular session.

By the constitution the sessions of the legislature shall commence on the first Monday after the first day of January next succeeding the election of its members, and shall be biennial, “unless the governor shall in the interim convene the legislature by proclamation.” (Const., art. IV, sec. 2.) The constitution, under the article in reference to the executive department, in defining the duties of the governor, provides that “he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the legislature by proclamation, stating the purposes for which he has con *89 vened it; and when so convened it shall have no power to legislate on any subjects other than those specified in the proclamation, but may provide for the expenses of the session and other matters incidental thereto.” (Const., art. V, sec. 9.)

The attorney general contends that proposing constitutional amendments is not “to legislate on any subjects other than those specified in the proclamation,” and, therefore, does not fall within this provision of the constitution.

It may be admitted that proposing constitutional amendments is not legislation in the sense of passing statutory laws, but it is nevertheless performing a legislative function. It is one of the modes pointed out to initiate the enactment of constitutional law. The performance of such a duty is neither executive or judicial, but purely legislative. No one would contend that the senate and assembly could propose constitutional amendments, except at the session of the legislature and while it is in session, and not before or afterward—that is, both houses in session, which constitute the legislature. The resolution to the proposed amendment follows the usual form in such cases, and reads: “The legislature of the state of California, .... two-thirds of all the members elected to each house of said legislature voting in favor thereof, hereby proposes,” etc. The provision in reference to proposing constitutional amendments is something similar to that in reference to the approval or ratification of city charters framed by freeholders. “Such approval may be made by concurrent resolution, and, if approved by a majority vote of the members elected to each house, it shall become the charter of such city,” etc. (Const., art. XI, sec. 8.)

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Bluebook (online)
62 P. 516, 130 Cal. 82, 1900 Cal. LEXIS 793, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-attorney-general-v-curry-cal-1900.