23CA0912 Peo v Zamora 05-08-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0912 City and County of Broomfield District Court No. 21CR434 Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge Honorable Sean Finn, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Anthony Wayne Zamora, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Grove and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 8, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Anthony Wayne Zamora, Jr., appeals the district
court’s restitution order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Zamora used a fraudulent check to buy a car and a
forged check to buy a trailer, he was charged with first degree
aggravated motor vehicle theft, fraud by check, forgery, and theft.
¶3 He pleaded guilty to an added count of second degree
aggravated motor vehicle theft in exchange for the dismissal of the
original counts. As part of the plea agreement, Zamora agreed to
pay restitution for any loss resulting from his conduct, including
conduct related to the dismissed charges.
¶4 The prosecution requested restitution in the amount of
$1,317.25 to be paid to High Plains Trailers. Zamora filed an
objection, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support
the requested amounts. The court set a restitution hearing.
¶5 At the hearing, the victim of the offense — the owner of High
Plains Trailers — testified for the prosecution. As relevant here, he
testified that when the trailer was recovered it was towed to a lot in
Castle Rock, and he had to personally retrieve the trailer and bring
it back to High Plains Trailers in Commerce City for a cost of $3.50
1 per mile, or $250. He also said that the trailer had to be cleaned
and detailed in-house after it was recovered, which cost $131.
¶6 Defense counsel objected to those amounts, arguing that
because the victim owned his own business, he did not sustain any
out-of-pocket losses; instead, any expenses he incurred, “he would
have incurred anyway.” The district court granted the prosecution’s
restitution request as submitted, finding it “reasonable to conclude
that this was an expense that was incurred by the company.”
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶7 On appeal, Zamora challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
only with respect to the amounts awarded for transporting the
trailer and cleaning it.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 In the restitution context, we review for clear error the district
court’s determination that the defendant proximately caused the
victim’s losses. Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 32. But when,
as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the amount of restitution awarded — that is, a challenge
to the quantum of evidence provided to the court — our review is de
novo. See id. at ¶¶ 19-22; People v. Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 11.
2 Evidence is sufficient when the evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, “viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant caused that amount of loss.” People v. Barbre,
2018 COA 123, ¶ 25. “A fact is established by a preponderance of
the evidence when, upon consideration of all the evidence, the
existence of that fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”
People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo. 1991). While “[m]ore
than speculation is required for a defendant to bear responsibility
for a victim’s loss,” the prosecution does not need to prove a victim’s
loss “by the same quality of evidence required in a trial.” People in
Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24.
¶9 Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim.”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. It includes all “losses or injuries
proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be
reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” Id.
Restitution’s purpose “is to make the victim whole, and the
Restitution Act is to be ‘liberally construed’ to accomplish that
purpose.” People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 5 (quoting People v.
3 McCann, 122 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Colo. App. 2005), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75).
B. Analysis
¶ 10 Zamora first contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the $250 restitution award for transporting the trailer. He
says that because the owner picked up the trailer himself and “a
tow hitch was all that was necessary,” he was not entitled to the
$3.50 per mile award, which would only apply if the owner had
used “special equipment” to tow the trailer.
¶ 11 We reject Zamora’s argument because we disagree with his
reading of the owner’s testimony. The owner testified that he spent
half a day retrieving the trailer from the tow lot in Castle Rock. He
explained that this was a sixty-six-mile roundtrip drive at a “going
rate . . . for freight” of $3.50 per mile, which is “what it costs [him]
to bring trailers in that [he] pay[s] to have . . . transported to [his]
facility.” He said that the $250 included the cost of “the miles down
there and back” as well as “the time once we’re down there to be
able to go in, pay the bills, get the vehicle out of tow.”
¶ 12 Contrary to Zamora’s assertion, the owner did not testify that
he forwent any special equipment and simply attached the trailer to
4 his own truck. Rather, when asked why he was not charging the
“business standard rate” of $0.65 per mile for the trip, he explained
that the lower rate would apply “if [he] was to drive down there [to
Castle Rock] and not return with the trailer,” but to retrieve a
trailer, he “ha[d] to send a piece of equipment down there big
enough to be able to transport the trailer back” to Commerce City.
And because $3.50 per mile is “the transport rate that [his] drivers
charge,” he charged that same amount for the trip.
¶ 13 The owner never said that he used a “tow hitch” to transport
the trailer. Defense counsel hypothesized that because Zamora
“drove around with the trailer with a truck,” the owner could have
done the same and transported the trailer without using any special
equipment. But that was just an argument by counsel, which was
not supported by the owner’s testimony.
¶ 14 Zamora does not challenge the $3.50 per mile rate on any
other basis. (We reject his argument that the sixty-six-mile trip
yields a total award of $231, not $250, because that calculation
does not account for the time the owner spent paying the tow bill
and moving the trailer off the lot.) Accordingly, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that it
5 was sufficient to support the $250 awarded for transporting the
trailer.
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23CA0912 Peo v Zamora 05-08-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0912 City and County of Broomfield District Court No. 21CR434 Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge Honorable Sean Finn, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Anthony Wayne Zamora, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Grove and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 8, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Anthony Wayne Zamora, Jr., appeals the district
court’s restitution order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Zamora used a fraudulent check to buy a car and a
forged check to buy a trailer, he was charged with first degree
aggravated motor vehicle theft, fraud by check, forgery, and theft.
¶3 He pleaded guilty to an added count of second degree
aggravated motor vehicle theft in exchange for the dismissal of the
original counts. As part of the plea agreement, Zamora agreed to
pay restitution for any loss resulting from his conduct, including
conduct related to the dismissed charges.
¶4 The prosecution requested restitution in the amount of
$1,317.25 to be paid to High Plains Trailers. Zamora filed an
objection, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support
the requested amounts. The court set a restitution hearing.
¶5 At the hearing, the victim of the offense — the owner of High
Plains Trailers — testified for the prosecution. As relevant here, he
testified that when the trailer was recovered it was towed to a lot in
Castle Rock, and he had to personally retrieve the trailer and bring
it back to High Plains Trailers in Commerce City for a cost of $3.50
1 per mile, or $250. He also said that the trailer had to be cleaned
and detailed in-house after it was recovered, which cost $131.
¶6 Defense counsel objected to those amounts, arguing that
because the victim owned his own business, he did not sustain any
out-of-pocket losses; instead, any expenses he incurred, “he would
have incurred anyway.” The district court granted the prosecution’s
restitution request as submitted, finding it “reasonable to conclude
that this was an expense that was incurred by the company.”
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶7 On appeal, Zamora challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
only with respect to the amounts awarded for transporting the
trailer and cleaning it.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 In the restitution context, we review for clear error the district
court’s determination that the defendant proximately caused the
victim’s losses. Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 32. But when,
as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the amount of restitution awarded — that is, a challenge
to the quantum of evidence provided to the court — our review is de
novo. See id. at ¶¶ 19-22; People v. Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 11.
2 Evidence is sufficient when the evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, “viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant caused that amount of loss.” People v. Barbre,
2018 COA 123, ¶ 25. “A fact is established by a preponderance of
the evidence when, upon consideration of all the evidence, the
existence of that fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”
People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo. 1991). While “[m]ore
than speculation is required for a defendant to bear responsibility
for a victim’s loss,” the prosecution does not need to prove a victim’s
loss “by the same quality of evidence required in a trial.” People in
Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24.
¶9 Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim.”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. It includes all “losses or injuries
proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be
reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” Id.
Restitution’s purpose “is to make the victim whole, and the
Restitution Act is to be ‘liberally construed’ to accomplish that
purpose.” People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 5 (quoting People v.
3 McCann, 122 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Colo. App. 2005), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75).
B. Analysis
¶ 10 Zamora first contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the $250 restitution award for transporting the trailer. He
says that because the owner picked up the trailer himself and “a
tow hitch was all that was necessary,” he was not entitled to the
$3.50 per mile award, which would only apply if the owner had
used “special equipment” to tow the trailer.
¶ 11 We reject Zamora’s argument because we disagree with his
reading of the owner’s testimony. The owner testified that he spent
half a day retrieving the trailer from the tow lot in Castle Rock. He
explained that this was a sixty-six-mile roundtrip drive at a “going
rate . . . for freight” of $3.50 per mile, which is “what it costs [him]
to bring trailers in that [he] pay[s] to have . . . transported to [his]
facility.” He said that the $250 included the cost of “the miles down
there and back” as well as “the time once we’re down there to be
able to go in, pay the bills, get the vehicle out of tow.”
¶ 12 Contrary to Zamora’s assertion, the owner did not testify that
he forwent any special equipment and simply attached the trailer to
4 his own truck. Rather, when asked why he was not charging the
“business standard rate” of $0.65 per mile for the trip, he explained
that the lower rate would apply “if [he] was to drive down there [to
Castle Rock] and not return with the trailer,” but to retrieve a
trailer, he “ha[d] to send a piece of equipment down there big
enough to be able to transport the trailer back” to Commerce City.
And because $3.50 per mile is “the transport rate that [his] drivers
charge,” he charged that same amount for the trip.
¶ 13 The owner never said that he used a “tow hitch” to transport
the trailer. Defense counsel hypothesized that because Zamora
“drove around with the trailer with a truck,” the owner could have
done the same and transported the trailer without using any special
equipment. But that was just an argument by counsel, which was
not supported by the owner’s testimony.
¶ 14 Zamora does not challenge the $3.50 per mile rate on any
other basis. (We reject his argument that the sixty-six-mile trip
yields a total award of $231, not $250, because that calculation
does not account for the time the owner spent paying the tow bill
and moving the trailer off the lot.) Accordingly, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that it
5 was sufficient to support the $250 awarded for transporting the
trailer.
¶ 15 Zamora also contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the $131 awarded for cleaning and detailing the trailer.
Specifically, he argues that the owner’s testimony was based on
speculation and that no evidence was presented of the “actual time
and/or costs.”
¶ 16 The owner testified that he had the trailer cleaned and detailed
“in-house,” and he charged the “normal” “shop rate” of $120 per
hour. He submitted an invoice for the cleaning, and, at the hearing,
he explained that “if [he] had” $131 on the invoice, he “assum[ed]
[he] had somebody on it for a little over an hour.” He could not be
more precise, he said, because “it [had] been well over a year” since
he recovered the trailer.
¶ 17 We conclude that the owner’s testimony and the invoice were
sufficient to support the restitution award of $131 for cleaning the
trailer. See People v. Stafford, 93 P.3d 572, 576 (Colo. App. 2004)
(rejecting the argument that the restitution award was too
speculative where it was based solely on the victim’s testimony
regarding the amount of the loss). Zamora presented no evidence to
6 rebut the testimony supporting the amount. See A.V., ¶ 30
(concluding that because the defendant failed to rebut the
prosecution’s evidence on estimated expenses, “the juvenile court
properly relied on the evidence presented”); People v. Miller, 830
P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo. App. 1991) (“[I]f the defendant fails to show
that the information is inaccurate or untrue, the trial court is
entitled to rely upon the report or statement as submitted.”).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The restitution order is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.